Civics in the Academy Webinar

Civics in the Academy is a new webinar series that explores the practice, pedagogy, and evolving landscape of civic education in higher education. The first event in this series will be: “What is the Alliance for Civics in the Academy?” We will discuss the Alliance’s founding, current initiatives, and aspirations for the future of civics on college campuses.

Speakers:

Mary L. Clark
Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, University of Denver

Peter Levine
Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship & Public Service, Tufts University

Josiah Ober
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Founding Director of the Stanford Civics Initiative
Constantine Mitsotakis Chair in the School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University

Jenna Silber Storey
Senior Fellow, Social, Cultural, Constitutional Studies at the American Enterprise Institute
Co-Chair, Civic Thought Project, AEI-Johns Hopkins University

Moderated By:

Debra Satz
Vernon R. and Lysbeth Anderson Dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University
Marta Sutton Weeks Professor Philosophy, and, by courtesy, Political Science

Wednesday, October 29, 2025
9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. Pacific

Click here to register.

design challenges for civics in higher education

The Educating for American Democracy (EAD) initiative works to improve k12 history and civic education. One of EAD’s contributions is a list of five “Design Challenges.” Each challenge names tensions between a pair of valid principles.

The tensions are not resolvable. Instead, we encourage teachers (and everyone else involved in civics and history education) to keep the five challenges in mind as they design and offer classes and other programs. We propose that materials, curricula, and pedagogy will be better if people always hold these tensions in mind.

At a meeting this weekend sponsored by the Alliance for Civics in the Academy, it occurred to me that a similar list might be useful for civic educators in higher education. But I don’t think the actual items would be the same. Here is a preliminary list of design challenges for college-level educators, just for consideration.

Realism and Inspiration

  • How can we analyze and understand institutions’ tendency to limit or even suppress human agency while also inspiring students to participate?

Honesty and Appreciation

  • How can we seriously study and discuss deep historical injustices without missing the value of excellent texts and other legacies from the past?

The Personal and the Institutional

  • How can we explore the potential and the limitations of two sometimes competing ways of improving the world: strengthening our own character (broadly defined) and preserving or reforming institutions?

Text and Context

  • How can we read and discuss common texts while also benefitting from the contextual knowledge that specialists offer about each specific work?
  • How can we learn from both the arguments and testimony of exceptional people, such as great writers, and also from empirical patterns in large-scale human behavior?
  • How can we learn from observations and analyses written long ago and from the latest social science?

Science and Values

  • How can we learn by using techniques that minimize the influence of the observer’s values (science) while also rigorously investigating questions of value (normative inquiry)?

Citizens’ Roles and Career Pathways

  • How can we educate students to play the generalist’s role of a citizen (in various contexts and communities) while also helping them to become professionals whose work can have civic benefits?

Pluralism and Shared Fate

  • How can we seriously explore deep differences among human beings–as reflected in our topics of study and in our students’ and teachers’ backgrounds–while also teaching students to reason and work together at various scales, from the classroom though the nation to the globe?
  • How can our assignments and discussions connect to students’ diverse cultural experiences and also stretch them to learn about ideas beyond their experience or contrary to their values?

Study and Experience

  • How can students learn from being responsibly involved in communities despite not having extensive academic knowledge, and how can they study civic topics in the classroom without having extensive civic experience? (In other words, how can students do good in the world if they don’t already know a lot, and how can they grasp and assess texts and ideas about civic life if they have not already experienced much civic engagement?)

Choice and Commonality

  • How can we encourage individuals to choose and display their diverse interests and agendas related to civics while also offering common experiences?
  • How can we offer courses or other experiences for many or all students in a given institution without compromising quality?

Heritage and Innovation

  • How can we introduce students to ideas, institutions, and practices inherited from the past while also helping them to learn to innovate beneficially in civic life?
  • How can we develop both trustees and designers?

(The fact that this list is longer than the EAD’s list of challenges should not imply that college-level education is more complicated or fraught than k12 education is. Quite the contrary. Instead, this list captures my own most recent thinking, and I would probably apply it to K12 as well.)

