competing political science perspectives on Trump

Political science is a heterogeneous discipline, and the various subfields are prone to interpret the Trump Administration and MAGA very differently.

  1. Comparativists compare and contrast political systems around the world. This approach could yield various interpretations of MAGA, but an influential interpretation assigns Trump to the category of modern authoritarianism, which is on the rise (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). We learn that personalist, populist authoritarians in many countries have a toolkit that works for them. They don’t cancel elections or ban parties but manipulate the system from the executive branch, subject their critics to costly investigations, apply pressure to media conglomerates to influence journalism, etc. Not every current authoritarian has succeeded–consider South Korea and Brazil. But many have prevailed, and therefore comparativists tend to be alarmed about the situation in the USA.
  2. Scholars of American political development think about this country historically, often looking not only at our government and politicians but also at culture and social movements (Smith & King 2024). They are likely to notice precedents and echoes from American history and observe that prominent current debates are about how to interpret the past. Trump may remind them less of Hungary’s Victor Orban than of segregationist politicians. They may focus less on Trump as an individual actor and more on persistent strands of nativism and white nationalism in the USA.
  3. Political theorists are intellectually diverse, but most of us spend at least some of our time reading works from a wide variety of eras and perspectives that pose fundamental questions about government and politics. A disproportionate number of these classic works discuss revolutionary change, and some of them advocate it. Consider Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau, or Marx and the Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt, as examples. Even philosophers who oppose revolution are often primarily concerned about it. Therefore, political theorists are quick to imagine that our regime may be on the verge of breaking down. And we are prone to assign MAGA an ideological label, whether we name it populist, nationalist, neo-fascist, neoliberal, or something else.
  4. Scholars of social movements may ask whether MAGA is a bottom-up movement, but mainly they study anti-Trump movements, asking whether they will prevail and what may increase their odds of success. For example, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011) noticed that every nonviolent social movements that has mobilized at least 3.5% of its nation’s population has succeeded in modern times. Chenoweth recently discussed the “3.5% rule” with Paul Krugman, giving a nuanced answer to the question whether an anti-Trump movement will defeat the current administration if it can activate 3.5% of the US population. Note that in this framework, the main path of social change is not via elections but on the streets.
  5. Scholars of American government and political behavior use empirical tools of social science (analysis of voting records, surveys, and interviews or focus groups) to identify trends and patterns in US politics. They are likely to view Donald Trump as a lame-duck second-term president with approval ratings in the low 40s (and falling just lately). They see regular patterns playing out, such as the tendency for the electorate to move in the opposite ideological direction from the incumbent president. Most trends suggest that Democrats will win in 2026 and probably 2028. This framework predicts that Republicans will become burdened by an unpopular, term-limited Republican president and will begin to distance themselves from him. More basically, it assumes that elections will unfold as normal, that we will have two parties, that both will compete for the median voter, that the main vehicle for public opposition is an election, etc.

In my own writing and extracurricular work, I have been trying to support social movements against authoritarianism. Lately, I have been offering trainings–most recently at the excellent Dayton (OH) Democracy Summit — on how to resist authoritarianism from the bottom up. Here is a video of my standard talk.

Thus, I am applying the comparativists’ framework plus social movement scholarship. However, I am not completely committed to this combination. It is plausible that scholars of American government are right, and the usual patterns of US politics will reassert themselves. I am using a precautionary principle: taking preventive action in case of a disastrous outcome.

Predicting the next three years is difficult because we don’t know two crucial variables.

One variable is the performance of the economy in the next months. So far, it is holding up pretty well considering all the stress. The main indicators are not really very different from last year. Voters are unhappy but not facing an economic meltdown.

The economy could improve, boosting Donald Trump. (The Supreme Court may help by striking down the tariffs). The economy could keep puttering along. Or it could tip into a significant recession. If that happens, scholars of American political behavior would predict a realignment in favor of Democrats, and comparativists might expect Trump to attempt drastic action to save himself.

The other unknown variable is the behavior of Trump and his inner circle. They have crossed many bright lines: choosing political opponents for investigations, pardoning rioters, deploying troops in selected cities, and shuttering whole departments that are authorized and funded by statute. But they could do a lot more, such as invoking the Insurrection Act, deploying ICE against peaceful protesters, or suspending elections.

Comparativists tell us that subtler methods of authoritarian control work better in the 21st century. Using drastic methods would indicate weakness. Nevertheless, heightened drama could end with victory or defeat for Trump. The regime might succeed in suppressing opposition, or it might provoke a much larger popular response that succeeds. A common pattern is: protest –> state violence –> protests that mourn and celebrate the victims –> state violence against the mourners –> larger protests –> victory for the grassroots movement.

Finally, Trump has some personal characteristics that make him hard to classify. One is that he seems to care almost entirely about his own welfare. All other modern American presidents have wanted to enact legislation. That is the main way to change society durably. A president can only sign a bill after both houses of Congress have passed it. Therefore, all modern presidents have cared deeply who prevails in Congress.

But Trump does not seem to care about legislation. He signed nothing significant during his first term except budgetary changes. The Republicans loaded a lot of provisions into the “Big Beautiful Bill” that Trump signed on July 4, but even most of those were budgetary.

Meanwhile, Trump has radically–but perhaps not durably–changed government through unilateral executive action. Looking forward, he may not care very much whether Democrats win in 2026. He can ignore subpoenas, avoid removal by holding at least 34 votes in the Senate, and continue to govern unilaterally from the White House.

