the Gulf War and the energy transition

Whether the current war in the Persian Gulf will push the world away from carbon depends on many factors, including the trajectory of the war and the policy responses of many countries. David Wallace-Wells offers a roundup of recent news, which generally paints an optimistic picture about the rapid recent shift to renewables. I’d also note that Ukraine has developed the capacity to hit Russian oil infrastructure at long range, which could take another batch of oil off the world market.

Meanwhile, it’s worth taking stock of the energy transition so far. I don’t think the basic patterns are well known. Here I will make some observations based on two datasets that have limitations:

  • The World Bank presents data on carbon use from 2022, which is now significantly dated. However, it covers almost all countries.
  • The Energy Institute has data through 2024 but only for 75 countries, omitting most of the Global South.

The World Bank’s 2022 data show that the countries that used the highest proportions of renewables were very poor, such as the DRC at 96.3% and Somalia at 95.4%. All of Sub-Saharan Africa used 70.3% renewables, and all of the world’s low-income countries used 69.2%–compared to 10.9% in the USA. (The Energy Institute puts the US share even lower, at 7.2%.)

Poor countries use too little total energy per capita, but their people cannot afford to import oil, and the energy that they do use is mostly renewable. I presume that as the price of oil rises and the cost of solar panels and electric vehicles continues to fall, many poor countries will move almost entirely off oil. Tankers will virtually stop visiting them.

Rich countries will continue to have the option to buy oil and gas. As shown in the graph above this post, the relationship between a country’s wealth and its dependence on carbon energy was strong and monotonic in 2022, although the countries with the very lowest proportions of renewables were mostly petro-states. Bahrain and Qatar were at zero renewables, and Iran was at 0.9%. The Russian Federation got 2.6% of its energy from renewables, mostly hydroelectrics.

For 2024, I show the per capita income (from the IMF) and the share of renewable energy (from the Energy Institute) for each of 75 countries in 2024. The OECD countries–which are wealthier–are shown with x’s. Some outliers are labeled.

For this smaller set of more affluent countries, dependence on carbon is weakly related to income, and other factors evidently matter more. The highest performing wealthy countries are in Scandinavia, where policy and nature (mainly hydroelectrics) help.

The best performing large market is Brazil, at 35% renewables. Brazil is classified as upper-middle-income but has no oil and lots of hydropower (55% of the energy that it generates instead of importing). The USA is below the regression line.

In the Energy Institute data, the countries that had achieved the best improvements in carbon intensity by 2024 were Bulgaria and Chile. (Carbon intensity is the amount of carbon used to generate a unit of energy.)

I suppose the conclusion is that poor countries will virtually stop using oil, and petro-states will probably keep using it. Those with abundant hydropower will be more likely to wean off oil. The USA is a bit of a petro-state but also a dynamic and diversified economy, so we could go either way.

reforming the parties, and especially the Democrats

We should change the functions of the US political parties. This is a different topic from the important–but permanent–debate about what each party should stand for.

As far as I know, every accountable legislative body in the world is organized into parties, which means that parties play an essential role in governance.

Our two-party system is generally thought to be a function of our electoral process. We could have more than two parties, but only if we reformed our elections in a fundamental way.*

When active Americans are dissatisfied with the party that they prefer, most opt to try to change it rather than quitting it (using “voice” instead of “exit”). Those who do quit tend not to vote at all rather than organize new parties. As a result, the Democratic and Republican Parties have repeatedly changed their ideologies and electoral bases since the 1860s and yet have never been replaced.

Although Americans have good reasons to be dissatisfied, they don’t actually rate the parties very poorly on average, nor have their ratings fallen very far. This is an additional reason to expect that our parties will persist.

However, the parties could function differently. Today, each party is basically a label for candidates and clusters of donors, consultants, and incumbent politicians who allocate money and volunteer labor to candidates on their side of the aisle.

Very few people join or belong to parties; we register to vote in one party’s primary elections. Parties per se do very little; campaigns and advocacy groups conduct almost all of politics.

As an example, I live in a heavily Democratic state of 7 million people, Massachusetts, where the state party has raised a bit less than half a million dollars so far in this election year. In 2023, it spent less than $300,000 for all purposes, including rent and salaries. The state party is not a major organization.

