translating Mind is Mind-Made

Few lines of text have been memorized by as many human beings over as many centuries as this one:

manopubbangama dhamma, manosettha manomaya

You don’t have to know the language to glean that it is verse. It consists of two pairs of eight syllables–a pattern that repeats for many subsequent lines after this one. Gama rhymes with dhamma, and three different words begin with mano.

You can’t tell from the Latin characters alone, but this line scans in a classic rhythm called siloka in Pali, which uses “light” (short) and “heavy” (long) syllables. You could get some sense of the metrical pattern by reading aloud the following string of English words:

Short short longer longer
Short longer longer longer
Short short longer longer
Short short short longer

These features make the line enjoyable and work as mnemonics. Regular verse is easier to memorize than prose.

All the words are very abstract, and they mark out zones of meaning that have no equivalents in English. In fact, some translators use the Sanskrit dharma to render the Pali word dhamma in English. Dharma can mean law, duty, doctrine, righteousness, experience, phenomena, thing, or truth. A modern English-speaker may get more from that one famous Sanskrit word than from any single English word chosen to render it.

There is no verb, because Pali, like Latin, can leave the verb “to be” implied.

The first person who translated this line into English, F. Max Müller, wrote, “All that we are is the result of what we have thought; it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thought” (1898).

Asked to translate it literally, ChatGPT proposes, “Phenomena have mind as their forerunner; mind is their chief; they are made by mind.” Claude says, “Mental phenomena are preceded by mind, mind-chief, mind-made.”

Gil Fronsdal (2018) has:

All experience is preceded by mind, 

Led by mind,

Made by mind.

His version employs the open typography and plainspoken diction of modernist verse to offer a valuable perspective on the ancient text, which is dense, formal, and abstract.

I cannot do better than Fronsdal (or AI), but I can explore alternatives. For example, what if we tried to make the English mnemonic?

In advance of whatever we find is mind. 
The mind is in charge; it makes the mind.

Or what if we expanded each Pali word into several English counterparts, to indicate its range of meanings?

Things, or what we experience, the truth--
What comes before and is responsible
For all this is the conscious stream. Mind is
The chief and what's foremost. Mind is mind-made.

The next verse begins with the same four Pali words as the first one, but to repeat my extended translation of them would become tiresome. So I could make that line more concise, and continue:

Mind comes before all experience and truth:
If the mind is serene and bright, then ease
Follows like a shadow that will never depart.

By the way, I am not sure I agree with this text. If you suffer pain because of an injury or violence, I don’t think it’s all in your head. Nor does a serene mind inevitably bring ease; the eternal note of sadness rolls back in.

This verse comes with a whole metaphysical basis that is worth considering but not necessarily correct. But it could also support some sensible ordinary advice: when something seems bad, you may be able to change your reaction to it rather than altering the thing itself.


The text is the Dhammapada (v.1). I got help from both ChatGPT and Claude. See also: the fetter; The Tangle; This is beautiful, scolds the mind; on translation as spiritual practice; Caedmon’s Hymn and modern responses; and Mani Rao’s innovative Sanskrit translations (with a mention of Anne Carson).

what about human life is essential to preserve?

At the beginning of the 20th century, people could presume that we are terrestrial creatures whose habitat is Planet Earth. They could predict that we will continue to live as humans until our far-distant natural demise or an end decreed by God. They could define human beings as creatures who work (homo laborans) and make tools and who understand the tools we’ve made. They could presume that we alone speak and reason in language, unless divine beings also interact with us.

Technology changed all those presumptions. It became clear that we could live on other planets, we could wipe out the species in a few moments, we might be able to automate all work, we might make machines that exceeded our own understanding, and we might build machines that could reason and talk, perhaps better than we do.

Hannah Arendt mentions each of these developments in the Preface to The Human Condition, which she published in 1958. Some of the traditional assumptions about humanity had already collapsed by then, due to atomic weapons and space exploration. So far, there were no machines that could do all our work or think better than we can, but she saw that those developments were coming unless we blew ourselves to dust first. Just five years later, she worried that “electronic ‘brains,’ devised and constructed by men” will “not only do man’s brainwork incomparably better and more swiftly (this, after all, is the outstanding characteristic of all machines), but can do ‘what a human brain cannot comprehend” (Arendt 1963, 530.)

