Where have lower-educated voters moved right? (a look at 102 countries over 35 years)

Posted on November 30, 2024 by Peter

I believe that left parties should draw their votes from lower on the socio-economic hierarchy, so that they can compete by offering more governmental support. Right parties should draw their votes from the upper end, so that they can compete by promising economic growth. This debate and competition is healthy.

In contrast, when left parties draw from the top of the social order, they tend to offer performative or symbolic policies, while the right promises low-SES voters some version of ethnonationalism. This debate is unhealthy because it blocks more effective and fair social policies, and it sets the right on a path whose terminus can be fascism.

Education is a marker of social class. We saw a social class inversion in the US 2024 election, with Harris getting 56% of college graduates and Trump getting 56% of non-college-educated adults.

Nowadays, we are used to assuming that Republicans have an advantage in the Electoral College because they are dominant in the states with the lowest percentages of college gradates, while Democrats win easily in the most educated states. But the opposite should be true.

I am fully aware that race is involved in the USA. Recently, less-educated white voters have formed the Republican base, whereas voters of color have preferred Democrats, regardless of their social class. However, in 2024, we saw a significant shift of low-education voters of color toward Trump.

Besides, race plays different roles in various countries, but many countries display a trend of lower-educated people preferring the right and moving in that direction .

The World Values Survey has periodically surveyed populations in 102 countries since 1989, for a total sample of almost half a million individuals in the dataset that I used for this post. The WVS asks most respondents to place themselves on a left-right spectrum, and the global mean is somewhat to the right of the middle. It also asks people their education level. For the entire sample, the correlation between these two variables is slightly negative and statistically significant (-.047**). In about two-thirds of sampled countries, the correlation is negative. This pattern is upside-down, suggesting the people with more education tilt mildly to the left around the world.

However, considering the heterogeneity of the countries and years in this sample (from Switzerland in 1989 to India in 2023), it is important to break things down.

The graph with this post shows the correlations for wealthy countries with democratic elections: the EU countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. A positive score indicates that people lower on the educational spectrum are more likely to vote left. The trend is slightly downward, meaning that the highest-educated have moved a bit left (and the lowest have moved right).

Among the countries that have recently demonstrated a class reversal (with the lower classes voting right) are Australia, Canada, Greece, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, the UK and the USA. Czechia and Slovakia are the main exceptions. In Japan and South Korea, less educated people have consistently favored the right to a small degree.

By contrast, for a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the trend has generally been toward what I consider the desirable pattern, with lower-educated people increasingly voting left. The mean for all voters in this region is distinctly left of center.

In a cluster of countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact and are not now members of the EU, the trend is flat. Interestingly, in these countries, the mean voter is on the right.

Finally, the WVS surveys in some countries from the Global South–from Bangladesh to Zimbabwe-but these countries do not seem representative of the whole hemisphere. For what it’s worth, the trend for this sample is just slightly upward, and the results vary a great deal among countries.

I am still in the “deliverism” camp, believing that left parties have not delivered sufficient tangible benefits to less advantaged voters since the 1990s. (One explanation could be their dependence on affluent voters, who do not really want them to do much.) Achieving more tangible change could turn things right-side-up again.

However, it should give us pause that the Biden Administration actually spent trillions of dollars in ways that will benefit working-class Americans, yet Trump won and drew an increasing proportion of lower-educated voters of color. The “deliverist” thesis now depends on the premise that Biden-Harris had too little time and suffered from post-COVID inflation.

Meanwhile, if your premise is that US working-class voters moved right due to (increasing?) racism and sexism, you need an explanation of similar trends in many countries, including some without substantial ethnic minorities.

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podcast on free Speech, democracy, and campus discourse

Posted on November 26, 2024 by Peter

In this episode of Pulse Check, entitled Reclaiming Free Speech, Democracy, and Discourse on Campus: A Post-2024 Election America, I was interviewed by Dr. J. Cody Nielsen. Recorded just days after the 2024 U.S. presidential election, our discussion addressed the election’s implications for higher education, democracy, and meaningful dialogue and civic engagement on college campuses.

