building power for resisting authoritarianism

After Donald J. Trump was elected president in 2016, informal groups popped up almost everywhere. They often attracted people who had not been involved in politics before. Stereotyped in the media as suburban white women, these citizens were informally named “The Resistance.” About a half million of them attended the Women’s March in Washington on January 21, 2017, with another five million marching in their home communities.

But the #resistance in 2017 proved evanescent because the nascent groups mainly encouraged their members to support other organizations.

Inboxes filled with urgent fundraising appeals for national organizations. For example, 350,000 people donated to the ACLU in just one weekend during Trump’s first month as president. People also shared and encouraged each other to follow news from national outlets, and digital subscriptions for The New York Times and The Washington Post tripled under Trump. Finally, many people gave money and time to Democratic candidates in 2022.

None of this generosity built power for the new groups themselves, and most–although not all–have faded away. For instance, donations to the ACLU funded essential legal advocacy but didn’t support much grassroots engagement. According to the Tufts Equity in America survey (which I co-led), just 1.5 percent of Americans “identified with” or “actively supported” the ACLU in 2020.

As Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks observe, many committed and skilled activists emerged, yet we have “no established, organizational infrastructure that can facilitate sustained collective action across a multiracial, multiclass constituency.”

How to Build Power

Imagine if the 350,000 people who gave $24 million to the ACLU in one weekend had instead (or also) formed 1,000 new local groups with an average startup budget of $24,000 and had set about raising enough additional funds and recruiting enough additional members to put 1,000 paid organizers at the service of half a million active volunteers in 1,000 American neighborhoods and towns. Our situation would be totally different today.

I am not saying that Kamala Harris would have won the election, but no president would be able to trample over a robust civil society.

Last summer, the Brennan Center and partners organized simulations to test how established institutions, such as state governments and the military, might resist if a US president used authoritarian methods. By all accounts, the results were unpromising. According to Ed Pilkington and Kira Lerner, “the consensus among many policy experts was that the … response felt weak and inadequate.” To me, this experiment reinforces the need for broad-based, nonviolent grassroots resistance.

In 2020, while 9.2 percent of survey respondents in the Tufts Equity in America survey said they had donated money to any advocacy organization, just 3.6 percent said they had “volunteered or worked for a political party, issue, or cause.” We need that last number to grow. Local groups must raise and control resources to recruit, train, and deploy volunteers, so that many more people work for issues and causes.

I would not exactly define the present cause as resistance to Trump. He was legitimately elected, and we don’t know how he will act. It will be an enormous relief if his administration turns out to be feckless. In that case, announcing a movement to save America from Trump would sound overwrought. What we certainly need is a movement to protect democracy and civil rights from anyone who might threaten those values, now or later.

The Structures We Need

This movement must be based on durable, self-sufficient, democratic organizations that work together effectively. They need financial autonomy, accountable leaders, paid staff, and federated structures.

When friends or neighbors are alarmed, they should decide whether they already have an organization that can join the #resistance or whether they need a new structure. A relevant existing organization could be a religious congregation, an activist group, or a union local, among others. It may need a new steering committee for its #resistance work.

However, most people do not belong to any entity that could seriously commit to politics, and they will have to consider incorporating new 501(c)4 organizations. This process starts with an online IRS form. A new group also needs by-laws so that it is clear who is responsible for what. There are free sample by-law documents that anyone can download.

Although structures can vary, some people should be elected to offices with limited terms so that the rest of the group can decide whether to reelect them. Someone’s job should be to develop agendas, facilitate discussions, and clarify the decisions that have been reached. Someone else should keep and share notes so that conversations can proceed from one meeting to another instead of cycling through the same issues. Someone should keep the accounts. Someone is responsible for the membership list.

These groups should raise money from their own members or through bake-sales and the like. They should not seek grants or large gifts from non-members, because they need autonomy.

If a group can grow to 100 or so members who donate or raise an average of $8,000/year, they can hire a full-time organizer with a budget. Even if these amounts are unrealistic, every member should be required to contribute money or specific amounts of volunteer time–with the requirements set low enough that anyone can join. Failure to contribute should cost you a seat at the table, but people should be encouraged to contribute in different ways.

Hiring organizers is crucial because we need some people to be organizing full-time, and because paid employment allows individuals to develop skills and networks that are essential in the longer term.

Growing to Scale

If a group gets much bigger than 100, it should consider splitting. The Black women who formed the Women’s Political Caucus in segregated Montgomery, Alabama in the 1950s launched a new chapter every time one of their existing groups breached the 100-person limit, so as to keep all members fully engaged in their own chapters. Depending on their economic resources, a group of 100 may be able to employ, or at least share, paid staff; and affluent groups should support needier ones.

It’s fine for groups to work “in coalition,” as people use that phrase nowadays–i.e., communicating with each other and periodically coming together for events. But loose coalitions will not really suffice for building power. Aligned groups should consider federating. This means incorporating a new entity for a region or state, with its own bylaws and budget, that has formal relationships with its affiliated groups.

For instance, each participating local group might get one seat on the larger organization’s board, might be expected to contribute some money to the umbrella organization for state-level work, and might be able to claim a portion of funds raised by the larger organization. Again, it may be possible to redirect an existing organization rather than forming a new nonprofit for a region or a state, but that will still require written agreements and bylaws.