She therefore posed the question: what is the human condition? She wanted readers to consider what is essential to us. This is what must be preserved if we love humankind. For her, love of our species was not contingent on our being excellent in some way–for example, the best thinkers on the planet. It was a fundamental ethic.

Clearly, human life will end if we vaporize ourselves. Presumably, we can live as humans on other planets: science fiction has envisioned that situation vividly. Whether we can be human without working or once we share the world with machines that think better than us are harder questions, and the answers depend on what it is to be us.

Later in the book, Arendt will explain that part of being human is to “act.” In her specific meaning of that verb, to act is to discuss what to do with other people who are independent and heterogeneous (Arendt’s “plurality”) and then to do or make things together.

Because many interacting people are required to decide what to do, Arendt cannot tell us how to address developments like nuclear weapons or artificial intelligence. We must think them through together. She writes:

To these preoccupations and perplexities, this book does not offer an answer. Such answers are given every day, and they are matters of practical politics, subject to the agreement of many; they can never lie in theoretical considerations or the opinion of one person, as though we dealt here with problems for which only one solution is possible (p. 5).

Why should we make decisions together instead of just doing the right thing? Arendt writes:

There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves (p. 4).

We live in a meaningful world–a world with meaning to us–only if we create it together. The question of the moment is whether our world will remain meaningful to us if we transform it through artificial intelligence that we no longer understand.

What are the “truths beyond speech” that Arendt mentions here? The most obvious candidates are transcendent truths, such as religious insights that a person might receive as revelations or intuit by introspecting. But there is a way in which science and technology are also “beyond speech.” Of course, scientists must communicate. However, for them, communication is a cost, a means to the end of analyzing nature. The less talk is necessary to produce knowledge, the better.

Ideally, scientists and technologists apply impersonal methods to generate knowledge that accumulates. A technician can install a light fixture or even design a new electrical device without reading and discussing the words of Alessandro Volta and Nikola Tesla. Historical contributions are now embedded in current techniques, some of which are algorithmic. And if a library is a device for accumulating knowledge, then a Large Language Model may be a better one.

Arendt is a solo scholar, applying her learning and methods to analyze how our thinking has developed so far. Her narrative in The Human Condition is the work of one thinker, yet she is in constant and explicit dialogue with previous writers and with her readers. Thus her contribution lies between “truths beyond speech” and “practical politics.”

The purpose of her text is to set questions that we must answer collectively by thinking and acting:

What I propose in the following is a reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears. This, obviously, is a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness—the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of “truths” which have become trivial and empty-seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time. What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing (p. 5).


Sources: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958; “Man’s Conquest of Space,” American Scholar 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1963). See also: the worlds we can lose when intelligence becomes artificial; Reading Arendt in Palo Alto; the papal encyclical on AI

why Victorian elites spent so few hours on the job compared to modern elites

According to the American Time Use Survey, American managers work a median of 43 hours per week, and 10% of them work at least 55 hours per week (Flood, Sayer, and Backman; my tabulations). Managers work more hours than people in the lower-status occupational categories. Construction, production, and transportation all report about 40 median weekly hours.

In Victorian times, when British managers ran the wealthiest and most advanced economy in the world and the largest empire in history–and when factory workers often labored for 72 hours per week–the elite spent few hours on the job.

I formed this impression recently as I read Anthony Troloppe’s Phineas Finn, a novel about politics. Finn, a rising MP and the Under-Secretary of State in charge of Canada, works for a few hours most afternoons, punctuated by holidays in country houses. He is dismayed that his former mentor, the barrister Mr. Low, must work 10 hours/day to make a living “and could rarely call a day his own.” Of course, Victorian workers and domestic servants worked even longer hours than lawyers did. But none of Finn’s political friends, including the Prime Minister, seem to work much beyond the afternoon.

This book is fiction and could be satirical (although it doesn’t seem to be). However, Samuel Hughes supplies facts to support the generalization that Victorian elites spent few hours on the job. “The great prime minister of the Victorian period, William Gladstone, hosted a social breakfast starting at 10.30am (claret was served), continuing till about noon. His rival Benjamin Disraeli attended breakfasts hosted by Lord Houghton, which started at 10am, but which Disraeli would join at about 11.30am.” Hughes adds, “many Victorians had a substantial lunch with wine, usually with professional peers at a club, sustaining them until dinner at about 8.30pm.” That left them just a few afternoon hours to work in the office.