Key Takeaways (as summarized by the podcast organizers):

Shifts in Youth Engagement: While youth voter turnout has improved [since the early 2000s], today’s students are more critical of social media’s role in public discourse and democracy.
The Role of Higher Education: Colleges are pivotal in teaching nonviolence, civic history, and bridging ideological divides while navigating heightened polarization.
Practical Civic Education: Institutions must focus on actionable outcomes, like developing research-based initiatives on civic issues rather than performative statements.
Opportunities Amid Challenges: Despite political instability, fostering consensus in civic education and equipping students with tools for nonviolent activism is essential.
Resilience and Positionality: Faculty and administrators, especially those with privilege, must stand up for civic democracy and support those most vulnerable to harm.

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countering selective harassment in the Trump Administration

Posted on November 25, 2024 by Peter

In How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt summarize the current playbook for authoritarian rule in countries whose constitutions are officially democratic.

Note that canceling elections, banning opposition parties, and summarily arresting opponents are not in this playbook, because they are unnecessary and too risky for the perpetrators. Authoritarians have moved beyond such tactics, which tended to fail from 1985-2010. They have improved their success rate by becoming more sophisticated. The graph with this post, by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, shows a disconcerting decline in the success rates of popular movements since 2010, which also illustrates that state repression has become more effective.

Key Trump loyalists like Russell Vought and Steven Miller have explicitly learned the current authoritarian playbook from its main practitioners. Their tactics are consistent with Trump’s personality and how he navigates life, so he doesn’t really have to learn them from the likes of Viktor Orban.

Here is the core:

[T]he government [can] selectively enforce the law, punishing opponents while protecting allies. Tax authorities may be used to target rival politicians, businesses, and media outlets. The police can crack down on opposition protest while tolerating acts of violence by progovernment thugs. Intelligence agencies can be used to spy on critics and dig up material for blackmail. Most often, the capture of the referees is done by quietly firing civil servants and other nonpartisan officials and replacing them with loyalists.

… Once the referees are in tow, elected autocrats can turn to their opponents. Most contemporary autocracies do not wipe out all traces of dissent, as Mussolini did in fascist Italy or Fidel Castro did in communist Cuba. But many make an effort to ensure that key players—anyone capable of really hurting the government—are sidelined, hobbled, or bribed into throwing the game. Key players might include opposition politicians, business leaders who finance the opposition, major media outlets, and in some cases, religious or other cultural figures who enjoy a certain public moral standing …

Players who cannot be bought must be weakened by other means. Whereas old-school dictators often jailed, exiled, or even killed their rivals, contemporary autocrats tend to hide their repression behind a veneer of legality. This is why capturing the referees is so important. …

Governments may also use their control of referees to “legally” sideline the opposition media, often through libel or defamation suits. … As key media outlets are assaulted, others grow wary and begin to practice self-censorship. …

Finally, elected autocrats often try to silence cultural figures—artists, intellectuals, pop stars, athletes—whose popularity or moral standing makes them potential threats. …

The quiet silencing of influential voices—by co-optation or, if necessary, bullying—can have potent consequences for regime opposition. When powerful businesspeople are jailed or ruined economically, as in the case of Khodorkovsky in Russia, other businesspeople conclude that it is wisest to withdraw from politics entirely. And when opposition politicians are arrested or exiled, as in Venezuela, other politicians decide to give up and retire. Many dissenters decide to stay home rather than enter politics, and those who remain active grow demoralized. This is what the government aims for. Once key opposition, media, and business players are bought off or sidelined, the opposition deflates. The government “wins” without necessarily breaking the rules.

Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018, pp. 78-85)

One appropriate response is to raise the price of subservience, as many tried to do when they dropped their Washington Post subscriptions after Jeff Bezos blocked a presidential endorsement. I am not against this strategy, but I do worry that it can inflict collateral damage (in that case, to journalists) and further encourage other organizations to stay out of view.

Thus I believe it’s at least as important to do the opposite: to assist individuals and groups that suffer selective harassment, so that they experience benefits as well as costs. For instance, we should subscribe to targeted publications, donate to nonprofits that are threatened with investigations or the loss of tax-exempt status, and make heroes out of people who are harassed.

Source: Levitsky, S., Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown. See also why autocrats are winning (right now); building power for resisting authoritarianism; strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy

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concerto of our climate

Posted on November 20, 2024 by Peter

A supple line and steady chords,
A light, stately pace, a pulse.
The air itself vibrates with the
Bows on strings and the buzzing reed.
Oboe and counterpoint—one wants
So much more than that. Time itself
Simplified; measures and chords,
With nothing more than these pure notes.

