alerting people to their privilege

Two recent studies:

  • Skinner-Dorkenoo, Sarmal, Rogbeer, André, Patel & Cha find that showing White Americans information about “the persistent inequalities that produced COVID-19” resulted in respondents reporting lower fear of COVID-19, less “empathy for those vulnerable to COVID-19,” and less “support for safety precautions.” White people who were already more aware of racial disparities were already less concerned about COVID-19; giving them more information further reduced their concern. This study builds on previous findings that informing White people about racial disparities in the criminal justice system reduces their commitment to reform.
  • Julian E. Barnes and Edward Wong report in The New York Times that “a group of Ukrainian activists, government officials and think tanks, called the Information Strategies Council of Ukraine, has sent emails and social media messages to 15 million Russian men of draft age, between 18 and 27.” These activists find that “Russians tend to dismiss messages highlighting Russian war crimes as American propaganda …, and pictures of Russian casualties run the risk of inciting anger at Ukraine, rather than the Kremlin.” Instead, “The most successful posts [focus] on the incompetence and corruption of Russian military leaders,” which highlights the suffering of Russian soldiers.

On one hand, we must speak freely and frankly about injustice. We must be able to address the powerful with moral critiques. Otherwise, crucial issues will be absent from the public debate, moral growth will be near-impossible, truths will be hidden, and those who suffer will lose their voice.*

On the other hand, it is a pretty safe bet that telling human beings they have unfair advantages is a good way to alert them to privileges they will want to protect. I am hard pressed to think of examples of progress that resulted from telling people they held advantages–no matter how eloquently or cleverly.

I can think of fairly large groups of people who have demonstrated moral growth, but generally at a slow pace and without major cost to themselves. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany now recalls its Nazi past responsibly, but that happened well after World War II. First, foreign nations destroyed the Nazi regime; then Germans gradually accomplished moral growth. “In Germany, despite Allied efforts at de-Nazification, many Germans in the immediate postwar era maintained strong prejudice against Jews, even as they denied all knowledge of Hitler’s crimes,” writes Robert S. Wistrich. It took another generation and favorable political and economic circumstances for opinions to shift.

This does not mean that radical and rapid change is impossible; it frequently occurs. There are alternatives to moral persuasion. Advantaged people can be forced to change (as in the WWII case), they can be paid off, or they can be persuaded that they will benefit from change.

For instance, in the current war, Ukrainians are not, for the most part, trying to persuade Russians of any moral case. Instead, they are trying to destroy Russian battalion tactical groups, aircraft, and ships in order to defeat the invasion. Meanwhile, if Russians can be persuaded that they are suffering unnecessarily at the hands of their own government, so much the better. That message may give the Kremlin some headaches. (And it is true, even though it is extremely selective.)

The great Bayard Rustin criticized people who

survey the American scene and find no forces prepared to move toward radical solutions. From this they conclude that the only viable strategy is shock; above all, the hypocrisy of white liberals must be exposed. These spokesmen are often described as the radicals of the movement, but they are really its moralists. They seek to change white hearts. … To believe this, of course, you must be convinced, even unconsciously, that at the core of the white man’s heart lies a buried affection for Negroes–a proposition one may be permitted to doubt. But in any case, hearts are not relevant to the issue; neither racial affinities nor racial hostilities are rooted there. It is institutions–social, political, and economic institutions–which are the ultimate molders of collective sentiments. Let those institutions be reconstructed today, and let the ineluctable gradualism of history govern the formation of a new psychology.

From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement” (Commentary, 2/39, Feb. 1965).

Both morality and politics matter. They are related but not identical. Morality demands speaking truth to power. But politics is about accomplishing beneficial change. Often, politics is more urgent; morality is better addressed in the wake of political success.

*To be sure, people sometimes make unfair or invalid critiques, but those should be aired, too, so they can be rebutted

needed: pragmatists for utopian experiments

It’s possible to organize a group of people so that goods and time are shared and decisions are consensual. Such groups avoid relying on two other prevalent forms of organization: authority (some tell others what to do) and exchange (individuals regard their goods and time as private property and trade them transactionally). We even see sharing and consensus arise in familiar locations like corporate offices, where workers will voluntarily share a stapler without keeping score, so long as morale is reasonably high.

With apologies for the oversimplification, I would assign the consensus-based commons to two categories: traditional ones–often agricultural villages of long standing–and experimental ones: intentional alternatives to the dominant society.