On one hand, this means that he is less likely to take drastic steps to prevent an electoral defeat in 2026. I think he has always expected to face a Democratic Congress in 2027 and 2028. He won’t pass any laws, and he may have difficulty appointing judges, but that won’t matter much to him. On the other hand, it means that no one in Congress–including congressional Republicans–will have much leverage over him. We may not see the usual pattern of the president’s party trying to constrain him to save themselves.

I think that Trump and many around him are incurring legal liability. Increasingly, as his term ends, we may see them primarily concerned about avoiding prosecution in 2029 and thereafter. Similar concerns could begin to influence private organizations that could be charged with bribery for assisting Trump. This phenomenon is common around the world–hence very familiar to comparativists. It raises questions about whether Trump will try to suppress elections just to avoid legal repercussions (although he could use preemptive pardons instead), and whether it will be necessary to negotiate an amnesty of some kind.


See also Trump: personalist leader or representative of a right-wing movement?; Trump, Modi, Erdogan; why political science dismissed Trump and political theory predicted him, revisited. Sources: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (Crown 2018); Smith, Rogers M., and Desmond King. America’s new racial battle lines: Protect versus repair. University of Chicago Press, 2024 Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. Columbia University Press, 2011.

civic education webinar

I enjoyed this recent discussion of civic education in colleges and universities with Josiah Ober, Jenna Silber Storey, Mary Clark, and our moderator Debra Satz. I thought the questions from the audience were particularly interesting.

In case you are interested in the Alliance, this is the website.

The next webinar will be “Out of Many, One: Creating a Pluralistic Framework for Civics in Higher Education,” with Paul Carrese (Arizona State University), Jacob Levy (McGill University) and Minh Ly (University of Vermont), moderated by Brian Coyne (Stanford University). That’s on Wednesday, November 12, 2025 from 9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. Pacific (noon Eastern). You could register here.

And the one after that will be Comparative Civics: Beyond Western Civ.,” with Dongxian Jiang, Shadi Bartsch, Simon Sihang Luo, and me as the moderator. That’s on December 12, 2025, from 9:00-10:00 a.m. PT.

the Democratic Party and the media environment

This new study by Democracy Matters (as reported in Politico) is typical of a wave of recent commentary:

The Democratic brand “is suffering,” as working-class voters see the party as “too focused on social issues and not nearly focused enough on the economic issues that impact every one, every day,” the report said.

“We lost people we used to get [in 2024], so why did we lose them? Why don’t we go ask them,” said Mitch Landrieu, co-chair of Democracy Matters and senior adviser to then-President Joe Biden. “They said what they thought about us and it was painful to hear … They feel forgotten, left out, and that their issues are not prioritized by the Democratic Party or the Republican Party.”

He added, “They want somebody focused first, second and third, on their economic stress.”

The usual implication is that Democratic candidates should stop talking about “cultural” issues–or maybe even pick fights with left-wingers on cultural issues–to gain the trust of working-class voters.

An important working paper by Shakked Noy and Aakaash Rao, “The Business of the Culture War,” offers a different perspective. These authors show that politicians in general, and particularly Democratic candidates, consistently emphasize economic issues. However, cable news fixates on cultural issues. The result is a deeply distorted impression of politicians, and (I suspect) especially of Democrats.

For example, in the 2016 election cycle, about three quarters of all political advertising, but just one quarter of cable news coverage, focused on the economy (p. 2). Since 2000, political candidates’ ads have been almost 10 times more likely than cable news to discuss corporate taxes, but cable news has been almost 10 times more likely than political candidates to discuss LGBTQ issues (p. 12). In 2022, the most recent year of the study, “economic topics comprise[d] the majority of messaging” by candidates of both parties, but 70 percent of cable news coverage was about cultural issues (p. 11).

To some extent, cable news may report and discuss the positions that politicians take on cultural issues. But at least some of the coverage isn’t about candidates or office-holders at all. It’s about activists and pundits and celebrities. And to the extent that politicians appear on cable news as guests or as topics, they are unrepresentative: atypical politicians who want to engage in the culture war.

Noy and Rao contribute an explanatory model. Using pretty persuasive methods and data, they show that cable news channels gain viewers in proportion to the degree that they focus on contentious cultural issues. This is true for both Fox and MSNBC. On the other hand, candidates (right and left) are more likely to win elections to the degree that they focus on economic issues. The incentives are different, apart from anyone’s ideological agenda.

When political leaders blame “the media,” this can be an excuse. We need leaders to solve problems. However, as an observer, I do blame the media. I doubt that it would be possible–even if it were desirable–for Democrats to pivot to bread-and-butter issues. The news platforms that draw the most viewers will keep covering culture wars. They will always have plenty to say on the air as long as there are any Americans (no matter how remote from political power) who say controversial things.

It is true that the proportion of Democratic campaign advertisements that emphasized economic policy or economic conditions fell from about 35 percent in 2008 to about 15 percent in 2020, and the proportion devoted to racial issues spiked during 2016-18 (see appendix, p. 3). Taken by themselves, these facts might suggest that Democrats have erred by shifting their attention to less popular issues. Noy and Rao offer a general model that can explain shifts of this type: politicians are affected by the news media in ways that may harm their own electoral prospects.