Suppose that this old melody
Floated free of its author’s flaws,
Erased his bile, spite and fear,
Cleansed the players’ bitterness,
And turned our time into a tune.
Still, one would want more and need more
Than this oboe’s sinuous line.

There would remain the restless mind
So that one would want to return
To the music from bitter thoughts
From regrets and shames. That turn,
For us—with our minds so noisy—
Our delight lies only there.

(A direct response to Wallace Stevens’ “The Poems of our Climate,” using music and time instead of art and space. See also: Wallace Stevens, The Snow Man; Wallace Stevens’ idea of order; the fetter; and one supple line.)

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building power for resisting authoritarianism

Posted on November 19, 2024 by Peter

After Donald J. Trump was elected president in 2016, informal groups popped up almost everywhere. They often attracted people who had not been involved in politics before. Stereotyped in the media as suburban white women, these citizens were informally named “The Resistance.” About a half million of them attended the Women’s March in Washington on January 21, 2017, with another five million marching in their home communities.

But the #resistance in 2017 proved evanescent because the nascent groups mainly encouraged their members to support other organizations.

Inboxes filled with urgent fundraising appeals for national organizations. For example, 350,000 people donated to the ACLU in just one weekend during Trump’s first month as president. People also shared and encouraged each other to follow news from national outlets, and digital subscriptions for The New York Times and The Washington Post tripled under Trump. Finally, many people gave money and time to Democratic candidates in 2022.

None of this generosity built power for the new groups themselves, and most–although not all–have faded away. For instance, donations to the ACLU funded essential legal advocacy but didn’t support much grassroots engagement. According to the Tufts Equity in America survey (which I co-led), just 1.5 percent of Americans “identified with” or “actively supported” the ACLU in 2020.

As Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks observe, many committed and skilled activists emerged, yet we have “no established, organizational infrastructure that can facilitate sustained collective action across a multiracial, multiclass constituency.”

How to Build Power

Imagine if the 350,000 people who gave $24 million to the ACLU in one weekend had instead (or also) formed 1,000 new local groups with an average startup budget of $24,000 and had set about raising enough additional funds and recruiting enough additional members to put 1,000 paid organizers at the service of half a million active volunteers in 1,000 American neighborhoods and towns. Our situation would be totally different today.

I am not saying that Kamala Harris would have won the election, but no president would be able to trample over a robust civil society.

Last summer, the Brennan Center and partners organized simulations to test how established institutions, such as state governments and the military, might resist if a US president used authoritarian methods. By all accounts, the results were unpromising. According to Ed Pilkington and Kira Lerner, “the consensus among many policy experts was that the … response felt weak and inadequate.” To me, this experiment reinforces the need for broad-based, nonviolent grassroots resistance.

In 2020, while 9.2 percent of survey respondents in the Tufts Equity in America survey said they had donated money to any advocacy organization, just 3.6 percent said they had “volunteered or worked for a political party, issue, or cause.” We need that last number to grow. Local groups must raise and control resources to recruit, train, and deploy volunteers, so that many more people work for issues and causes.

I would not exactly define the present cause as resistance to Trump. He was legitimately elected, and we don’t know how he will act. It will be an enormous relief if his administration turns out to be feckless. In that case, announcing a movement to save America from Trump would sound overwrought. What we certainly need is a movement to protect democracy and civil rights from anyone who might threaten those values, now or later.

The Structures We Need

This movement must be based on durable, self-sufficient, democratic organizations that work together effectively. They need financial autonomy, accountable leaders, paid staff, and federated structures.

When friends or neighbors are alarmed, they should decide whether they already have an organization that can join the #resistance or whether they need a new structure. A relevant existing organization could be a religious congregation, an activist group, or a union local, among others. It may need a new steering committee for its #resistance work.

However, most people do not belong to any entity that could seriously commit to politics, and they will have to consider incorporating new 501(c)4 organizations. This process starts with an online IRS form. A new group also needs by-laws so that it is clear who is responsible for what. There are free sample by-law documents that anyone can download.

