From June 1-June 11, 2020, “support for the [anti-racism] protests grew 10 points among Mixed Feelings voters, 14 points among Lean Biden voters, and a head-spinning 25 points among Lean Trump voters. ‘I had never in my research career seen public opinion shift on the scale in this time frame,’ Michiah Prull said.’”

But how much does this change matter? Beyond affecting the vote in November, what does the shift in public opinion portend?

I’d offer the following general observations.

Public opinion is subject to fairly quick and major shifts when people assess something that doesn’t affect them directly and substantially. For instance, the Civil Rights Movement persuaded many white Northerners to turn strongly against segregation in the South ca. 1958-65. This mattered because it changed votes in the US Congress, yet Northerners were not asked to renounce any of their own advantages. The Civil Rights Movement struggled when it shifted to the North and the issue became White Northerners’ behavior.

People will voluntarily renounce advantages over other people (“privileges”) so long as they don’t have to pay a tangible price or undergo a serious risk as a result. Most straight people have decided that it’s no problem if gay people also marry. In a way, this means renouncing a privilege or a status advantage. But since straight people can still marry, it’s not really a sacrifice. Marriage equality is win/win. To be sure, some people take challenges to their status advantage as threats, but they can often be outvoted by people who are willing to give up merely symbolic privileges.

It is not true that people always act out of self-interest. More than 600,000 Americans died in the US Civil War (putting both sides together), which is hard to explain in terms of individual self-interest — or coercion. Many were eager to sacrifice. But when human beings sacrifice, it is very rarely for other people. It is usually for some “we” to which the individual feels loyalty. And that “we” usually takes a tangible, concrete form as well as an abstract one. Maybe Americans will sacrifice for America because it’s part of our identity, but each soldier is more likely to sacrifice for his own buddies in the squad.

Although people sacrifice when they belong to cohesive groups or during moments of dramatic change, self-interest tends to prevail over the longer term. Relative advantages are astoundingly durable, surviving even revolutions and invasions. The descendants of pagan, Roman gentry became medieval French bishops. Even in the hardest circumstances, people find ways to pass relative advantage to their own offspring and justify doing so using the ideological materials of their time and place.

Still, we are capable of building fairer societies, ones that guarantee more security and opportunity to the least advantaged. Typically, those societies are also democratic, and a substantial majority sees the social contract as beneficial to them.

People will also make concessions to organized groups who can extract a price. For instance, we’ll pay more for a good if the people who manufacture it can strike for better wages. We’ll give up a social advantage to calm a restive group so that they leave us alone. In these cases, a majority yields to a minority for pragmatic reasons.

If these generalizations generally apply, then it’s unlikely that White Americans will voluntarily change their behavior in ways that are actually costly to them or their descendants. I believe that efforts to educate people about their relative advantage are apolitical in the sense that they do not reflect a coherent strategy for addressing power. I fear that these efforts can actually alert people to their own advantages and cause them to dig in. As Steve Biko wrote, “No amount of moral lecturing will persuade the white man to ‘correct’ the situation.” Trainings in diversity, equity and inclusion may be ways for institutions to maintain the status quo, not tools for changing it.

But that does not mean that change is impossible. In fact, I am optimistic that change is coming. It will come in other ways.

First, a majority of the American electorate is shifting on issues that they see as not directly costly to themselves, although these issues matter. Aggressive, racially biased policing and mass incarceration really don’t benefit you if you happen to be white and middle class. In fact, you may suffer collateral damage. Even though African Americans are much more likely than whites to report discriminatory treatment by the police, a plurality of all the people who report such treatment are white. White people can definitely be persuaded to oppose militarized, muscle-bound (and expensive) policing.

We may shift toward a new social contract that prevails because a broad cross-section of voters see it as beneficial to them–and it reduces racial injustice. Many Americans will vote for universal health care or cheaper college because of their self-interest. A society with better access to health and education should also be more racially equitable.