These men had been educated in what the British call public schools, where (Hughes says) pupils spent about 2-5 hours/day on schoolwork. The curriculum was dominated by Latin and Greek, but few adults recalled either language, which might reflect the lack of attention they had given to their schoolwork. Hughes quotes Winston Churchill: “In all the twelve years I was at school no one ever succeeded in making me write a Latin verse or learn any Greek except the alphabet.” I similarly recall a line from George Orwell’s Wigan Pier: “You forget your Latin and Greek within a few months of leaving school–I studied Greek for eight or ten years, and now, at thirty-three, I cannot even repeat the Greek alphabet–but your snobbishness, unless you persistently root it out like the bindweed it is, sticks by you till your grave.”

Many leaders had finished their educations at Oxford or Cambridge, where a “pass” degree required almost no work, and the rarer “honors” degree might demand a few hours of studying between morning chapel and an elaborate lunch, plus a tutorial around 4 pm–over sherry.

The US was not so different. As I wrote in 2015, FDR “was a busy man: Secretary of the Navy, Governor of New York, President of the United States for 13 epic years. And yet he also had time to collect one million stamps and more than 20,000 books, many of them about naval history, a special interest of his. He also welcomed many house guests and obviously socialized constantly. He had a dog and was interested in birds.”

Here is a theory of why Victorian and early-20th century elites spent few hours officially on the job, while our elites spend so much time at work.

First, it pays to be recognized and liked by others within an elite. This is “social capital,” as Pierre Bourdieu defines it. The main benefit is to the individual who is included in an elite network. But the whole network may also function better if it is tight and mutually supporting. Then information can move efficiently and individuals may sacrifice–if not for the common good or the welfare of the poor, then at least for their collective interests as the rulers or owners of an institution. Many a Victorian gentleman gave his life for his peers.

Second, the forms by which elites maintain social ties vary. Victorian gentlemen spent many hours on sports (especially as youth), clubs, dinners, country parties, balls, hunting, and paying visits. As Hughes says, “By one definition, then, elite Victorians did remarkably little work: they could easily spend just four or five hours a day actually in the office. But by another definition, they were working all the time. Lunches, balls, and dinners were certainly fun, but they were not just fun.” These were the places where information traveled and people decided whom to favor and support.

By the way, Troloppe is sympathetic to his female characters for their vulnerability and lack of explicit power, yet he explores how women exert influence in settings like dinner parties and hunts, where they distribute social capital.

Today’s managerial elites are more likely to spent their time in meetings or in front of screens, exchanging messages. A typical email, text, or Slack message goes from one person to many. All the recipients must consider whether to reply, which means that every message generates a great deal of work for others. If you are not cc-d or invited to a meeting, you may miss social capital. If you fail to answer a message, you may be forgotten or cause offense. The more hours you spend sending and receiving messages or sitting around a conference table, the better networked you are. People with very busy calendars have high social capital (in the Bourdieu sense) and can dispense appointments selectively. Whole tranches of managers can be mainly engaged in communicating with one another about when and how to meet to communicate with each other, which is exhausting labor.

Third, networking will tend to become more demanding over time. Wine-soaked lunches will give way to text-message threads at 11 pm. This is because networking in an elite status-group is intensely competitive and has high stakes. It may seem fun if it takes place over claret or at a country house party, but the function is serious. Therefore, the serious side will constantly ratchet up.

Networking behavior will grow more efficient in the sense that the competition for influence will grow more relentless and unsparing. However, elites will not necessarily manage things better. A remarkably small number of British men (and one Empress) ran a vast empire pretty well–as measured by their own interests–while saving time for drinking and hunting. They were much more efficient at ruling than our modern elites are.

Functionally, a modern office may be like a Victorian dinner party. But our modern ways seem a lot less fun.


Source: Sarah M. Flood, Liana C. Sayer, and Daniel Backman. American Time Use Survey Data Extract Builder: Version 3.3 [dataset]. College Park, MD: University of Maryland and Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2025. https://doi.org/10.18128/D060.V3.3. (My tabulations.) See also: what happened to leisure time? (on FDR’s ample free time); Mrs. Dalloway with a smartphone; two approaches to social capital: Bourdieu vs. the American literature; and vestiges of feudalism in Emma; or, why the gentry acts as it does.

full-time college students spend 90 minutes per day on academics

[Oct. 14: Dustin Fry, a postdoc at the Institute for Social Research and Data Innovation, notes that many–apparently, 55%–of respondents who are coded as full-time college students report zero hours of academic work. This begins to look to me like some kind of data error rather than the reality. If all of the zero-hour students are removed, then the mean number of hours of academic work jumps up to five per day. His finding could basically invalidate the following post. I am grateful for it and wanted to add this caveat.]