Although structures can vary, some people should be elected to offices with limited terms so that the rest of the group can decide whether to reelect them. Someone’s job should be to develop agendas, facilitate discussions, and clarify the decisions that have been reached. Someone else should keep and share notes so that conversations can proceed from one meeting to another instead of cycling through the same issues. Someone should keep the accounts. Someone is responsible for the membership list.

These groups should raise money from their own members or through bake-sales and the like. They should not seek grants or large gifts from non-members, because they need autonomy.

If a group can grow to 100 or so members who donate or raise an average of $8,000/year, they can hire a full-time organizer with a budget. Even if these amounts are unrealistic, every member should be required to contribute money or specific amounts of volunteer time–with the requirements set low enough that anyone can join. Failure to contribute should cost you a seat at the table, but people should be encouraged to contribute in different ways.

Hiring organizers is crucial because we need some people to be organizing full-time, and because paid employment allows individuals to develop skills and networks that are essential in the longer term.

Growing to Scale

If a group gets much bigger than 100, it should consider splitting. The Black women who formed the Women’s Political Caucus in segregated Montgomery, Alabama in the 1950s launched a new chapter every time one of their existing groups breached the 100-person limit, so as to keep all members fully engaged in their own chapters. Depending on their economic resources, a group of 100 may be able to employ, or at least share, paid staff; and affluent groups should support needier ones.

It’s fine for groups to work “in coalition,” as people use that phrase nowadays–i.e., communicating with each other and periodically coming together for events. But loose coalitions will not really suffice for building power. Aligned groups should consider federating. This means incorporating a new entity for a region or state, with its own bylaws and budget, that has formal relationships with its affiliated groups.

For instance, each participating local group might get one seat on the larger organization’s board, might be expected to contribute some money to the umbrella organization for state-level work, and might be able to claim a portion of funds raised by the larger organization. Again, it may be possible to redirect an existing organization rather than forming a new nonprofit for a region or a state, but that will still require written agreements and bylaws.

Unity and Disagreement

Since groups and alliances need as much support as possible, they should avoid purity tests. A basic tip for anyone who drafts a statement of principles is to keep it short and simple, because unnecessary details offer individuals reasons to opt out. In fact, groups should generally avoid issuing statements, which have relatively little impact. They should affirmatively welcome internal dissent and hold robust discussions for their own members.

Nevertheless, their charters should clearly communicate their mission, and they should look for opportunities to speak in a single voice when that can make a difference. In short, the movement should aim for both unity and pluralism.

For those who are prone to reject broad-based movements as too moderate, I commend Bayard Rustin’s prophetic 1965 article, “From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement” (Commentary, 2/39, Feb. 1965):

[The] effectiveness of a swing vote depends solely on ‘other’ votes. It derives its power from them. … Thus coalitions are inescapable, no matter how tentative they may be. … The issue is which coalition to join and how to make it responsive to your program. Necessarily there will be compromise. But the difference between expediency and morality in politics is the difference between selling out a principle and making smaller concessions to win larger ones. The leader who shrinks from this task reveals not his purity but his lack of political sense.

What Should People Do?

Protests are appropriate, but the #resistance is not a set of protest actions. In fact, seasoned organizers often view a public protest mainly as an opportunity to identify supporters who can then be recruited for more consequential tasks. So what should people actually do?

One-to-one interviews with residents who may or may not share the principles of the movement. These conversations may persuade some neutral or even hostile people and can help to recruit new active volunteers and potential leaders. In 2000, 2.2 percent of our respondents told us that they had “worked as a canvasser–having gone door to door for a political or social group” within the past year. That represents a substantial number, especially during a pandemic, but it needs to grow; and we need genuine conversations rather than quick pitches for political candidates.
Filling the vacuum created by the collapse of local professional journalism and combatting propaganda. This means collecting reliable information from published sources, conducting original research, and monitoring institutions and sharing the results with the public in credible forms–social media channels, email lists, teach-ins, and the like.
Forming relationships with established institutional leaders (elected officials, corporate CEOs, small-business owners, clergy, college presidents, philanthropists, celebrities) and asking them to take steps that are appropriate for their roles. For example, a university cannot and should not take a partisan position, but it must protect its own undocumented students, the intellectual freedom of its students and employees, and its own projects that address contested issues, such as climate change. It may need a nudge to do those things. Similarly, a Republican Member of the House will not vote to impeach Trump but might privately bury a terrible bill.
Registering and educating voters, including people who turn 18 or who naturalize as US citizens.
Endorsing candidates in primaries and general elections. A 501(c)4 organization is allowed to endorse, but its primary activity may not be assessing and endorsing politicians. In any case, political endorsements are more meaningful when they come from civic groups that mainly work independently. Their members can choose to volunteer for candidates or parties if they want to.
To a limited extent, fundraising for other entities, such as organizations that can mount legal strategies. However, there is a risk of sharing so much of a group’s own resources that it becomes a mere conduit.
Periodically organizing confrontational actions, such as boycotts, sit-ins and occupations, sheltering fugitives, and strikes. These methods must be used sparingly and strategically or else they will wear people out. But they certainly belong in the repertoire of any social movement.