Second, the composition of the public shifting. Although a majority of the electorate remains White, about half of Democrats are now people of color. Their concentration on one side of the aisle poses risks but also offers advantages. When Republicans falter for any reason, people of color suddenly have a lot of leverage.

Third, skillfully organized people of color can (and are) extracting concessions by protesting, boycotting, and otherwise challenging institutions that need them in various ways.

Finally, change can result from random events that are skillfully exploited. I think, for example, that both childhood and gender have been transformed by the rise of girls’ team sports. One reason was Title IX (1972), which was not intended to popularize girls’ athletics. Girls’ sports didn’t arise automatically as a consequence of Title IX; many women and girls (and some men) had to work hard to create teams, leagues, training programs, role models, etc. However, the law created an opening–more or less by accident–and people took advantage of it. We should look for such opportunities today.

See also: the significance of the progressive primary victories; when social advantage persists for millennia; why some forms of advantage are more stubborn than others; the remarkable persistence of social advantage.

This is meant for incoming Tufts undergrads but might have some interest beyond:

Women, college graduates, Democrats more likely to self-isolate to reduce coronavirus risks

Survey also finds differences in prevalence of COVID-19 testing based on geographic, personal and socio-economic factors

MEDFORD/SOMERVILLE, Mass (July 20, 2020)—Women, older Americans, Democrats and people with more education are more likely to try to isolate themselves from contact with other people to reduce COVID-19 transmission risks, according to a new Tufts University national survey.

The survey also identified notable differences in whether people have received testing for COVID-19 based on geographic regions, age group, educational level, political affiliation, income, race/ethnicity and gender. Those who have been tested for COVID-19 most commonly live in the Northeast, are affiliated with the Democratic party, and are African American, according to the research.

“The results of our survey indicate that there are significant demographic and geographic differences in how people respond to COVID-19 pandemic risks, and that these disparities in protective responses need to be taken into account by public health and public policy officials,” said Tom Stopka, an epidemiologist at Tufts School of Medicine, and a co-lead on the study.

“As public health officials continue to increase access to testing  across the U.S. in light of persistent surges in COVID-19 infections in many states, they need to consider how to increase testing in geographic hotspots and the highest-risk groups to better understand infection patterns and inform data-driven public health and clinical responses,” Stopka added.

The survey was designed and analyzed by Tufts University’s Research Group on Equity in Health, Wealth and Civic Engagement. The research group previously released data showing that only 57 percent of Americans plan to get vaccinated for COVID-19. The group will soon release additional research about the economic impacts of the pandemic.

Self-isolation rates differ

Overall, 71% of adult Americans say they have tried to separate themselves from others to avoid COVID-19.

Women are about nine percentage points more likely to self-isolate (75% versus 66% for men). People with a bachelor’s degree are almost 20 percentage points more likely to self-isolate than those with a high school diploma (79% versus 59.3%, respectively). Democrats (77.5%) and Independents (73%) are about 10 points more likely to self-isolate than Republicans (66%). Almost eight out of ten Americans who are 60 or older report trying to self-isolate, while two-thirds of respondents in all other age categories report similar attempts.                        

The disparities among those who are more likely to self-isolate may reflect opportunities and perceived risks, according to the researchers. For instance, retired people and people who work at computers can isolate more easily than people who provide in-person services. Also, people in older age groups may be paying close attention to the elevated risks that they face based on national and international epidemiological data and news.

“Below age 60, all age groups are self-isolating at the same rate. That may counter speculation that the young are flouting restrictions,” said Peter Levine, an associate dean of academic affairs at Tufts’ Tisch College.

Testing rates vary by geographic region

Overall, 7% of those polled say that they have personally been tested for COVID-19, and 17% report that someone in their family has been tested.