Unity and Disagreement

Since groups and alliances need as much support as possible, they should avoid purity tests. A basic tip for anyone who drafts a statement of principles is to keep it short and simple, because unnecessary details offer individuals reasons to opt out. In fact, groups should generally avoid issuing statements, which have relatively little impact. They should affirmatively welcome internal dissent and hold robust discussions for their own members.

Nevertheless, their charters should clearly communicate their mission, and they should look for opportunities to speak in a single voice when that can make a difference. In short, the movement should aim for both unity and pluralism.

For those who are prone to reject broad-based movements as too moderate, I commend Bayard Rustin’s prophetic 1965 article,  “From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement” (Commentary, 2/39, Feb. 1965):

[The] effectiveness of a swing vote depends solely on ‘other’ votes. It derives its power from them. … Thus coalitions are inescapable, no matter how tentative they may be. … The issue is which coalition to join and how to make it responsive to your program. Necessarily there will be compromise. But the difference between expediency and morality in politics is the difference between selling out a principle and making smaller concessions to win larger ones. The leader who shrinks from this task reveals not his purity but his lack of political sense.

What Should People Do?

Protests are appropriate, but the #resistance is not a set of protest actions. In fact, seasoned organizers often view a public protest mainly as an opportunity to identify supporters who can then be recruited for more consequential tasks. So what should people actually do?

  • One-to-one interviews with residents who may or may not share the principles of the movement. These conversations may persuade some neutral or even hostile people and can help to recruit new active volunteers and potential leaders. In 2000, 2.2 percent of our respondents told us that they had “worked as a canvasser–having gone door to door for a political or social group” within the past year. That represents a substantial number, especially during a pandemic, but it needs to grow; and we need genuine conversations rather than quick pitches for political candidates.
  • Filling the vacuum created by the collapse of local professional journalism and combatting propaganda. This means collecting reliable information from published sources, conducting original research, and monitoring institutions and sharing the results with the public in credible forms–social media channels, email lists, teach-ins, and the like.
  • Forming relationships with established institutional leaders (elected officials, corporate CEOs, small-business owners, clergy, college presidents, philanthropists, celebrities) and asking them to take steps that are appropriate for their roles. For example, a university cannot and should not take a partisan position, but it must protect its own undocumented students, the intellectual freedom of its students and employees, and its own projects that address contested issues, such as climate change. It may need a nudge to do those things. Similarly, a Republican Member of the House will not vote to impeach Trump but might privately bury a terrible bill.
  • Registering and educating voters, including people who turn 18 or who naturalize as US citizens.
  • Endorsing candidates in primaries and general elections. A 501(c)4 organization is allowed to endorse, but its primary activity may not be assessing and endorsing politicians. In any case, political endorsements are more meaningful when they come from civic groups that mainly work independently. Their members can choose to volunteer for candidates or parties if they want to.
  • To a limited extent, fundraising for other entities, such as organizations that can mount legal strategies. However, there is a risk of sharing so much of a group’s own resources that it becomes a mere conduit.
  • Periodically organizing confrontational actions, such as boycotts, sit-ins and occupations, sheltering fugitives, and strikes. These methods must be used sparingly and strategically or else they will wear people out. But they certainly belong in the repertoire of any social movement.

A Broad-Based Civic Movement

We need a pro-democracy movement for the kind of people who are “normies” in the eyes of deeply committed activists. This will not be a movement that requires the modes of organizing that are favored (and perhaps necessary) on the radical left. For example, some long-term antiracist organizers keep their groups highly decentralized and avoid uplifting prominent leaders because so many high-profile leaders of color have been prosecuted or murdered in the past. And some pacifists, deep environmentalists (and others) repudiate ordinary bourgeois American lifestyles.

I honor these people as contributors to our overall political culture, but they alone will not protect the republic as it currently stands. For that purpose, we need many millions of much less committed and much less radical people to operate effectively in response to each new threat.

Building civic organizations is a deep American tradition. The urgent task is to revive it.


Source: Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks (2022), Pro-democracy Organizing against Autocracy in the United States: A Strategic Assessment & Recommendations, HKS Working Paper No. RWP22-017.

See also: the tide will turn; strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy; time for civil courage; time to build; tools for the #resistancepreparing for a possible Trump victory; etc.

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the tide will turn

Michael Schaffer has a piece in Politico entitled, “The Resistance Is Not Coming to Save You. It’s Tuning Out.” He collects indicators of low engagement, such as declining audiences for MSNBC and the number of people who are projected to attend a January protest march in DC: 50,000, instead of the 500,000 who showed up in January 2017.

I don’t think Schaffer is wrong about the present moment. In 2016, the election surprised many liberal, centrist, and principled conservative Americans and jolted them into action. This year, most anti-Trump voters dreaded the outcome and now feel resigned. The various contingent explanations for Trump’s 2016 election (Comey, Russian interference, an Electoral College fluke) can’t apply in 2024, so it’s common to blame the American people, the media landscape, or the American left–none of which appear alterable in the near future. Certain scenarios, such as Trump’s overriding the 22nd Amendment, are causing fearful paralysis and resignation.

But there is a tide in the affairs of men–as Brutus said, when he advocated a battle that proved disastrous for his own cause. The tide had turned against Brutus well before that moment (at Caesar’s funeral). As Shakespeare’s dramatic irony implies, momentum is easy to misread, especially when it seems to be with you. Today, Trump thinks everything is flowing his way, and that is when leaders make fatal errors.

