what I’m reading

I am blogging a bit lightly this month, partly because I have wanted to reserve time for relatively sustained reading, mostly in two areas.

First, I am planning a new course on the life and thought of Hannah Arendt. To that end, I have been rereading a lot of her own work and reading some of her articles for the first time. I also reviewed Elizabeth Young-Bruehl’s landmark biography (1982) and recent biographies by Samantha Rose Hill (2021) and Lyndsey Stonebridge (2024), plus many interpretive articles, old and new.

I really admire Young-Bruehl’s biography. She misses some information that has come to light in the 44 years since she published it, but she summarizes Arendt’s ideas and the work of other thinkers reliably and insightfully and paints a vivid portrait of her subject.

I am struggling to appreciate The Origins of Totalitarianism as much as I did when I first read it, notwithstanding my deep appreciation for Arendt’s political theory. At least on its face, this is a work of empirical, narrative history, and it includes many claims that don’t seem empirically right to me.

Just for example, Arendt views racism as basically a 19th century phenomenon and largely ignores transatlantic slavery. I can understand that racism took a new form in the 1800s, and I agree that it became more of an ideology then. (Arendt defines ideologies as “systems based upon a single opinion that proved strong enough to attract and persuade a majority of people and broad enough to lead them through the various experiences and situations of an average modern life.”) In his 2017 history of 19th century Britain, David Cannadine also emphasizes that racism hardened into an ideology in the later Victorian Era. Still, Arendt’s overall argument is distorted by a failure to address slavery.

I also wonder whether Arendt’s historical scholarship on European Jewry holds up. It is a little hard to tell, because Origins of Totalitarianism has been cited almost 30,000 times, and I haven’t found needles of historical scholarship in that haystack of political theory. Meanwhile, when I scan histories of Jewry, she does not appear as a source.

Second, I have collected my own writing about the inner life and personal ethics in an evolving collection called Cuttings: Ninety-Nine Essays About Happiness. Reviewing this collection when I prepared to present about happiness in Kyiv in June, I realized that Montaigne is really my model, and I interpret him as a kind of Skeptic in the tradition of the ancient Greek Skeptical School, except that Montaigne adds empathy for others’ suffering. I explored how this combination resembles Buddhism here.

My attraction to this way of thinking about ethics dates back to my 1998 book, Living Without Philosophy. With an eye to writing at least an article about Montaigne-style Skepticism, I have been reading and appreciating Richard Bett’s How to Be a Pyrrhonist (2019), Sarah Bakewell’s How to Live: Or a Life of Montaigne (2010), and some texts by Sextus, Plutarch and Montaigne himself.

what a Democrat could do with Trump’s power

In the Atlantic, Paul Rosenzweig asks what a Democratic president could do with the unilateral executive powers that the Supreme Court seems willing to grant Trump–assuming that the “Court acts in good faith—that its views on presidential power are without partisan favor, and that it doesn’t arbitrarily invent carve-outs to rein in a Democratic president.”

As Rosenzweig notes, a Democrat would want to rebuild or build things, whereas Trump’s new powers mostly involve canceling or blocking things. Therefore, a Democrat would have a harder job than Trump has. Rosenzweig also notes that it will be a challenge to fill vacant positions that are authorized by statute. “Firing experts is much easier than hiring them. And given the uncertainties that Trump has created, our best and brightest might not willingly take positions in the federal government. Who wants a job that might last only four years?”

I would add that any president must refrain from crossing certain ethical lines, regardless of what the courts may rule. For example, selecting individuals to be prosecuted violates the rule of law; the government should only investigate alleged crimes, not choose people as targets for legal action. No politician should decide ex ante to prosecute Elon Musk or Steven Miller or any other individual.

But I think Rosenzweig somewhat underestimates the opportunities for the next administration. Here are four:

  1. Rebuilding the civil service

Hiring federal workers will be a challenge, but a worthy one. Yes, the Trump cuts have unjustly ended careers and caused massive damage. At the same time, the federal civil service has long suffered from a severe problem of generational replacement, hiring far too few young people. This is one reason that some federal agencies and offices have been sclerotic and ineffective. To attract young and talented people into federal service will require leadership. We should expect that from our next president. The result could be a better executive branch.

