academic freedom and the Steven Salaita case

I want to draw additional attention to the case of Steven Salaita, because it poses a threat to academic freedom. Here is the Change.org petition to reinstate him, which I have signed.

Last year, the University of Illinois granted professor Salaita a tenured faculty position as a professor of American Indian Studies, subject only to a vote of the Board of Trustees, which was described to him as a formality. He did what you’re supposed to do and resigned his position at Virginia Tech as he prepared to move to Illinois to start teaching this fall. He then composed a series of tweets against the Israeli invasion of Gaza.

With support of the Board of Trustees, the Illinois Chancellor revoked the position offered to Prof. Salaita. They made no bones about the fact that his tweets were the reason for their decision. In an explanatory letter, the Trustees endorsed freedom of speech but went on to say:

Our campuses must be safe harbors where students and faculty from all backgrounds and cultures feel valued, respected and comfortable expressing their views.  We … write today to add our collective and unwavering support of Chancellor Wise and her philosophy of academic freedom and free speech tempered in respect for human rights – these are the same core values which have guided this institution since its founding. … The University of Illinois must shape men and women who will contribute as citizens in a diverse and multi-cultural democracy. To succeed in this mission, we must constantly reinforce our expectation of a university community that values civility as much as scholarship.

Disrespectful and demeaning speech that promotes malice is not an acceptable form of civil argument if we wish to ensure that students, faculty and staff are comfortable in a place of scholarship and education. If we educate a generation of students to believe otherwise, we will have jeopardized the very system that so many have made such great sacrifices to defend. There can be no place for that in our democracy, and therefore, there will be no place for it in our university [emphasis added].

I have argued that a university may assess the quality and content of a professor’s public communications in deciding whether to hire her, publish her, or invite her to speak. “Civility” could be relevant to those judgments. (Jennifer Saul makes that point well.) However, it is very hard to see Prof. Salaita’s tweets as uncharacteristically lacking in civility or as especially demeaning. What they are is critical of Israel.

The Brown University professor Bonnie Honig interprets his tweets as the opposite of uncivil:

Here is a man of Palestinian descent watching people he may know, perhaps friends, colleagues, or relatives, bombed to bits while a seemingly uncaring or powerless world watched. He was touched by violence and responded in a way that showed it. In one of the tweets that was most objected to (Netanyahu, necklace, children’s teeth), Salaita commented on a public figure who is fair game and who was promoting acts of terrible violence against a mostly civilian population. I found that tweet painful and painfully funny. It struck home with me, a Jew raised as a Zionist. Too many of us are too committed to being uncritical of Israel. Perhaps tweets like Prof. Salaita’s, along with images of violence from Gaza and our innate sense of fair play, could wake us from our uncritical slumbers. It certainly provoked ME, and I say “provoked” in the best way – awakened to thinking.

Prof. Salaita is also a strong supporter of the “boycott of Israeli academic institutions,” which I happen to oppose. I would reject any academic boycott, and I disagree that the one country in the world to single out this way is Israel. But if Prof. Salaita was “unhired” because he supports the boycott, that is a clear violation of his freedom of speech and association. He is entitled to advocate a boycott; I just don’t endorse it.

As Michael Dorf explains, it’s a little bit complicated whether Prof. Salaita had a legal right to his position. Illinois was not obligated to hire him in the first place. It did, however, extend him an offer. He was told that the Trustees’ vote was a formality, and, as Brian Leiter writes, “Such approval clauses … had, previously, been pro forma at Illinois, as they are at all serious universities: it is not the job of the Board of Trustees of a research institution to second-guess the judgment of academics and scholars.” Thus, arguably, the University was constrained to hire him.

One could argue the reverse–that the Trustees’ vote is precisely meant to be a check on the decisions of the faculty and administration, to be used rarely but at the Board’s discretion. That would be a legal defense of the Trustees’ decision (I cannot say how plausible), but it is not a moral justification of this particular choice, whose basis appears clear enough.

I am not sure I would go far as to say that the University of Illinois has “repealed the First Amendment for its faculty.” Professors already in place there cannot be unhired. This case actually reinforces the value of tenure. But it is a problem if you can lose your academic freedom during a period of transition. And the bigger problem is: a major state university cannot seem to tolerate criticism of Israel.