According to the American Time Use Survey, the median full-time college student in the USA spends 90 minutes per day on “non-work education activities, such as taking classes, conducting research and homework, administrative tasks, and extracurricular activities except sports.”

The graph with this post shows that more than 45% of full-time college students report spending less than one hour per day on academic work (including extracurriculars). But there is a long tail, with a few reporting 11 hours or more. The mean is almost 3 hours/day, pulled up by the high achievers.

It’s possible that I am naive, but I believe that students at Tufts, where I teach, spend enough hours on schoolwork that it can interfere with their sleep or even feel impossible to accomplish by the deadlines. But the national data show that they are unrepresentative.

If you are spending less than one hour/day on academics, including the time you spend actually “taking classes,” you just cannot be learning much. Maybe you are happy enough to be a college student living together with thousands of peers. But it is really hard to see why your family or the society should pay for this experience for four years of your young adulthood. Millions of families do pay, but they must see tuition as a kind of toll for entry to the middle class. I can see why they might view the toll-takers much as the Billy Goats Gruff viewed the Hungry Troll.

If you are getting so little out of your college experience that it occupies less than one hour per day, you might as well replace any remaining effort with an AI tool. And if your professors are so little involved with your education that you are able to get away with less than one hour per day of instruction plus homework plus extracurriculars, they might as well replace their teaching and grading with an AI.

Credit hours represent a kind of contract. A 3-credit course is supposed to require 9 hours of class plus homework per week, and most students take at least four courses. That takes them to about 40 hours of work per week, or more than five hours per day. If that is the official expectation, yet many students are doing 20% as much work, then the whole thing must seem like a travesty.

Finally, these data suggest that there is a qualitative difference among institutions. Some students are spending half their waking hours on demanding intellectual work. Others are not intellectually engaged at all. They may overlap on some of the same campuses, but they are probably concentrated in institutions that either demand a lot or not much of their students’ time. Nevertheless, the two kinds of institutions are both called “colleges,” and many students and families may not realize the difference.

Technicalities: This is my tabulation using data from Flood, Sayer, and Backman. I’ve amalgamated 2003-2025 to get a sample of 3,074. I do not show the trend during this period. For what it’s worth, the median rises in each decade from the 2000s to the 2020s, so the situation does not seem to be worsening.

In 2013, the National Survey of Student Engagement found that first-year college students spent about 2 hours per day preparing for class. That is a mean, not a median. It may be consistent with the 3-hour mean in the American Time Use Survey, since the latter includes class-time and extracurriculars.


Sources: Sarah M. Flood, Liana C. Sayer, and Daniel Backman. American Time Use Survey Data Extract Builder: Version 3.3 [dataset]. College Park, MD: University of Maryland and Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2025. https://doi.org/10.18128/D060.V3.3. National Survey of Student Engagement. (2013). A Fresh Look at Student Engagement—Annual Results 2013. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research.See also: a conversation with Farah Stockman about American Made: What Happens to People When Work Disappears

a deliberative response to Trump’s building projects?

Imagine that it’s 2029 and you have been inaugurated as the President of the United States. (Congratulations and good luck.) You can look out from your bedroom window or during a helicopter ride and see a new ballroom, a huge arch, a helipad, a sculpture garden, and other major physical constructions that your predecessor ordered. Which would you do?

  1. Order them taken down to restore the legitimate status quo ante. If by any chance a court or Congress blocked your unilateral executive action (despite the precedents that Trump had set), treat the restoration of a limit on presidential power as a victory. Otherwise, act promptly to demonstrate the frailty of Trump’s unilateralism and to restore the capital city.
  2. Ask Congress to consider legislation to authorize a complete or partial restoration and to appropriate the necessary funds. Encourage Congress to hold hearings and a public debate. Use your veto power if you believe that you must, but lean in favor of honoring the legislative process. Treat the debate as a restoration of legislative primacy and the rule of law.
  3. Convene a representative body of citizens (perhaps randomly selected) to decide what to do, recognizing that there are genuinely competing values at stake. Some people may love the new buildings, or simply want to use the money that could be spent on restoration for other purposes. You would use a deliberative process to symbolize that the capital’s buildings belong to the people, not to the president or even to Congress. You would be trying to set a precedent for other deliberations.
  4. Ask Congress to authorize a citizen deliberation on the topic and to honor the results.
  5. Do nothing.