(Yes, federal jobs are less secure, now that the president seems to have the right to lay off civil servants; but government positions are at least as secure as jobs in the private sector.)

  1. Restoring accountability

Although the rule of law does not permit selecting individuals for prosecution, it requires accountability. The difference lies in process. The next administration could create commissions, offices, and/or tribunals that investigate corruption and illegality without fear or favor. Individuals and organizations that allege that they were abused by the Biden Administration or its predecessors could come forward, not just those with complaints against Trump and his people. The White House would have no say in the decisions.

  • It would be worth considering a Truth and Reconciliation model.
  • In addition to investigating crimes, the administration could investigate federal employees and contractors and terminate those who crossed ethical lines–with due process. Companies that gave things of value to Trump would also be at risk of bribery charges.
  • It would be worth trying to waive sovereign immunity so that aggrieved parties could sue the government for damages. There is no question that the Trump Administration has intentionally caused costly harms. (And possibly previous administration did so as well.) I am not sure whether courts would allow plaintiffs to sue without Congressional approval. But it would be worth testing a strategy of unilaterally waiving the sovereign immunity defense.
  1. Judicious cuts

There are pieces of the federal government that a responsible center-left or progressive administration should cut by fiat, using the powers that Trump has accumulated. For example, I would consider zeroing out Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) within ICE. The benefits would far exceed any disadvantages.

  1. Leverage

A responsible president of any party should not fire people or cut spending just to achieve political objectives. For example, a responsible president should not threaten to fire all the federal workers in a district unless its representative votes with the administration. That would harm innocent workers and clients.

However, leverage can be used more judiciously. Terminating all positions in Enforcement and Removal Operations would be a net benefit for the public; it could also be a bargaining chip in negotiations about immigration reform. A president could even threaten to relocate federal jobs of certain types out of specific districts. For example, there are nearly 1,000 Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), 50 federal Rural Development State Offices, and more than 360 IRS Taxpayer Assistance Centers (TACs). Maybe a Member of Congress would like those to leave his district? Or would the Member prefer to vote “aye” on the president’s bill?

I am not sure I want this kind of president. There is a risk that playing hardball with the new presidential powers would further degrade constitutional norms. But perhaps such leverage would be ethical if the proposed legislation were valuable and the collateral damage were strictly limited.

Going beyond specific bills, I would consider proposing a grand bargain. We need a much stronger and more capable Congress, a more resilient civil service, and a more rule-bound presidency. Since the courts are responsible for unleashing the president, laws won’t suffice to change the balance; we probably need constitutional amendments. I could see a progressive or center-left president saying: “Pass these amendments and limit my discretion. Meanwhile, I will use my unilateral powers to the full.”

A raft of ambitious policies would be a success. A restored constitutional balance would be a success. And it might be possible to get one followed by the other.

See also: repairing the damage of federal actions; Gen Z and rebuilding the federal workforce; a generational call to rebuild; and rule of law means more than obeying laws: a richer vision to guide post-Trump reconstruction

The Day of My Life

I wish I did not have that human wish,
The wish that today were a different day,
But the wish that pours forth in the song of a bird:
“May it be this same day, so may it be.”

No, a bird sings not to say but to be.
It grants a wish just by being heard.
I wish I didn’t want the day to stay
Or change. I should, like the bird, just be.

(Responding to Randall Jarrell’s “A Man Meets a Woman in the Street,” with Keats’ nightingale also in mind.)

Drowning in the River Parable: Our Favorite Public Health Story is a Noble Lie

Most people know the story: Tom and Joe are fishing on a boat in the middle of the river, when they spot a baby floating past. Joe tosses his pole and jumps into the water to save the child, and Tom helps him back into the boat, checking on the infant. They’re rowing back to shore when they see two more babies floating downstream, so Joe jumps back into the water while Tom sprints away.

Joe grabs the children and then turns back to Tom, shouting, “Where are you going, you idiot? Help me with these kids!”

Tom shouts over his shoulder: “I’m going to find the maniac chucking babies into the river!”

You can get a laugh with the right delivery—”maniac chucking babies” has lots of hard /k/ sounds and that’s inherently funny. But the “going upstream” story isn’t really a joke. It’s an argument dressed as a parable, with contested premises and a tidy conclusion: we should address root causes, not just emergencies. The story circulates through public health conferences, activist trainings, policy workshops, and criminal justice seminars like a benediction: go upstream, find the source, put yourself out of a job.