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Sen on climate change

Amartya Sen’s August 22 New Republic piece probably has an unfortunate title: “Stop Obsessing About Global Warming.” That is bad advice–and a poor summary of the article–if it means: “Care less about climate change.” But it is wise guidance if it means: “Care more about other things, too.” (The latter, by the way, is a valid gloss on “Stop obsessing”).

[8/25: the headline has been changed to "Global Warming Is Just One of Many Environmental Threats That Demand Our Attention"]

In any case, the article is vintage Sen, drawing on several of his lifelong themes:

  • Unidimensional moral reasoning is a mistake; moral judgment always requires balancing many goods. Just as raising GDP is too narrow, so is cutting carbon. “The recent focus of energy thinking has been particularly concentrated on the ways and means of reducing carbon emissions and, linked with that, cutting down energy use, rather than taking energy use as essential for conquering poverty and seeing the environmental challenge within a more comprehensive understanding.”
  • The poorest people of the world are constantly overlooked. They need more resources, not less. “In India, for example, about a third of the people do not have any power connection at all. Making it easier to produce energy with better environmental correlates (and greater efficiency of energy use) may be a contribution not just to environmental planning, but also to making it possible for a great many deprived people to lead a fuller and freer life.”
  • People have agency and freedom. They are capable of improving the world, and supporting their agency is generally the best way to help them. “The environment is not only a matter of passive preservation, but also one of active pursuit. Even though many human activities that accompany the process of development may have destructive consequences (and this is very important to understand and to address), it is also within human power to enhance and improve the environment in which we live.”
  • Economics, technology, and politics interrelate; you cannot ignore politics when assessing an economy. For instance, we can imagine nuclear power being used safely, but that is like assuming that people will be rational enough to avoid war. We mustn’t forget “the risks of terrorism and sabotage (a strong possibility in countries such as India); the consequences of possible nuclear theft … ; and nuclear reactions that may be set off if and when a nuclear power plant is bombed or blasted with conventional weapons in a conventional war, or even in a rather limited local skirmish.”
  • Development is liberating, as long as we define it broadly and do not reduce it to the pursuit of GDP. Growth is desirable, not sinful. “In general, seeing development in terms of increasing the effective freedom of human beings brings the constructive agency of people in environment-friendly activities directly within the domain of developmental efforts.”

I am guessing that Sen has in mind The Population Bomb (1968) and debates of that era. Paul Ehrlich argued that the earth faced imminent catastrophe because of population growth. There were too many people, especially in the poorest countries, and they were using up finite resources of food, water, energy, and space.

As a result of such thinking, some developing countries imposed illiberal and undemocratic controls on population–not only communist China, but also India during the State of Emergency. These were the problems with that approach:

  • The diagnosis was wrong. With increasing demand, resources have been used more efficiently. India’s population has tripled since 1960, but its rate of malnutrition is less than half as high. Overpopulation has costs, but it is not a “bomb.”
  • The ethics was wrong. Poor people were treated as a problem, as fundamentally undesirable. They were not treated with dignity.
  • The politics was dangerous. Governments used population control to justify tyranny. As Sen famously noticed, famines never occur in representative democracies but are common under colonial rule and dictatorships, including the very tyrannies that control population growth.
  • The solution was wrong because it ignored agency and freedom. It turned out that the best way to reduce the pace of population growth was to educate and empower women, because then they had alternatives to bearing many children.

Perhaps Paul Ehrlich was the boy who cried “wolf,” and now a real wolf is at the door. Over-consumption is somewhat self-correcting because prices rise with rising demand, but carbon emissions have no price. So climate change could be a worse problem than over-consumption caused by population growth. If we are at severe risk of global environmental catastrophe, then Sen’s concerns seem misplaced, and we may regret that a Nobel laureate with progressive credentials published an article headed “Stop Obsessing About Global Warming.”