On the other hand, Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey’s political committees have spent about $16 million since 2019. (Elizabeth Warren’s political committees have raised about $28 million, but she’s an unusual case because of her presidential ambitions.) These figures illustrate a system that is based on candidates and their campaigns, not on parties as organizations.

People who choose to identify with a party argue about what it should stand for and whom it should support, but the decisions are decentralized. The outcomes depend on many individuals and committees who allocate funds and endorsements across a range of candidates and groups, plus candidates and the primary voters who make some key decisions at the polls. The phrase “the party decides” (from Cohen et al 2008) does not refer to a literal decision by an organization, but to the fact that certain well-placed insiders are influential.

Since parties organize lawmaking, they should be more accountable to regular people, and they should make their decisions about candidates and policies more deliberatively.

Their deliberations need not be wonkish seminars about policy. People who try to influence a party are entitled to care about ideology and values, power and ambition, various kinds of interests, emotions, and even “vibes.” But somehow a party’s conversation should be organized and productive, allowing the whole entity to learn, adjust, and accommodate a range of views.

Parties should also be pluralistic. Since our electoral system serves up just two parties for an extremely diverse country of 341 million people, each party should be home to heterogeneous people and communities. When a party must make a common decision, such as choosing its presidential nominee, these factions will have to compete. But on many other matters, factions can coexist–for example, Democrats can select Andy Beshear to lead Kentucky and Zohran Mamdani to lead New York City without contradiction.

Parties should provide ladders to influence for diverse people who discover political passions, talents, and ambitions. A sign that this is not happening is the fact that virtually no members of Congress held working-class jobs before they were elected (Carnes and Lupu, 2023).

(It is great that Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez was a bartender and waitress before she ran for Congress, but she also held a BA from Boston University and had been a Senate intern. Graham Platner really is an oyster farmer, but he’s also the grandson of the designer of Windows on the World, and he attended the Hotchkiss School and George Washington University. It is hard to find any clear exceptions to the rule that Members of Congress are “bourgeois.”)

To connect parties to millions of ideologically and demographically diverse people requires changing how they operate.

Parties should be more than conduits for money and volunteering during elections. They should offer social and cultural opportunities, public education, recruitment and training, and perhaps direct services on a continuous basis. This implies that party organizations should have much larger budgets than they have now, especially relative to candidates.

Although donors could begin this shift by funding parties, party organizations must depend on dues or small contributions, not on wealthy donors. Besides, current federal law limits donations to parties while basically leaving support for campaigns wide open.

The parties should also interact regularly with other democratic organizations in our society, such as genuinely participatory voluntary groups and unions.

At the state and national levels, each party should organize its internal debates so that various constituencies are explicitly represented. This does not mean a shadowy struggle among donor-funded, DC-based organizations that can veto candidates and policy proposals–the dreaded “Groups” that are said to dominate the Democratic Party, especially (although the extent of their power is debated).

Instead, there should be an ongoing, public debate among organizations that are accountable to masses of voters, such as elected representatives of party committees from places like Kentucky and New York City. These factions should disagree and must ultimately settle some of their disagreements in primary campaigns. But they should also look for ways to mediate their conflicts, such as supporting different philosophies in different communities, running balanced slates, compromising on national legislation, or agreeing to take turns.

This is not an argument for moderation or centrism within the parties. Rather, we should expect debate and handle it productively.

These reforms are applicable to both parties. But I am especially concerned about the Democrats, not only because my own preferences align more with that side but also because the party that is further left should represent working-class voters. I have argued elsewhere (e.g., Levine 2026) that a serious threat to democracy across the developed world is a tendency for the left parties to represent upscale voters, leaving workers with nowhere to turn except to ethno-nationalism. The Democratic Party (such as it is) is actually a cluster of highly educated donors, candidates, and consultants. This is a particularly serious problem, and the solution must involve a different role for the party.


(These comments are informed by a recent Ash Center/Columbia World Projects meeting about Deliberation and Competition. Since Chatham House Rules applied, I am indebted to my fellow participants but I am not citing anyone specifically.)

See also: A System-Analysis of Democracy’s Crisis; why don’t young people like parties?; what if political parties structure our thinking for us?; two theories of American political parties; the Koch brothers network and the state of American parties; etc.