However, the decline in attention to economic conditions after 2008 has a more specific explanation. Democrats attacked Republicans for the economy during the 2008 Bush recession but then became responsible for the (recovering) economy under Obama. Also, what I named a “spike” in Democrats’ attention to race was a temporary change from about one percent of all their campaign advertising in 2008 to about seven percent during one cycle.

Democratic candidates are already talking about economics and healthcare. Not only because of ideological biases but also for business reasons, cable news constantly changes the subject to contentious cultural issues. There is little point in discussing whether Democratic candidates should adjust their rhetoric. But they should change their means and modes of reaching the American people, reducing the importance of cable news (and viral videos) by investing more in year-round grassroots organizing.

from empathy toward compassion

The English words empathy, sympathy, and compassion are used inconsistently; a dictionary will not sort them out.* For this discussion, I will posit the following definitions:

  • Empathy: An imaginative identification with someone else’s emotion. This is not just a belief that another person’s feels a certain way, but a kind of mirroring of the feeling. For example, if you are angry, and I empathize with you, then I “feel” your anger in some respect and to some degree. My feeling is embodied, affecting things like my heart rate and my involuntary facial expressions as well as any beliefs that I may express or privately think. Empathy can be positive if it mirrors a positive emotion. It is always partial and concrete. I can empathize with a person’s specific feeling or with the shared feeling of a group of people. I could empathize with many different people’s feelings, but only one by one, just as I can only hear one person’s story at a time.
  • Sympathy: An emotion provoked by someone else’s emotion. It is not a mirroring but a different feeling that arises in response. For example, if you are angry, and I sympathize, then I am sad that you are angry. The phrase “sympathetic joy” makes sense in English and covers situations when your fortunate condition triggers a positive feeling in me. However, this phrase almost always translates the Sanskrit or Pali word mudita. Without a modifier, the English word sympathy connotes a negative feeling, something akin to sadness or even pity. Like empathy, it is concrete and partial. I can sympathize for you in your loss, but not for everyone at once.
  • Compassion: an emotion that responds to someone else’s suffering, but it is not similar to the other person’s feeling, nor is it negative. It is calm and purposive. To be compassionate is to will that the other’s suffering ceases; and to will something seriously means being prepared to act accordingly. I don’t think it makes sense in English to be compassionate for someone else’s happiness, only for their suffering. We can use the English word for an emotion that is impartial and general, such as the attribute of God that is named in the first verse of the Quran or the Buddhist concept of karuna. Thus, if you are angry, I can compassionately desire that your anger cease along with the anger of your enemy and whatever is causing both. It is theoretically possible to feel compassion for all sentient beings, even though it would make no sense to empathize with all of them at once.

Against sympathy

Let’s say that I am angry or otherwise suffering. I may want you to empathize, sympathize, and feel compassion for me. I may want you to feel bad because I do. And I may want your feelings to be partial: Sympathize with me!

These desires are human frailties. Ethically, I should only want you to be compassionate. Asking you to feel my pain just expands the amount of suffering. Besides, you cannot really feel what I do, just a dim reflection of it or a different form of distress. Neither of us should fool ourselves that you can feel my pain, as if that were even desirable.

Empathy and sympathy are unreliable guides to good action. Perhaps you will wallow in your pity for me, or give yourself credit for feeling bad, or—worse—allow your partial feelings about me to negate other people’s valid interests. Politicians often stir up sympathy for favored groups to make us hate other people, and they succeed because sympathy is partial.

The Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca didn’t write about any of the three words that I defined earlier, because none of those were available in classical Latin. But he criticizes misericordia, and although that word is normally translated as “pity,” it sounds a lot like sympathy. He calls it “a sickness of the soul due to the sight of others’ suffering, or a sadness caused by someone else’s misfortunes which one believes to be undeserved.”

For Seneca, misericordia is a sickness, and “no sickness can affect a wise man, for his mind is serene and nothing can get through to it that he guards against.” Therefore, a wise person does not feel misericordia. For Seneca, “it is impossible to be both great and sad.” Even in a disaster, a wise one maintains “the same appearance—quiet, firm—which he couldn’t do if he were overcome with sadness.”

Seneca warns that pity prevents effective planning in the interests of the person whom we may want to help. “A wise person discerns the future and makes decisions without interference, yet nothing clear and lucid can flow from turbulence. Sadness is unfitted for discerning circumstances, planning useful tasks, evading dangers, weighing equities. Therefore, the [wise person] will not feel pity, because there cannot be pity without suffering of the soul [De Clementia (2.5.4-2.6.4, my trans.]

Compassion as a virtue

Seneca’s idea of disinterested benign sentiments that we exercise freely and with a tranquil mind [2.6.2, 2.6.3] could translate the Sanskrit word karuna, which is fundamental in Buddhism. Seneca also relates this virtue to a political idea: equal standing and a common claim on the public good. A great-souled person

will reach a hand to the drowning, welcome the exile, donate to the poor, not in the abusive way of most people who want to be seen as pitying—they toss something and flinch in disgust at those whom they aid, as if they feared to touch them—but as a man gives to a man from the common pool. He will return the child to the weeping mother, unfasten chains, save people from [gladiatorial] games, and even bury the stinking body, but he will do these things with a tranquil mind, of his own will. Thus the wise person will not pity but will assist and be of use, having been born to help all and for the public good, from which he will distribute shares to all.

