leverage as a moral issue

Newly out from Springer is Leveraging: A Political, Economic and Societal Framework, edited by my friend David M. Anderson. Anderson identifies bargaining leverage, resource leverage, and investment leverage as three distinct but related issues and then develops the idea of a “leverage mean,” which is the “mean between the extremes of too much leverage and too little leverage.” He and the other contributors examine cases from Wall Street meltdowns to parenting. Significant portions of the book are available online for free.

I’ve been thinking about leverage lately as well. We begin the Summer Institute of Civic Studies by examining forms of human interaction that are direct and human. In community organizing, deliberative democracy, and the management of common pool resources, the participants can explain what they believe and value to one another and can tangibly affect the outcomes with their own words and work.

But we don’t believe that we can stop at that scale, because the national and global economy and environment are crucial. Therefore, by the second week of the course, we are reading authors like James Madison and Bruce Ackerman who are interested in the design of nations and other large-scale systems. But then the deliberate, intentional, active citizen tends to recede from view. After all, most of us are not in the position to write a new constitution that will be ratified. As one of our participants acutely noted, “I had to miss a day, and when I returned, we were talking about Madison. Where is the civic in that?”

The problem is one of leverage. If we only do what is right, we leave most of the world unchanged. If we seek to change the world at large scale, we must get others to do what is right as well. That is leverage. For the most part, our leverage in the social world comes from creating, using, and changing institutions.

As the Archimedean metaphor suggests, to use leverage is to manipulate–to treat something as a means. In the social world, that something will have to be human: a person or a group. Leverage is necessary if you care for the world at any significant scale. But leverage is also risky and is ethically problematic because it can’t be fully reciprocal and relational. I think this is a fundamental problem, and Anderson and colleagues have opened an important line of inquiry.

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Frontiers of Democracy 2014

I’m with more than 140 scholars, practitioners, and activists from as far away as India, Ukraine, and Israel at Frontiers of Democracy 2014. We are streaming some of the conference live, but another good way to check in on the conversation is to follow the Twitter hashtag #demfront. So far, I’ve hear lots of tough, passionate, and thoughtful conversation about whether the small-scale democratic practices that we create–practices marked by deliberative and relational values–have anything to do with the large-scale structures that dominate our lives. One way that they might relate is by actually shoring up existing institutions, at the expense of justice. But can we critically assess powerful structures in a way that gives us agency? If this conference became a critical seminar on global crony capitalism, would we do anything differently after we left?

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needed: the case method for civics

David Garvin has written, “All professional schools face the same difficult challenge: how to prepare students for the world of practice. Time in the classroom must somehow translate directly into real-world activity: how to diagnose, decide, and act. A surprisingly wide range of professional schools … have concluded that the best way to teach these skills is by the case method.”

I propose that we need cases for citizens. Of course, there are many case studies available. Participedia provides hundreds of examples of citizens’ engagement with government. Many books (including my own) tell stories of successful or failed civic efforts.

But the case method is a little different. A “case” in this context means a deliberately incomplete story. It ends at a point of decision for a character or small group. The decision is contrived or chosen to be difficult in the specific sense that it is unresolvable by any formula or algorithm. Such difficulty may arise because the situation involves conflicting and incommensurable values or because the facts and likely outcomes are uncertain–or both. These two sources of indeterminacy are extremely common. Yet we must act. Garvin writes:

“The case system, ” business school alumnus Powell Niland, now of Washington University, has observed, “puts the student in the habit of making decisions.” Day after day, classes revolve around protagonists who face critical choices. Delay is seldom an option. Both faculty and students cite the “bias for action” that results—what Fouraker professor of business administration Thomas Piper calls “courage to act under uncertainty.”

In the Summer Institute of Civic Studies last week, we discussed a case study from Harvard’s Pluralism Project. It involves an adult leader (who, coincidentally, I happen to know) who helped youth organize an interfaith event in a synagogue and who must decide, at very short notice, what to do about a sign that says, “We support Israel.” This is a case about religious pluralism, but we could also consider it a case of civic action. We need more cases like it.