But if we learn from the previous crisis, then we should address the climate crisis in a different way. We should consider the severe costs and risks of carbon emissions along with other problems, such as poverty and lack of democracy. A top priority should be helping the poorest people in the world to use more energy with less carbon emissions. We should support them in exploiting solar power and alternatives like “biochar.” Finally, we should not treat human beings as sin in the Garden of Eden and try to minimize their impact. Sen writes:

The environment is sometimes seensimplistically, I believeas the ‘state of nature,’ including such measures as the extent of forest cover, the depth of the ground water table, the number of living species, and so on. It is tempting to go from there to the conclusion that the best environmental planning is one of least interference, of leaving nature alonethat the urgent need is for inaction, rather than for actions that may be best supported by reasoning.

Sen’s vision is a deeply humanistic one, in which all people have dignity and the capacity to improve the world, including the natural world. Again, that would be the wrong case to make right now if climate change poses an unprecedented threat to our very survival. Then we should be trying to persuade governments to regulate carbon–end of case. But we can’t literally make governments do what we want. So the real question is not whether states should focus narrowly on carbon (which they won’t do, anyway), but rather: How should environmental activists pose this issue? Should they try to raise the odds of significant regulation by using apocalyptic and unidimensional language about climate change? Or should rather adopt a more balanced rhetoric, in which growth is desirable but carbon has costs?

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a real chance to improve civics in California

I am pasting excerpts of a press release below, because I am excited about what it announces and I have been involved as a consultant on the project. It is an example of the kind of strategy we recommended in the report of the Commission on Youth Voting and Civic Knowledge, entitled “All Together Now: Collaboration and Innovation for Youth Engagement” (2013):

Sacramento, Calif., August 5, 2014 – California Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye and State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Torklakson today received the Final Report of the California Task Force on K-12 Civic Learning. The report is the culmination of a year-long process of assessing the state of civic learning in California schools, receiving input at regional meetings, and crafting research-based recommendations to ensure that all California K-12 students gain the knowledge, skills and values they need to succeed in college, career and civic life.  Both the executive summary and the full report are available online.

Members of the California Task Force on K-12 Civic Learning, co-chaired by Justice Judith McConnell and Sacramento County Superintendent of Schools David Gordon, presented the recommendations aimed at providing all students in California with the instruction, support and experiences they need to actively participate in society and succeed in the 21st century workplace.

These recommendations include:

  • revision of the California History/Social Science content standards;
  • integration of civic learning into state assessment and accountability systems;
  • improved professional learning for teachers connected to Common Core State Standards;
  • sharing of curriculum resources and best practices;
  • engaging stakeholders from local government, business, the courts, nonprofits, community organizations and parents; and
  • promoting funding in Local Control Accountability Plans (LCAP) through Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF).

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what should an individual citizen do about money in politics?

(New York City): I am on a Washington-New York-Boston trip in which many of my meetings coincidentally touch on the same topic: what should we do about money in politics? Per my usual rant, the question is not what should be done. That is relatively easy. The question is: What should you and I do, granting that courts and legislatures are not going to do what should be done?

This is a question not only for you and for me, but also for the national organizations that work on this topic, such as my beloved first employer, Common Cause (now under the dynamic and visionary leadership of Miles Rapoport). Such organizations can communicate with the public and can enroll members, but ultimately they must ask citizens to do stuff. What should they ask?

They can’t just ask people to change their minds. Public opinion is at the heart of some problems. For example, climate change is worse because many voters do not believe it is happening, do not consider it a serious threat, or doubt that we can realistically do anything about it. Motivation is also a factor, because individuals, communities, and nations benefit by generating the problem (in this case, carbon emissions), and anyone who takes individual or collective action to limit pollution bears the price of that action. Climate change is thus the Mother of All Collective Action Problems, made worse by false opinions (which, in turn, result from targeted investments in misinformation). It is worth changing people’s minds to believe the facts and to vote and act differently.

Campaign finance is a different kind of problem. The public already thinks it’s terrible. Most people do not contribute to the problem, since only 0.18% of the population gives $200 or more. But it is against the interest of the majority of elected officials to do anything about money in politics, since they were elected under the current system. Democratic politicians tend to be more hypocritical than Republicans on this topic; neither party does anything about it, but some Republicans would defend the status quo on philosophical grounds.