Even though Seneca addresses his book On Clemency to the Emperor Nero, I think that in this passage, he describes a republican virtue, appropriate for relations among equal citizens who co-own a commonwealth.

I can wish that you feel compassionate without wishing any harm on you, because compassion is a tranquil state that anyone can welcome. A compassionate person is not exposed to chance. If we feel worse as another person worsens, and better as he improves, then we demonstrate sympathy, which subjects us to fate. But compassion remains unchanged regardless of the state of the sufferer.

In fact, to the extent that a person is absorbed in compassion, that person’s own negative emotional states recede. While willing the end of other people’s suffering, we are not desiring concrete things for ourselves, and so we escape from the inevitable frustrations of a selfish will.

Quiet is his wisdom,
Calm his emotion,
Serene and firm his reasoning.
His will has departed. His self-consciousness has been abolished,
Making him serene.

(Lotus Sutra, translated by Reeves, 2014)

It is no accident that the Boddhisatva of Compassion is depicted with a serene expression.

One pitfall is to attach one’s happiness to accomplishing the relief of other people’s suffering. Most remedies fail. Even if they succeed, suffering recurs, and while you address one problem, suffering also afflicts everyone else. However, we can focus on the action, not the outcome, thus avoiding disappointment.

How do we know that compassion is a virtue?

In contemporary courses on moral philosophy or ethics, we usually present students with difficult moral choices about which reasonable people disagree, such whether punishment or war can be just, whether people have a right to health insurance, or whether abortion is acceptable. The overall message is that it is not easy to know what is right, but we should reason about justice, developing and assessing competing arguments. Students may also learn that the ultimate basis of ethical reasoning is hard to determine, a matter of controversy. Value claims may be objective or subjective, discovered or created. We often assign competing arguments about this question.

Until the late 1700s, moral philosophers in the European languages made a different assumption. They thought that all reasonable people knew what was right (Rosen 2022). The philosophical challenge was to develop a theory that matched all our moral intuitions so that we would understand the overall structure of ethics better. The practical challenge was to get people to do what they already knew they ought to do, whether through education, social pressure, rewards and penalties, or in some other way.

Emily McRae (2017) summarizes a similar tenet of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism that I think is widely shared in classical Asian thought:

Most of us understand that there is great and unbearable suffering in the world and that it would be better to alleviate that suffering than ignore or increase it. The moral problem, according to Buddhist ethics, is not that we do not understand what we should do, but we may not have the emotional and psychological resources to actually do it. … One of the basic assumptions—and, I would argue, insights—of Buddhist ethics is that most of us, most of the time, fail to adequately respond to suffering. This failure is not because we are especially bad people, or that human beings are inherently evil or selfish, but it is simply the result of the sheer amount of suffering that is part of the sentient condition (samsara) combined with the habits of thought, feeling, and action that make it difficult for most of us to respond to or sometimes even notice suffering. An appreciation of the myriad ways in which beings suffer and having an adequate response to that suffering is not a basic set of moral skills in Buddhist ethics; it is a rare moral accomplishment that requires a major transformation of our habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Empathy is one of the main ways by which this transformation can occur.

Thus empathy reemerges in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism not as a goal but as a step along the way. First, we can imaginatively project ourselves into the experience of a concrete person or animal who is suffering. We strive to feel its pain while retaining our own consciousness, so that we attain a dual perspective. This is a practice that requires attention and time. It is a continuum. We can never replicate another creature’s feelings, but we can work on it.

Next, we can shift our empathy to other creatures. One reason is to avoid partiality. We are trying to develop a general capacity. The goal is compassion, which includes empathy along with a lack of selfishness and a genuine desire to act to alleviate all suffering. A moral exemplar, a bodhisattva, demonstrates empathy plus “other skills and virtues such as wisdom, mindfulness, perceptiveness, and responsiveness” (p. 129)

The overall picture is of compassion as an ideal that does not need a foundation in beliefs but that does require cultivation.

Indeed, there is a path from skepticism to compassion. We can begin by applying skepticism to all beliefs that seem to justify suffering or explain it away, including the Aristotelian idea that people have a telos; theologies that attribute suffering to divine will; the Third Noble Truth (enlightenment frees us from suffering); and all political ideologies that make some people’s suffering seem necessary for a better future.

Once we have made ourselves appropriately skeptical about such beliefs, all that is left is the realization that other creatures suffer for no ultimately good reason. And this realization comes close to compassion.

One might ask: Why care about the others’ suffering? What reason compels concern instead of indifference? This question is the mistake that Stanley Cavell analyzes in his famous interpretation of King Lear—thinking that we need a reason to love (Cavell 1969). Skeptics do not believe in the kind of truth that could serve as a foundation for caring in the face of prevalent suffering. Nor do they believe in the negation of such truths: in moral nihilism. Rather, they teach that seeking beliefs as the basis for happiness and ethics is a habit that we can train ourselves to drop.

We can simply care. And as we do so, we may experience some of the benefits recommended by proponents of compassion, such as diminished self-clinging and increased serenity. We will not escape from our own suffering, but we can find a measure of relief.


*Indeed, sympathy and compassion come from words that mean exactly the same thing—“feeling-with”—in Greek and Latin. The Greek word sympatheia originally meant harmony within nature more than a human emotion, and our modern sense of sympathy as well as the Latin translation compassio come well after the classical period. Empathy was coined on p. 21 of Edward Bradford Titchener’s Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes (Macmillan, 1909) as a translation of the German word Einfühlung, which goes back at least to Herder.