*A modest reform that I favor is fusion voting. Last fall, New Yorkers could vote for Zohran Mamdani as the Democratic Party candidate or as the Working Families Party candidate, which allowed voters to register an ideological preference while aggregating their votes behind one person. Mamdani voted for himself on the Working Families line while also leading the city’s Democrats.

Teaching Skepticism in Kyiv and Nablus

This is a new piece by me in Public Seminar: “Teaching Skepticism in Kyiv and Nablus.”

It’s partly autobiographical (discussing my visits to Ukraine and the West Bank in 2025) and partly philosophical. I argue that skepticism supports compassion and commitment, when they might seem opposed.

It begins:

In 2025, I gave lectures and classes in Kyiv, Ukraine, and at two Palestinian universities in the occupied West Bank.

I have lived a tame life, and these were relatively intense experiences for me. 

As I had anticipated, Kyiv was heavily bombed while I visited, and I taught in a bomb shelter. In the Balata refugee camp in the West Bank—a zone of intensely concentrated poverty—I watched children literally playing with fire in the darkness, carrying burning garbage to build a make-believe lethal trap for the Israeli soldiers who frequently raid the camp later at night. Many of the walls are plastered with the photographs and names of armed young men (five to ten years older than the kids on the street) who have been killed.

I was invited to visit these universities by people who thought that their students might benefit from connections with a senior American academic. My best moment was when I demystified American financial aid for 65 Palestinian undergraduates who showed up to have office hours with me. 

I offered a lecture in each location on a philosophical theme: how to think about happiness.

postdoc in Civic Studies

The Civic Studies Program at the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life at Tufts University, in partnership with the Center for Expanding Viewpoints in Higher Education (CEVIHE), seeks to host a Postdoctoral Fellow. Please see this announcement for details.

This postdoc’s research and teaching will focus on one of two broad areas:

  • The first area concerns how people speak and listen to those with whom they disagree on controversial issues, and how such dialogue can be improved. This line of inquiry may be of particular interest to scholars in psychology, communications, political science, and related fields.
  • The second area examines what makes certain types of intellectual work influential and well supported within the academy, while others remain marginal. It asks how such differences ought to be evaluated and addressed, under what conditions a body of thought can be considered improperly marginalized, and what responses may be warranted. These questions may be especially relevant to sociologists of knowledge, philosophers, political theorists, and scholars of Science and Technology Studies, among others.

The Postdoctoral Fellow will teach two courses in these areas. These courses may include seminars designed to introduce students to recent research and central debates about pluralism and intellectual diversity. The courses may be cross-listed in other relevant departments. The position offers an opportunity to develop an independent research program while gaining teaching experience in a supportive academic environment. The fellow will be encouraged to participate in Tisch College seminars, workshops, and collaborative research activities.

The appointment is for one year, with the possibility of renewal based on performance, funding, and mutual agreement.

Applications will be reviewed on a rolling basis beginning April 13, 2026, and the position will remain open until filled. The hiring range for this position is $65,000-$75,000, commensurate with experience.

The Postdoctoral Fellowship in Civic Studies is supported by CEVIHE, which seeks to cultivate early-career scholars whose teaching and research broaden the range of ideas represented in their disciplines and strengthen Tufts’ culture of open inquiry. The Center is committed to renewing the university’s intellectual mission by fostering a culture of engagement across ideological, religious, and cultural differences.

The fellow will maintain their offices at CEVIHE, where they will be part of a cohort of postdoctoral fellows representing various departments and programs. The fellow will be supported by a dual-mentor structure, including a faculty mentor in the Tisch College and a CEVIHE faculty mentor, to support research, teaching, and professional development. Fellows are expected to work in person at least four days a week and contribute to the CEVIHE community through attendance at a weekly lunch series, informal mentorship of undergraduates, and participation in occasional Center events.

What We’re Looking For

  • Applicants should hold a Ph.D. in a relevant field by the start of the appointment, with demonstrated research and teaching interests in civic studies. We are particularly interested in candidates whose work engages questions related to dialogue across disagreement or the dynamics of intellectual inclusion and marginalization within the academy.
  • Successful applicants will exhibit a capacity for rigorous, interdisciplinary inquiry and a commitment to fostering open, constructive engagement with contested ideas in both research and the classroom.