These testing rates vary by region. In the Northeast, 10% have been tested, and 21% have a family member who has been tested, compared to 5% and 14% in the Midwest, respectively, with the other regions in between. Democrats are significantly more likely to have been tested (9%) or to have a tested family member (22%) than Republicans (6% and 13.5%, respectively). African Americans are the most likely to be tested (10%) or to have had a test in the family (26%), compared to 5% and 14% for Whites, respectively. Increased testing may reflect the higher rate of infection among African Americans that has been widely reported.

About the survey

The survey was fielded online by Ipsos between May 29 and June 10, 2020, using its KnowledgePanel. The sample was nationally representative, and the number of complete responses was 1,267 non-institutionalized adult residents of the United States. More technical information about the survey is at https://equityresearch.tufts.edu/the-survey/.

Tufts University’s Research Group on Equity in Health, Wealth and Civic Engagement was established in 2019 as part of a strategic effort to use resources and expertise across the university to address major global issues. It brings together researchers from across Tufts campuses and schools to discuss and investigate aspects of equity and inequity in the United States and the world. The research has been funded by Tufts University’s Office of the Vice Provost for Research as one of several such initiatives.

The group’s principal investigators are Jennifer Allen, professor of Community Health in the Tufts School of Arts and Sciences; Levine; and Stopka. Other members of the group can be found here.

By September 2020, the Research Group will launch a website at https://equityresearch.tufts.edu that will allow anyone to explore numerous dimensions of equity and inequity with an interactive data-visualization tool. Tufts’ Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life is funding the data-visualization tool.

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About Tufts University

Tufts University, located on campuses in Boston, Medford/Somerville and Grafton, Massachusetts, and in Talloires, France, is recognized among the premier research universities in the United States. Tufts enjoys a global reputation for academic excellence and for the preparation of students as leaders in a wide range of professions. A growing number of innovative teaching and research initiatives span all Tufts campuses, and collaboration among the faculty and students in the undergraduate, graduate and professional programs across the university’s schools is widely encouraged.

The Harper’s Letter decries “A new set of moral attitudes and political commitments that tend to weaken our norms of open debate and toleration of differences in favor of ideological conformity.”

If the Letter is reasonable at all, such claims must be testable. I think that someone who fully endorses the Letter should hypothesize that Americans have–for better or worse–grown less likely to tolerate hateful speech, such as explicit expressions of anti-Black racism.

Have they? Since 1976, the General Social Survey has asked Americans whether someone should be allowed to give an anti-Black racist speech in their community. There is no significant change in responses to this item. It is true that the lowest rate was measured in the most recent year: 2018. But the difference between 2018 and the average year was within the margin of error (+/- 2.6 points), and the line has long wobbled around the mean.

Maybe the left has forgotten about the First Amendment? Here is the trend for people who identify on the left end (1 or 2) of a 7-point ideology scale:

Liberals (as the survey names this group) have been a bit more likely than the population as a whole to think that a racist speech should be allowed (mean = 67.6% vs 61.3% for the whole sample). The only reason this second line wiggles more than the first is that the sample is smaller. The trend is again essentially flat.

Or perhaps it is “the young” who have forgotten the First Amendment?

Maybe, to a limited extent. The third graph shows the trend for people who were 18-29 at the time of each survey. There has not been much change since 1982, but the 2018 result is well below the 1976 number.

By the way, I am not sure that I believe a racist speech should be allowed in my community. The First Amendment applies–there should be no state censorship–but if my “community” is something like my school, religious congregation, university, or town council, I’m against a sanctioned, formal speech “claiming that Blacks are inferior” (which is how the GSS phrases the question).

The GSS has also asked about other forms of speech or speakers: a speaker who is gay, a speech advocating military dictatorship in the USA, a communist speaker, or a Muslim clergyman preaching hatred of the USA.

Generally, the trends are up. I find it troubling that ten percent still don’t want to permit a person who is gay to speak in their community. I also find the level of tolerance for the Muslim clergy-person worrying, although the question is worded in a particular way that’s arguably Islamaphobic itself. But overall, the trend is that more people would tolerate more differences.