An example of traditional commons (one of many) is a longhouse in the Iroquois nations, “where most goods were stockpiled and then allocated by women’s councils, and no one ever traded arrowheads for slabs of meat” (Graeber, 2011, p. 47). Such institutions are not chosen by their participants; people grow up in them. They presumably encompass a range of personality-types and opinions, but they tend to socialize their children to be useful participants. That means that they may inculcate strongly communitarian values, even to the point where I might object to a lack of concern for autonomy and diversity.

In contrast, experimental commons are set up by founders (individuals or groups) who recruit volunteer participants. Here I have in mind New Harmony, IN from 1814-1827 and many other Victorian utopian socialist communities, workers’ co-ops, Black Mountain College (1933-1957) and other experimental schools, Gandhian ashrams, hippie communes, kibbutzes, #occupy encampments, and many more.

Traditional commons have set extraordinary records for durability (Ostrom 1990). Some of the experimental commons also survive for quite long periods. A house in my neighborhood has been a successful commune since the early 1970s; the original residents are now aging in place. However, the overall record of utopian experiments seems disappointing. Even the ones that survive fail to spread widely–perhaps because of organized opposition, but perhaps also because they do not appeal to most people.

I think part of the problem is that self-conscious utopian experiments attract principle-driven idealists. Such people can be effective collaborative workers, but I doubt that idealism correlates with effectiveness. You have to be very lucky to find a full complement of participants who are both committed to building utopia and good at getting the work done. Even those rare types tend to be overly concerned about abstract principles, and thus too reluctant to compromise and too sensitive to hypocrisy or imperfect processes. The record shows many cases of controversy and disintegration, or a drift toward intolerant extremism and capture by the radical fringe, or–ironically–dominance by a charismatic leader who thrives in an atmosphere without sharp and clear limits on power.

Years ago, I used to speculate about an alternative form of college or university in which all the faculty shared the essential work of administration and student affairs. There would be no distinctions among instructors, administrators, and staff, but roles would be rotated or shared, and decisions would be made by committees.

I still think that this could work and it might cut costs and improve results. But I believe you would need a crew of easy-going pragmatists to get it done. They would have to be the kind of people who address pressing problems without generating unnecessary new ones; who notice serious injustices toward others but don’t stand on ceremony when it comes to themselves; who think ahead about what needs to be done and are quick to volunteer to do it; who balance their own needs with the common good in a sustainable way; and who may even demonstrate some impatience with fine questions of principle.

The problem is, it’s hard to attract people like that to a risky experiment, and it’s hard to keep ideologues out. If someone figures out a solution to this selection problem, we will be more likely to see successful experiments that influence the mainstream.

David Graeber, Debt: The First Five Thousand Years (Melville House, Kindle Edition, 2011); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also: making college much cheaper; the death of an ancient commons?; what a libertarian commune says about political socialization and freedom. (I am mildly amused to find that I made a similar argument in 2015 but forgot it completely.)

Register for Frontiers of Democracy

June 24, 2022, 9 am-4:30 pm, live in Boston or online

In 2022, the annual Frontiers of Democracy conference at Tufts University’s Tisch College of Civic Life has a special format. The main activity will be to deliberate in small groups—at tables or on Zoom—about the issues raised in selected “civic cases.”  

Individuals may choose to attend either in-person or remotely. The entire conference will take place between 9 am and 4:30 pm on June 24. The in-person version will be held in Tufts’ downtown Boston campus.

If you have not done so already, please purchase a ticket for the event now, choosing an in-person or remote ticket.

If registration for the face-to-face version looks unexpectedly low, or if the pandemic situation worsens, it may be necessary to cancel the in-person version. In that case, in-person tickets will be refunded in full. The status of the face-to-face meeting will be reviewed on May 13.

In-person attendees will be required to show proof of COVID-19 vaccination and to follow other Tufts procedures in force in June, as described here.

“Civic cases”

Civic cases describe difficult choices faced by real groups of activists, social-movement participants, or colleagues in nonprofit organizations. By discussing what we would do in similar situations, we can develop civic skills, explore general issues, and form or strengthen relationships with other activists and thinkers.