A Broad-Based Civic Movement

We need a pro-democracy movement for the kind of people who are “normies” in the eyes of deeply committed activists. This will not be a movement that requires the modes of organizing that are favored (and perhaps necessary) on the radical left. For example, some long-term antiracist organizers keep their groups highly decentralized and avoid uplifting prominent leaders because so many high-profile leaders of color have been prosecuted or murdered in the past. And some pacifists, deep environmentalists (and others) repudiate ordinary bourgeois American lifestyles.

I honor these people as contributors to our overall political culture, but they alone will not protect the republic as it currently stands. For that purpose, we need many millions of much less committed and much less radical people to operate effectively in response to each new threat.

Building civic organizations is a deep American tradition. The urgent task is to revive it.

Source: Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks (2022), Pro-democracy Organizing against Autocracy in the United States: A Strategic Assessment & Recommendations, HKS Working Paper No. RWP22-017.

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the tide will turn

Posted on November 15, 2024 by Peter

Michael Schaffer has a piece in Politico entitled, “The Resistance Is Not Coming to Save You. It’s Tuning Out.” He collects indicators of low engagement, such as declining audiences for MSNBC and the number of people who are projected to attend a January protest march in DC: 50,000, instead of the 500,000 who showed up in January 2017.

I don’t think Schaffer is wrong about the present moment. In 2016, the election surprised many liberal, centrist, and principled conservative Americans and jolted them into action. This year, most anti-Trump voters dreaded the outcome and now feel resigned. The various contingent explanations for Trump’s 2016 election (Comey, Russian interference, an Electoral College fluke) can’t apply in 2024, so it’s common to blame the American people, the media landscape, or the American left–none of which appear alterable in the near future. Certain scenarios, such as Trump’s overriding the 22nd Amendment, are causing fearful paralysis and resignation.

But there is a tide in the affairs of men–as Brutus said, when he advocated a battle that proved disastrous for his own cause. The tide had turned against Brutus well before that moment (at Caesar’s funeral). As Shakespeare’s dramatic irony implies, momentum is easy to misread, especially when it seems to be with you. Today, Trump thinks everything is flowing his way, and that is when leaders make fatal errors.

I wouldn’t be surprised if Trump’s momentum carries him to early victories, such as ramming his whole cabinet through the Senate on 50-50 votes (with J.D. Vance as the tiebreaker). But I’m also confident that this lame-duck, second-term, cognitively impaired president who surrounds himself with sycophantic fools will lose momentum as his popularity tanks.

Although the threat of primaries will keep incumbent Republicans in line, they will face tough reelection races against Democrats and will scramble to contain the damage. The Democratic Party is only one element of the resistance–and electoral politics is only one avenue–but Democrats will gain momentum in inverse proportion to Republicans’ approval ratings. The military, the legal and medical professions, the intelligence agencies, and big companies that have liberal consumers all have considerable capacity.

Seasoned organizers (both leftists and those who are trans-partisan advocates of democracy) may be dispirited right now, but we will rally. New people will join as a result of Trump’s provocations or encouraged when he stumbles.

Leaders will emerge. Some may be contenders for 2026 statewide races or the 2028 presidential election, but some will be celebrities, clergy, or organizational leaders who attract broad support without seeking public office. While I certainly hope that no one dies as the direct result of conflict about Trump, tragedies can reverse public opinion. Political prosecutions will also create heroes.

Some us are in a position to act right now. We have the security, resources, and space to work in defense of democracy. We may feel tired and dispirited, but we are obligated to step up.