Summer Institute of Civic Studies in Dayton

The Kettering Foundation will host a Summer Institute of Civic Studies at the Foundation’s Dayton, OH campus from Sunday, August 2 to Saturday, August 8, 2026. This will be an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to learn and connect with each other and with collaborators and partners in Dayton.

I will be present and part of the first two days. I am grateful to my colleagues at Kettering for their leadership of this institute. The rest of this post is pasted from their website.

Summer Institute of Civic Studies (SICS)

SICS are intensive interdisciplinary seminars that bring together faculty, advanced graduate students, and practitioners from diverse areas that may include but are not limited to higher education, nonprofits, philanthropies, community work, as well as civic and religious leaders. Participants will read a selection of articles and chapters that will be shared and available prior to the Institute. Participants should plan on 10– 15 hours of pre-SICS preparation time.

The SICS week involves seminar-style discussion groups as well as visits with our friends and neighbors in the Dayton community who are working at the intersection of civic life, community, and democracy. The 2026 Dayton SICS is in-person only.

SICS Goals

The goal of this SICS is an immersive experience in the literature and practices of civic studies, as well as the creation of connections and a learning community. Together, we can explore what it means to live well together, how to solve problems together, and collectively imagine how we can create safe, just, democratic, and inclusive communities now and in the future.

SICS Framing Questions

Central questions that participants will explore include the following:

  • How can people work together to improve the world?
  • What helps voluntary groups to function and succeed?
  • How can people address disagreements about values?
  • How can groups address disparities of power?
  • What practices and institutional structures promote civic engagement and civic
  • values?
  • How should we consider and combine facts, values, and strategies?

SICS History

The Summer Institute was taught from 2009 to 2019 by Peter Levine, associate dean of academic affairs at Tisch College and Kettering Foundation board member, and Karol So?tan, now retired from the University of Maryland. Since 2019, the Institute has been hosted in several locations, including Chernivtsi and Kyiv, Ukraine; Munich and Augsburg, Germany; Madrid, Spain; and James Madison University in Virginia. You can read more about previous SICS here.

The Institute was shaped by the Civic Studies Framing Statement created in 2007 by leaders and scholars working at the intersection of civic, community, and democratic studies, including Harry Boyte, Stephen Elkin, Peter Levine, Jane Mansbridge, Elinor Ostrom, Karol So?ttan, and Rogers Smith.

Who Should Apply?

The common thread for participants is a desire to deeply engage in the literature of civic studies, democracy, and community building; to learn and grow; to connect with others and be part of a community of civic studies practitioners and scholars; and to understand and strengthen civic politics, initiatives, capacity, society, and culture.

The Summer Institute of Civic Studies will take place in Dayton, Ohio, and is in-person only. Participation requires arrival in Dayton by 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, August 2, and departure after 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, August 8. Participants agree that if they accept the invitation to participate, they are committed to taking part in the entire week’s activities.

Participants should feel comfortable with 10–15 hours of pre-SICS reading and preparation time, as well as with seminar-style discussions for 3–6 hours a day (withplenty of breaks!).

Cost

Participation in the SICS is free. All food for the week will be provided. Participants willbe responsible for their own travel and lodging. There are limited travel and lodgingstipends available based on need and demand.

Barriers to Participation

We acknowledge that taking a week to attend a seminar and the requirement of in-person attendance presents barriers that will prevent some amazing candidates from being a part of this. That said, we will strive to lessen barriers to participation when possible. We welcome applications from parents and caregivers, as well as those with varying physical, familial, financial, or mental health needs. Accepted applicants will have an opportunity to share any specific needs or issues relevant to their participation. With the caveat that this is an in-person only Institute, we look forward to working with accepted participants to reduce barriers to participation when feasible.

International Applicants

We are happy to accept applications from international applicants but are not able to assist with or offer legal, practical, or financial support related to visas or international travel.

Application Instructions: please see this Kettering Foundation web page.