These are my people, so of course I enjoy the story. But when you hear it often enough, you start to notice things. In most tellings, the story is about making non-heroic things feel more heroic. Joe saves the children—clearly heroic. But Tom’s heroism happens offscreen—we’re meant to imagine him wrestling some psycho to the ground and preventing future drownings. Both men are heroes, just different kinds. This equivalence matters to the advocates, policy wonks, and public health workers hearing the story, whose version of Tom’s upstream heroics involves writing grants, organizing campaigns, drafting legislation, or sitting through interminable meetings hoping for three minutes at the microphone to nudge policy incrementally forward. This work rarely feels heroic, but the story insists: Tom and Joe are both part of the solution, both heroes in their own ways.

That’s why the argumentative structure stands out. The parable only works because Joe manages to save every child. When Tom leaves, no one is drowning. Reality rarely offers such tidy arithmetic. The frontline need almost always exceeds capacity, making upstream work feel like abandonment. Imagine the story with children still rushing past, gasping and drowning, while Tom sprints away to search for causes. That’s closer to how these decisions actually feel.

The babies aren’t just metaphors: a former student of mine died recently. I did what downstream workers do: drove her to the police station—twice—to report abuse. Helped her find safe housing. Loaned money she couldn’t repay. Listened. Counseled. Hoped. My colleagues threw their own lines too, tried to pull her free of the river. None of it was enough. The tragedies kept finding her until the last one didn’t let go. So imagine the story again, but Joe stays in the water for more than a decade, and misses as many babies as he saves. Maybe that’s why we keep telling these “upstream/downstream” stories: because the alternative is admitting what actually happens to the babies.

My work now is definitely upstream work. It’s satisfying in its own way—not least because so much of it is writing work. The people with whom I collaborate are heroic, the challenges are interesting, and the details suit my nerdy bent.

But the river story assumes Tom knows exactly where to run. No five-year PhD program to identify which tributary harbors the villain. No chance Tom will devote his life to an upstream intervention that proves worthless or actively harmful. No unintended consequences exist in this world—though what would that even look like? Tom accidentally helping the villain find more victims? Maybe not quite—but it’s easy to imagine that Tom’s carefully brokered upstream solution may well require the babies’ mothers to attend workshops on “parenting skills.”

Upstream work is rife with unintended consequences. Well-meaning advocates for abstinence-only education promote a policy that the evidence suggests will worsen children’s sexual health, leading to more sex, earlier, that’s less safe. It’s painful to acknowledge—easier to assume malice than accept that good intentions can produce harm.

The seductive simplicity of the upstream story makes it perfect for any political perspective. Recast the river as the Rio Grande, make the fishermen Border Patrol, blame the cartels. Change it again: does rent control decrease housing supply? Do some NIMBYs cause gentrification while fighting it? The world forces tradeoffs, but we can ignore that when we’re sprinting upstream to address our chosen tragedy.

These examples will rankle readers across the political spectrum—but that’s beside the point. I want to focus on the issues raised by story structure itself. Whatever your ideology, the upstream story works because everyone can cast themselves as Tom or Joe, the smart one who sees the “root” problem, or the empathic one who refuses to ignore the needs of the real people suffering in front of them. Head, or heart? Either way you’re a hero.

Both Tom and Joe are trapped in impossible roles. Yet J.D. Salinger lampooned Joe’s trap decades ago in a book we all read in middle school:

“I keep picturing all these little kids playing some game in this big field of rye and all. Thousands of little kids, and nobody’s around—nobody big, I mean—except me. And I’m standing on the edge of some crazy cliff. What I have to do, I have to catch everybody if they start to go over the cliff—I mean if they’re running and they don’t look where they’re going I have to come out from somewhere and catch them.”

Holden Caulfield’s fantasy is pure Joe—an endless, impossible vigil at the cliff’s edge. On Salinger’s telling, it comes off a bit naive, an obsession with the pure victim, the complete innocence and authenticity of childhood that ignores all the complexity with which system-tinkering Toms are forced to wrangle. Unlike the river with its upstream perpetrator, the field of rye doesn’t need a catcher at all; it needs someone to fence off the cliff.