Before choosing, you might want to get reliable legal advice about whether Trump’s projects were illegal or else within the bounds of unilateral presidential power as that is currently understood. The answer might affect your thinking but would probably not determine your decision.

For example, if I believed that Trump had acted unlawfully, I might order the buildings removed to remedy the violation, or I might hesitate to order a demolition that would also be illegal. If I were told that Trump’s actions were lawful, I might either see a green light to demolish the buildings or else work to narrow presidential discretion by deferring to Congress.

I would also think about this very practically. The fourth option is appealing but would lose its appeal if a bill got nowhere in Congress. I might do nothing instead of expending considerable political capital. After all, an arch can be taken down now or another year, whereas other problems are truly urgent.

That said, this highly symbolic issue could be used to convey worthy points.

public intellectuals and the fickle food of fame

This weekend, at Amherst, I enjoyed a rich conversation about the purposes of liberal arts colleges. One proposal (not mine, but I appreciated it) was for liberal arts colleges to nurture public intellectuals.

The colleges represented at the meeting use basically the same criteria and standards for hiring and promotion that research-intensive universities use. Should their faculty be distinctive in any way? Universities tend to reward work produced for experts within fields. Liberal arts colleges could favor work that is meant for the public. Because they can be very selective, they could attract public intellectuals without compromising quality.

Sometimes, writing or speaking for the public is defined as reaching a large audience–in a word, as fame. But the most famous person who ever lived in Amherst refused to share her work with the public and wrote several trenchant poems about fame.

For instance, these four lines constitute Emily Dickinson’s poem #1788:

Fame is a bee.
It has a song—
It has a sting—
Ah, too, it has a wing.

The “song” is the attraction of fame, but the the “wing” refers to its tendency to fly away after causing pain. The ancient personification of Fame was winged, but I think she was envisioned arriving by air to announce someone’s success, rather than flying away unpredictably. Dickinson suggests a similar idea in the poem (#1659) that begins “Fame is a fickle food / Upon a shifting plate.” There is also: “Fame is the one that does not stay” (#1507).

Dickinson carefully designed her own funeral, a public event that launched her career posthumously. It seems that she wanted to reach an audience (hence becoming famous) but did not want fame to affect her work. She carefully timed her fame until after she could experience it (Crumbly 2017).

That sequence is clear in #1427:

To earn it by disdaining it
Is Fame’s consummate Fee—
He loves what spurns him—
Look behind—He is pursuing thee.

So let us gather—every Day—
The Aggregate of
Life’s Bouquet
Be Honor and not shame—

The addressee of the poem (Dickinson herself?) is moving toward an unnamed goal. That goal is not fame, which is behind her. Fame pursues her because she does not seek him. Perhaps an author or thinker who disdains to pursue fame is more likely to become famous because the quality of her work will be higher.

There is an air here of lovers, like Keats’ figures on the Grecian Urn (“What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape?”). And there is something a bit creepy about Fame sneaking up from behind. You would think that turning around to see him would be a mistake, like Orpheus’ tragic error in looking behind him for Eurydice. But Dickinson’s narrator advises, “Look behind–he is pursuing thee.” Perhaps you should look back to remember the temptation that shadows you and then press forward to stay out of his clutches. Play hard to get.

The second stanza instructs us to attend to what life provides and to make art from it, not caring about the “shame” of becoming famous. We should be concerned with what we can gather, not with what people will think of us.

Nevertheless, Dickinson is a consummate rhetorician in the sense that she addresses strangers and tries to influence them, carefully considering what they may know, care about, and want to hear. Even though she eschews a contemporaneous audience, she writes for a public. Most readers feel that she is talking to them, and we certainly don’t have to be professional poets.

The kind of academic or intellectual work that I most appreciate (and try to support through the Tisch College of Civic Life at Tufts, the Institute for Civically Engaged Research, and other efforts) involves collaborations between scholarly experts and concrete groups, organizations, movements, or communities. The experts must talk in useful ways. It is exciting when their collaborative work expands to large scales and affects many people, but sometimes large scale is inappropriate or impossible. Aiming for big numbers can undermine integrity and quality. The goal is to share what Hannah Arendt calls a “world” with people who are independent and different from oneself.