For now, I don’t think our message should be that everyone else must rush out and join us. Many people have good reasons to be afraid, or at least confused and demoralized. Now is not the time to mobilize but to work quietly to build the skills, networks, and organizational muscle for popular resistance in 2025 or 2026. Short-term indicators of passivity are largely irrelevant. Our job is to prepare for a riper moment.

(I’ll be posting regularly about concrete actions and strategies.)

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Mrs. Dalloway with a smartphone

Posted on November 13, 2024 by Peter

Mrs. Dalloway created the Zoom link herself. There was so much to do for the evening’s virtual meeting: outreach, slides, breakout-group assignments.

Scrolling social media, Clarissa came upon a lovely vacation photo of an English garden. How calm the air can be early in the morning, like the flap of a wave, the kiss of a wave. She scrolled down to the comment thread and saw that Hugh had posted a cheerful remark. Her old friend Hugh–the admirable Hugh! She “liked” his comment.

A push notification: Active shooter. The location seemed to be no more than five miles away. Clarissa could have been there.

Septimus saw the same notification. Deep in a subreddit for veterans, he muttered to himself several times: “Active shooter.” Evans had been shot. No, it was an IED–Evans had bled out before Septimus’ own eyes when the shrapnel had ripped his throat. He’d come home in a body bag. But you could still see Evans sometimes, you could still hear him clearly speak. Septimus scanned the comments for Evans’ name, because he might still post. He might say what it’s like where he is now–is it a happier place?

Now, an automated reminder to take his meds. Septimus hated those pills. They deadened him so that he could hardly see the future or how love rules everything or the disgusting corruption of the human body.

On Clarissa’s screen, the name Peter Welch popped up. Out of the blue, after so many years, Peter suddenly wanted to know how she was doing. “Where RU?!?” she asked him back. He was in town, visiting from Dubai; maybe they could get together? His status was complicated and he wanted to talk.

A flood of memories, like photos from deep in one’s saved-items folder. For some reason, seeing Peter’s text brought back that time she’d hooked up with Sally Seton.

Richard was talking to someone, but Clarissa couldn’t see who. His laptop was angled away from her, and he had his headset on. She checked his calendar. He must be talking to Millicent Bruton. Millicent had sent the meeting invite and had asked Hugh to join them. Clarissa felt a pang. It wasn’t sexual jealousy–Millicent was no threat, and these people would never see each other in person. The feeling was FOMO. Why didn’t Millicent want her to join the conversation? Was Clarissa totally out of the loop now?

Richard honestly found Millicent Bruton a bit silly and scatterbrained. She’d drafted a post that she wanted him to put on his policy Substack. He, Hugh, and Millicent were editing it together in a shared doc. It was a mess. Her main point seemed to be that people should move to Canada. (That’s always the idea, Richard thought–let’s all move to Canada). Hugh, who managed internal comms. for his family’s real estate business, believed that no one ever reads more than 40 words. He was adding bolded headings– “What it means” and “Why it matters”–and turning Millicent’s paragraphs into bullet points.

Richard would post her piece–why not? His traffic was way down, anyway. So nice of Clarissa to organize the webinar for his org! A virtual get-together might boost his profile. He thought about sending his wife a heart emoji, but that feeling passed before he clicked.

Clarissa hoped that people would join the Zoom on time, leave their cameras on, post witty comments in the chat, and have a good time together. She pinged an old friend with a reminder and ordered a protein smoothie to be delivered for lunch. Before she submitted her order, she messaged Richard to see if he wanted anything, but he’d already ordered his own tempeh tacos.

Their daughter Elizabeth said, “I’m going outside for a walk.” Clarissa and Richard nodded distractedly and went back to their screens.

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complexity and nuance about public opinion

Posted on November 12, 2024 by Peter

Last Monday, I gave a talk at Colgate University. I claimed that if you read a lot of mainstream survey research, you’re likely to conclude that “people are stupid and they hate each other,” but this negative assessment reflects some bias. A student, Colgate senior Clementina Aboagye, told Maddie Koger of the Colgate Maroon-News:

“I think it was important that we had someone like Peter Levine who comes from an institution like Tufts University to present us [with the idea] that as much as we may disagree with each other, we still have complexities in how we think — that it’s important we search for gray areas because politics isn’t so black and white,” Aboagye said. “Those gray areas are important for us to not only converse about, but also to give each other space to speak — even when we don’t agree, because we can’t always agree — and we live in a world where people’s experiences and access to things determine what kind of ways in which they think — that deserves consideration.”