See also: The Educating for American Democracy Roadmap; Educating for American Democracy: the work continues

The 2026 International Transformative Learning Conference and a Civic Studies preconference

Please hold the date and consider proposing a presentation for the 2026 International Transformative Learning Conference:

The Art of Co-Creating Change: Learning, Acting, and Transforming Collectively

North Carolina State University

Raleigh, North Carolina, USA

October 21-23, 2026

Website: https://itlc2026.intertla.org/

“Transformative learning (TL) is an area of research and theory that addresses the potential of learning for profound personal and social change. The theme of this conference centers on the transformative power of learning to address the collective challenges of our time—both locally and globally. … We invite participants to explore how transformative learning can catalyze both large- scale and small-scale transformations necessary to navigate today’s interconnected challenges.”

I will be one of several keynote speakers. There will also be a preconference on October 20, 2026, in which one strand will be “Civic Studies: Co-creating Our Shared Worlds.” That portion will be facilitated by Tetyana Hoggan-Kloubert (Universität Augsburg, Germany) and me. According to the blurb:

“This workshop invites participants to reflect on the possibilities and challenges of co-creating our worlds—exploring civic politics, initiatives, capacity, society, and culture. It is open to newcomers curious about civic studies, as well as former participants of the Institute of Civic Studies, offering a space to connect, think globally, and act transformatively.

“Since 2009, Peter Levine, and since 2015, Tetyana Hoggan-Kloubert (with colleagues) have hosted the Institute of Civic Studies in different countries as a living tradition of learning, acting, and co-creating change.”

Join us!

Trump, Modi, Erdogan

I am flying back to the USA after a meeting in Istanbul with activists and NGO leaders from six or more countries. (By the way, I don’t think that all of them could have met in the USA because of our government’s visa policies and treatment of visitors.)

One of the many benefits of the meeting was to challenge a framework that I have been using which treats leaders like Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as examples of the same phenomenon. These men are both similar and different, and it’s important to keep the differences in mind.

All three (it seems to me) are national narcissists, meaning that they believe their own country is the best yet disrespected (Cislak & Cichocka 2023). All espouse a form of populism: the idea that they enjoy the united support of the true nation, whereas opponents and critics are enemies of the people. All identify a favored ethnic and/or religious majority as the authentic country and its rightful rulers.

All favor aggressive state economic interventions while favoring allied businesses and industries (and making money from these alliances). All prefer splashy infrastructure projects to providing consistently decent public services. To be generous, we could say that they each “see like a state” (Scott 1998). And they all use a similar toolkit. They don’t cancel elections or openly suspend (most) constitutional rights but rather prosecute opponents and use economic pressure against the producers of speech: publishers and universities (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).

As for the differences:

Modi represents a century-old effort to establish Hindu supremacy in India. Islamophobia is central to this project (Bhatia 2024). It already inspires regular violence, and it has the potential to spark vast destruction. Modi’s party and government are disciplined. Their agenda is not only social control or personal profit but also redefining a nation in a way that would exclude 200 million of its citizens.

Erdogan, I think, began by opening Turkish politics and civil society to groups and perspectives that deserved representation, including but not limited to observant Muslims. He made appropriate reforms. He is the kind of leader who should have retired a decade ago, in which case he could now travel the international circuit as an elder statesman with some genuine contributions to his name. Alas, he crossed many bright lines by jailing opponents and crushing opposition, perhaps in part because he sincerely believes that he is indispensable. But his managerial record is now quite poor.

Trump represents political views that he did not invent. He espouses familiar forms of xenophobia, chauvinism, and aggrieved nationalism. But I interpret Trump as more transactional than his counterparts in Turkey and India. For many voters, he offers a deal: better economic outcomes in return for legal impunity, the ability to settle scores, praise and monuments, and lots of sheer cash.

Since Trump’s relationships are always self-interested, they are also relatively fragile. I think an economic downturn would break his implicit contract with voters, lowering his approval by 10 points, and that would make him an increasingly problematic ally for Republican politicians. I can see him being discarded (not necessarily impeached, but rendered a lame duck) in a way that I cannot quite see for the regimes represented by Modi or Erdogan.


Sources: Cislak, A., & Cichocka, A. (2023). National narcissism in politics and public understanding of science. Nature Reviews Psychology2(12), 740-750; James C . Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale, 1998)  Stevnb Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (Crown 2018), and Rahul Bhatia,, The New India (Abacus, 2025)

See also: national narcissism; countering selective harassment in the Trump Administration; Trump: personalist leader or representative of a right-wing movement?; the Constitution is crumbling etc.

youth activism now

I am grateful to have frequent opportunities to talk with grassroots democracy groups about tactics and methods. My current standard talk is here (but I like to offer it as a discussion rather than a lecture).