Most of the cases for Frontiers 2022 have been developed by the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins UniversityJustice in Schools, or the Pluralism Project at Harvard, which are co-sponsors of Frontiers this summer. Selected cases can be found here, and more options will be available by June. Unlike most cases about business, public policy, or ethics, these stories involve groups of voluntary participants who must make decisions together. This website (based on Peter Levine’s new book,What Should We Do?) provides an optional framework for such discussions. You will be able to indicate your preference for which cases to discuss. Each group will discuss a case either online or face-to-face (not in a hybrid format). There will be time for two case discussions on June 24, plus plenary sessions meant for both remote and in-person attendees together.

About Frontiers

Frontiers of Democracy has been held annually since 2009, with a hiatus due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It traditionally attracted about 140 activists and scholars or advanced students from many countries for relatively informal discussions of civic topics. The 2022 version is intentionally shorter and hybrid in format.

Scholars at Risk opportunity at Tufts

I am very happy to serve on this committee and would be open to questions about it:

The Scholars at Risk (SAR) Program at Tufts is dedicated to helping scholars, artists, writers, and public intellectuals from around the world escape persecution and continue their work by providing ten-month-long academic fellowships at Tufts University. Tufts has been a member of the international Scholars at Risk (SAR) network, which is chaired by Tufts Trustee Lisa Anderson, since 2011. Tufts has hosted several scholars in the past in both Medford and Boston. These scholars have made positive contributions to our academic life and offered important perspectives to our students and faculty.

Details are here. There may also be opportunities to conduct funded research or to teach from Ukraine (or from other countries in crisis) without coming to Tufts, but that is still being considered.

2023 Florida College and University Faculty Assembly Conference

The Florida College and University Faculty Assembly (FL-CUFA) invites proposals for scholarship to be presented at its Annual Meeting, which will be held during the Florida Council for the Social Studies Annual Conference.  FL-CUFA’s program will include papers, symposiums, contemporary issues dialogue, and research-into-practice sessions focused on empirical research or conceptual analyses of social studies education. 

Deadline: Sunday, July 31, 2022 @ 11:59 p.m. 

Presentation Formats 

Paper Presentations (20 minutes) 

An individual paper presentation gives authors an opportunity to present abbreviated versions of their empirical or theoretical/conceptual scholarship. After the papers are presented, time will be provided for audience interaction, focusing on commentary on key revelations, vexations, and themes raised by the papers. For the sake of effective presentation and discussion, individual papers should be limited to 3,000 words, excluding references. The typical structure for a session with two papers includes a brief introduction by the chairperson or the presenters themselves, 20 minutes for each author’s presentation, and 10 minutes of audience participation. 

Symposium Sessions (50 minutes) 

A symposium offers presenters and audience members the opportunity to explore a particular problem or theme from various perspectives. Organizers of symposium sessions typically establish the topic, identify and solicit participation from appropriate scholars, and assemble and submit a single proposal representing the collective work of participants. Symposium proposals should include no more than four participants. The organizer must obtain permission and input from each individual represented in a symposium proposal. Symposium papers should be limited to 3,000 words. The lead presenter will determine how time is to be allocated to each presenter for symposium sessions. 

Contemporary Issues Dialogue (50 minutes) 

The contemporary issues dialogue format offers conference attendees an opportunity to explore contemporary issues or dilemmas in social education via a unique forum not represented by paper sessions and symposiums. Contemporary issues dialogues can include informal discussions, town hall meetings, roundtables, papers-in-progress, structured poster sessions, research planning and methodological activities, video presentations and performances, and book talks. Sessions that promote active participation and open dialogue among audience members are strongly encouraged. Proposal authors will determine how time is to be allocated during contemporary issues dialogues. 

Research-Into-Practice Sessions (50 minutes) 

Research-into-practice sessions offer FL-CUFA members the opportunity to discuss and demonstrate the implications of research for educational practice. Given their association with the regular FCSS Conference program, audience members typically are classroom teachers, teacher educators, supervisors, and school administrators. With that audience in mind, presentations should feature scholarly, yet accessible, discussions and activities of interest to practicing educators. Proposal authors will determine how time is to be allocated during research into practice sessions. 

Submission Guidelines 

Presenters must provide, in an email to the Program Chair, Scott Waring (, the following: 

  1. The names of all presenters and corresponding affiliations 
  2. Lead presenter’s mailing address, email, and phone number 
  3. A Microsoft Word compatible document, as described below, that includes a narrative of 3,000 words or fewer, excluding title, abstract, and references. 