A System-Analysis of Democracy’s Crisis

Newly published: Peter Levine, “A System-Analysis of Democracy’s Crisis,” in Studies in Law, Politics, and Society (2026), https://doi.org/10.1108/S1059-433720260000091003

Abstract: Democracy is in crisis. Evidence supports at least 16 explanations, many of which are linked in complex ways. Some of these explanations are likely to appeal more to the political left, center, or right. Instead of choosing one factor as the “root cause” and counting on any party or ideological movement to solve democracy’s crisis alone, we must understand the situation as a system of interlocking factors that should be addressed by different movements and organizations. Fortunately, American citizens and groups are already committed to tackling many of the threats. This article’s system-map is meant to help organize and inspire such action.

The published article is behind a paywall, but the corrected page proofs can be downloaded here.

postdoc opportunity in Civic AI

The Civic Studies program at the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life and the Department of Computer Science at Tufts University, in partnership with the Center for Expanding Viewpoints in Higher Education (CEVIHE), seek to host a Postdoctoral Fellow whose research and teaching will focus on using artificial intelligence (AI) to help colleges and universities, other organizations, informal groups, or communities navigate intellectual diversity and debate. The Fellow may develop AI applications, study the impact of existing AI tools, or conduct preliminary research that could lead to applications later, such as tools that combat echo chambers or teach individuals to hear alternative views. The appointment is for one year, with the possibility of renewal based on performance, funding, and mutual agreement.

More information is here. Please direct any questions to Prof. Fahad Dogar of Computer Science at fahad@cs.tufts.edu or to me at peter.levine@tufts.edu

a crime against humanity

Today, the elected leader of the United States said, “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. I don’t want that to happen, but it probably will.”

Even before we learn what actually happens, it is clear that the threat was a crime against humanity that will permanently mark the history and the reputation of our republic.

These are the two elements of the crime of genocide in Article II of the Genocide Convention (ratified by the United States, with the signature of Ronald Reagan):

  1. A mental element: the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”; and
  2. A physical element, which includes specific acts that include “killing members of the group,” “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” or “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

Just as murder is a crime against a community, which removes an individual from the group, so genocide is a crime against humanity that removes a people or a civilization from the earth. And just as a threat to commit murder is a felony even if the murder is never committed, so a threat to commit genocide is a grave crime against humankind.

This President threatened genocide in order to force Iran to allow oil tankers to continue carrying the substance that is most responsible for global warming, after he had begun the sequence of events that caused the Strait to close in the first place.

As Americans, we might consider Karl Jaspers’ analysis of war guilt, which he presented to an very uncomfortable German audience during the winter of 1944-5:

  1. Criminal guilt is attributable to individuals who have broken specific laws. It merits individual punishment. Donald Trump is guilty in this sense. It is a much harder question whether military personnel bear criminal guilt for following orders, particularly if Trump’s threat turns out to be mainly bluster. It is also doubtful whether Trump will be found guilty in any tribunal. However, Jaspers’ argument implies that Trump should be condemned, not that he will be.
  2. Political guilt belongs to all members of a polity (a democracy or otherwise), because “Everybody is responsible for the way he is governed.” All Americans now bear political guilt for Trump’s actions, even if we have been organizing against him. This does not mean that we should feel personally ashamed or face punishment as individuals. In fact, to cultivate feelings of personal guilt or shame can be self-indulgent. Political guilt does mean that we have a responsibility to act in defense of humanity. We should also expect and be ready to pay a price for the isolation and marginalization of the United States.
  3. Moral guilt: This is what one ought to feel as a result of being connected to an evil, even if one wasn’t personally responsible for what happened. All else being equal, it is bad moral luck to be an American citizen right now, because that makes us morally inferior to citizens of many other countries. Moral guilt requires penance and renewal. We must change the context so that we can be better.
  4. Metaphysical guilt: Jaspers says, “There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge.” This kind of guilt extends beyond the borders of the United States. I think one aspect of it is complicity. Billions of people will use (and will have to use) oil that will be cheaper if Trump’s threat works. Another aspect is self-awareness. We now know–if we didn’t know it already–that an educated and affluent population of free human beings can choose a leader who chooses to threaten another civilization with extermination. This is a fact about people. It would be convenient if it were only a fact about Americans, but we have learned that it is not. Our thinking about politics and ethics must be chastened by this reality about ourselves.

See also: Jaspers on collective responsibility and polarization;

why be introspective?