The groups that have invited me this year tend to be quite grey–well populated by retirees. I actually believe that it is important for large, nonviolent democracy movements to draw heavy participation from people who are relatively safe from state violence, including older and wealthier white people. But I encounter some anxiety about how to engage younger people.

I suspect that part of the issue is simply age-segregation: younger activists have separate groups. But there also may be some discouragement and confusion among American youth at this moment.

CIRCLE surveyed a representative national sample of youth shortly after the 2024 election and found relatively high levels of engagement. For example, 18% of young adults said they had recently participated in a protest, up from 15% in 2022. Another 29% said they would protest if they had the opportunity. (This was before Trump had been sworn in.) An outright majority had signed a petition.

For the population as a whole, the rate of participation in protests has risen rapidly during 2025, surpassing the increase in 2017. I am not sure whether youth are keeping pace with that growth.


See also: the state of nonviolent grassroots resistance; tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy etc.

The Groups, Messaging, and Politics

Apparently context is scarce. Here’s some:

A variety of activists and special interests — collectively known as “The Groups” — can basically persuade Democratic staffers and politicians of their ideas in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms, well out of the public eye. Democrats’ focus on identitarianism allows the Groups to falsely present themselves as representatives of various “communities” — the Latino “community”, or the trans “community”, etc. And Democrats’ legacy of urban machine politics causes them to think that these “communities” can basically be bought off with targeted benefits, much as they would be in urban politics. Incidentally, this is probably a big part of why progressive cities are governed so badly. Anyway, when all of this finally has to make contact with the actual voting public on election day, it turns out that The Groups weren’t really representative of easily buy-able “communities”, and voters reject the Dems at the polls. That’s a very simplified model, of course. But it looks like in the aftermath of the 2024 election, a lot of people are zeroing in on a model like this to explain Democrats’ weakness. 

When I say the work of politics has become diminished, part of how that happened is that talking about this creates this counterargument: Well, even to discuss it is to abandon.

In 2008, as you and I both know, Barack Obama ran as a public opponent of gay marriage.

He ran opposed to it. At a time when not only — I won’t speak for you — was I not opposed to it, but most of us did not think he was opposed to it. Like, at his heart, we did not think he was opposed to it.

But he was playing politics. That playing of politics allowed him to name Supreme Court justices, and that led to the decision that created a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.

And I am saying that kind of playing politics is needed.

For a party that spends billions of dollars trying to find the perfect language to connect to voters, Democrats and their allies use an awful lot of words and phrases no ordinary person would ever dream of saying. The intent of this language is to include, broaden, empathize, accept, and embrace. The effect of this language is to sound like the extreme, divisive, elitist, and obfuscatory, enforcers of wokeness. To please the few, we have alienated the many—especially on culture issues, where our language sounds superior, haughty and arrogant.

Public safety must be a priority—in Memphis, DC, and the rest of the country—but sending militarized police to serve as additional local law enforcement is not the answer. As five mayors wrote in the Hill earlier this month, instead of weaponizing the National Guard, the federal government could help by bolstering the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to investigate firearms trafficking, support ballistics testing, and work in coordination with local law enforcement—not supplant them. “Real progress happens when Washington partners with local leaders,” they wrote, “not when it sidelines them.”

Say What You Mean

After getting the same Vera Institute of Justice messaging presentation twice on Friday, I’ve been thinking about what messaging consultants are actually trying to do.

The average messaging summit is a triangulation between three things:

* What the consultants’ funders want
* What their pollsters tell them voters like
* What the audience of candidates, staffers, and pundits needs to hear

That’s the strategic task: here are some folks who don’t talk to each other or can’t hear what each other is saying. How should they communicate?

But that’s also the whole problem.

We start with a naive paradigm: citizens talk honestly to each other and their elected officials. Politicians listen, then speak. Citizens vote. But it’s more complicated than that! Politics is a constant battle by which different politicians can win, different laws can pass, different programs can get implemented.

People with expertise or money want to convince their fellow citizens that the naive conclusions of dialogue are wrong. So we ask: What should candidates say and do to win? What should pundits say to help them? What about party members and primary voters? Advocacy directors? Activists?