By the way, if you follow the argument of Bent Flyvberg (whom we also read in the Institute), then you will conclude that all knowledge of the social world is particularistic and case-specific. The only valid knowledge comes from cases. I think that is too strong. General knowledge is also helpful. If there are no laws or algorithms that tell us what we should do, there are at least useful rules-of-thumb and principles, both explanatory and normative. Yet cases play an essential role, especially if the purpose is to educate citizens to act.

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explaining Dewey’s pragmatism

In the Summer Institute of Civic Studies, we read chapter 5 of John Dewey’s The Public and its Problems, which exemplifies pragmatism as a method or as a theory of knowledge and value. This year, we are also reading a lecture by Hilary Putnam entitled “The Three Enlightenments” (from “Ethics without Ontology”), which I find helpful for elucidating Dewey’s method.

Putnam distinguishes three stages of enlightenment, of which the last is the “pragmatic” stage inaugurated by Dewey. We can consider Putnam’s three stages using an example–voting–that he does not use himself.

1. The Greek stage of enlightenment is exemplified by Socrates’ going around Athens, asking “why?” Socrates won’t do or endorse anything until his “why?” question is answered. As Putnam says, Socrates seeks “reflective transcendence” as he tries to throw off both “conventional opinion” and “revelation” and make his own reason the only judge.

If Socrates encountered our practice of regularly voting for our leaders (which, of course, originated in his culture), he would say, “Why do you do that?” We could not reply: “Because it’s in the Constitution.” Or “Because it is our custom.” We would have to give a reason that could overcome his skepticism.

2. The Age of Enlightenment stage repeats this skepticism but adds two big ideas capable of offering answers: the social contract and natural science. Actually, each offers a potential justification of voting. If society is and ought to be a social contract, then giving everyone a vote to select their leaders is a means of renewing the contract. Or one could say that voting is a right that people would demand before they entered the contract in the first place. Further, we can study whether voting leads to good outcomes, such as social welfare. That kind of investigation employs the tools of natural science to study a social phenomenon.

3. The third stage is Deweyan and pragmatic. It is a “criticism of criticisms.” It rejects enlightenment reason. For instance, the concept of a social contract is an invention. Even if we accept it, it does not answer all the “Why?” questions. Why should there be a social contract? Why should persons be equal? Further, no empirical study of voting can vindicate it by demonstrating its positive outcomes. Why, after all, should we value those outcomes? Why did we decide to measure them as we do?

In contrast, Dewey would say that he was formed by a society in which voting is a norm. He does not have a vantage point completely independent of that society. That is the basic reason that he and the rest of us vote. It is not appropriate to ask the “Why?” question as if one could stand apart from this society. That kind of skepticism leads nowhere. As Dewey puts it (p.158), “philosophy [once] held that ideas and knowledge were functions of a mind or consciousness that originated in individuals by means of isolated contact with objects. But in fact, knowledge is a function of association and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed, and sanctioned.”

However, we do not have to continue doing what we have done. It is appropriate to ask whether we should change our political system. The evidence we need to make that decision is much more than data about causes and effects.

As Putnam says, Dewey is “simultaneously fallibilist and anti-skeptical.” To be fallibilist is to presume that what you believe today may be wrong. To be anti-skeptical is to believe that you ought to go forward even if you cannot answer every “Why?” question adequately. Putnam adds that “traditional empiricism is seen by pragmatists as oscillating between being too skeptical, in one moment, and insufficiently fallibilist in another of its moments.” For instance (a pragmatist might argue), empirical political science is too skeptical when it treats value-judgments about matters like democracy as mere matters of subjective opinion; but it is insufficiently fallibilist when it treats data about things like voting as reliable bases for deciding what to do. And political philosophy is insufficiently fallibilist when it strives for permanent answers to questions like, “Should we vote?” The answer will be different a century from now.

Putnam writes:

For Dewey, the problem is not to justify the existence of communities, or to show that people ought to make the interests of others their own [that much is natural and unavoidable]; the problem is to justify the claim that morally decent communities should be democratically organized. This Dewey does by appealing to the need to deal intelligently rather than unintelligently with the ethical and practical problems that we confront.

So what about voting (as an example of a social practice that we should assess)? It is what we have inherited, so we must start with it. It has arisen as a tool for making our social life more intelligent–or it is useful for that purpose, regardless of its original reasons. But it is merely a tool, and there may be better ones.