Hobson, who offered one particular horse or none at all, and called that a choice.

Voters are typically offered a Hobson’s Choice: Vote for Candidate A–who shares your views on important issues like climate change but won’t do anything about campaign finance–or vote for Candidate B, who opposes your views of those other essential issues and won’t do anything about campaign finance.

I think that to some extent, politicians also face a Hobson’s Choice because of the recalcitrance of all the other politicians, a classic collective action problem. They can A) burn their capital trying to pass campaign finance reform, or B) actually pass health insurance reform, Wall Street reform, and environmental laws. Basically, my reading of President Obama is that he chose option B.

We would like everyone (voters and politicians) to change their priorities and put campaign finance reform higher–but in order to do what?

Well, there are things you can do. Join Common Cause, because it’s a robust membership organization that fights indefatigably for reform. Give money to Mayday PAC, which will intervene in “five districts during this election cycle, in a way that makes it clear that the most important issue was the role that money plays in politics.” Donate to Fund for the Republic, too. Tell your elected officials, even if they stand with you on other issues, that they risk losing your support unless they sign onto something like H.R. 20, the Government by the People Act.

I think these are worthy steps, but I am not overly optimistic they will work even if quite a few people do them. That is why I am obsessed with the problem of leverage, or how to turn ethical civic action into large-scale change in a given system of incentives and constraints, against dedicated opponents. After all, Margaret Mead was wrong: we should doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. They usually fail–or grow into a large group, maybe achieve something, and cease to be thoughtful and committed along the way. We must turn from a bunch of citizens who are angry about the status quo (and who perhaps take some modest actions) into an effective mass movement. That is a problem of organization and structure that I do not think we have cracked.

The Mayday PAC widget:

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community review boards for research?

(Washington, DC) If you work at a federally funded institution like mine and you want to collect data from human beings or animals, you need permission from an Institutional Review Board. Its purview is ethics, and specifically the ethical treatment of the individuals from whom data is collected. Although the idea of a IRB intimidates some new researchers, you can learn to navigate the process routinely. I believe I am the PI on more than a dozen IRB-approved projects right now.

I have often heard the argument that the review should be broader; it should consider impacts on whole communities and issues like cultural sensitivity and whether results are shared in useful forms. Likewise, the reviewers should be more diverse, including laypeople from the community as well as experts.

I now read that there are in fact several community review boards in operation that consider such issues, apart from or in addition to research ethics.* They gain their approval power from agreements with local institutions that agree to participate. For instance, in Hawaii, five nonprofits and three universities or university-based centers have agreed to put all research proposals involving the Native population through a community committee’s screening.

I must admit that I have mixed feelings. On the one hand, research is usually supported by the government (directly or otherwise) and has social impact, whether positive or negative. Thus researchers should be accountable to the public for their questions, methods, and presentations. Community members have a right to express their views and valuable perspectives to offer.

On the other hand, research is already quite bureaucratic, and every extra layer of review means another set of forms and meetings. Also, there are potential costs to academic freedom. We might start with an assumption that citizens may talk to and observe other citizens and say what they want as a result. That is a First Amendment right, meant partly to protect individuals so that they can say things that are critical and uncomfortable. Although we may want to oversee a scholar when government money is supporting organized research, liberty remains a consideration. For instance, if a community panel blocked a study because it was critical of the community’s norms, that would be a violation of free speech. Finally, I would wonder whether any committee could truly represent a community.

Despite the caveats in the last paragraph, this is an innovation to watch and to consider.

*Shore N, Park A, Castro P, Wat E, Sablan-Santos L, Isaacs ML, Freeman E, Cooks JM, Drew E, Seifer SD. Redefining Research Ethics Review: Case Studies of Five Community-Led Models. Seattle, WA: Community-Campus Partnerships for Health, 2014.

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when society becomes fully transparent to the state

I am posting some longer analytical pieces because I am working on a chapter about “democracy in the age of digital media.” Today’s topic is how digital media makes society more legible to the state, and whether that is good or bad for democracy.