Because proposals will be reviewed in a blind peer review process, please do not include the names or affiliations of authors and presenters in the proposal document and ensure that no identifying information is embedded in the proposal document as metadata. 

The Program Chair reserves the right to reject without review any proposal that exceeds the 3,000-word limit. The Program Chair reserves the right to disqualify submissions in which authors’ identifying information is revealed. 

The submission deadline is Sunday, July 31, 2022 @ 11:59 p.m. 

Individual Paper and Symposium Proposal Contents 

Each proposal should include the following elements: a) the title; b) an abstract of 35 words or less; c) the purposes and/or objectives of the study; d) the theoretical framework or perspective; e) research design and/or methods of inquiry; f) findings or arguments and their warrants; g) the importance of the work’s contribution to scholarship; and h) references. To preserve the integrity of the blind peer review process, please do not include the names or affiliations of authors and presenters in the proposal document. The Program Chair reserves the right to disqualify submissions in which authors’ identifying information is revealed. The review criteria will incorporate the clarity, organization, and perceived scholarly significance of elements c) through g) above.  

Contemporary Issues Dialogue and Research Into Practice (RIP) Proposal Contents 

Contemporary Issues Dialogue and RIP session proposals should include the following elements, as appropriate: a) the title of ten words or less; b) an abstract of 35 words or less; c) the purposes and objectives of the session; d) theory and research in which the session is grounded; e) methods of presentation or modes of activity for the session; f) findings or arguments and their warrants; and g) references.  

To preserve the integrity of the blind peer review process, please do not include the names or affiliations of authors and presenters in the proposal document. The Program Chair reserves the right to disqualify submissions in which authors’ identifying information is revealed. The review criteria will incorporate the clarity, organization, and perceived significance of elements c) through f) above. 

Participation Requirements 

It is expected that all authors or presenters represented in a proposal will register for the FCSS Annual Meeting and attend and participate in conference sessions. If an emergency or other unforeseen circumstance precludes a participant from attending, she or he should immediately contact the Program Chair, Scott Waring, at To promote diversity among perspectives and participants, no presenter shall appear as author or co-author on more than two proposals. 

Calling all A.P. U.S. Government and Politics Teachers! FREE Workshop in Orlando, With a Stipend!

The Florida Joint Center for Citizenship is hosting a one-day, project-based learning workshop for Advanced Placement U.S. Government and Politics teachers. FJCC’s Politics in Action is a project-based approach to learning that involves students engaging in political discourse and real-world scenarios to learn about U.S. government principles and policies. Participants will develop strategies to support students as they grapple with the complexities of the course content through a series of simulations designed to augment and enrich the learning environment.

The workshop will be held at the Lou Frey Institute Offices in Orlando on Saturday, May 14 from 8:30am-3:30pm.  Space is limited to 30 participants and registration is a first come, first served basis. Breakfast and lunch will be provided, and participating teachers will receive a $200.00 stipend.

To register, go to

Questions? Contact Chris Spinale at

what explains state variation in COVID-19 mortality?

Why have some states seen many more deaths from COVID-19 than others? Do differences in state policies matter? Is it mostly about demographics? Or what about factors like climate and population density, which could influence whether and when people congregate indoors?

To explore these questions, I made a spreadsheet with 58 salient variables about the 50 states, drawing most of the data from the Senate Joint Economic Committee or the Kaiser Family Foundation. I then went fishing for variables that could predict cumulative death rates from COVID-19. I use this “fishing” metaphor with irony, because there is a danger of obtaining spurious results when you explore too many variables at once. Still, the following results might suggest tighter research questions.

Below, I describe nine regression (OLS) models, each with a different thematic focus, arranged in order by how much variance in the states’ COVID-19 mortality they seem to explain. (I report adjusted r-square statistics, which should allow the models to be compared despite differences in the number of variables.)

In summary: the states’ policies that I measured and the partisanship of governors did not matter, but the proportion of people who voted for Trump did. That relationship was not explained by demographics, which I controlled for.

Variables that mattered in many of my models included the percentage of the population that was already in poor health, the GOP vote share in 2020, Black/White residential segregation, and the GINI coefficient (a measure of inequality). A model with just those four components could explain 71% of the variance in COVID deaths (unadjusted r-square = .715).