I’m on that list. So are you.

Here’s how it plays out in my work: citizens are worried about crime and demand their elected officials do something. Politicians hear that crime is salient, so they give cops massive raises, exempt police from accountability, increase sentences, send in the National Guard. “Something must be done. This is something. We must do this.”

Meanwhile, experts look at incarceration numbers, racial disparities, crime rates, and how other countries handle these problems—and conclude we have a prison problem. We suggest lower sentences, point to the cruelty of these institutions, identify root causes. Then pollsters tell us our messages aren’t landing.

Back in 2014, I published David Green’s “Penal populism and the folly of ‘doing good by stealth‘” in The Good Society. He describes how Tony Blair pursued effective criminal justice reforms quietly while making loud, punitive pronouncements—what he calls “loud low-roading” paired with “quiet high-roading.” The logic: good policy can only survive if wrapped in tough rhetoric or hidden entirely.

But Green argues this approach corrodes democratic legitimacy and public trust. When citizens are treated as audiences to manipulate rather than as participants in deliberation, the legitimacy crisis that drives penal populism gets worse. The solution to public punitiveness isn’t better spin—it’s actual engagement that treats people as capable of weighing complex trade-offs when given real information.

The US locks up too many people, especially too many Black and brown people. Voters currently reward politicians who do that. Maybe that changes when we stop gaming the message and start being honest about what we know.

Freud on mourning the past

In 1915, Sigmund Freud wrote a short essay entitled “Transience.” Just over a century later, during the Coronavirus pandemic, the philosopher Jonathan Lear wrote “Transience and Hope” about returning to Freud’s essay in a time of COVID-19, the climate emergency, and the resurgence of authoritarianism. Now, Lear has passed, adding one more layer of pathos to their dialogue.

Freud’s piece turns out to be political, but it begins with a personal memory. “Not long ago,” he says, he went on a “summer walk through a smiling countryside” with a “taciturn friend” and a “young but already famous poet.” Many commentators have identified this poet as Rilke, but Lear thinks the whole story is fiction.

In any case, Freud and the poet argue. The poet is unable to enjoy the beauty of nature because it will fade with the coming fall, “like all human beauty and all the beauty and splendour that men have created or may create.” Freud has the opposite feeling, that transience only “raises the value of the enjoyment.” He adds, “A flower that blooms only for a single night does not seem to us on that account any less lovely.” But neither the poet not the silent friend is convinced by Freud.

Freud says that his friends could not accept the transience of beauty because there was “a revolt in their minds against mourning.” He explains that we have a natural inclination to love–first ourselves, then other objects. When an object of love is lost, we cling to it anyway, which is the painful stage that we call mourning. However, mourning “comes to a spontaneous end,” allowing our love to move to new objects. In a later essay, Freud will explicitly distinguish the healthy, temporary process of mourning (which ultimately frees us to love something new) from “melancholia,” which is stuck in place.

The final paragraph of “On Transience” explains what the story is really about:

My conversation with the poet took place in the summer before the war. A year later the war broke out and robbed the world of its beauties. It destroyed not only the beauty of the countrysides through which it passed and the works of art which it met with on its path but it also shattered our pride in the achievements of our civilization, our admiration for many philosophers and artists and our hopes of a final triumph over the differences between nations and races. It tarnished the lofty impartiality of our science, it revealed our instincts in all their nakedness and let loose the evil spirits within us which we thought had been tamed forever by centuries of continuous education by the noblest minds. It made our country small again and made the rest of the world far remote. It robbed us of very much that we had loved, and showed us how ephemeral were many things that we had regarded as changeless.

In 1914, Europeans like Freud had lost an object of their love–life before the war–and they were mourning it. To make matters harder, they had strongly identified with prewar culture and taken pride and hope in it. They were like a widower who not only misses his deceased partner but also mourns his own lost role or place in the world as a spouse. (This is my analogy, not Freud’s or Lear’s.)

Dr. Freud has a prescription. Mourning passes, and the same will happen to Europeans as the war moves into the past. “When once the mourning is over, it will be found that our high opinion of the riches of civilization has lost nothing from our discovery of their fragility. We shall build up again all that war has destroyed, and perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before.”

Mourning involves, among other emotions, a recognition of the value of what was lost. Thus, for someone like Freud to mourn his optimistic youthful days before August 1914 was to recognize their worth. His sadness reveals that it had been good to pursue medical science in Vienna.