According to many ancient stories, one of a ruler’s first tasks is to count his people and objects. For instance, the biblical Book of Numbers relates the journey of the newly formed people of Israel to take possession of the land that they believe is theirs. In the very first verse, the Lord tells Moses: “Take ye the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel, after their families, by the house of their fathers, with the number of their names, every male by their polls” (Numbers 1:2). Likewise, near the beginning of Luke, we are told, “And it came to pass in those days, that there went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be taxed.” The emperor needed information, and the people complied: “All went to be taxed, every one into his own city” (Luke 2:1-3). And not long after William the Conqueror seized England, he “sent his men over all England, into every shire, and caused them to ascertain how many hundred hides of land it contained, and what lands the king possessed therein, what cattle there were in the several counties, and how much revenue he ought to receive yearly from each” (A1085).

Since these are stories about monarchs, we might have mixed feelings about their ability to count and read their societies. But in a democracy, the state is supposed to do the people’s will, and it cannot do that unless it can see the society clearly. For example, unless it knows how much money each individual earns, it cannot implement an income tax and use the revenues for popular purposes. In turn, the people must be able to see what the democratic state does in order to hold it accountable. Some degree of transparency and legibility (in both directions) is necessary for a democracy to function.

However, even a democratic state should not be able to see everywhere all the time. Jeremy Bentham was a proponent of democracy (defined as majority-rule) who pushed the ideal of transparency to a horrifying conclusion. His famous model of the ideal prison was the “Panopticon,” which he sketched thus:

The building circular—the cells occupying the circumference.… One station in the inspection part affording the most perfect view of two stories of cells, and a considerable view of another … By blinds and other contrivances, the keeper concealed from the observation of the prisoners, unless where he thinks fit to show himself: hence, on their part, the sentiment of an invisible omnipresence.—The whole circuit reviewable with little, or, if necessary, without any, change of place” (order changed).

Bentham fought what he called a “War” to have his Panopticons built, and he wanted to extend the same principles to programs that served “persons of the unoffending class.” For paupers, much like criminals, the “principle of universal and constant inspectability” would ensure that they would learn habits of good behavior that would persist even after they were officially released from oversight. As a democrat, Bentham also advocated “inspectability of the inspectors by the eye of the public opinion tribunal.” He saw the consequent changes in the behavior of both the rulers and the ruled as fully consistent with the public good.

For most readers, however, the Panopticon is a nightmare. What is wrong with it? First, it makes power pervasive and reduces human agency to a minimum. Michel Foucault observed:

The major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.

In a society that is completely legible to the state, we cannot have private spaces in which to develop beliefs and interests so that we can participate in the public realm as distinct individuals. The result is a far poorer public sphere. Hannah Arendt was a great defender of public life, but she wrote that the “four walls, within which people’s private life is lived, constitute a shield against the public aspect of the world. They enclose a secure place, without which no living thing can thrive” (p. 186). The Panopticon’s cells have three walls, so that the prisoners cannot communicate with each other; the fourth is deliberately missing to allow the keeper to see in.

In the digital age, the problem of legibility has become much more severe. We now use computers, mobile phones, and other electronic devices in almost all aspects of our lives, for work, exchange, health, recreation, and intimacy. Each call placed, character typed, and site visited leaves a digital trace. Those traces can be collected and analyzed by firms and governments—or first by firms and then by the governments that seize or penetrate their data. We do not know whether our behavior is being analyzed at any time, but it could be. That is the principle of the Panopticon. I think Foucault was too quick to see power as determinative and was not optimistic enough about people’s capacity to resist surveillance, our creativity and sheer recalcitrance. But the threat is real.

One aspect of the threat is pervasiveness. Hannah Arendt’s four walls cannot shield you against surveillance if inside your house you are typing emails that Google analyzes and the NSA reads. As long as you are using a digital device, there is no secure refuge from surveillance. The chilling effect may take many forms. Just for example, journalists now say that government sources are more reluctant to come forward than they used to be because they believe their communications are being monitored. “Many journalists reported a strong preference for meeting sources in person in large part for reasons of security. ‘I don’t think there’s anything ironclad you can do except [meet] face to face,’ remarked Jonathan Landay. ‘Maybe we need to get back to going to sources’ houses,’ added Peter Finn. Indeed, several journalists expressed a marked reluctance to contact certain sources by email or phone” (p. 35).