Of course, another trend is taking place–albeit harder to quantify. Nowadays, an incident that reinforces the beliefs or concerns of a given group can easily “go viral.” Given our tendency to confirmation bias, we can select and share news items that confirm almost any belief. Incidents that are widely shared represent severe selection bias. I have read about true stories of problematic (or even scandalous) intolerance on the left. I see no evidence that these stories are common or becoming more so. Absent empirical evidence, can we avoid making sweeping empirical claims?

See also: the Harper’s letter is fatally vague; a civic approach to free speech; what sustains free speech?

This is the text of the letter that is working as a national Rorschach Test, appearing self-evident and overdue to some, offensive to others.

It is remarkably and intentionally vague. Trends are described, but without any data, timeframes, or evidence. For instance, “a new set of moral attitudes and political commitments” is “weaken[ening] our norms of open debate and toleration of differences in favor of ideological conformity.” Is that true? Which moral attitudes? Are they new (since when)? What is the degree to which disagreements are tolerated today? How does that vary by institution and community? How has it changed?

No proper names are used, but specific cases are surely being alluded to. For instance, “a researcher is fired for circulating a peer-reviewed academic study.” That must be David Shor, fired from Civis Analytics for tweeting a summary of research by Omar Wasow. That sounded like an injustice to me and a way of blocking an important topic, but does it generalize? Why exactly did it happen? (I am guessing it was a business judgment, which doesn’t make it fair but does suggest that it wouldn’t happen in many other organizations.) Are there other cases like it?

“Journalists are barred from writing on certain topics.” That has happened since the dawn of journalism: reporters constantly negotiate their story ideas with editors. I presume the concern is about journalists who want to write on topics uncomfortable to the left, but that isn’t specified. How common are such cases? After all, a vast amount of journalism is uncomfortable–if not downright hostile–to the left.

The vagueness is fatal because the issues at stake are complex and subtle. I think all these points are valid but in tension:

1. It pays to wrestle constantly with diverse and conflicting ideas. That keeps you sharp, tough-minded, and creative.
2. Social movements are often essential to positive change. They work to create unity because it’s an asset for them (along with worthiness, numbers, and commitment–Charles Tilly’s WUNC acronym). They therefore tend to discourage internal disagreement.
3. It is much harder to face an open discussion if you are the topic of it. If people are talking about why you are socially disadvantaged, that can be (at best) deeply uncomfortable. Oppressed people are usually familiar with a wide range of opinions, including ones that are explicitly hostile to them. They may need a break rather than more exposure to challenging opinions.
4. Regardless of their social position, people tend to prefer ideas that confirm their own prior beliefs and avoid or minimize conflicting beliefs in ways that distort their thinking.
5. Strongly criticizing people is an act of free speech. Preventing or decrying strong criticism is not a way of supporting free speech.
6. Being criticized can have tangible costs, including losing your job.
7. Marginalizing odious views can be an appropriate way for communities to uphold norms. All decent communities marginalize some opinions.
8. We navigate a world of massively disaggregated media by making constant individual choices about what to read, watch, and share. Much more of our speech is now visible, searchable, and sharable compared to pre-Internet days. What is odious in one space is an assumed truth in another. Anyone can be perceived as an outlier and a threat somewhere.
9. Impartiality is a worthy goal for some people, such as public school teachers and editorial-page editors. Impartiality is not an empty concept, as you can tell by actually trying to act impartially.
10. No institution is a free-speech zone, because it must decide whom to admit, hire, promote, publish, reward, etc. These are inevitably value-judgments and they cannot and should not be content-neutral.

If we interpret the Harper’s letter charitably, it’s saying that people are forgetting #1 because they are only concerned about #2 and #3. I’m sure this is the case for some people, but how many? Is there any basis for thinking that “censoriousness is … spreading more widely in our culture”? In my experience, a lot of people actually see merit in many of the ten points listed above and struggle to find the right balance.