The very next day, a majority of American voters chose Donald Trump, concluding a campaign marked by polarized media, misinformation, hostility, and attacks (from one side) on basic liberal norms. Yet I still think there’s truth in the argument I offered at Colgate, which you could watch in full here.

The previous week, I had given American University’s annual Lincoln Scholars Lecture on “What Should We Do? A Theory of Civic Life.” Although my topic was quite different, this talk also offered a more positive view of civic life than one would glean by focusing only on an ugly and dangerous national election. According to Ridha Riyani’s summary in the AU Eagle newspaper, I said,

“We disagree because we care, and we need to do it better. …

[Levine] ended with a call to action, reminding attendees that civic life extends beyond national politics and requires thoughtful collaboration.

“In conversation, we can move towards greater wisdom,” Levine said. “We communities are capable of changing the rules.”

I would not argue now that all we need is to listen generously across differences and explore the complexity of other people’s views. We must also stand up against injustice. Confrontational nonviolent civil resistance was a major theme in my AU talk, and I have been preparing for a Trump victory for several years. Still, there remains a place for listening, bridge-building, and collaboration, and I strive to offer useful concepts and skills for those purposes.

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social class and the youth vote in 2024

Posted on November 11, 2024 by Peter

My colleagues at CIRCLE (The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement) have already produced an incredible body of analysis of the 2024 youth vote. Overall, they find that youth turnout was higher than in past decades but lower than in 2020, and young adults supported the Democrats, but much more narrowly than previously.

I recommend all their work, but I’d like to discuss one pattern. It appears that being working-class predicted support for Donald Trump when holding race and gender constant, with the exception that young women of color supported Harris by the same amount, regardless of their social class. These trends are stronger for older Americans but still evident among the 18-29s.

(I interpret education as an indicator of social class. Especially for younger people, income is much less revealing. An MBA student might earn less current personal income than a mechanic of the same age.)

Young adults who have not attended college favored Trump by two-to-one, whereas those with postgraduate educations preferred Harris by 14 points. Nearly half (42%) of young Latinos without college experience chose Trump. Thirty-four percent of all young Black men favored him, a pretty remarkable increase that may also be related to social class.

I would be reluctant to explain this pattern by citing any specific policies of the Biden Administration or proposals of the Harris-Walz campaign, nor by criticizing the candidates or their rhetoric. This is because the same pattern–working-class voters supporting the right–has been evident recently in France, Germany, and the UK–the other democracies that I’ve studied–and was already strongly present in the USA in 2022.

My pet theory is that liberal or progressive parties prefer to regulate, because they can shift the costs to private entities and local governments. The regulated organizations then pass mandates on to workers and consumers, and the rules that originate in legislation are mixed together with all the things that companies require or prohibit for their own profit. The same department that tells workers not to use polluting chemicals also warns them not to take unauthorized work breaks. As a result, regulation that has social benefits looks like corporate monitoring, and progressives sound like the nation’s HR department or legal office. It doesn’t help that almost all Democratic elected officials are, in fact, lawyers or former managers.

My preferred alternative would be to spend public money to benefit workers, because that is a more direct and transparent way to achieve public purposes. However, the Biden Administration and congressional Democrats did authorize $1.9 trillion of new spending on green manufacturing (and microconductors) and reaped no apparent political gain.

Perhaps contingent factors interfered, such as the pandemic and the end of pandemic-related benefits, global inflation, and Joe Biden’s inability to make the case when it mattered. But the failure of nearly $2 trillion to move working-class opinion requires reflection. Unless something changes fast, the formative experiences of our rising generation will not incline them to progressive values.

The post social class and the youth vote in 2024 appeared first on Peter Levine.

explaining a past election versus deciding what to do next

Posted on November 8, 2024 by Peter

The Internet is saturated with explanations of the 2024 election. Some of these “quick takes” are dispassionate, while others take the form: If only Harris had done what I know is right, she would have won.

The challenge is epistemic: it’s virtually impossible to explain a single past event that involves many decision-makers (in this case, about 150 million of them).