I wouldn’t be surprised if Trump’s momentum carries him to early victories, such as ramming his whole cabinet through the Senate on 50-50 votes (with J.D. Vance as the tiebreaker). But I’m also confident that this lame-duck, second-term, cognitively impaired president who surrounds himself with sycophantic fools will lose momentum as his popularity tanks.

Although the threat of primaries will keep incumbent Republicans in line, they will face tough reelection races against Democrats and will scramble to contain the damage. The Democratic Party is only one element of the resistance–and electoral politics is only one avenue–but Democrats will gain momentum in inverse proportion to Republicans’ approval ratings. The military, the legal and medical professions, the intelligence agencies, and big companies that have liberal consumers all have considerable capacity.

Seasoned organizers (both leftists and those who are trans-partisan advocates of democracy) may be dispirited right now, but we will rally. New people will join as a result of Trump’s provocations or encouraged when he stumbles.

Leaders will emerge. Some may be contenders for 2026 statewide races or the 2028 presidential election, but some will be celebrities, clergy, or organizational leaders who attract broad support without seeking public office. While I certainly hope that no one dies as the direct result of conflict about Trump, tragedies can reverse public opinion. Political prosecutions will also create heroes.

Some us are in a position to act right now. We have the security, resources, and space to work in defense of democracy. We may feel tired and dispirited, but we are obligated to step up.

For now, I don’t think our message should be that everyone else must rush out and join us. Many people have good reasons to be afraid, or at least confused and demoralized. Now is not the time to mobilize but to work quietly to build the skills, networks, and organizational muscle for popular resistance in 2025 or 2026. Short-term indicators of passivity are largely irrelevant. Our job is to prepare for a riper moment.

(I’ll be posting regularly about concrete actions and strategies.)

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Mrs. Dalloway with a smartphone

Mrs. Dalloway created the Zoom link herself. There was so much to do for the evening’s virtual meeting: outreach, slides, breakout-group assignments.

Scrolling social media, Clarissa came upon a lovely vacation photo of an English garden. How calm the air can be early in the morning, like the flap of a wave, the kiss of a wave. She scrolled down to the comment thread and saw that Hugh had posted a cheerful remark. Her old friend Hugh–the admirable Hugh! She “liked” his comment.

A push notification: Active shooter. The location seemed to be no more than five miles away. Clarissa could have been there.

Septimus saw the same notification. Deep in a subreddit for veterans, he muttered to himself several times: “Active shooter.” Evans had been shot. No, it was an IED–Evans had bled out before Septimus’ own eyes when the shrapnel had ripped his throat. He’d come home in a body bag. But you could still see Evans sometimes, you could still hear him clearly speak. Septimus scanned the comments for Evans’ name, because he might still post. He might say what it’s like where he is now–is it a happier place?

Now, an automated reminder to take his meds. Septimus hated those pills. They deadened him so that he could hardly see the future or how love rules everything or the disgusting corruption of the human body.

On Clarissa’s screen, the name Peter Welch popped up. Out of the blue, after so many years, Peter suddenly wanted to know how she was doing. “Where RU?!?” she asked him back. He was in town, visiting from Dubai; maybe they could get together? His status was complicated and he wanted to talk.

A flood of memories, like photos from deep in one’s saved-items folder. For some reason, seeing Peter’s text brought back that time she’d hooked up with Sally Seton.

Richard was talking to someone, but Clarissa couldn’t see who. His laptop was angled away from her, and he had his headset on. She checked his calendar. He must be talking to Millicent Bruton. Millicent had sent the meeting invite and had asked Hugh to join them. Clarissa felt a pang. It wasn’t sexual jealousy–Millicent was no threat, and these people would never see each other in person. The feeling was FOMO. Why didn’t Millicent want her to join the conversation? Was Clarissa totally out of the loop now?

Richard honestly found Millicent Bruton a bit silly and scatterbrained. She’d drafted a post that she wanted him to put on his policy Substack. He, Hugh, and Millicent were editing it together in a shared doc. It was a mess. Her main point seemed to be that people should move to Canada. (That’s always the idea, Richard thought–let’s all move to Canada). Hugh, who managed internal comms. for his family’s real estate business, believed that no one ever reads more than 40 words. He was adding bolded headings– “What it means” and “Why it matters”–and turning Millicent’s paragraphs into bullet points.

Richard would post her piece–why not? His traffic was way down, anyway. So nice of Clarissa to organize the webinar for his org! A virtual get-together might boost his profile. He thought about sending his wife a heart emoji, but that feeling passed before he clicked.

Clarissa hoped that people would join the Zoom on time, leave their cameras on, post witty comments in the chat, and have a good time together. She pinged an old friend with a reminder and ordered a protein smoothie to be delivered for lunch. Before she submitted her order, she messaged Richard to see if he wanted anything, but he’d already ordered his own tempeh tacos.

Their daughter Elizabeth said, “I’m going outside for a walk.” Clarissa and Richard nodded distractedly and went back to their screens.