If Amherst’s most famous resident is a model, the lesson would be to make things that have value for strangers, not just for colleagues and specialists. But treat fame as a threat to quality. Run away from it.


Source: Crumbley, Paul. “Emily Dickinson’s Funeral and the Paradox of Literary Fame.” The Emily Dickinson Journal, vol. 26 no. 2, 2017, p. 51-69. Project MUSE, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/edj.2017.0014. See also: anxieties of influence; love of the world

Civic Studies and the Black Intellectual Tradition

The Center for the Humanities at Tufts and the Center for Public History will offer a discussion on “The University and the Democratic Imagination: Civic Studies and the Black Intellectual Tradition” at 4:30 pm on Oct. 5 with Hollis Robbins, Brandon Terry, and me. Please join us!

Robbins is a scholar of American and African American literature and my favorite writer these days about AI. Terry is an authority on African American political thought.

“The broader seminar gathers scholars from within and beyond the Boston area to explore the resources of the Black intellectual tradition and the practice of public history for supporting academic freedom and advancing democracy within and beyond the university.”

I suspect we will pick up some themes from Robbins’ piece, “My AI thinks Civics is Black Studies,” and my response, “Is Black Studies Civic Studies?” More generally, this may be an opportunity to think about what people should read and discuss to be good citizens, particularly in the USA. I would make a case that we should all reflect on the history of Black thought and respond to it, but I also believe that other canons are valuable. So our conversation can explore what kinds of thought citizens need, what makes a “tradition,” how academic freedom and the university relate to democracy, and the particular resources of the Black American tradition for democracy in the USA and around the world.

Those are my questions, but I’m sure the other speakers will have additional ones.

the university between a club good and the commons

The late Elinor Ostrom taught us many useful things, including how to analyze complex situations rigorously to reveal ways to improve them. Instead of reacting to the world with anger and confusion, someone who has learned from Ostrom can break down a problem and look for remedies.

I am teaching her work this week to undergraduates, and separately discussing the application of her framework to energy policy with colleagues in engineering. If you happen to want a primer to Ostrom, I have recorded lectures about her basic ideas (Part I, 17 minutes) and their application (Part II , 1 minutes).

To develop the mental habit of analysis, our students and I considered Ostrom’s framework for goods (things of value to anyone). We used her framework to model the situation in which we found ourselves, a classroom at Tufts University.

As shown in the graphic that accompanies this post, Ostrom divided all goods in two ways. Some goods are subtractable, meaning that they can be used up or ruined. But others are not. And some are excludable, meaning that it is possible to prevent individuals from using them. But again, others are not. These two distinctions create four categories.

In a college classroom, the private goods include the students’ property, such as their phones (neatly out of sight in our case) and their clothes. One student pointed out that a chair in the classroom, although legally the property of Tufts, functions as a private good during class because of an effective norm that you can’t take someone’s chair away.

Knowledge can be a pure public good. If I explain Ostrom’s theories, that doesn’t subtract or detract from them. And it is hard to block people from learning about her thought once it’s published.

Tufts is a club good, meaning that students benefit by virtue of being admitted to it. Other students do not detract from the benefits of enrolling, except that a very large student body would begin to dilute the “brand.” Yet it is easy to exclude individuals through the admissions process. I suppose that a diploma is a private good, as are the credits that add up to a degree. But the value of a degree depends on its indicating a club good that is owned by all alumni.

Finally, the learning environment is what Ostrom called a “common pool resource” or “commons,” for short. It is subtractable in the sense that a student (or a professor) can make it worse by acting badly or even by taking space in a classroom without contributing much. However, the learning environment is not very excludable, because it will benefit everyone who is present and wants to take advantage of it.

For me, the interesting question in an institution like mine is the relationship between the commons and the club goods.

Our business model depends on selling a club good. This is not true in other countries with different educational systems, or at least it is less important there. But institutions like Tufts cannot survive financially without charging people to join an exclusive club.