Sources: McRae, Emily. “Empathy, compassion, and “exchanging self and other” in indo-Tibetan Buddhism.” The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy. Routledge, 2017. 123-133; Rosen, Michael (2022) The Shadow of God: Kant, Hegel, and the Passage from Heaven to History (Harvard University Press); Stanley Cavell, “The avoidance of love: A reading of King Lear,” in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1969, updated ed., 2002), pp. 246 – 325.

This post is an amalgam and revision of several previous ones, so apologies for the repetition.

gratitude and the sublime

Let’s define a sublime experience as one that is dramatically better than life as usual, since life involves suffering—at least in part and over the long run.

I doubt that sublime experiences reveal a truth: that everything is redeemed. Nor are they false, mere fantasies of people who cannot face reality. Rather, they are part of human experience, within our available range.

Life may be suffering, but it also encompasses the sublime. We are constituted to enjoy some things, and that is a wonderfully good fact about us. Just as we may lament our human proclivities to violence, despair, and cruelty, so we can celebrate our ability to savor what we find sublime. And not only celebrate it but actively cultivate this appreciation and share it with other people through the representations that we create.

Some wonderful experiences intrinsically involve interacting with other people. These activities include romance and sex, athletic competition, and success in any collective effort, including (I presume) victory in battle. I will leave this category aside for the present purposes, although it is desirable to gain emotional highs by interacting with other people while also being ethical.

I want to focus, instead, on that diverse category of experiences in which a person encounters an object that seems sublime, whether it is a view of nature, a song or a picture, a religious ceremony, or a meditative insight. Indeed, the word “sublime” is generally reserved for this category.

A classic debate in aesthetics asks how we should interpret such experiences. Does the object cause the experience? If so, do some things merit being called sublime while others should not be treated that way? (Can we be wrong to relish something that is not worthy?) Did the creator of the object have a powerful and positive emotion that the object now communicates to us? Or are observers more responsible for causing our own emotions by how we choose to perceive an object (Peacocke 2024)?

Our answers to those questions may differ if the object is a poem, a sunset, or a meditative exercise. For instance, an author has emotions while writing, so we can ask whether a poem conveys the poet’s inner state to us. But some would say the same about nature. Gerard Manley Hopkins (1877) detects a Divine Father behind all “dappled things,“ like “skies of couple-colour” or “a brinded cow.” “Praise Him,” says Hopkins. On the other hand, some doubt that an author’s emotion is relevant in any case, even when a sensitive human being has made a work. They think it is all about the object or the observer.

This debate continues. I want to add a different dimension, not only because I believe it is true, but also because it can enrich our experience.

I think we often relish things because we have been taught how to perceive them. This is a skeptical point. It reminds us that we would enjoy very different things if we lived in a different time and place. It provokes some (appropriate) doubt about whether our reactions are true.

For instance, I like a snowy day. I believe this appreciation is something learned. I do not simply see the snow; I see it with things already in my mind, like Christmas decorations, paper snowflakes on second-grade bulletin boards, Ezra Jack Keats’ A Snowy Day, Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s “Hunters in the Snow,” Han-shan’s Cold Mountain lyrics, Robert Frost’s “lovely, dark and deep” woods, Hiroshige’s woodblock prints of wintry Japan, Rosemary Clooney with Bing Crosby. In short, I have been taught to appreciate a winter wonderland, a marshmallow world, and a whipped cream day. Some of these influences probably detract, but they were meant well.

It is sometimes said that when Petrarch climbed Mont Ventoux (in Provence) in 1336—simply to enjoy and describe the view—he was the first European ever to do such a thing. Clearly, some people outside of Europe had loved mountain views long before Petrarch. I find it plausible that certain communities of people appreciate alpine vistas, while others do not. And some of us may have learned the sublimity of landscapes from a chain of people originally inspired by Petrarch, although he was surely influenced by classical sources. We all see what we have learned to see.

Let’s say that I am looking at a large and dramatic sky, with ragged clouds that are mostly dark but illuminated here and there by a hidden sun. Perhaps there are also wind-blown trees in view and small signs of human habitation.

I believe that I appreciate this vista in part because I have studied and enjoyed 17th-century Dutch landscape painters and some later artists whom they influenced, such as John Constable, the Americans of the Hudson River School, and Impressionists. These artists do not explain nature to me. They do not reveal why the background color of the sky is blue and leaves are generally green. Their representations of nature would not convey sublimity to a different species, such as my dog Luca or an alien from Mars. As Thomas Nagel (1970) says, “A Martian scientist … would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud.”

Instead, these artists help me to see what is in my phenomenal world: how clouds pile up and sun peeks through. Come to think of it, our phenomenal world is a bit strange. It includes an object that is so painfully bright that we avoid it, and it has borders that we cannot see because they move as we shift our gaze. This is also the world that the Dutch painters present on canvas.