If the question is whether the government should censor speech, the answer should almost always be no. That case is worth defending and propagating. I would welcome a letter from diverse and distinguished thinkers that made the positive case for intellectual diversity and individual rights against the state.

If the question is whether you should join with other people on Twitter to criticize an individual in strong terms for saying something, that’s a much more complicated matter. It’s highly context-specific. It may depend how bad you think the targeted opinion was, how many other people have already piled on, and what consequences you expect to follow from the critique. If, for example, the target is the President of the United States, go for it. If it’s an untenured professor whose claim was subtly problematic, maybe you should back off. Your criticism is itself protected by the First Amendment, but that doesn’t mean it is justified or helpful–or effective.

I have no more right to generalize than the authors of the Harper’s letter, but if I dared to describe the American left in broad strokes, I would begin by observing that a lot of people are wrestling with versions of the ten points above and trying to land in the right place. Any given controversy provokes diverse and often conflicted reactions.

People are more aware of #3 (the negative impact of a diverse debate on the people being discussed) than they were in the ’60s or the ’80s, presumably because of the growing diversity of our population and leaders. We should be concerned about #3, but it doesn’t erase the importance of robust debate or the need to counter confirmation bias. A balance is required.

All of this is playing out in a very problematic institutional context. Twitter allows just a few words and makes it easy to amplify an attack without even reading the original text. Most professors hold precarious (non-tenured) jobs that can vanish if they become targets of controversy. More than half of reporters have been laid off, creating a massive shortage of paid positions for journalists and an unprecedented concentration of those jobs in a few newsrooms. Malicious actors love to stir the pot.

It would be hard to navigate this context even if we all radiated wisdom and beneficence. Considering that everyone is fallible and biased–and some of us are actually Russian bots–I would like to celebrate the many among us who are doing their best.

See also: marginalizing odious views: a strategy; marginalizing views in a time of polarization; trying to keep myself honest; we need SPUD (scale, pluralism, unity, depth); the value of diversity and discussion within social movements; diversity, humility, curiosity; and Francis Bacon on confirmation bias.

Vaccine interest higher among Whites and Hispanics, wealthier households, and Democrats

This is the latest product from the Tufts Research Group on Equity in Health, Wealth, and Civic Engagement, which I co-lead; and I did some of this analysis.

MEDFORD/SOMERVILLE, Mass. (July 9, 2020)—Despite widespread agreement among experts that having a prophylactic COVID-19 vaccine will be critical to the nation’s ability to safely return to some form of normalcy, only 57% of Americans say they would get a COVID-19 vaccine if it were available today, according to a national survey designed and analyzed by Tufts University’s Research Group on Equity in Health, Wealth and Civic Engagement.

The nationally representative survey also uncovered significant variations in vaccination acceptance by race/ethnicity, household income, educational background and party affiliation. Whites and Hispanics, Democrats, those with more formal education, and those with higher incomes reported being more likely to get vaccinated than Blacks, Republicans, those with less education, and those with lower incomes. Fully one-quarter of respondents said they didn’t know if they would get the vaccine, possibly indicating the need for more public health education and information.

 “It’s really concerning that only 57% of our respondents said they would get vaccinated. It’s evident that we need to begin working on a national vaccine strategy and education campaign right now– even before we have the vaccine in hand,” said Jennifer Allen, professor of community health in Tufts University’s School of Arts and Sciences and co-leader of the study. “There is still some uncertainty, but some studies show that we need between 60 and 70% of the population to be vaccinated in order to confer herd immunity.”

There has been growing resistance to all vaccines in the U.S. over the past decade, which has led to reduced compliance with vaccine recommendations and the re-emergence of diseases like measles and mumps, which were previously well-controlled. Growing anti-vaccination sentiment has been fueled by misinformation about vaccines, including the widely de-bunked theory that vaccines could cause autism.