[We] must protest against the assumption that the [democratic] idea itself has produced the the governmental practices which obtain in democratic states: General suffrage, elected representatives, majority rule, and so on. … The forms to which we are accustomed in democratic governments represent the cumulative effect of a multitude of events, unpremeditated as far as political effects were concerned and having unpredictable consequences. …

The strongest point to be made in behalf of even such rudimentary political forms as democracy has already attained, popular voting, majority rule and so on, is that to some extent they involve a consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles.

See also “Dewey and the current toward democracy.”

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what qualifies a theorist to be part of civic studies?

We are almost halfway through the 2014 Summer Institute of Civic Studies at Tufts University. A group of 24 professors, graduate students, and civic leaders from many countries (only half are from the US) are deep into discussing several thousand pages of theoretical readings. We present the readings as an emerging–and disputable–canon for a field we call “civic studies.”

What qualifies an author to be included?

I have argued here that the only serious question for human beings as members of communities is: “What should we do?” Importantly, the question is not “What should be done?” which is much more commonly addressed in modern scholarship. Thus we must reform scholarship to make it address the citizen’s essential question.

A contributor to the nascent discipline of civic studies helps us to decide what we should do. A theorist of civic studies is someone who doesn’t just address that question in a particular context (e.g., “What should we parents of X school do to improve it?”). Instead, she or he offers guidance about broad categories of situations–perhaps about all situations that confront human beings. That is the screen through which I put potential contributors to the canon of civic studies.

So far this week, we have considered Jurgen Habermas, Elinor Ostrom, Robert Putnam, Harry Boyte, Albert Dzur, and Bent Flyvbjerg. Roberto Mangabeira Unger is up next.

As an example, Habermas addresses the question, “What should we do?” roughly as follows. It is a moral question, about what is right or just to do. It is not the question: “What do we want?” nor “What does our perspective, bias, or interest cause us to want?” We may have to choose against our desires or interests. The claim that something is right is like the claim that something is true. In both cases, we put the proposition before other human beings and seek their free agreement. If, for example, I assert that it would be right or just for me to pay lower taxes, then–if the conversation is free and public–I will have to give reasons persuasive to my fellow citizens. It won’t matter what my motives are. My arguments will have to be valid from others’ perspectives.

(By the way, if I make a claim about my motives–e.g., “I really only want to pay lower taxes because I want to help others,” that is a separate proposition that can also be tested by other human beings. They can look for consistency and other evidence of sincerity. Claims of justice, truth, beauty, and sincerity require different justifications but are alike in that they are all requests for free assent and they all promote reasonable inquiry.)

Thus what we should do is (a) whatever we decide to do in a very good conversation. But that implies (b) that we must participate in such conversations. And since they do not occur automatically, we must (c) work to make them happen, which is not just a matter of organizing and facilitating discussions but also of changing the incentives and rules that apply in public life so that democratic discussions flourish more. Finally, discussion by itself is insufficient to accomplish justice, so we must (d) press the economic and political systems to respond to reasonable public opinion.

This leaves much to be worked out–and is not ultimately satisfactory to me–but it qualifies Habermas as a civic theorist.

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on the contributions of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom

Vincent and Elinor Ostrom founded a whole school of thought–some call it the Bloomington School–that now orients the work of many scholars and practitioners around the world. Last week, about 250 people came from many countries to give papers inspired by the Ostroms’ framework as part of a conference entitled the “Workshop on the Ostrom Workshop.” In my paper, I argued that the Ostroms addressed the citizen’s question, “What should we do?,” which is the guiding question of “Civic Studies.” I am posting a PDF of my paper here. It is a bit of a cut-and-paste job, portions of it having appeared on this blog or in various published articles.

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Ostrom plus Habermas is nearly all we need

The late, great Elinor Ostrom is much on my mind. I taught her work in Mexico a couple of weeks ago and will be visiting her Bloomington (IN) Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis next weekend. I’d like to claim that many thinkers have influenced me, and I wouldn’t want to have to do without any of them. But I believe we can get at least 80% of the way to a satisfactory social theory if we combine the two thinkers we talked about in Mexico: Ostrom and Jürgen Habermas. They are importantly different, as this table indicates–yet I think both contribute essential insights.