  1. A politics and policy model. Variables: party of state governor, percent of the 2020 state’s popular vote for Republicans, whether the state required masks indoors for some people in Feb 2022, whether the state required, allowed, or banned local vaccine requirements, and state/local spending per capita. The only statistically significant correlate of the mortality rate: the GOP vote share in 2020. Adjusted r-square = .203, meaning that this model offers little insight.
  2. A geography model. Variables: population density, percentage rural, average commuting time, mean daily temperature. Statistically significant correlates: none. Adjusted r-square = .240 (again, a poor fit).
  3. Sociability model: Variables: average number of close friends, percent of neighbors who regularly do favors, number of nonprofits per 1,000 people, percentage who worked with neighbors to fix/improve something. Statistically significant correlate: working with neighbors (related to lower mortality). Adjusted r-square = .415.
  4. A comorbidities model: Variables (all measured pre-pandemic): percent in poor health, premature mortality rate, mortality from suicide/drug overdose, percent disabled, percent with diabetes, obese, and smokers. Statistically significant correlates: general poor health and disabilities. Adjusted r-square = .451.
  5. A political participation model: Variables: percent who participated in a demonstration, attended a public meeting, served on a committee, and voted in 2012 and 2016. Statistically significant correlate: attending a public meeting (related to lower mortality). Adjusted r-square = .483.
  6. An economics model. Variables: unemployment, incarceration, poverty, GINI coefficient, college graduation rate, internet access at home. Statistically significant correlates: worse inequality, higher incarceration, fewer people with BAs. Adjusted r-square = .623.
  7. An inequality model: Variables: Black/White residential segregation, GINI coefficient, college graduation rate, incarceration rate. Statistically significant correlates: racial segregation, GINI coefficient. Adjusted r-square: .646.
  8. A politics and demographics model. Variables: the party of state governor, percent of the 2020 state vote for Trump, and the racial demographics and median age of the state. Statistically significant correlates: higher GOP vote, more African Americans, more Latinos, a higher median age. Adjusted r-square = .647.
  9. A model that explains most of the variance. Variables: percent in poor health before the pandemic, GOP vote share, Black/White segregation, GINI coefficient, percent over age 65, incarceration rate, college graduation rate. Statistically significant correlates: the first three. Adjusted r-square = .699. (Unadjusted r-square = .735.)

My dataset also included some variables that I have not mentioned here, including several measures of trust (for other people and for institutions) and other types of civic and political participation. None seemed to be influential in any of the models I tried.

social class in the French election

The left should represent the lower-income half of the population; the right should represent the top half. When that happens, the left will generally advocate government spending and regulation. Such policies may or may not be wise, but they can be changed if they fail and prove unpopular. Meanwhile, the right will advocate less government, which (again) may or may not be desirable but will not destroy the constitutional order. After all, limited government is a self-limiting political objective.

When the class-distribution turns upside down, the left will no longer advocate impressive social reforms, because its base will be privileged. And the right will no longer favor limited government, because tax cuts don’t help the poor much. The right will instead embrace government activism in the interests of traditional national, racial or religious hierarchies. The left will frustrate change, while the right–now eager to use the government for its objectives–will become genuinely dangerous.

This class inversion is evident in many wealthy democracies, although usually with exceptions and complexities. For instance, in the USA, Democrats now represent the 17 richest congressional districts and most of the richest 50. Put together, Democratic districts are wealthier than Republican ones, although Democratic candidates often win a bit more of the vote below $50,000/year than above that income level. It’s in this context that we now see Republicans eager to use state power against private companies on cultural issues.

A similar inversion was evident in France this week. The class called “cadres” could be translated as executives, although I understand that it is a larger category than that English word implies. Among the cadres, Macron (a centrist technocrat) won and Melenchon* (from the left) came in second, with Le Pen (right-wing) drawing only about 12%.

The “intermediate professions” split their votes about evenly. This is a large and diverse group (26% of all employees), ranging from teachers to technicians. I would guess that sub-groups within this 26% voted quite differently from each other.

At the bottom of the scale–the ordinary employees and workers–Le Pen won by pretty substantial margins. Melenchon edged out Macron among these two categories, but he ran far behind Le Pen. If we look instead at wages, Macron performed better at the higher end, while Le Pen and Melenchon split the lower end about evenly. Macron won the most retirees and came in third amongst the young.

In the first round, French voters had numerous choices, and three candidates finished pretty close to even. That makes the outcome somewhat difficult to compare to a two-party contest between left and right, as in the USA. But one could envision Biden as a kind of hybrid of Macron and Melenchon (we can debate which one he is closer to), and Le Pen as Trump. Then the class inversion is clear.