In turn, I enjoy Dutch landscapes more thanks to Svetlana Alpers’ 1983 book The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century, which I read when it was still fairly new and have returned to since. Alpers’ project is not to praise the artists whom she discusses; she does not practice “art appreciation.” She identifies a way of thinking about images, an epistemic framework, that explains what the Dutch painters were up to and that distinguishes them from Renaissance Italian painters (without suggesting that either is preferable). Her insights have enriched my understanding of the original works. And she is only one in a sequence of critics and historians, collectors and curators, and subsequent artists who have turned 17th-century Dutch landscape painting into a category and helped us to value it and see it better. Again, how I see that art influences how I see nature, especially when the landscape even remotely resembles Holland.

I hold a doctoral degree and have chosen to visit museums and read academic criticism for decades. I am not claiming that reading scholarly books and labels in museums is the best (let alone the only) way to enrich current experiences. Many people learn to name, value, represent, protect, and use objects from their elders without needing written words. Religious communities also develop ceremonies and observances that convey the creativity of previous generations. Academic criticism is unusually explicit and transparent about its sources; that is the purpose of footnotes. But all human communities accumulate and transmit ways of experiencing the world.

Sometimes, people are motivated to ignore or conceal the influence of previous observers on their own sublime experiences because of an implicit assumption that the sublime should be pure and universal and stand outside of history. Just as an example, North Americans who experience anapanasati, or Buddhist breathing-meditation, may be told (or may tell themselves) that this is the original practice of the Buddha himself. They envision themselves as doing something pure and personal that reveals absolutely general truths, such as the non-existence of the self. A person who may have lived in what is now northern India and Nepal more than two thousand years ago not only did the same thing as modern meditators but is causing us to practice anapanasati now, because we hear the Buddha’s “teachings.”

But we might look around the room, which probably (not invariably) incorporates some aesthetic elements from East Asian art, along with 20th century European minimalism: bare wood, a simplified statue. People speak English with a sprinkling of Sanskrit words. They sit cross-legged and meditate but do not maintain shrines, prostrate themselves, make pilgrimages, or give alms, which would be common manifestations of Buddhism in East Asia (Moon 2024)

Many participants may identify as white and think of what they are experiencing as Asian. Indeed, they may classify the Buddha as an Asian man, notwithstanding that he predated the distinction between Asia and Europe. Rev. Cristina Moon (a Zen priest from Hawaii) recalls:

Over the fifteen years before coming to Chozen-ji [a temple and monastery founded by Asian Americans], I sat with more than a dozen different Buddhist communities where I was often the only Asian and sometimes one of the only non-white people in attendance. When non-Asian Buddhists (particularly at American Zen centers) wore Japanese clothes, bowed to me theatrically, referred to me as “Cristina-san,” responded to requests in English with “Hai!”, and expressed rigid attachment to the technical accuracy of certain Japanese and Buddhist forms, it looked more like cosplay [dressing as a character from a movie] than a means to enter Zen, (Moon 2024)

In the US, there is a certain tendency—I don’t know how widespread—to see Buddhist thought as ahistorical. The Buddha is treated as a contemporary; the meditating mind lives only in the immediate present. There is also a tendency to acknowledge Buddhism’s roots in Asia but to depict Asian or Eastern “culture” as monolithic, apart from superficial aesthetic differences that people can browse like consumers.

The white or European-American Buddhists whom Rev. Moon has encountered may differentiate between the transcendent truths of the Buddha and optional traditions and behaviors that they label “culture.” They then pick and choose from the traditions without recognizing that they (highly educated, mostly White Americans) are every bit as immersed in their own stream of inherited behaviors, aesthetics, beliefs, and values, which influence their choices about what to borrow from Asian contexts. Linda Heuman writes:

The French philosopher and sociologist of science Bruno Latour famously described it this way: “A Modern is someone who believes that others believe.” A modern Buddhist, in Latour’s sense, is someone who believes that Asian forms of Buddhism carry the “baggage” of their host cultures but who remains unreflective about the assumptions that shape his or her own modern adaptation (Heuman, 2015).

For instance, sitting in a minimalist pine room feels pure, although it reflects the same Modernist aesthetics as a boardroom in a skyscraper, whereas prostrating before a brightly colored Tibetan shrine would seem like “culture.”

Any mind is ineluctably historical. As we develop from speechless infants into adults, we absorb a vast array of classifications, assumptions, and values that other people invented before us. We can never escape this historical contingency. You might think that you can have an unmediated experience of nature, but your tastes in nature, your words and concepts for nature, and even your physical location in front of a specific patch of nature are all historically conditioned. 

History is highly complex, diverse, and often cruel, whether we happen to know the details or not. Evils are widespread—consider, for example, the use of Buddhist ideas in imperial Japan or in Myanmar today. Human beings widely and blatantly violate principles that they expressly teach, such as nonviolence and compassion. On the other hand, people all over the world also create practices and institutions that reflect wise goals and choices. What we think we know is a result of this complex, globally interconnected, and fraught past.

Cristina Moon’s description of cringy behavior at North American Zen centers is a portrait of people who want to pick and choose ideas and practices that they find comfortable without taking seriously the historical development and interconnection of those ideas, without being genuinely open to practices that might challenge them, without being careful about their own status and impact, and without wrestling with the connections among racial hierarchy and exclusion, everyday culture, and the abstract beliefs that we might classify as Buddhist philosophy or theology. Yet the solution is not to declare these beliefs off limits (nor does Moon suggest we do so), because everyone should always be looking for good beliefs to adopt. We must simply do it with a lot of care–not only about the ideas and their effect on our inner lives, but also about the other people we touch.