Ostrom Habermas
Fundamental problem Tragedies of the commons. People manipulating other people by influencing their opinions and goals.
Characteristic symptom of the problem We destroy an environmental asset by failing to work together. Government or corporate propaganda distorts our authentic values.
Characteristic starting point People know what they want but can’t get it. People don’t know what they want or want the wrong things.
Essential behavior of a citizen Working together to make or preserve something. Talking and listening about controversial values.
Instead of homo economicus (the individual who maximizes material self-interest) we need … Homo faber (the person as a maker) Homo sapiens (the person as a reasoner) or homo politicus (the participant in public assemblies).
Role of the state It is a set of nested and overlapping associations, not fundamentally different from other associations (firms, nonprofits, etc.). Citizens form public opinion, which should guide the state, which makes law. The state should be radically distinct from other sectors.
Modernity is … A threat to local and traditional ways of cooperating, but we could use science to assist people in solving their own problems. A process of enlightenment that liberates people, but it goes wrong when states and markets “colonize” the private domain.
Main interdisciplinary combination Game theory plus observations of indigenous problem-solving. Normative philosophy (mainly achieved through critical readings of past philosophers) plus system-level sociology.

If you ask me who is right about any of the issues in this table, I am inclined to say: both.

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America’s authentic conservative movement

In the influential reform conservative manifesto, Room to Grow, Yuval Levin argues

that what matters most about society happens in the space between the individual and the state—the space occupied by families, communities, civic and religious institutions, and the private economy. … Local knowledge channeled by evolved social institutions—from families and civic and fraternal groups to traditional religious establishments, charitable enterprises, private companies, and complex markets—will make for better material outcomes and a better common life. … What happens in that space generally happens face to face—between parents and children, neighbors and friends, buyers and sellers. It therefore answers to immediately felt needs, and is tailored to the characters, sentiments, priorities, and preferences of the people involved. That kind of bottom-up common life, rather than massive, distant systems of material provision, is what makes society tick and what holds it together. While it can certainly be reinforced by public policy, it could never be replaced with centralized administration, however capable or rational it might be.

Levin decries “public programs that consolidate the application of technical expertise: that try to take on social problems by managing large portions of society as if they were systems in need of better organization and direction.” Instead he advocates a “kind of bottom-up, incremental, continuous learning process, rather than imposing wholesale solutions from above.”

Imagine that there were a large but decentralized grassroots movement dedicated to precisely these values. It would operate at a remove from the state and would be based instead in nonprofit organizations and colleges. It would be skeptical of top-down directives, expertise, and centralizing policies–especially the drive to measure and assess outcomes quantitatively. It would often stand in the way of ambitious plans that originate in bureaucracies.

This movement would evolve elaborate tools for appreciating and developing local norms and assets. These tools might be branded, for example, Asset Based Community Development or Participatory Action Research. The movement might also rely heavily on local deliberative processes to decide what to do, and the real hallmark of those deliberations would be “a belief that constructive processes must focus on strengths and future-oriented possibilities” (as Caroline Lee writes).

Because the movement would believe, as Levin does, in the importance of face-to-face human connections, its characteristic response to a local problem would be a hands-on service project. Prospective volunteers would be taught to respect local norms. They might even insist (in the words of Talmage A. Stanley) on a “militant or radical particularity, knowing a place in its fullness, with its contradictions, its conflicts, its questions, what it means to be a citizen in that place.” The movement would strongly endorse “relational organizing,” with its emphasis on human-to-human bonds.

The movement would also be anchored in the values of diversity (i.e., support for inherited and “evolved” cultures and norms); social capital (seeing value in the networks and values that connect people to each other); and sustainability (strategies for continuing to do what we have done in the past).

In all these respects, this movement would be authentically conservative. But–as my readers will have realized several paragraphs ago–I am referring to community service programs, campus/community partnerships, community-based research projects, and other “civic” practices, most of whose leaders would place themselves well to the left of President Obama on the political spectrum.

I make this argument not to score debating points against Yuval Levin, although he is deeply invested in the idea that the “Left’s social vision tends to consist of individuals and the state, so that all common action is state action, and its purpose is to liberate individuals
from material want and moral sway.” (I have trouble thinking of any prominent American liberal to whom that sentence would apply.) On the whole, I would like to make common cause with Levin, not debate him.