According to Thomas Chatterton Williams, some leading tech oligarchs are explicitly against introspection. The “venture capitalist Marc Andreessen says that he engages in ‘zero’ introspection—or at least ‘as little as possible.’” Similarly, the billionaire investor Peter Thiel “contends that looking inward can impede action.”

Both men think that introspection is a recent phenomenon, or at least a growing one. Thiel blames “hippies, who derailed American technological progress when they ‘took over the country’ in the late 1960s.” Andreessen says, “If you go back, 400 years ago, it never would have occurred to anybody to be introspective.”

They are definitely wrong about history. Exactly 400 years ago (in 1626), John Milton began his third elegy: “Silent I sat, dejected, and alone, / Making in thought the public woes my own” (citing Cowper’s translation of Milton’s Latin).

About 2,000 years before that, Socrates had said, “The unexamined life is not worth living for a human being” (Apology 37e), and his premise was echoed by all the Greek philosophical schools. Two millennia of Christian introspection resulted from this Greek heritage plus the Biblical injunction “For indeed, the kingdom of God is within you” (Luke 17:21). For example, St. Augustine wrote, “Do not go outside, come back into yourself. It is in the inner self that Truth dwells” (De vera religione, 39).

Meanwhile, verses like this were being attributed to the Buddha: “The mind is fast-moving and hard to subdue, / landing wherever it wishes; / it is good to train it— / a trained mind brings happiness” (Dhp 33–43). And, further east, “The Master [Confucius] said: ‘If you learn without thinking about what you have learned, you will be lost. If you think without learning, however, you will fall into danger'” (Analects 2.15).

Notwithstanding all this ancient advice, the tech bros may spend their entire lives taking pleasure from success and power without suffering the self-doubts and anxieties that result from introspection. Since I don’t happen to believe in a posthumous reckoning, I think their lives may conclude without any penalty for having been (as Williams says) “pathologically unreflective.” If a good life is one of pleasure, then their odds of attaining it are as high as anyone’s.

But is pleasure good? That is an ethical question, in the original sense of an ethos as a matter of character. Here is a very general account of what it means to be ethical:

  1. It is better to be good or right than bad or wrong
  2. This principle both applies inwardly and outwardly. That is, it is better to be good rather than bad to yourself and better to be good rather than bad to others.
  3. It is not obvious what being good entails. Neither the outcome (a good state) nor the appropriate means to reach this outcome is self-evident. For example, it is not obvious whether (or when, or to what extent) pleasure is good, either for oneself or for others.
  4. To know what is good requires wisdom or discernment, which is a matter of character.
  5. To improve one’s character requires knowing what it is.
  6. Therefore, introspection is crucial; the unexamined life is not worth living.

I presume that Andreeson, Thiel, Jeff Bezos, and other oligarchs (financial or political) would disagree with all of these points, and certainly with the final one.

So did Thrasymachus, as he is presented in Plato’s Republic. Thrasymachus has the arrogant, combative, proudly selfish air of a contemporary tech bro. Like them, he is successful, and he is developing a powerful technology (in his case, Sophistic rhetoric).

Socrates tries to prove to Thrasymachus that it is better to be just than unjust. Influenced by previous interpretations, I believe that Socrates essentially fails. Thrasymachus leaves, and Socrates’ disciples observe that he was unconvinced. Once he is gone, Socrates develops a detailed account of justice for them. This is a metaphor for the idea that ethical reasoning is persuasive for those who accept the first point listed above, but not for others. There are ethical reasons, but there are no reasons to be ethical.

Even before Thrasymachus exits the dialogue, Cephalus has departed. He is a character who has lived a conventionally respectable life–he has basically tried to do good but without asking what goodness is. I think his departure is a metaphor for the idea that it can be better to be good than to think too much about it, contrary to Socrates’ premise that the good life is an examined one.

It is possible to live beneficially without giving ethics too much thought, although success is then a matter of chance. It is also possible to live ethically–displaying some introspection and self-improvement.

An ethical life can serve as an example, but it will not inspire everyone. Those who are not drawn to ethics cannot be proven wrong and may not pay any price for their refusal. To the extent that their behavior threatens others, they must (like everyone else) face the restraints and penalties of the law. But they may not cause great harm or break major rules, and they have a right to organize their inner lives as they wish. Although their lives are worse for being unreflective, they will never know it.