The story also erases race, gender, and class. In reality the large majority doing Tom’s job are white women, and the large majority doing Joe’s job are women of color, especially Black women. And the babies—the victims and clients? Almost always Black and brown, and always poor.

Go to any social services office, any emergency room, any homeless shelter. Who’s behind the desk doing intake? Who’s restraining the violent client? Who’s helping them navigate their housing options? Now go to any foundation, any policy institute, any legislative hearing. Who’s presenting the PowerPoints? Who’s writing the white papers? Who’s deciding which upstream interventions deserve funding?

The parable pretends Tom and Joe just happened to be fishing when babies floated by. Could it be that Joe’s neighborhood is downstream because Tom’s neighborhood votes to keep the toxic waste facilities, the highways, the flood zones somewhere else? You might worry that Tom is careful not to look too close to home.

The story’s most notable premise: victims are infants—completely innocent, completely helpless. They can’t drag Joe down with them. They can’t get angry when they notice Tom’s glitzy contracts from the lifeguards’ advocacy group, can’t accuse him of “coming to do good, but staying to do well.”

They also can’t help with their own rescue. Imagine adult victims: they’d join the rescue efforts, tell Tom where to look for causes, organize their own upstream interventions. But babies can only float and cry.

The story circulates at conferences because people patting themselves on the back for being Tom secretly wish they were Joe. Joe’s job seems simple—save the babies. Frontline workers get lip service and cheap talk about being heroes. But upstream folks have fancier titles, better pay, more control over resources. Meanwhile, the Joes are burning out, loaded with trauma and unpaid overtime.

The problem that the parable addresses is that the quotidian work of advocacy often feels inadequate. Every policy director wants to be Tom, finding and stopping the source of harms. Every social worker wants to be Joe, directly saving lives. This isn’t to say the upstream/downstream framework has been useless. Childhood lead poisoning rates plummeted because upstream advocates pushed for unleaded gasoline and paint regulations. Drunk driving deaths dropped when the focus shifted from rescuing crash victims to changing social norms and laws. Vaccine programs prevented millions from ever approaching the river’s edge. These victories matter.

But notice how these successes involve clear mechanisms: remove lead from paint, reduce poisoning. Mandate seatbelts, prevent ejections. The villain really was throwing babies in the river, and we really could stop him. The parable works when the problem is technical. It fails when the problem is poverty, racism, trauma—the compound fractures of injustice that don’t heal with a single intervention.

Usually there’s a proximate villain, an opposing coalition who stands between us and the root causes—but when they’ve been defeated the problems persist. Building slightly better guardrails, teaching swimming lessons, arguing about river regulations—it’s not exciting stuff. We’re doing work that’s incremental, frustrating, and impossible to capture in a satisfying story. It involves compromise and dirty hands. The big boss is always some concept or abstraction: Capitalism or Whiteness or Sin or Socialism.

Here’s what I worry: what if many of the world’s hardest problems don’t have maniacs at their source, just complex systems failing in predictable ways? What if the reforms we propose will improve but not abolish the situation? What if there’s no villain to wrestle, no single cliff to guard?

Heroic journeys promise a big save at the end. Would that it were so: mostly we just muddle forward.

what causes works to be used in college courses?

I just read a valuable forthcoming article about bias in college syllabi. I don’t want to “scoop” that piece and won’t address its claims here. It did get me thinking more broadly about why some texts are widely assigned in college courses.