See also: three endings for Christabel; Amy Replies; The House of Atreus: A Play

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complexity and nuance about public opinion

Last Monday, I gave a talk at Colgate University. I claimed that if you read a lot of mainstream survey research, you’re likely to conclude that “people are stupid and they hate each other,” but this negative assessment reflects some bias. A student, Colgate senior Clementina Aboagye, told Maddie Koger of the Colgate Maroon-News:

“I think it was important that we had someone like Peter Levine who comes from an institution like Tufts University to present us [with the idea] that as much as we may disagree with each other, we still have complexities in how we think — that it’s important we search for gray areas because politics isn’t so black and white,” Aboagye said. “Those gray areas are important for us to not only converse about, but also to give each other space to speak — even when we don’t agree, because we can’t always agree — and we live in a world where people’s experiences and access to things determine what kind of ways in which they think — that deserves consideration.”

The very next day, a majority of American voters chose Donald Trump, concluding a campaign marked by polarized media, misinformation, hostility, and attacks (from one side) on basic liberal norms. Yet I still think there’s truth in the argument I offered at Colgate, which you could watch in full here.

The previous week, I had given American University’s annual Lincoln Scholars Lecture on “What Should We Do? A Theory of Civic Life.” Although my topic was quite different, this talk also offered a more positive view of civic life than one would glean by focusing only on an ugly and dangerous national election. According to Ridha Riyani’s summary in the AU Eagle newspaper, I said,

“We disagree because we care, and we need to do it better. …

[Levine] ended with a call to action, reminding attendees that civic life extends beyond national politics and requires thoughtful collaboration. 

“In conversation, we can move towards greater wisdom,” Levine said. “We communities are capable of changing the rules.”

I would not argue now that all we need is to listen generously across differences and explore the complexity of other people’s views. We must also stand up against injustice. Confrontational nonviolent civil resistance was a major theme in my AU talk, and I have been preparing for a Trump victory for several years. Still, there remains a place for listening, bridge-building, and collaboration, and I strive to offer useful concepts and skills for those purposes.

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social class and the youth vote in 2024

My colleagues at CIRCLE (The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement) have already produced an incredible body of analysis of the 2024 youth vote. Overall, they find that youth turnout was higher than in past decades but lower than in 2020, and young adults supported the Democrats, but much more narrowly than previously.

I recommend all their work, but I’d like to discuss one pattern. It appears that being working-class predicted support for Donald Trump when holding race and gender constant, with the exception that young women of color supported Harris by the same amount, regardless of their social class. These trends are stronger for older Americans but still evident among the 18-29s.

(I interpret education as an indicator of social class. Especially for younger people, income is much less revealing. An MBA student might earn less current personal income than a mechanic of the same age.)

Young adults who have not attended college favored Trump by two-to-one, whereas those with postgraduate educations preferred Harris by 14 points. Nearly half (42%) of young Latinos without college experience chose Trump. Thirty-four percent of all young Black men favored him, a pretty remarkable increase that may also be related to social class.

I would be reluctant to explain this pattern by citing any specific policies of the Biden Administration or proposals of the Harris-Walz campaign, nor by criticizing the candidates or their rhetoric. This is because the same pattern–working-class voters supporting the right–has been evident recently in France, Germany, and the UK–the other democracies that I’ve studied–and was already strongly present in the USA in 2022.

My pet theory is that liberal or progressive parties prefer to regulate, because they can shift the costs to private entities and local governments. The regulated organizations then pass mandates on to workers and consumers, and the rules that originate in legislation are mixed together with all the things that companies require or prohibit for their own profit. The same department that tells workers not to use polluting chemicals also warns them not to take unauthorized work breaks. As a result, regulation that has social benefits looks like corporate monitoring, and progressives sound like the nation’s HR department or legal office. It doesn’t help that almost all Democratic elected officials are, in fact, lawyers or former managers.

My preferred alternative would be to spend public money to benefit workers, because that is a more direct and transparent way to achieve public purposes. However, the Biden Administration and congressional Democrats did authorize $1.9 trillion of new spending on green manufacturing (and microconductors) and reaped no apparent political gain.

Perhaps contingent factors interfered, such as the pandemic and the end of pandemic-related benefits, global inflation, and Joe Biden’s inability to make the case when it mattered. But the failure of nearly $2 trillion to move working-class opinion requires reflection. Unless something changes fast, the formative experiences of our rising generation will not incline them to progressive values.

See also: why “liberal” can sound like “upper-class”; a trillion here, a trillion there, and pretty soon, you’re talking real money; and class inversion as an alternative to the polarization thesis

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explaining a past election versus deciding what to do next

The Internet is saturated with explanations of the 2024 election. Some of these “quick takes” are dispassionate, while others take the form: If only Harris had done what I know is right, she would have won.

The challenge is epistemic: it’s virtually impossible to explain a single past event that involves many decision-makers (in this case, about 150 million of them).

Explaining the decisions of a few powerful people is hard enough, but at least then we can use evidence about their individual values, goals, and personalities. For instance, we can investigate why Napoleon ordered the main assault at the Battle of Borodino in 1812. However, says Tolstoy,

It was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, for none of his orders were executed and during the battle he did not know what was going on before him. So the way in which these people killed one another was not decided by Napoleon’s will but occurred independently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds of thousands of people who took part in the common action. It only seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his will (War and Peace, 10:28)

It’s easier to explain the pattern displayed in a large set of cases (inductive reasoning). John Burn-Murdoch observes that every incumbent government in the world that has faced an election in 2024 has suffered major setbacks. John Sides argues that inflation lowered Biden’s approval rating, and the incumbent’s approval predicts reelection.