To me, our debt to other human beings only deepens the sublime. Nature was not created for us; it just is. And we were not created to enjoy it, although—very fortunately—we do. But our fellow human beings have deliberately shared their appreciation and heightened our own, which means that we are the beneficiaries of benevolent intelligence after all.

In “Of Dappled Things,” Hopkins writes, “Praise Him.” I would (also) say, “Praise them.”


This is a combination and reformulation of previous posts (apologies for the repetition), including: the sublime and other people; the sublime is social–with notes on Wordsworth’s Lines Above Tintern Abbey; notes on religion and cultural appropriation: the case of US Buddhism

Sources: Antonia Peacocke, “Aesthetic Experience,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.); Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?.” Philosophical Review 79 (1970): 394-403, p. 443; Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (University of Chicago Press, 1983); Cristina Moon, “From ‘Just Culture’ to a Just Culture, Tricycle, Oc.. 29, 2020; Linda Heuman (2015) “A New Way Forward,” The Tricycle, Spring.

Civics in the Academy Webinar

Civics in the Academy is a new webinar series that explores the practice, pedagogy, and evolving landscape of civic education in higher education. The first event in this series will be: “What is the Alliance for Civics in the Academy?” We will discuss the Alliance’s founding, current initiatives, and aspirations for the future of civics on college campuses.

Speakers:

Mary L. Clark
Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, University of Denver

Peter Levine
Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship & Public Service, Tufts University

Josiah Ober
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Founding Director of the Stanford Civics Initiative
Constantine Mitsotakis Chair in the School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University

Jenna Silber Storey
Senior Fellow, Social, Cultural, Constitutional Studies at the American Enterprise Institute
Co-Chair, Civic Thought Project, AEI-Johns Hopkins University

Moderated By:

Debra Satz
Vernon R. and Lysbeth Anderson Dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University
Marta Sutton Weeks Professor Philosophy, and, by courtesy, Political Science

Wednesday, October 29, 2025
9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. Pacific

Click here to register.

design challenges for civics in higher education

The Educating for American Democracy (EAD) initiative works to improve k12 history and civic education. One of EAD’s contributions is a list of five “Design Challenges.” Each challenge names tensions between a pair of valid principles.

The tensions are not resolvable. Instead, we encourage teachers (and everyone else involved in civics and history education) to keep the five challenges in mind as they design and offer classes and other programs. We propose that materials, curricula, and pedagogy will be better if people always hold these tensions in mind.

At a meeting this weekend sponsored by the Alliance for Civics in the Academy, it occurred to me that a similar list might be useful for civic educators in higher education. But I don’t think the actual items would be the same. Here is a preliminary list of design challenges for college-level educators, just for consideration.

Realism and Inspiration

  • How can we analyze and understand institutions’ tendency to limit or even suppress human agency while also inspiring students to participate?

Honesty and Appreciation

  • How can we seriously study and discuss deep historical injustices without missing the value of excellent texts and other legacies from the past?

The Personal and the Institutional

  • How can we explore the potential and the limitations of two sometimes competing ways of improving the world: strengthening our own character (broadly defined) and preserving or reforming institutions?

Text and Context

  • How can we read and discuss common texts while also benefitting from the contextual knowledge that specialists offer about each specific work?
  • How can we learn from both the arguments and testimony of exceptional people, such as great writers, and also from empirical patterns in large-scale human behavior?
  • How can we learn from observations and analyses written long ago and from the latest social science?

Science and Values

  • How can we learn by using techniques that minimize the influence of the observer’s values (science) while also rigorously investigating questions of value (normative inquiry)?

Citizens’ Roles and Career Pathways

  • How can we educate students to play the generalist’s role of a citizen (in various contexts and communities) while also helping them to become professionals whose work can have civic benefits?

Pluralism and Shared Fate

  • How can we seriously explore deep differences among human beings–as reflected in our topics of study and in our students’ and teachers’ backgrounds–while also teaching students to reason and work together at various scales, from the classroom though the nation to the globe?
  • How can our assignments and discussions connect to students’ diverse cultural experiences and also stretch them to learn about ideas beyond their experience or contrary to their values?

Study and Experience

  • How can students learn from being responsibly involved in communities despite not having extensive academic knowledge, and how can they study civic topics in the classroom without having extensive civic experience? (In other words, how can students do good in the world if they don’t already know a lot, and how can they grasp and assess texts and ideas about civic life if they have not already experienced much civic engagement?)

Choice and Commonality

  • How can we encourage individuals to choose and display their diverse interests and agendas related to civics while also offering common experiences?
  • How can we offer courses or other experiences for many or all students in a given institution without compromising quality?

Heritage and Innovation

  • How can we introduce students to ideas, institutions, and practices inherited from the past while also helping them to learn to innovate beneficially in civic life?
  • How can we develop both trustees and designers?

(The fact that this list is longer than the EAD’s list of challenges should not imply that college-level education is more complicated or fraught than k12 education is. Quite the contrary. Instead, this list captures my own most recent thinking, and I would probably apply it to K12 as well.)