Whites and Hispanics more likely to vaccinate

The study also revealed marked differences of opinion toward vaccination across racial groups, with 58% of non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics reporting they would get the vaccine as compared with 48% of non-Hispanic Blacks.

“The pandemic has disproportionately affected Black individuals,” said Allen. “The lower level of vaccine acceptance within this population is worrisome, as it suggests the vaccine could further exacerbate COVID-19 racial/ethnic disparities. Given the legacy of medical experimentation on African Americans, there is understandable mistrust in medical science and in government.

“The accelerated time-frame for vaccine development and testing could further raise concerns about the safety and efficacy of an eventual vaccine,” Allen continued. “Targeted efforts will be needed to make sure that a vaccine doesn’t further widen the gap in health outcomes.”

Income and education plays factor

Surprisingly, those with higher levels of income and education were more likely to report that they would get the COVID-19 vaccine. “Historically, those most likely to refuse vaccines have been those with higher levels of income and education,” said Allen.

Among those with incomes less than $20,000, only 41% said they would get the vaccine, compared with 72% among those with incomes of $150,000 or more. Less than half of those with a high school education or below said they would get the vaccine, compared with 74% among those who had a college education.

Differences across political parties

Sharp polarization by political party affiliation also emerged in the responses. Willingness to be vaccinated was highest among Democrats (71%) compared with Independents (61%) and Republicans (47%).

“Differences between political parties are striking. As with many aspects of the pandemic, vaccination is a highly partisan issue,” said Peter Levine, an associate dean at Tufts’ Tisch College of Civic Life. “The partisan gap may pose an obstacle to widespread vaccination.”

While public health officials, clinicians and pharmaceutical companies race to develop a COVID-19 vaccine, it is evident that, should a successful vaccine become available, distribution and administration will need to be accompanied by health communication, promotion and education campaigns,” said Tom Stopka, an infectious disease epidemiologist and associate professor with the Tufts University School of Medicine, and a co-leader of the study. “Such campaigns can help to increase understanding of how the vaccine will work, decrease doubts and mistrust of local, state, and federal officials, and potentially demonstrate that the benefits of the vaccine far outweigh the risks.

“The U.S. population has been overwhelmed with COVID-19 information and stress, as well as massive changes to their day-to-day lives,” added Stopka. “When and if a vaccine becomes available, and has been thoroughly tested in human populations, it will be necessary to also develop a massive public health communication campaign to provide community members with the information they need to make an informed decision to protect themselves, and to protect their families and local communities.”

The survey was fielded online by Ipsos using its KnowledgePanel. The sample was nationally representative, and the number of complete responses was 1,267. More technical information about the survey is at https://equityresearch.tufts.edu/the-survey/.

Tufts University’s Research Group on Equity in Health, Wealth and Civic Engagement was established in 2019 as part of a strategic effort to use resources and expertise of Tufts campuses and schools to address major global issues. It brings together researchers from across the university to discuss and investigate aspects of equity and inequity in the United States and the world. The research has been funded by Tufts University’s Office of the Vice Provost for Research as one of several such initiatives. 

The group’s principal investigators are Allen, Levine and Stopka. Other members of the group can be found here. 

By September 2020, the Research Group will launch a website at https://equityresearch.tufts.edu that will allow anyone to explore numerous dimensions of equity and inequity with an interactive data-visualization tool. Tufts’ Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life is funding the data-visualization tool.

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About Tufts University

Tufts University, located on campuses in Boston, Medford/Somerville and Grafton, Massachusetts, and in Talloires, France, is recognized among the premier research universities in the United States. Tufts enjoys a global reputation for academic excellence and for the preparation of students as leaders in a wide range of professions. A growing number of innovative teaching and research initiatives span all Tufts campuses, and collaboration among the faculty and students in the undergraduate, graduate and professional programs across the university’s schools is widely encouraged.

I’m one of those who already knew the music and lyrics of Hamilton extremely well but watched a performance of it for the first time this weekend on video.