But these generalizations cannot explain the single event of the 2024 US presidential election. Generalizations inevitably involve variance, and 2024 is obviously anomalous. Should we even categorize Harris as the incumbent, when she was a vice president stepping in for a president and running against the previous president?

We can also look at patterns within the population to try to explain why individuals voted. For instance, Michael Tesler assembles evidence that few American women vote from gender solidarity and race consistently trumps gender as an explanation of voting.

This is a valid approach that will yield more precise insights once we have voter files and better survey analysis for 2024. But this method also has limitations for the purpose of explanation. As the (true) cliché reminds us, correlation is not causation. Besides, individuals vary in ways that are not captured in generic surveys. And we must distinguish carefully between two tasks: explaining why large numbers of people voted for each candidate, versus explaining the marginal change since 2020. Big blocs of the electorate vote predictably, yet much of the conversation is about changes at the margin. Our whole discussion would be different if Harris had won by 4 points instead of losing by less than one point, but either way, most people would have voted the same.

To emphasize the last point: I strongly suspect that a male Democrat would have fared no better than Kamala Harris, or even possibly worse. One of many pieces of supportive evidence is the fact that people whose survey answers indicated sexism already tended strongly to oppose Joe Biden in 2020 (Spencer 2021). I doubt that sexism explains the marginal change between 2020 and 2024, yet that hardly makes sexism irrelevant, since it helps to explain the 2020 baseline. Whether you feel that sexism is at stake may reasonably reflect your own depth of concern about misogyny in our society; this is not simply a statistical question. Put another way, whether you explain the result in terms of sexism depends on whether you are trying to a) combat misogyny or b) win an election. The explanation is relative to its purpose.

We might conclude that it is fruitless to make a model to explain any particular case. But that is exactly what we must do before we act. Even if there is no way to know now what would have happened had Harris acted differently, Harris and her team had to do something. In September, they needed a prospective model of the single case that confronted them: the election.

In 1903, Charles Sanders Peirce coined the term “abduction” (or “abductive judgment”) for the logic that explains a single case. Abduction is a pragmatic necessity because we always act in specific circumstances. In my view, valid abduction never depends on a single claim. There is no way to test whether one premise caused a given outcome in a given case. Rather, a good abduction consists of many linked components: a whole model. And it is appropriate for the model to contain facts, values, and strategies.

Thus, if you were Kamala Harris in September, you needed a coherent account of the current US electorate (facts), what you sought to achieve as a president (values), and how various messages and methods would affect the outcome (strategy). You had to guard against biases (believing facts because they confirmed your values), but you were entitled to bring your self into the analysis. For one thing, this was a model for how you should act, so it had to motivate you and your team and sound authentic coming from you.

We cannot tell which parts of Harris’ implicit model were right or wrong–and it remains possible that her model was as good as it could have been. But what we need now is a model to guide our own next steps.

Since I am not running for president, my model should not be designed for that purpose–although I might start armchair strategizing in 2026 or so. For now, I need a model that guides my actions as a concerned citizen during the Trump Administration. To a limited extent, my model might be guided by my retrospective assessment of the 2024 presidential campaign–but not by much. The main question, as always, is what should we do?


Sources: Spencer, Bettina. “Impact of racism and sexism in the 2008–2020 US presidential elections.” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 21.1 (2021): 175-188; Peirce, C.S. 1903. Lectures on Pragmatism, Lecture 1: Pragmatism: The Normative Sciences. See also: using a model to explain a single case; overestimating the impact of leaders; What Should We Do? A Theory of Civic Life

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time to build

This is from a Twitter thread posted yesterday by University of Pittsburgh historian Lara Putnam:

When highly-engaged people who had voted against him came out of their initial shock in wake of Trump’s first election and tried to figure out how to push back on Trump and his GOP majorities, a few templates were offered them:

Guidance # 1: Tea Party in Reverse — or at least those parts of the Tea Party visible from the congressional offices where its anger hit. More or less, the Indivisible playbook. Which included….

A. Hold large protest marches
B. Build local groups or networks, drawing on those who attend
C. Contact incumbent politicians to pressure them to act against Trump policy efforts
D. Conduct targeted actions to drive earned media against Republican incumbents
E. [Run primaries against] Democratic incumbents who were not sufficiently active, oppositional, or ideologically aligned

Guidance # 2: Trust the Professionals; Be Their ‘Grassroots Engagement’

A. Donate to existing Democratic candidates
B. Participate in the “ground game” of anonymous voter contacting for them (doorknocking, textbanking, phonebanking… & the slightly rogue postcards to voters)

Guidance #3: Movement Voter Project & similar

A. Give money to support organizing by paid staff w/in disadvantaged communities, [especially] communities of color, which will empower & mobilize the members of those communities to push progressive policy by voting more & voting Left.

Putnam comments, “I don’t think anyone can look at the last four years of results, culminating in last night’s outcomes, & say that any of these theories of change looks vindicated. & I say this very much as someone who has put mileage in on each route, alongside others who’ve done so much more.”

I wouldn’t make the counterfactual claim that Harris would have won if the organizing had been more effective. Who knows? But I do think we would be in a better position to resist Trump’s policies in 2025 and beyond.