See also: The Educating for American Democracy Roadmap; Educating for American Democracy: the work continues

The 2026 International Transformative Learning Conference and a Civic Studies preconference

Please hold the date and consider proposing a presentation for the 2026 International Transformative Learning Conference:

The Art of Co-Creating Change: Learning, Acting, and Transforming Collectively

North Carolina State University

Raleigh, North Carolina, USA

October 21-23, 2026

Website: https://itlc2026.intertla.org/

“Transformative learning (TL) is an area of research and theory that addresses the potential of learning for profound personal and social change. The theme of this conference centers on the transformative power of learning to address the collective challenges of our time—both locally and globally. … We invite participants to explore how transformative learning can catalyze both large- scale and small-scale transformations necessary to navigate today’s interconnected challenges.”

I will be one of several keynote speakers. There will also be a preconference on October 20, 2026, in which one strand will be “Civic Studies: Co-creating Our Shared Worlds.” That portion will be facilitated by Tetyana Hoggan-Kloubert (Universität Augsburg, Germany) and me. According to the blurb:

“This workshop invites participants to reflect on the possibilities and challenges of co-creating our worlds—exploring civic politics, initiatives, capacity, society, and culture. It is open to newcomers curious about civic studies, as well as former participants of the Institute of Civic Studies, offering a space to connect, think globally, and act transformatively.

“Since 2009, Peter Levine, and since 2015, Tetyana Hoggan-Kloubert (with colleagues) have hosted the Institute of Civic Studies in different countries as a living tradition of learning, acting, and co-creating change.”

Join us!

Trump, Modi, Erdogan

I am flying back to the USA after a meeting in Istanbul with activists and NGO leaders from six or more countries. (By the way, I don’t think that all of them could have met in the USA because of our government’s visa policies and treatment of visitors.)

One of the many benefits of the meeting was to challenge a framework that I have been using which treats leaders like Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as examples of the same phenomenon. These men are both similar and different, and it’s important to keep the differences in mind.

All three (it seems to me) are national narcissists, meaning that they believe their own country is the best yet disrespected (Cislak & Cichocka 2023). All espouse a form of populism: the idea that they enjoy the united support of the true nation, whereas opponents and critics are enemies of the people. All identify a favored ethnic and/or religious majority as the authentic country and its rightful rulers.

All favor aggressive state economic interventions while favoring allied businesses and industries (and making money from these alliances). All prefer splashy infrastructure projects to providing consistently decent public services. To be generous, we could say that they each “see like a state” (Scott 1998). And they all use a similar toolkit. They don’t cancel elections or openly suspend (most) constitutional rights but rather prosecute opponents and use economic pressure against the producers of speech: publishers and universities (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

As for the differences:

Modi represents a century-old effort to establish Hindu supremacy in India. Islamophobia is central to this project (Bhatia 2024). It already inspires regular violence, and it has the potential to spark vast destruction. Modi’s party and government are disciplined. Their agenda is not only social control or personal profit but also redefining a nation in a way that would exclude 200 million of its citizens.

Erdogan, I think, began by opening Turkish politics and civil society to groups and perspectives that deserved representation, including but not limited to observant Muslims. He made appropriate reforms. He is the kind of leader who should have retired a decade ago, in which case he could now travel the international circuit as an elder statesman with some genuine contributions to his name. Alas, he crossed many bright lines by jailing opponents and crushing opposition, perhaps in part because he sincerely believes that he is indispensable. But his managerial record is now quite poor.

Trump represents political views that he did not invent. He espouses familiar forms of xenophobia, chauvinism, and aggrieved nationalism. But I interpret Trump as more transactional than his counterparts in Turkey and India. For many voters, he offers a deal: better economic outcomes in return for legal impunity, the ability to settle scores, praise and monuments, and lots of sheer cash.

Since Trump’s relationships are always self-interested, they are also relatively fragile. I think an economic downturn would break his implicit contract with voters, lowering his approval by 10 points, and that would make him an increasingly problematic ally for Republican politicians. I can see him being discarded (not necessarily impeached, but rendered a lame duck) in a way that I cannot quite see for the regimes represented by Modi or Erdogan.


Sources: Cislak, A., & Cichocka, A. (2023). National narcissism in politics and public understanding of science. Nature Reviews Psychology2(12), 740-750; James C . Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale, 1998)  Stevnb Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (Crown 2018), and Rahul Bhatia,, The New India (Abacus, 2025)

See also: national narcissism; countering selective harassment in the Trump Administration; Trump: personalist leader or representative of a right-wing movement?; the Constitution is crumbling etc.

youth activism now

I am grateful to have frequent opportunities to talk with grassroots democracy groups about tactics and methods. My current standard talk is here (but I like to offer it as a discussion rather than a lecture).

The groups that have invited me this year tend to be quite grey–well populated by retirees. I actually believe that it is important for large, nonviolent democracy movements to draw heavy participation from people who are relatively safe from state violence, including older and wealthier white people. But I encounter some anxiety about how to engage younger people.

I suspect that part of the issue is simply age-segregation: younger activists have separate groups. But there also may be some discouragement and confusion among American youth at this moment.

CIRCLE surveyed a representative national sample of youth shortly after the 2024 election and found relatively high levels of engagement. For example, 18% of young adults said they had recently participated in a protest, up from 15% in 2022. Another 29% said they would protest if they had the opportunity. (This was before Trump had been sworn in.) An outright majority had signed a petition.

For the population as a whole, the rate of participation in protests has risen rapidly during 2025, surpassing the increase in 2017. I am not sure whether youth are keeping pace with that growth.


See also: the state of nonviolent grassroots resistance; tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy etc.