  • Fashion: When I was a humanities-oriented undergraduate in the 1980s, it seemed as if every professor assigned Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1935). I don’t hear much about that book these days, and other texts are more fashionable. Such changes presumably reflect shifts among intellectuals as well as prominent developments in the world. For instance, Benjamin’s book seemed prescient when culture was first turning digital but may now seem dated.
  • Ideological proclivities: Individual professors tend to prefer to assign works that they agree with. I recognize that many of my colleagues intentionally choose texts that they would criticize, but I am asserting that there is some degree of bias in the whole population of professors, with variations by discipline. By the way, a proclivity is not a bias if it’s reflective, acknowledged, and open to change. The main concern is unconscious bias.
  • Genre and style: It is much easier to use a text that is addressed to a general reader and aims to interest people in the topic and influence their behavior, rather than a text that is written for academic colleagues and meant to contribute to a literature. One issue is jargon (specialized terminology), but some jargony works are widely assigned anyway. I think the main issue is the purpose of the work. If it aims to influence a public audience, it is more likely to be assigned.
  • Marketing, broadly defined: Like everyone else, academics are influenced by marketing. I am not thinking of the deliberate advertising and promotion of specific academic books, because those investments are very modest. I am thinking about the difference between any academic book and a mass-market paperback that is sold in bookstores and reviewed in The New York Times. The latter will be used in more courses. By the way, ideological bias could be relevant here, but it would be the bias of commercial publishers and mass-circulation journals, not academics.
  • Personal branding: Some authors, including some professors, turn themselves into recognizable personalities. Nowadays, that means that they are prominent on broadcast and social media, and they exemplify a particular position or perspective. Academics quickly think of their works when deciding what to assign.
  • Hedgehogs, not foxes: When you’re designing a syllabus, you often want texts that clearly and directly represent a particular view, even if you are also looking for contrary views. For instance, in teaching 20th century political philosophy last spring, I wanted to include fascist texts. This was certainly not an endorsement; I just thought that we should analyze their views. I went looking for clear expressions of fascism, not subtle or equivocal arguments. I assigned a speech by Mussolini (probably ghost-written by Gentile). I did not end up using Heidegger’s 1933 “Rector’s Address” because it’s too complicated and addresses too many things at once. Authors and individual texts are more attractive if they say one thing clearly (like the proverbial hedgehog) rather than many things with various qualifications and complexities (like the fox). Therefore, our syllabi fill up with works by “hedgehogs.”

See also: on hedgehogs and foxes; trying to keep myself honest; don’t confuse bias and judgment

Hannah Arendt: “The problem wasn’t what our enemies did, but what our friends did”

Here is a clip that resonates today. It is from Hannah Arendt’s 1964 interview on German television. The journalist Günter Gaus takes her through her life, from her childhood in Königsburg to the controversy about her 1963 Eichmann book.

At this point in the conversation, Arendt has been describing her work in France in 1933-1941. As an activist, social worker, and educator, she had helped to move Jewish refugee teenagers from France to kibbutzim in Palestine.

She concludes, “So that was roughly the activity [Tätigkeit]”. In her later theoretical writing, Arendt combines that word with other terms to differentiate three major human “activities”: labor, thinking, and action. Her work in France was the third kind of activity, “Die Tätigkeit des Handelns”: talking and working with others to change the world. That is how she defines politics, and “freedom is exclusively located in the political realm” (The Human Condition, p. 31),

She asks Gauss whether he would like to hear how she turned to this “activity.”

He nods, and she says, “You see, I came from purely academic activity [what she would call “thinking”], and in that respect, the year ‘33 made a very lasting impression on me, first positive and second negative. Or I would say, first negative and second positive.”

It is surprising that there was anything positive about 1933, but I suspect Arendt was thinking of how it had propelled her from thinking into action.

She continues, “Today, one often thinks that the shock of the German Jews in ’33 came from the fact that Hitler seized power. Now, as far as I and people of my generation are concerned, I can say that this is a curious misunderstanding. It was of course very bad. It was political. It wasn’t personal. That the Nazis are our enemies, my God, we didn’t need Hitler’s seizure of power to know that. It had been completely evident to anyone who wasn’t an idiot for at least four years that a large part of the German people were behind it. Yes, we knew that too. We couldn’t have been surprised by it.”

Gauss says, “The shock in 1933 was that something general and political turned into something personal.”

Arendt replies, “No. Well, first, that too. First, the general and political did become a personal fate, if one emigrated. Secondly, you know what conforming is. [She uses Nazi jargon, Gleichschaltung, which could perhaps be translated as preemptive capitulation.]. And it meant that friends were conforming. Yes, it was never a personal problem. The problem wasn’t what our enemies did, but what our friends did. Well, uh, what happened back then in the wave of Gleichschaltung–which was pretty voluntary, anyway, not under the pressure of terror–above all, in this sudden abandonment, it was as if an empty space had formed around me.”

For Arendt, this empty space would not only be cruel and disillusioning but would also reveal that she could not act freely when surrounded by the people she had counted as friends. “Action is entirely dependent on the presence of others” and requires interaction with them [The Human Condition, p. 23].