This pattern is by no means exclusive to France, but it presents dangers wherever it appears.

I do perceive France as combining relatively egalitarian economic policies with a particularly sharp gradient of prestige and power. As the figure below shows, France uses taxation and spending to transfer far more cash than the US does (albeit mostly to pensioners), yet an extraordinary proportion of French business, cultural, and political elites attend a few Parisian schools. This means that a welfare state that redistributes a great deal from rich to poor has a culturally elite look. That may be a refined version of an international problem.

Joumard, Pisu & Bloch 2012

*This blog isn’t letting me use accent marks, unfortunately. See also: the social class inversion as a threat to democracy; what does the European Green surge mean?; and why the white working class must organize

seeking a religious congregation for a research study

I am seeking a congregation (of any religion, denomination, tradition, size, and location) for a research study. My interest is in testing a new method that I have been developing with colleagues that could apply to any community. I would give the congregation’s leadership–or its full membership–easy-to-understand findings about shared values and areas of disagreement within their congregation that should have practical value for planning events and programs.

Please consider whether this project might interest a congregation to which you belong or one that you know. Inquiries are welcome. More details follow:

I would ask the clergy or other leader(s) of the congregation to encourage members to take anonymous online surveys. The minimum would be two: a short survey with open-ended responses followed by a multiple-choice survey a week or two later that is based on the first one. I would be interested in repeating the multiple-choice survey months later to understand change, although that’s optional. If it’s practical, I would also like to visit and observe informally to get a feel for the community.

I would publish a scholarly study that would refer to the congregation anonymously (e.g., “a Protestant church in the Northeastern USA”). I would also provide the congregation with concise findings in PowerPoint format and would be happy to discuss them. No money would change hands. The congregation would own the PowerPoint and would not be obliged to publish or share it in any way. No individuals would be obligated to take the surveys, and I would expect only some people to do so. No identifiable information about individuals would be shared either within or beyond the congregation.

I could provide more detail about the method, but in brief, we don’t simply ask people their opinions about values, beliefs, and norms. Instead, we ask them how their personal opinions relate to each other. For instance, do they value A because they value B? Do they think that A causes B? From those responses, we generate network diagrams of the beliefs of each respondent and of the community as a whole. In this study, the questions would focus on religion and the congregation as a community, not on politics (unless respondents happen to bring up political matters).

Typically, each person’s responses are unique—a nice illustration of the uniqueness of human beings and how much we lose when we assign people to categories. Yet we typically see clusters of agreement and disagreement that can otherwise be overlooked. Understanding these patterns should provide ideas for visitors, readings, events, discussion groups (etc.) that would be valuable for the specific congregation.

Education for Sustainability and Human Rights Program 2022 at Kennesaw State

Good morning friends. On behalf of our colleagues, we are happy to share this professional development opportunity!

Date: June 6th-11th, 2022*
Location: Kennesaw State University

The Miner Anderson Family Foundation and the Division of Global Affairs at Kennesaw State University are pleased to announce the 2022 Education for Sustainability and Human Rights Program. Inspired by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 2030 Framework of Education for Sustainable Development, the seminars will foster dialogue among educators regarding linkages between global and local topics. Ultimately, the seminars aim to build a platform towards collaboration, curriculum development, and instruction for authentic student learning; so that young citizens may acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable lifestyles, cultural diversity, gender equality, and a culture of peace and non-violence through principles of human rights.

Our hope is by the end of the week, participants will authentically examine and integrate Human Rights as well as Sustainable Development issues & initiatives in their student’s educational experiences.

During this 6-day program, you will:
-Learn about the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals
-Gain a deep understanding of the main principles in human rights education
-Explore the attributes of global citizenship
-Work with fellow teachers to develop ideas on how to implement these values in the classroom
-Visit Atlanta’s Martin Luther King Jr. Center and the National Center for Civil and Human Rights

To register, please fill out this form. For guaranteed review of submission, applications must be received by May 6, 2022. As we receive applications, our criteria for evaluation will be on the basis of inclusion, equity and diversity. For inquiries, please contact the Division of Global Affairs at

Participants do have the option to attend the workshop virtually, but in-person participation is preferred.

*Please note that this free Teachers Seminar in Atlanta is open to all K-12 Teachers in Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida & Alabama.