Perhaps it is good for the world that American colleges and universities provide club goods by selecting and labeling their students. For one thing, many people appreciate the club that is their own alma mater. And arguably, the sorting function sends useful signals, transmitting information about people who have graduated from Chicago or Oberlin or Vanderbilt. However, on the whole, I think the competition to generate club goods does harm. It sorts and separates young people, reinforces prior inequalities, and allows colleges to compete for exclusivity instead of offering educational value.

An institution’s value (in the more idealistic sense of that word) involves the commons that we create in which our people learn, grow, and form a community.

Thus we can measure our excellence by the degree to which we leverage our club goods for the commons, or (put another way) how we minimize the exclusivity of our club while maximizing the common-pool resource that we create here.

The cynical take on US higher education says that it maximizes its club goods and uses the commons (i.e., the learning environment) mostly for branding. Frank Bruni satirized that situation in a memorable 2016 piece in which he imagined that Stanford had finally reached the ultimate success, a zero percent admission rate. He wrote:

At first blush, Stanford’s decision would seem to jeopardize its fund-raising. … But over recent years, Stanford administrators noticed that as the school rejected more and more comers, it received bigger and bigger donations, its endowment rising in tandem with its exclusivity, its luster a magnet for Silicon Valley lucre.

In fact just 12 hours after the university’s rejection of all comers, an alumnus stepped forward with a financial gift prodigious enough for Stanford to begin construction on its long-planned Center for Social Justice, a first-ever collaboration of Renzo Piano and Santiago Calatrava, who also designed the pedestrian bridge that will connect it to the student napping meadows.

But real universities (including Stanford) actually create learning environments for those who get in; they don’t merely issue diplomas to those whom they admit.

A university also generates important pure public goods, new knowledge and culture that disseminate globally. And it can even offer worthwhile private goods, like t-shirts and dorm rooms. But I would focus on the degree to which an institution deploys the resources from its club goods to provide common-pool resources. The more of that, the better.


See also: why don’t colleges allocate more resources to access?; the weirdness of the higher ed marketplace, etc.

do the liberal arts accomplish civic education?

Next weekend, I’ll participate in a discussion at a famous liberal arts college about the various crises facing such institutions.

All the other participants will be liberal arts college professors. Although my institution is a research university, the intersection of the liberal arts and civic learning also matters to me.

First, the crises that confront the liberal arts (from the cost of college to the rise of AI; from Donald Trump to cultural challenges within the academy) also threaten the parts of a university where I work.  

Second, we face an important conceptual question whenever we try, at universities like mine and many others that I visit (and in k-12 education) to strengthen civic learning. Are the liberal arts automatically “civic”? In other words, is saving the liberal arts a way to accomplish “education for citizenship” (which will be the title of my talk next weekend)? In practical terms, can we say that a student who has a good basis in the liberal arts is also educated for citizenship? Or is there a distinction between civic and liberal education?

In short, my answer would be that the liberal arts provide education for a good individual life. But the specific question for citizens is how to do good things together. Citizens need collective agency.

Most or perhaps all of the liberal arts are useful for collective agency. A group of people concerned with the condition of their community can benefit from understanding economics, the carbon cycle, liberalism and its critics, and the origins of their language, to name just four examples. However, a mass of such knowledge may not sufficiently inform them about how to act well together. They also need the Tocquevillian art and science of association, the “mother science” in a democracy.

We can learn how to associate effectively and wisely from experience. If one grows up amid functioning voluntary associations and participatory democratic institutions, one may learn how to make them work well without having to study that topic extensively. However, most modern Americans lack such opportunities.

Besides, since the challenges of forming and sustaining effective groups have grown and changed in the 21st century, accumulated experience may not suffice. Civic education requires the explicit study of collective agency, often based on texts.

Note that the scale of collective action ranges from pairs of collaborators to the whole human species. A nation is one “we” among many others.

The precise topics of civic education may vary depending on students’ interests and needs. However, as illustrative examples, it can be very useful to understand how the grassroots leaders of the American Civil Rights Movement formed effective nonviolent organizations, or how a 21st century nonprofit should develop a strategic plan, or how to analyze an argument about values, or how to collect relevant environmental data, or (indeed) what James Madison advises about the problem of factionalism in Federalist #10.

These are classic topics in the liberal arts, likely offered in departments from history and biology to philosophy. What matters is the spirit and purpose of the inquiry, which must involve collective agency. The primary question is not how things work, or how things should be, or what someone thought, but what we (a group to which a person belongs) should do.