In this case, however, the prewar culture had yielded an unspeakably terrible war. Therefore, the culture was not only over but also discredited. If Freud could travel back in time, perhaps he should not enjoy prewar Vienna (or Paris) but regard it with dismay as the predecessor of a global slaughter. Perhaps Freud and his contemporaries were not like people mourning loved-ones who had died innocently, but like people whose lovers had been unmasked as villains. Worse, the mourners had been part of the lost and discredited world.

When Freud went for his country walk, he and his friends knew that the flowers would fade. But that was not the flowers’ fault. Watching them wither would not negate their value while they bloomed, and the friends could fully appreciate new buds when they returned (as normal) the following spring. In contrast, the First World War revealed that prewar European society, which had seemed so progressive to Freud’s generation, had been deeply corrupt all along.

I am disagreeing here with Freud. He thinks that the negative feelings of his contemporaries are symptoms of mourning, which is healthy but should not be allowed to last forever. Their mourning reflects an authentic and appropriate appreciation for life before the war. They now realize that the past was “fragile,” but this recognition should not detract from its value. Their job is to create good things anew.

It is much harder if we think that something that we have lost is not only transient and absent but was never as valuable as we had previously believed.

I am often nostalgic for the polity and society that I knew as a young adult and up through the Obama Administration. I realize that many people who were less fortunate than I felt less positive about things then, as did people who were more radical than I. I am simply reporting my subjective state. I now experience mourning for that time. The questions is whether my mourning is appropriate because the past was good, or whether it is naive and self-justifying.

Lear’s main objective is to help us to see that mourning reflects a degree of appropriate appreciation for the past, and we can continue to make good things. We should recognize the fragility of what we had built but not reject it all. This is difficult if we blame the past that we miss for what has gone wrong.


Source: Sigmund Freud, “On Transience,” 1915 (just “Vergänglichkeit” in the original, without a preposition), translated by James Strachey in the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, pp. 305-7, discussed in Jonathan Lear, Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life (Harvard, 2022). See also: the politics of nostalgia just isn’t what it used to be; nostalgia in the face of political crisis; there are tears of things; and Rilke, The Grownup

the rule of law and the Trump Administration versus higher education

On Wednesday, according to The New York Times, the Trump Administration sent letters to nine universities offering them financial benefits and relief from investigations if they agree (among other things) to “freeze tuition for five years,” provide “free tuition to students studying math, biology, or other ‘hard sciences’ if endowments exceed $2 million per undergraduate,” “cap the enrollment of international students,” “commit to strict definitions of gender,” and “change their governance structures to prohibit anything that would ‘punish, belittle and even spark violence against conservative ideas.'”

I have not seen the letter itself, but it refers to a “compact” document that the universities are asked to sign, and that is here. It includes, among other things, a provision that “all university employees, in their capacity as university representatives, will abstain from actions or speech relating to societal and political events except in cases in which external events have a direct impact upon the university.” (Does that mean I may not publish an article about Ukraine and identify myself as a Tufts professor?) Erwin Chemerinsky says, “It would be hard to come up with a more explicit attempt to restrict freedom of speech.”

Failure to sign evidently means risking federal support, or at least facing investigations and litigation. “This Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education represents the priorities of the U.S. government in its engagements with universities …. Institutions of higher education are free to develop models and values other than those below, if the institution elects to forego federal benefits.”

Trump won the election, and elections have consequences. The Administration may write regulations governing higher education. So why doesn’t the Department of Education publish this “compact” as a regulation applying to all universities? One rule would then apply to all, and it would be transparent and predictable.

A rule would also be subject to judicial review, and colleges and higher ed. associations would have incentives to sue, arguing that the regulations exceed the statutory authorization of the Department of Education, violate the First Amendment, or both. Some or all of the regulations might survive judicial review. In any case, everyone would know the results and would have to comply with the courts’ rulings. Because the rules would apply to the entire sector of higher education in all 50 states, there might be considerable backlash from voters.

All of this–publicity, consistency, predictability, judicial review, and review by voters–constitutes the rule of law. These letters violate it.

Some institutions may willingly take the deal, and others may decide to settle even if they believe that it undermines their rights because it is cheaper to negotiate than to fight back. Already, the chair of the University of Texas Board of Regents has said that UT is “honored” to have been “named as one of only nine institutions in the U.S. selected by the Trump administration for potential funding advantages.”