In a 2024 New York Review article and elsewhere, Putnam has advocated building local Democratic Party organizations that consistently engage and involve people, not only during campaigns. Her advice is consistent with research by political scientists like Eitan Hersh, Dan Shea, and others, and it’s valid. But for some of us, it’s not perfectly on point, because our roles and missions are not partisan. We want or are obliged to organize for democracy, not necessarily for Democrats. For us, the same general advice applies, but it implies building effective grassroots organizations outside of parties.

Why did so much of the spontaneous grassroots opposition to Trump in 2016-17 prove evanescent? Why did relatively few groups that formed in 2017 survive, and why didn’t they turn into one more powerful movement? I would offer three reasons:

  1. These grassroots groups never received significant investment. Kamala Harris raised more than $1 billion between her nomination and Election Day. I don’t begrudge her that money. I happen to think she ran an excellent campaign against strong headwinds. But her fundraising success reminds us that there is a lot of money on the center-left and left. Paltry sums flow to grassroots organizing efforts between elections. Local groups can’t hire paid staff or pay rent. If there were much more total investment, we wouldn’t have to make painful choices between funding groups that organize vulnerable people of color and those that have suburban and middle-class constituencies (and larger numbers of voters). We could support both and help them to collaborate.
  2. Progressive money flows to apolitical institutions. Amy Binder and Jeffrey Kinder show that wealthy people with progressive objectives often donate to universities. That makes sense if they are trying to support research and development. But often they are trying to educate, inform, and empower students. As a result, college students are drawn into well-funded campus-based programs that are not (and should not be) free to participate in actual politics. Along with the the young staff and faculty who work most closely with them, these students then find themselves in opposition to the very institutions that also purport to serve them–denouncing their own universities for failing to act politically. Meanwhile, conservative donors, who don’t trust universities, tend to fund and employ conservative young people directly to work on state and national issues. This is a much better youth-development strategy, giving students leadership experience and helping them to develop career networks. I mention Binder’s and Kinder’s book on higher education, but I suspect that public broadcasting and other nonpartisan nonprofits are also absorbing funds that should be spent on organizing.
  3. We are not good enough at organizing at scale. When the Civil Rights movement got fully underway in the mid-1950s, people like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Rosa Parks had an effective template for building and expanding organizations. They naturally founded new membership groups that used Roberts’ Rules of Order in their face-to-face meetings, elected officers (a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer), and printed regular newsletters. When they observed similar groups forming in other communities, they federated, sending representatives to regional or statewide or even national meetings, where officers were elected. Today, we don’t act this way because we have lost some experience and skills, but also because the models of the 1950 will not suffice in an era of social media, working parents, multiple simultaneous social movements that compete for attention, and decreased deference to authority. We need new modes of organization, but we can’t function without any structures at all.

For the last year or more, I have been trying to use my own modest venues, such as last summer’s Frontiers of Democracy conference and various classrooms, to explore and train people in the nuts-and-bolts of nonviolent civic action. I never tell people what causes to support or whom to oppose, but only try to develop their skills and offer them templates for effective organizing. Of course, other colleagues do the same and better. But many more people and groups with much deeper resources than mine must invest now in a robust civic infrastructure that can defend and even improve our republic.

See also: strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy; tools for the #resistance; and the website Civic Theory and Practice.

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strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy

In July, Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts said, “We are in the process of the second American Revolution, which will remain bloodless, if the left allows it to be.” His statement reflected some bluster and hype, and Trump distanced himself from Heritage. Nevertheless, Roberts expressed a mood that will be shared by many–perhaps more than 1,000–new White House staff, senior federal appointees, allied members of Congress and staff, and ideological lobbyists. They will all be thinking hard about what to do to advance their “revolution.”

To plan a response, we should imagine what such people will do. Here is a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) assessment of the situation from the perspective of the second Trump Administration:

  • Strengths: Ability to make appointments, issue executive orders, negotiate with foreign governments, and command attention. Immunity from prosecution for all official acts and the power to pardon people who follow illegal orders. A compliant congressional GOP, a friendly Supreme Court, and some fawning media platforms. A claimed mandate from the election, and tens of millions of actual supporters.
  • Weaknesses: At this moment, the House remains in play. Democratic control would mean no laws or budgets without Democratic support. Even if Democrats lose the House, they will be able to filibuster legislation in the Senate. The economy looks healthy right now, but Trump’s tariffs and other economic proposals would cause inflation and/or contraction. MAGA true-believers will be tempted to introduce bills that are clearly unpopular.
  • Opportunities: Picking fights to establish dominance, discourage opposition, motivate supporters, and dare opponents to promote positions that many voters consider radical. If the opposition looks radical, many voters will perceive that politics is polarized, not that the president is extreme, and they may accept authoritarianism to “restore order.”
  • Threats: Trump voters include substantial subgroups who don’t really share his ideology but who believe that he is competent to deliver prosperity and order. (According to the exit polls, 31% of voters chose the economy as their top issue, and of those, 78% voted for Trump.) If he causes chaos and controversy, and many voters abandon him, he will become toxic for GOP candidates looking toward 2026. If a small group of GOP defectors in Congress join the Democrats, they can block Trump. If he loses the appearance of influence and momentum, he could quickly become a lame-duck (especially if he continues to display cognitive decline). If momentum swings strongly to the opposition, there will be opportunities to make the Supreme Court and other institutions more democratic, rather than less so.

Next, we might brainstorm specific moves that Trump may make in the early stages of his administration and think about counter-moves.