Both pedagogy and content are relevant. To learn to govern things together, it is valuable to practice discussing and writing about texts and data. These are forms of pedagogy. But it is also valuable to understand the difference between a labor union and a corporation–that is content, which can be conveyed in a lecture. Both matter.

Three quick historical illustrations may help to convey this ideal.

The earliest attested use of the phrase “liberal arts” occurs in an early and minor work by Cicero, De Inventione (1.35). He is not discussing the liberal arts. The phrase occurs in a long list of ways that people differ. A person can be male or female, strong or weak, Greek or barbarian. (I would like to ask a classicist whether Cicero, a Roman writing in Latin, considered himself a barbarian on account of his country or a Greek because of his education.) A man’s character also depends on “who he had as teachers of the liberal arts” and “who has instructed him in living.”

This brief mention is hardly a theory of the liberal arts. However, Cicero opens the book with this problem: wisdom is moot without eloquence (no one will act wisely unless persuaded), yet eloquence is morally neutral and can be used for evil. His stated objective is to serve “our republic” by uniting wisdom with eloquence. In that context, the liberal arts appear, along with moral exhortation, as ways of making men lead good lives–men who are not only individuals but also citizens of a republic.

Now compare the image of Philosophy and the Seven Liberal Arts by the remarkable woman Herrad of Landsberg (ca. 1185), which accompanies this post. Here Philosophy is the Queen. Philosophy says that the liberal arts flow from her as seven streams of wisdom, and she gets her wisdom from God. At the bottom of the picture are four bad men (listening to black birds instead of Philosophy) who violate the liberal arts. One of those is a Magician, and another is a Poet, consigned to the bottom because he makes up false stories.

Herrad may have been an exemplary participant and leader of a group–the abbey whose nuns elected her as their abbess in 1167. Nevertheless, her conception of intellectual life is religious as opposed to republican. For her, knowledge is abstract and divine, discovered not created by people. Education leads one up and out of human affairs.

Finally, Hannah Arendt aimed to recover the republican ideals that animated the young Cicero but for modern times. In 1958, she wrote:

There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves.(The Human Condition, p. 4).

Herrad of Landsberg’s truths are definitely beyond speech and relevant to the individual soul, because they are truths about God. But I think the ordinary modern liberal arts also pursue truths beyond “speech” (in Arendt’s idiosyncratic terminology). For example, pure mathematics belongs to the liberal arts. One might think that any science which relies on impersonal methods pursues truths without intrinsically requiring “speech,” and its truths can matter to people. But the liberal arts also involve truths that we make together by talking and acting. That is where the liberal arts and civic education intersect.


See also: love of the world; is Black Studies Civic Studies?; A Defense of Higher Education and its Civic Mission (2013); the humanities as civic education etc.

Frontiers of Democracy 2026

Frontiers of Democracy 2026: The United States at 250: Meeting the Moment for Democracy, in the US and Around the World

October 2 – 4 | Tufts University in Medford, MA

Frontiers of Democracy is an annual conference at Tufts University’s Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life that convenes practitioners, scholars, leaders, and community members from across the United States and the world. I co-led (or even sometimes solely led) this conference between 2009 and 2025, but I am delighted that a new set of leaders has taken it over. Although I am (thankfully) no longer in charge, I will be there and excited to see many friends and meet new ones. The agenda–with at least 19 different sessions–looks rich and interesting. As always, the sessions tend to be highly interactive and informal, and the participants bridge the worlds of research and teaching and practice and advocacy.

At a moment of significant political change in the United States and around the world, the Frontiers of Democracy 2026 convening will explore the essential elements of democratic process, policy, and partnership. Drawing on global, historical, and youth perspectives, and using the framework of generous listening, we will examine the intersections of political pluralism, activism, and academia—and consider how to meet this pivotal moment in history.

While this framing guides our conversation, the convening is not limited to a single theme. Sessions will also engage with topics central to Tisch College’s North Star: building robust, inclusive democracy for an increasingly multiracial society.

The agenda will feature concurrent breakout sessions, keynotes, plenary sessions, and networking opportunities, including an organization and poster fair. We are pleased to announce Danielle R. Holley, President of Mount Holyoke College as this year’s keynote speaker.

Here, again, is the Agenda. Register now!

This event is hosted by the Vuslat Foundation Generous Listening and Dialogue Initiative(VF-GLADi) and the Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement (CIRCLE) of the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life at Tufts University