Explaining the decisions of a few powerful people is hard enough, but at least then we can use evidence about their individual values, goals, and personalities. For instance, we can investigate why Napoleon ordered the main assault at the Battle of Borodino in 1812. However, says Tolstoy,

It was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, for none of his orders were executed and during the battle he did not know what was going on before him. So the way in which these people killed one another was not decided by Napoleon’s will but occurred independently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds of thousands of people who took part in the common action. It only seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his will (War and Peace, 10:28)

It’s easier to explain the pattern displayed in a large set of cases (inductive reasoning). John Burn-Murdoch observes that every incumbent government in the world that has faced an election in 2024 has suffered major setbacks. John Sides argues that inflation lowered Biden’s approval rating, and the incumbent’s approval predicts reelection.

But these generalizations cannot explain the single event of the 2024 US presidential election. Generalizations inevitably involve variance, and 2024 is obviously anomalous. Should we even categorize Harris as the incumbent, when she was a vice president stepping in for a president and running against the previous president?

We can also look at patterns within the population to try to explain why individuals voted. For instance, Michael Tesler assembles evidence that few American women vote from gender solidarity and race consistently trumps gender as an explanation of voting.

This is a valid approach that will yield more precise insights once we have voter files and better survey analysis for 2024. But this method also has limitations for the purpose of explanation. As the (true) cliché reminds us, correlation is not causation. Besides, individuals vary in ways that are not captured in generic surveys. And we must distinguish carefully between two tasks: explaining why large numbers of people voted for each candidate, versus explaining the marginal change since 2020. Big blocs of the electorate vote predictably, yet much of the conversation is about changes at the margin. Our whole discussion would be different if Harris had won by 4 points instead of losing by less than one point, but either way, most people would have voted the same.

To emphasize the last point: I strongly suspect that a male Democrat would have fared no better than Kamala Harris, or even possibly worse. One of many pieces of supportive evidence is the fact that people whose survey answers indicated sexism already tended strongly to oppose Joe Biden in 2020 (Spencer 2021). I doubt that sexism explains the marginal change between 2020 and 2024, yet that hardly makes sexism irrelevant, since it helps to explain the 2020 baseline. Whether you feel that sexism is at stake may reasonably reflect your own depth of concern about misogyny in our society; this is not simply a statistical question. Put another way, whether you explain the result in terms of sexism depends on whether you are trying to a) combat misogyny or b) win an election. The explanation is relative to its purpose.

We might conclude that it is fruitless to make a model to explain any particular case. But that is exactly what we must do before we act. Even if there is no way to know now what would have happened had Harris acted differently, Harris and her team had to do something. In September, they needed a prospective model of the single case that confronted them: the election.

In 1903, Charles Sanders Peirce coined the term “abduction” (or “abductive judgment”) for the logic that explains a single case. Abduction is a pragmatic necessity because we always act in specific circumstances. In my view, valid abduction never depends on a single claim. There is no way to test whether one premise caused a given outcome in a given case. Rather, a good abduction consists of many linked components: a whole model. And it is appropriate for the model to contain facts, values, and strategies.

Thus, if you were Kamala Harris in September, you needed a coherent account of the current US electorate (facts), what you sought to achieve as a president (values), and how various messages and methods would affect the outcome (strategy). You had to guard against biases (believing facts because they confirmed your values), but you were entitled to bring your self into the analysis. For one thing, this was a model for how you should act, so it had to motivate you and your team and sound authentic coming from you.

We cannot tell which parts of Harris’ implicit model were right or wrong–and it remains possible that her model was as good as it could have been. But what we need now is a model to guide our own next steps.

Since I am not running for president, my model should not be designed for that purpose–although I might start armchair strategizing in 2026 or so. For now, I need a model that guides my actions as a concerned citizen during the Trump Administration. To a limited extent, my model might be guided by my retrospective assessment of the 2024 presidential campaign–but not by much. The main question, as always, is what should we do?

Sources: Spencer, Bettina. “Impact of racism and sexism in the 2008–2020 US presidential elections.” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 21.1 (2021): 175-188; Peirce, C.S. 1903. Lectures on Pragmatism, Lecture 1: Pragmatism: The Normative Sciences. See also: using a model to explain a single case; overestimating the impact of leaders; What Should We Do? A Theory of Civic Life

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