Their most pragmatic option would be to avoid prominent controversies while turning the quieter processes of the executive branch against immigrants and environmental programs. If Trump took that path, he might be able to avoid an energetic resistance and claim credit for the positive economy that he will inherit. He could play golf and retire in four years. But he and his people will be tempted to take riskier actions:

  1. Appoint numerous radical supporters to senior positions. Perhaps give them all “acting” titles and not even request Senate confirmation, thus defeating the norm that political appointees require approval. They will cancel grants and contracts, slow-walk appropriations, fire civil servants, and direct funds to friendly groups and legislative districts. Much of this activity will be unreported, since the executive branch gets little coverage.
  2. Negotiate privately with Putin, without a readout or meaningful public declaration. Offer Russia free scope in Ukraine and promise to block or sabotage US aid. Likewise, communicate privately with Netanyahu and encourage Israel to operate without limits in both the West Bank and Gaza.
  3. Pardon all the January 6th insurrectionists. Convene them on the White House lawn. Possibly deputize them as federal agents or at least encourage them to organize as a private militia. If any of them commit violent crimes against protesters, journalists, or residents, immediately pardon them again. Deploy them to break up marches and demonstrations and to patrol the capital.
  4. Order federal law enforcement and perhaps state national guards to detain immigrants in large numbers, hold them, and physically move them across the southern border.

Some counter-moves:

  • Large, regular, orderly marches that, as Bayard Rustin would recommend, are aimed at winning mass public support. At first, the main message should not be that Trump is illegitimate, since he won the election. Nor is this an opportunity to advance progressive policies, including those that I passionately support. Rather, the message should be opposition to specific things that Trump does that are both unpopular and illegal. The aim is to establish a legitimate counter-force in support of the Constitution and the rule-of-law. The priority is to preserve a system within which progressives (and others) are able to advocate their goals, not to accomplish those goals immediately. The larger and more diverse the protests, the better.
  • A mass walkout like the one that defeated the Kapp Putsch in Berlin in 1920 and preserved German democracy for more than a decade. That story makes important reading right now. I could envision Trump provoking a self-coup, much like the Kapp Putsch, even if he doesn’t really plan to do so. This could begin to happen if armed MAGA supporters exercise violent control in DC, perhaps in reaction to peaceful marches. However, a similar attempt failed in 1920 when Berliners refused to work in the face of a coup, the city shut down, and civilian resistance spread to regular military units. The Berlin work-stoppage did not begin with a formal strike but happened organically when frightened Berliners just stayed home.
  • Building organizations that allow many Americans to take concrete steps to protect democracy in a coordinated fashion.

Finally, some points about the movements that should form:

There should be no expectation that the opposition will coalesce into one big organization. For one thing, the Democratic Party will constitute part of the opposition, but not everyone will want to–or be able to–coordinate with any party. Besides, diversity and choice are valuable. We should expect opponents of Trump to hold diverse beliefs, from radical leftist ideals to genuinely conservative or libertarian values. It is important for people to be able to find groups in which they can feel reasonably comfortable.

On the other hand, the opposition will be weak if it consists of lots of evanescent, hyper-local, voluntary groups that have loose and shifting memberships. Such groups simply cannot accomplish much. In turn, a grassroots opposition will quickly lose momentum and confidence unless it enlists many Americans in tangible work that accomplishes victories.

The middle ground between one big organization and lots of ad hoc meetings is a widespread commitment to organize at medium scales. People need templates for forming small organizations that function and survive, including processes for selecting accountable leaders, making concrete decisions, and recruiting new members. Leaders of small groups should then seek each other out and form coalitions that, in turn, make decisions and elect accountable leaders for larger scales.

A healthy, broad-based nonviolent resistance movement will have leaders, but not just one or a few. It will be “leaderful,” and its best-known representatives will demonstrate some diversity.

I am in the camp that says that Kamala Harris ran a nearly flawless campaign, and she will make a plausible case to be renominated in 2028. But she cannot be the leader of a whole broad-based movement, if only because she is a potential presidential candidate. I would not be surprised to see a range of people from various sectors and walks of life gain prominence as part of a civil resistance. There is no need for them to agree in detail, but we will benefit if they communicate and come together at key moments.

As I have argued, successful movements need scale (lots of people), unity (the ability to coalesce), depth (some activists who develop impressive skills and networks), and pluralism (disagreement and dissent about many issues).

SPUD is hard to attain because combining unity with pluralism requires tolerance and patience within the movement; and combining scale with depth means finding ways for committed activists and peripheral supporters to collaborate. Nevertheless, good movements build SPUD.

One pitfall to avoid right now is debating whether Kamala Harris lost because she didn’t stand for what you believe–whatever that may be. Maybe you’re right (although it is always hard to prove such counterfactuals). If you’re planning a partisan political campaign for 2026 and 2028, you should think about why Trump won this time. But retrospective arguments will not help to build a citizens’ pro-democracy movement that includes people who both agreed and disagreed with Harris on key points.

To put it more bluntly: it’s alienating to be told that Trump won because Harris took a stance that one agrees with, and why alienate people whom we need? This was an election season of shifting “vibes,” and now we need the vibe to shift to unified resistance.

When brainstorming concrete actions for people to take, one option that is always worth considering is to send everyone out to conduct one-to-one meetings. In the tradition of relational organizing, these are not mainly about persuading individuals to endorse, support, or join the group. They are about genuine listening: learning what a range of people believe, experience, and care about. That said, whenever anyone demonstrates enthusiasm for the organization’s current vision, that person should be recruited to join.