The result will be a de facto policy, applied one institution at a time, with no judicial review. Colleges may accept deals that trade away their Constitutional rights. Possibly, students and faculty will have standing to sue their own institutions (as Jimmy Kimmel could have sued ABC), but it will be hard for third parties to challenge these “voluntary” agreements. And institutions that the Administration decides not to target will be left alone, thus reducing any backlash.

It is very important that students, faculty, and alumni of these communities advocate for their institutions not to sign the compact: University of Arizona, Brown, Dartmouth, MIT, the University of Pennsylvania, USC, the University of Texas, Vanderbilt University, and UVa.

See also: primer on free speech and academic freedom; AAUP v Rubio; Holding two ideas at once: the attack on universities is authoritarian, and viewpoint diversity is important

AAUP v Rubio

On March 25, Tufts student Rümeysa Öztürk was abducted by masked ICE agents because she had co-authored a clearly legal op-ed in our campus newspaper, not directly about Israel but about how the university had responded to our student government. According to Andre Watson, the Assistant Director of the National Security Division of ICE, this op-ed could “undermine U.S. foreign policy by creating a hostile environment for Jewish students and indicating support for a designated terrorist organization.”

After an unconscionably long period of detainment in inhumane circumstances, Rümeysa was ordered released. Subsequently, the American Association of University Professors and the Middle Eastern Studies Association sued Donald Trump and members of his administration, seeking an injunction against the policy that had ensnared Rümeysa and other defendants.

Yesterday, federal District Court judge William G. Young, an appointee of Ronald Reagan, issued a 161-page decision in favor of the plaintiffs that is a blistering denunciation of the Administration. It makes quite a read.

It starts with the image that I reproduce above. (I have never seen a judicial decision with a front-page illustration.)

The judge’s main finding comes early:

Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, together with the subordinate officials and agents of each of them, deliberately and with purposeful aforethought, did so concert their actions and those of their two departments intentionally to chill the rights to freedom of speech and peacefully to assemble of the non-citizen plaintiff members of the plaintiff associations (pp. 4-5).

Judge Young does not mince words in the many pages that follow. For example, “the facts prove that the President himself approves truly scandalous and unconstitutional suppression of free speech on the part of two of his senior cabinet secretaries” (p. 96).

After considering the arguments in favor of masking ICE agents, the court “rejects this testimony as disingenuous, squalid and dishonorable” (p. 98).

The judge explains:

It was never the Secretaries’ immediate intention to deport all pro- Palestinian non-citizens[.] for that obvious First Amendment violation … could have raised a major outcry. Rather, the intent of the Secretaries was more invidious — to target a few for speaking out and then use the full rigor of the Immigration and Nationality Act (in ways it had never been used before) to have them publicly deported with the goal of tamping down pro-Palestinian student protests and terrorizing similarly situated non-citizen (and other) pro-Palestinians into silence because their views were unwelcome.

The Secretaries have succeeded, apparently well beyond their immediate intentions” (p. 95).

I have been saying that we in academia should enhance ideological pluralism because it’s the right thing to do. It makes our thinking and teaching more rigorous. However, the Trump’s Administration’s attacks on higher education have nothing to do with that goal, except that intellectual diversity is occasionally and inconsistently used as a pretext. The Administration is trying to crush pluralism by applying a set of tools popular among modern authoritarians of the left, center, and right. The Administration’s policies make it considerably more difficult to promote reasonable dialogue across ideological differences on campuses. But more importantly, the government is “terrorizing” vulnerable people into silence.

Near the end of the decision, Judge Young quotes the president who appointed him, Ronald Reagan: “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation, for it comes only once to a people.” The judge concludes:

As I’ve read and re-read the record in this case, listened widely, and reflected extensively, I’ve come to believe that President Trump truly understands and appreciates the full import of President Reagan’s inspiring message –- yet I fear he has drawn from it a darker, more cynical message. I fear President Trump believes the American people are so divided that today they will not stand up, fight for, and defend our most precious constitutional values so long as they are lulled into thinking their own personal interests are not affected.

Is he correct?

See also: primer on free speech and academic freedomacademic freedom for individuals and for groupsHolding two ideas at once: the attack on universities is authoritarian, and viewpoint diversity is important