A second aspect of the problem is precision. Today, analysts no longer rely on samples of information taken from random surveys, observations, or audits, which they would analyze using statistical techniques that depend on probability. Now they can get all the data. For example, social scientists working in academia, business, or the government can collect and analyze all the votes in cast in an election, all the job openings advertised in newspapers, or all the social media postings that include a given phrase. They can also merge these data, so that we can know, for instance, detailed consumer and employment information about each voter. The result is a wealth of information about small groups and their behavior that yields remarkably accurate predictions. Those predictions would have been unthinkable when we relied on samples and on statistics based on probability.

Pervasiveness and precision relate to a third threat: manipulability. Behavioral economics, prospect theory, and the latest marketing science combine to tell us that: (1) people’s behavior is predictable, but it does not depend on rational calculations of benefits versus costs; (2) we can get people to do what we want by understanding their individual behavior thus far and then subtly shifting messages or the way we frame choices; and (3) this is all good because we can attain desirable social outcomes without paying people or threatening people to do the right thing. Governments needn’t ban or tax harmful products; they can “nudge” citizens into avoiding them. According to Katrin Bennhold,

In 2010, [the British Prime Minister] Mr. Cameron set up the Behavioral Insights Team — or nudge unit, as it’s often called. Three years later, the team has doubled in size and is about to announce a joint venture with an external partner to expand the program. The unit has been nudging people to pay taxes on time, insulate their attics, sign up for organ donation, stop smoking during pregnancy and give to charity — and has saved taxpayers tens of millions of pounds in the process, said David Halpern, its director. Every civil servant in Britain is now being trained in behavioral science.

From Bentham’s perspective, it is excellent news that a democratically elected government can make people act better without threats or bribery, just by observing them more accurately and tweaking choices or messages to nudge them in the right direction. Democracy benefits because the people can decide what counts as “better” and can monitor the state, and the government will be more efficient and effective thanks to its use of data. But from Foucault’s perspective, the new data-driven behavioral economics is the epitome of a Panopticon. Precisely because the power is soft, imperceptible, cheap, and ubiquitous, we don’t resist it.

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youth participatory budgeting in Boston

In lieu of a substantive post here today, I’d like to link to my article in Transformations entitled “You can add us to equations but they never make us equal: participatory budgeting in Boston.” It’s a reported piece; I didn’t conduct formal research, but I attended a key meeting, talked to the kids, and noted my impressions. I believe that asking kids to allocate $1 million of city funds is an excellent idea. It not only involves them in deliberation but also requires them to do collaborative work (analyzing and vetting proposals) and builds relationships. I argue that those are the three essential aspects of hands-on, citizen-centered engagement.

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the principle of affected interests and the decline of the nation state

The dominant theory of democracy used to be a sovereignty theory. A “people” would consist of a bounded group, all of whose members would have equal rights to discuss and decide the issues that came before them. Such groups might be nation-states bounded by international borders, but they might also be organizations or associations; they were sovereign to the extent that they could make decisions about categories of issues. They would thus exercise what the French Revolutionary theorist Benjamin Constant called the “liberty of the ancients,” meaning the right “to deliberate, in a public space, about war and peace, to ratify treaties of alliance with foreigners, to vote laws, pronounce decisions, examine the accounts, actions, and management of officials, to compel them to appear before the whole people, to accuse them, to condemn or acquit them.”

Two problems arise for all such sovereign groups: 1) they may not have a legitimate moral basis to exclude outsiders from their decisions, and 2) they may not have actual control over the situations that they confront. For example, the US may not have a legitimate moral justification to exclude Germans from influencing our government’s surveillance policy, which also affects Germany; and the US government cannot control capital markets or pollution flows that cross its borders.

These problems have become more severe and more evident in a highly interconnected world. A traditional justification for the sovereignty theory presumed that nation states could safeguard the interests of their own members without impinging often on others. But, as my friend Archon Fung writes, “If there once was a time when the laws of a nation-state could adequately protect the fundamental interests of its citizens, many argue that such time is past.” He and others argue that we should shift from a sovereignty theory to a “theory of affected interests,” or at least add the latter to our understanding of democracy.