I posted the graphic that accompanies this post immediately after the 2016 election, and it went a bit viral. (Thanks to my colleague Alberto Medina for improving its appearance.) Although the name “Obama” should be changed to “Biden,” and some other minor tweaks might apply, I think the diagram remains pertinent and is perhaps even more urgent today.

See also: learning from Robert’s Rules?; a flowchart for collective decision-making in democratic small groupstools for the #resistance; preparing for a possible Trump victory (Nov. 15 2023); and Maria Avila et al., Building Collective Leadership for Culture Change: Stories of Relational Organizing on Campus and Beyond

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Tomashi Jackson, Time and Space

Last week, my 50 undergraduate students and I visited the exhibition “Tomashi Jackson: Across the Universe” at the Tufts University Art Gallery. They looked carefully and derived many insights from the work of this important artist. I highly recommend the show, which is open until Dec. 8 and free.

I illustrate this post with a photograph of Jackson’ 2020 work entitled “Time and Space (1948 End of Voter Registration Line)(1965 LBJ Signs the Voting Rights Act).” The photo does little justice to the original object, which is monumental (more than seven feet high) and structural, a multi-media painting mounted on a tilted wooden frame. In the photo with this post, you can see the shadows that the object casts on the gallery wall.

The materials listed on the gallery’s label are: “Acrylic, Pentelic marble, Ohio Underground Railroad site soil, American electoral ephemera, and paper bags on canvas and fabric.” Jackson collected the marble dust near the Acropolis in Athens, birthplace of democracy. The whole work is overlaid with red-white-and-blue stripes that are slightly askew.

We discussed the composition: Black citizens waiting to register to vote in Atlanta in the 1940s (at the top); recent election flyers (at the bottom); and in the middle, LBJ signing the Voting Rights Act. The President is larger than anyone else. Does that mean that he played a pivotal role? Or that his importance is overplayed in conventional accounts of American history? Is he responsible for the law, or was that really an outcome of a process that began with the people at the top of the picture?

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a constitutional crisis is not the end of history

In Forbes yesterday, Meg Little Reilly paraphrases and quotes me:

American students are generally taught that the U.S. Constitution is unbreakable — which has been true, thus far—but this narrative reinforces the notion that if the Constitution were to fall, so too would the nation. For many Americans, everything that comes after political unrest is a “blank page,” according to [Peter] Levine. It’s a paradoxically fragile characterization of a country.

But this isn’t how civilizations or humans respond to political chaos. In reality, an existential challenge to the U.S. Constitution would trigger the next chapter, not the end. Preparing students with this more comprehensive understanding of human history could be constructive in November and long into the future.

Reilly also quotes my friend Emma Humphries from iCivics, who says, “Teachers are going to be a safe and steady presence for their students” in the aftermath of next week’s election, regardless of who wins and whether the outcome is resolved immediately.

I’d elaborate my comment as follows: Love it or hate it, the US Constitution is the oldest in the world. It suffered a catastrophic crisis in 1860, but the people who sought to preserve it won the ensuing Civil War. Although explicit amendments and subtler reinterpretations have changed the Constitution significantly, its stability has been evident. As a result, Americans are taught to assume that the document will always govern us–for the rest of our lives. We learn to equate the Constitution with the nation, as if it had constituted us as a people. Given this civic religion, a constitutional rupture sounds like the end of our history.

The prospect of a possible second Trump administration (which is, of course, very far from guaranteed) is causing people to mutter phrases like “Game over,” as if there would be no future for the republic if Trump wins and overrides constitutional limits.

I do fear a constitutional rupture or a period of deep constitutional instability, especially if the cause is an authoritarian presidency (no matter how competent). We could be much worse off than we are now, and the rest of the world is at risk as well. I do not want our system to break down.

However, it is an idiosyncratic US trait to view the Constitution as both fixed and fragile and to equate that document with the people and the nation. France has had five republics, two monarchies, two empires, a nascent commune, and a Quisling dictatorship during the period that our Constitution has stood.

French history is not enviable. More people were executed during the suppression of the Commune in 1871 than during the Terror of 1793-4, to name just two cruel episodes. Yet the French nation and people have demonstrated deep continuities, even when their formal system has changed.

Between the Second and Third Republics, Napoleon III ruled as a quasi-dictator. This was a betrayal of democratic rights and values, yet the republic in a deeper sense persisted. French history continued, and the French continued to influence their own state–as well, tragically, as the subjected peoples of their colonies. When Napoleon III won his rigged 1851 referendum, I doubt that many French people thought that the game was over. In fact, there were three more republics to come. And their history is far more typical than ours.

We Americans must be ready in case we have to use vocabulary and concepts that are familiar around the world: coups and auto-coups, oligarchs and juntas, Bonapartism, unrest and disorder, state media and oppositional media, states of emergency, security forces (and security-force defections), popular fronts, civil service strikes, general strikes, electoral boycotts, mass civil resistance, and constitutional restorations and re-foundings.

I devoutly that hope we experience none of these things, but if we do, it will be up to us to determine how they turn out. In that sense, the republic will still be ours, whether we can keep it consistently or not.

See also: the relevance of American civil religion to K-12 education; constitutional pietyhow to respond, revisited.

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