She adds:

Well, I lived in an intellectual milieu, but I also knew other people, and I could see that among the intellectuals, [conforming] was the rule, so to speak; and among the others, not. And I’ve never forgotten that story.

I always thought back then (I was exaggerating a bit of course): ‘I am leaving Germany. Never again! Never again will I touch this intellectual business. I don’t want to have anything to do with this community.

“I was, of course, not of the opinion that German Jews or German-Jewish intellectuals would have acted any differently if they had been in a different situation. I didn’t think so. I was of the opinion that it had to do with this profession. I’m speaking of that time–I know more about it now than I did back then.


I learned about this interview from the new PBS documentary, Hannah Arendt: Facing History, which I generally recommend. See also: Hannah Arendt: I’m Nothing but a Little Dot; “Complaint,” by Hannah Arendt; Reading Arendt in Palo Alto; Arendt, freedom, Trump (from 2017); Hannah Arendt and thinking from the perspective of an agent; notes on Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution; what is the basis of a political judgment? etc.

the landscape for civically engaged research

I’m on my way home from co-directing the Institute for Civically Engaged Research (ICER), which took place this year at UCLA. Our participants are encouraged to debate what constitutes “civically engaged research” (CER), and we look for people who will disagree about that question. Nevertheless, here is one definition:

Civically engaged political science research is an approach to inquiry that involves political scientists collaborating in a mutually beneficial way with people and groups beyond th eacademy to co-produce, share, and apply knowledge related to power or politics, contributing to self-governance.

civically: How people govern themselves. Engaged research teams are self-governing collaborative groups (composed of community organizations, government actors, social movements, and others); their research strengthens self-governance for others.

engaged: Collaborative, in partnership, with benefits andsubstantive roles for both political scientists and nonacademicsin the same projects.

research: Any organized, rigorous production of knowledge,including empirical, interpretive, historical, conceptual, nor-mative, and other forms of inquiry.

political science: A pluralist discipline with a central focus onquestions of power, politics, and governance

Amy Cabrera Rasmussen, Peter Levine, Robert Lieberman, Valeria Sinclair-Chapman & Rogers Smith “Preface,” PS: Political Science & Politics symposium on Civically Engaged Research (2021)

I don’t believe that CER is the single best approach. I also appreciate many other kinds of political science, from close readings of ancient texts to game theory to analyses of massive voter files. But I believe that CER is valuable and underdeveloped in political science.

Fairly often, the senior administrators of a university are supportive. In Southern California, we heard impressive presentations about university-wide policies and initiatives at UCLA, UC-San Diego, and Cal-State Dominguez Hills that enable CER. Many other examples could be found across the country. Perhaps some politically edgy engaged research projects make some university leaders nervous (depending, in part, on the state’s political environment), but often institutional leaders appreciate interdisciplinary work, applied research, collaborations with local community organizations, and projects that create opportunities for students.

The funding landscape is complicated. Often CER requires a lot of time and effort for developing relationships. Outcomes are unpredictable; goals may shift as projects play out. Some funders prefer concrete projects that have predictable outcomes. On the other hand, local foundations and philanthropists may prefer engaged research over other kinds of academic activity because they care about local issues and organizations. And many serious CER scholars are credible applicants for grants because they are seasoned civic actors with strong networks.

Often the strongest skeptics and opponents of CER in political science are political scientists–other members of a scholar’s department, hiring committees, and reviewers. At best, these colleagues overlook and fail to value the time and skill required to build partnerships that yield research. At worst, they reject the results as fatally biased, or merely local and un-generalizable, or insufficiently original and sophisticated. Theorists, empiricists, and formal modelers have different notions of sophistication, but any of them may regard CER as simple, even though an impressive CER project is often extremely complex.

Not every effort to collaborate with partners deserves credit, any more than any text typed on a word processor should count toward tenure. Good CER demonstrates rigor, ethics, and validity while also requiring diplomatic and managerial skills, cultural competence, and tactical acumen. I would not ask the profession to reward every effort at CER but to become capable of identifying the really good work (and supporting newcomers who are still developing their skills).

We certainly have allies within the profession; in fact, APSA is responsible for ICER. But we still need to change many minds.

the 2025 Institute for Civically Engaged Research

We are concluding the second day of the 2025 edition of the American Political Science Association’s Institute for Civically Engaged Research (ICER), which is a professional-development program for political scientists (graduate students, professors, and some people who work in other institutions) who want to create knowledge in partnerships with non-academics.