According to a theory of affected interests, a democracy is not a group of people who constitute a fixed polity that has a right to decide on everything that comes before it. In fact, if Americans can decide every topic under our government’s control, we will violate non-Americans’ rights to be consulted on matters that affect them as much or more than they affect us. Rather, each person has a potentially unique set of interests and a right to be consulted on all the decisions that affect those interests. For example, I have interests in clean and safe streets in my neighborhood and also the amount of carbon produced by Chinese industry. Archon Fung proposes as the basic democratic principle that “An individual should be able to influence an organization if and only if that organization makes decisions that regularly or deeply affect that individual’s important interests.” On that basis, I may have a right to influence Cambridge, MA and the People’s Republic of China, as well as Microsoft, the National Security Agency, and the American Political Science Association. The world becomes more democratic to the extent that each person has influence over the various overlapping organizations that affect him or her.

Empirically, this seems to be one direction politics is taking in our digitally enabled, global world. Social movements now draw people from a range of political jurisdictions who share a common interest. Movements target the appropriate organizations, which may be governments, corporations, or NGOs. They work like networks rather than institutions: people who share interests connect up to protest, boycott, or otherwise confront organizations.

Visiting Tufts in July, Archon cited the example of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, farm laborers in the Florida tomato industry who were subject to terrible pay, stolen wages, and even documented cases of slavery. The sovereignty theory of democracy would not work for them because they were mostly not US citizens; they would be badly outvoted even if they were citizens; and they worked in a global market. Instead, the workers identified consumers from many nations who felt a moral stake in not supporting oppression. (The consumers had an interest, but not a purely selfish one.) The workers organized a boycott that forced the major buyers to negotiate. The result was a binding code of conduct that the workers can help enforce.

In essence, they identified a common interest with global consumers, targeted a set of international companies, and created a new micro-democracy just for their issue, in which they have considerable clout. One could define a more democratic world as one in which there are more such movements that represent more interests more effectively. Digital media would make that version of democracy more attainable than it ever was in the past. The democratic nation state would have decreasing relevance.

However, we should consider what would be lost if the sovereignty theory gave way entirely to a theory of affected interests. Constant spoke for a long line of civic republican theorists who envisioned citizens as groups of people who do not assess their individual interests in an ad hoc way and decide what affects them. Rather, they take responsibility for forming opinions about all matters that involve the group, giving at least some attention to abstract principles of justice as well as interests. Because they are responsible for considering a wide range of issues, they can weigh conflicting claims. For example, they should not only care about the farmworkers but also industry, the environment, and consumers. They should make laws that govern not only the tomato industry but the whole economy. And they should be subject to the laws that they influence, consistent with Aristotle’s definition of a citizen as one who both rules and obeys (Politics III:5).

So far, the democratic nation state has provided the main venue for this kind of citizenship. It has the two limitations named above: it may not have acceptable reasons to exclude outsiders, and it may not be capable of addressing all of its own problems. Therefore, the state should not be the only venue for democracy. Yet the democratic nation state is an achievement that we should not casually discard. Nations are big enough that they encompass some diversity of culture and class, and the successful ones have been able to organize one reasonably representative national discussion about justice. That requires an inclusive public sphere, a powerful and accountable legislature, and a sense of common fate that draws people’s attention to the public good. I read works as diverse as the “Gettysburg Address” and Bleak House as contributions to building that sense of common fate at the national level. Perhaps we should now understand ourselves as global citizens as well, but we are not literally people who both rule and obey at that scale. Meanwhile, we are at some risk of losing the national solidarity that underlies hard-won sovereign democratic institutions.

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We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For in 10 minutes

This video from Frontiers of Democracy 2014 is my best effort to summarize my book We Are the Ones … in 9 minutes and 39 seconds. It presents the book as an effort to answer the problem that was most on my mind during the conference–how to achieve leverage over large systems while retaining the human relationships and sense of personal agency that are most evident when we work together in small voluntary groups.

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