I hadn’t realized how consistently Aaron Burr (Leslie Odom Jr.) appears on stage or even dominates it. I understood the plot but didn’t appreciate the strength of Burr’s presence. Specifically, I had missed scenes that emphasize his parallels with Hamilton, such as when the two men split the stage to sing love songs to their infants.

The musical as a whole is about who gets to tell the story. At the end, George Washington and the company sing, “Who lives / Who dies / Who tells your story?” Burr asks, “But when you’re gone, who remembers your name? / Who keeps your flame?” Angelica and the women of the company echo his question: “Who tells your story?” The women say, “Eliza,” and she begins, “I put myself back in the narrative.”

Washington has skillfully controlled his own story by exiting voluntarily and leaving a farewell address (written by Hamilton). Burr is the one who narrates Hamilton’s story for us, but he plays his cards so badly that he makes himself into the villain. Hamilton is obsessed with his own reputation; his efforts to safeguard it are one source of his own destruction. Eliza takes herself out of the narrative and then puts herself back in, using her 50 remaining years after Hamilton’s death to become a public historian. And Lin-Manuel Miranda turns Hamilton’s life into the material for his own art, thus becoming the one who really tells the story.

One general implication is that politics generates the noblest stories. We should want to be in the Room Where it Happens because then we can engage with other people, not as friends but as equals, and make something public and lasting together. This is high drama. It is possible only in a republic or in a revolutionary struggle to make a republic. Of course, Burr’s tragedy is that he can’t get in.

I think that Hamilton is the best fictional evocation of the intrinsic value of politics–politics not as a necessary means to some end but as a venue for drama and excellence. It also rescues the American story by treating our republic as an ongoing project to which anyone can contribute.

[HAMILTON]

Legacy. What is a legacy?
It’s planting seeds in a garden you never get to see
I wrote some notes at the beginning of a song someone will sing for me
America, you great unfinished symphony, you sent for me
You let me make a difference

Another general point is that Miranda has appropriated the founding history. He has taken it as his material and turned it into something original that exemplifies his own culture. To be sure, any culture is layered, internally diverse, and vaguely bounded. Lin-Manuel Miranda and the original Alexander Hamilton actually share some aspects of culture as their common birthright. But the musical (lyrics, plot, music and cast) surely reflect a racially diverse 21st century New York City and a base in hip hop that are distant from Hamilton.

In this case, cultural appropriation is great. It is an impressive power move and a creative act. That reinforces my view that cultural appropriation is not an intrinsic problem at all. It simply depends on who appropriates whom for what. Appropriation is a political act, and politics can be noble.

See also Hannah Arendt and Lin-Manuel Miranda; ambition: pro or con?; Arendt, freedom, Trump; taking satisfaction from politics in the face of injustice; a welcome talk for college interns newly arrived in Washington; what is cultural appropriation?; and diversity, humility, curiosity

Here is Michel Foucault’s definition of “spirituality”:

… I think we could call “spirituality” the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth. We will call “spirituality” then the set of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc., which are, not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth. Let’s say that spirituality, as it appears in the West at least, has three characteristics.

[1] Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right. … It postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself. … It follows that from this point of view there can be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject.

[2] Eros [the subject’s attraction to the truth, or the truth’s movement to the subject] and askesis [labor] are, I think, the two major forms in Western spirituality for conceptualizing the modalities by which the subject must be transformed in order finally to become capable of truth.

[3] The truth enlightens the subject; the truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives the subject tranquility of the soul. In short, in the truth and in access to the truth, there is something that fulfills the subject himself, which fulfills or transfigures his very being.

Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Lectures at the College de France 1981-2, translated by Graham Burchell (Palgrave, 2005), pp. 15-16

Foucault distinguishes spirituality from philosophy: “the form of thought that asks what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth” (p. 15).

Although philosophy and spirituality are different, all the Greek and Roman philosophers–except (Foucault thinks) Aristotle–believed that a person could not have access to the truth without first being transformed into a better self. Therefore, all the classical philosophers argued for spirituality, as defined above. More than that, they combined their philosophical arguments with spiritual instruction, because they saw the two as inseparable.