See also: Cephalus; varieties of skepticism; introspect to reenchant the inner life, etc.

what is a brute fact?

During the twenties, so a story goes, [the former Prime Minister of France, Georges] Clemenceau, shortly before his death, found himself engaged in a friendly talk with a representative of the Weimar Republic on the question of guilt for the outbreak of the First World. War. “What, in your opinion,” Clemenceau was asked, “will future historians think of this troublesome and controversial issue?” He replied, “This I don’t know. But I know for certain that they will not say Belgium invaded Germany.” (Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” 1967, p. 239 )

Arendt uses this anecdote as an example of “brutally elementary data.” On p. 237, she mentions the “unyielding, blatant, unpersuasive stubbornness” of certain “truths seen and witnessed with the eyes of the body, and not the eyes of the mind.”

I agree that Belgium did not invade Germany in August 1914. (The reverse is true.) However, this example is complicated.

First, it is not a literal fact that “Germany” invaded “Belgium.” The name of any country is a concept, a metaphor, or a simplification. Perhaps the “brutally elementary data” is that some people moved from locations in German territory to locations in Belgian territory, and these people were (among other things) soldiers in the German Army. But even that formulation introduces information that would not be evident to an observer who was unaware of European politics.

Second, you and I do not remember seeing German troops cross the border. We believe that Germany invaded because that is what we have learned in school or from media. Our knowledge is entirely contingent on trust in these institutions.

Third, the word “invaded” is normatively loaded. An invasion isn’t necessarily bad. The Allied landings in Normandy were an invasion in a just cause. But Clemenceau uses the the word to imply that Germany broke its obligations and started the war. He would disagree with someone who said, “In August 1914, Imperial German troops had to extend the front into Belgian territory to protect the Fatherland,” even though that would also describe the same event.

Finally, Clemenceau used this example because he presumed–and expected his audience to presume–that the act of invading Belgium was the crucial causal factor. What if someone replied that the invasion was only one event in a sequence that begin with the assassination in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, Austro-Hungary’s declaration of War on Serbia one month later, and Russia’s declaration of war against Austro-Hungary?

Clemenceau could have remarked, “They will not say that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand assassinated Gavrilo Princip.” (The reverse was the case). But he did not choose that example because his motive was to cast blame on Germany. There are infinite facts, and Clemenceau selected one to make a point.

Lenin argued that the cause of the First World War was imperialism. Europeans had run out of countries to conquer and exploit and had turned on each other. Some would say that Lenin’s thesis was an interpretation, whereas “Germany invaded Belgium” is a fact. But Clemenceau implied (or “implicated“) a whole interpretation by choosing a particular fact. And Lenin could cite many facts in support of his interpretation.

Insofar as we can know facts by direct observation or reliable methods, we don’t really need a variety of opinions to attain knowledge. If you think of a school, a university, or a newspaper as a purveyor of facts, then you may be uninterested in whether the people involved hold diverse views, and you may be suspicious when they seem to be editorializing. They should stick to the truth. Disagreement is a sign that an issue hasn’t yet been resolved–as it should be.

On the other hand, if you think that every important claim is an opinion, then you will see such institutions as forums for debate. (I think that is how Bari Weiss sees both CBS News and the University of Austin.) You may want these institutions to be pluralistic, but you won’t count on them to generate reliable information. And you may be quick to assert a right to disagree with any claim, no matter the nature of the evidence.

Presumably, we should navigate between these extremes, valuing both information and opinion and recognizing the two as intrinsically linked. Arendt wants us to remain connected to the actual world, and she is worried that ideology disconnects us from facts. But she also wants us to remain connected to other people, who inevitably have different interpretations. As she writes in The Human Condition (p. 57):

… the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised. For though the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have different locations in it, and the location of one can no more coincide with the location of another than the location of two objects. Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public life, compared to which even the richest and most satisfying family life can offer only the prolongation or multiplication of one’s own position with its attend ing aspects and perspectives. ….Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without chang ing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.

See also: ideological pluralism as an antidote to cliche; the case for viewpoint diversity; is all truth scientific truth?; holding two ideas at once: the attack on universities is authoritarian, and viewpoint diversity is important etc.