Nor do I mean to provoke my friends and collaborators in the “civic” world by calling them authentic conservatives. I have deep regard for genuine conservative values and believe that they need intellectual development and political support. Authentic conservatism has been swamped by laissez-faire neoliberalism on the right and by soft technocratic managerialism on the left.

But I do think it’s clarifying to recognize everyday civic work as conservative. Like any valid ideology, conservatism highlights certain goods with which other goods conflict. As Bill Galston insists, the hard part of politics is not the choice between good and bad but between good and good. In promoting decentralized, relational, appreciative, bottom-up, voluntary politics, the civic movement to which I belong (and which Levin ought to endorse) risks overlooking other values, especially social critique, cosmopolitanism, efficiency, and dissent.

See also: “what defines conservatism?” “how conservatives can reclaim the civic ideal;” “Edmund Burke would vote Democratic“; and “is society an artifact or an ecosystem?

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Frontiers of Democracy conference is taking shape

(Washington, DC) This year’s “Frontiers of Democracy” conference will take place on July 16-18, 2014 in Boston, MA. Although the agenda is not completely final, it is now quite detailed, involving about 18 plenary or concurrent sessions–all highly interactive.

In addition to these discussion sessions, there will be some provocative short talks. Signed up to give those are: Ambassador Alan Solomont, the dean of Tisch College; Gloria Rubio-Cortes, president, National Civic League; Josh Lerner, Participatory Budgeting Project; John Gastil, Penn State (communication); Tina Nabatchi, Syracuse University (public administration); Shelby Brown, Executive Administrator, State of Connecticut’s Office of Governmental Accountability; Tim Eatman, Research Director, Imagining America; Sabeel Rahman, Harvard (government and law).

Register here to hold your place.

Frontiers of Democracy is sponsored by Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts University, the Democracy Imperative, and the Deliberative Democracy Consortium.

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Mike Edwards on civil society

The third edition of Michael Edwards’ invaluable book Civil Society is newly out, and Mike makes a strong argument on OpenDemocracy.net that draws from his book.

He notes that nonprofit organizations are growing (by almost all measures) and offering significant benefits to the people and communities that they serve directly. There are, for example, 3.3 million registered charities in India. In our own work, we find that the number of nonprofits in a US community, adjusted for population, predicts that community’s economic performance (holding many other factors constant).

And yet, as Mike Edwards notes, the world is slipping backward on many fronts, as “economic inequality is rising, democracies are being hollowed out, climate change is worsening, and discrimination based on race, gender, ability and sexual orientation remains endemic.”

These are the kinds of issues that are traditionally addressed by governments. In turn, governments are helpful when broad-based social movements hold them accountable. (Benign elites are possible–but rare and usually short-lived–and, by definition, they cannot address a problem like the hollowing-out of democracy.)

Civil society–defined as an array of nonprofit organizations–can support broad-based social movements:

When one looks at the few times in history when civil society has functioned as a powerful and lasting moral and political lever – like the civil rights and women’s movements of the 1960s and 1970s – large numbers of people became active in translating ethical action into power structures at every level, from the family to the courts and corporations.

In this sense, civil society is like an iceberg, with the peaks of protest rising above the waterline and the great mass of everyday citizen action hidden underneath. When the two are connected – when street protests are backed up by long-term action in every community, bank, business, local government, church or mosque, temporary gains in equality and diversity have more chance of becoming permanent shifts in power and public norms. In that respect it’s not the Arab or any other ‘Spring’ that really makes the difference, but what happens in every other season, of every other year, across every generation.

Unfortunately these episodes of large-scale, joined-up action are quite rare, and the long-term trend has been the opposite, at least in Europe and North America.

Edwards sees two functions for civil society at its best: connecting everyday local action to policy, and building human solidarity across lines of class and race so that citizens support private and public action in the common good. Neither is achieved by civil society understood as a set of social enterprises or social networks. Instead, we need civil society as coalitions of organizations committed to political and social change.

Edwards concludes that “the strength of civil society is declining even as its size continues to expand. … But since civil societies are ours to lose, they are also ours to reclaim, to refresh and re-energize.”

(I make somewhat similar arguments in my qualms about a bond market for philanthropy and can nonprofits solve big problems?)

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