This is the 6th ICER, which means that our current and former Fellows number about 120 people. It has been deeply satisfying to watch them do impressive research with partners and to advance in their careers.

Previously, we met at Tufts’ Tisch College of Civic Life. This year, thanks to the Haynes Foundation, we are at UCLA. The Los Angeles metro area, home to almost 13 million people, makes a fascinating backdrop for discussions of research about politics and social issues. Just yesterday, according to the LA Times,

Immigration agents in military green surrounded MacArthur Park as the convoy readied for a show of force akin to a Hollywood movie.

They came with horses and armored vehicles, carrying rifles and in tactical gear in the middle of what is the heart of immigrant Los Angeles. But there were few of their supposed targets to be found Monday — immigrants without documentation.

On the elegant UCLA campus, quiet in midsummer, there is no obvious sign of state repression. However, some of our speakers have offered insights about the city from their perspectives as engaged scholars. And our conversations range much more widely, for we have participants from Bangladesh, Nigeria, and elsewhere.

See also: Civically Engaged Research in Political Science; how to keep political science in touch with politics; Grounded Normative Theory

a pluralistic 250th

As the 250th year of the republic begins, I am not in a celebratory mood. Our current political crisis is the worst since 1877, the end of Reconstruction. The government is violating core republican principles; and to some extent, this is happening because of flaws in American culture and civil society.

Still, the United States is a community, and communities can mark auspicious dates. America’s 250th anniversary events need not celebrate our national leaders or claim any kind of superiority for our political history and system. The year can be a celebration of our people, by our people, in all our diversity. We can mark the 250th in a pluralistic way, with many local communities, groups, and institutions expressing how they understand the moment–not in a centralized way determined by the White House. In that case, the 250th will be an opportunity to contest the meaning of America, and such contestation is the best of our tradition.

My friend Rev. Dr. Willis Johnson writes: “Personally, I’m drawn to the notion of bearing witness, not just to what is, but to what ought to be. Independence Day, in its best form, should be an act of collective remembrance and recommitment, not just a party. We need to remember that freedom is not static, nor is it evenly distributed. We need to recommit to the labor of making liberty real for everyone, especially those for whom the promise of independence still rings hollow.”

I am old enough to remember the Bicentennial, albeit dimly. The official American Revolution Bicentennial Administration organized some of the events. President Ford presided over a nationally televised fireworks display and reviewed the sailing ships that had gathered in New York Harbor from aboard a naval vessel.

But there were also many local and nongovernmental events, including some protests. The image with this post illustrates an environmental protest in the Boston Harbor that marked the 200th anniversary of the Tea Party. Even the Tall Ships were organized by a nonprofit.

To the extent that the celebrations appeared unified, it was mainly because of the political context. Two centrist presidential candidates, Ford and Carter, were competing to unite the country after the traumas of the previous decade. Nixon had resigned in 1974; Saigon had fallen in 1975. This meant that Watergate and the war were now definitively over, and Americans could hope that a less contentious period was starting. The national government did not create a unifying moment, but the country was in a relatively unified mood.

Such is not the case today. The official national effort, America250, has “announce[d] a monumental celebration, kicking off a new era of American greatness, featuring special remarks by President Donald J. Trump. This kick-off event will take place at the Iowa State Fairgrounds, offering patriotism, excitement, inspiration, and a glimpse into the grand festivities planned for America’s 250th anniversary.”

Even people who support Trump need to recognize that many fellow citizens oppose him, and any kind of ceremony that focuses on him and invokes MAGA concepts will provoke opposition. In my view, such conflict is the most appropriate celebration of a free people, born in rebellion and accustomed to free speech and debate.

Rev. Johnson concludes, “In my heart, I still love my country. I love its messiness, its stubborn hope, its capacity to surprise. To love America means abstaining from turning a blind eye to its wounds. Loving our dear republic means asking hard questions at the cookout. Above all, love of country requires telling the truth—about the people still locked out of the celebration, about the freedoms that remain unfulfilled, about the dangers of settling for easy myths.”

There is little hope that America250 will tell these truths, but it doesn’t own the anniversary. The American people have an opportunity to celebrate our diverse community and to recommit to self-government.