One of the main topics that a self was supposed to understand was justice. To understand justice required improving oneself. In turn, learning about justice made a person better. “Consequently, taking care of oneself and being concerned with justice amount to the same thing” (p. 72, here interpreting Plato).

These presuppositions of ancient philosophy and spirituality contrast with two prevalent modern traditions. First:

• Science is that set of methods and institutions (such as labs, PhD programs, and peer-review) that allow us to know nature without having to improve the self first. A scientist “can recognize the truth and have access to it in himself and solely through his activity of knowing, without anything else being demanded of him and without him having to change or alter his being as subject” (p. 17). In turn, science generates knowledge that may not improve anyone spiritually. Nature is precisely the realm that is independent of our spiritual condition. If some scientists prepare themselves mentally to do their jobs or gain tranquility from what they discover about nature, those are incidental facts about them as people. Spiritual preparation may not be necessary, and it certainly isn’t sufficient. Science is about methods, techniques, instruments, rules, and norms that prevent the self from influencing knowledge. And science pursues truth without flinching even when the results are morally problematic.

I would add another tradition as a contrast with ancient spirituality, although I am not sure Foucault would agree:

• Liberalism is the political tradition that seeks to base good government on well-designed institutions (rights, checks-and-balances, elections and other mechanisms of accountability) so that good government need not depend on the moral excellence of either leaders or the people. Good institutional design is a more secure basis for justice than human excellence. Further, in a well-designed polity, we can leave people alone in their private lives instead of badgering them to transform themselves. Thus liberalism is compatible with freedom as autonomy and with diverse understandings of the good life.

According to Foucault, classical spiritual traditions lived on in Christianity. Spirituality ran into trouble with the rise of scholasticism, which made the study of God into a kind of science. Drawing on Aristotle, medieval scholastics provided methods for understanding God and nature that did not depend upon spiritual self-improvement. They left methods of self-improvement to non-scholars, a division that continues today.

I struggle to decide where Foucault stands himself. Does he give detailed lectures about Greco-Roman spiritual traditions because he believes that modern science and governance are bad and he wants us to return to a better way? Does he describe these Hellenistic traditions dispassionately, as a contribution to truth that may not improve us or himself? (In other words, is he a scientist of the past?) Or does he seek to liberate us from spirituality and science by demonstrating the historical contingency of both? If we shed spirituality and science, what are we left with?

I don’t know, but I enjoy the moments in the lectures when Foucault interacts with his audience. For instance, here he demonstrates concern:

[Is there] another room you can use? Yes? And are those people there because they cannot get into the other room or because they prefer to be there? I am sorry that the conditions are so bad, I can do nothing about it and as far as possible I would like to avoid you suffering too much. Okay, earlier, while talking about these techniques of the self and their existence prior to Platonic reflection on the epimeleia heautou [care of oneself], it came to mind, and I forgot to mention it to you, that there is a text … (p. 65)

And here he is playing with his audience:

I was saying that it seemed to me that at a certain moment … the link was broken, definitively I think, between access to the truth, which becomes the autonomous development of knowledge (connaissance), and the requirement of the subject’s trans- formation of himself and of his being. When I say “I think it was definitively broken,” I don’t need to tell you that I don’t believe any such thing, and that what is interesting is precisely that the links were not broken abruptly as if by the slice of a knife (pp. 25-6).

Foucault respected and learned from his colleague Pierre Hadot, a great scholar of Hellenistic thought. Hadot emphasized that the Hellenistic thinkers did not write systematic treatises. They were teachers who worked with students or other audiences in concrete circumstances.

Philosophy in antiquity was a spiritual exercise. … Whether we have to do with dialogues as in the case of Plato, class notes as in the case of Aristotle, treatises like those of Plotinus, or commentaries like those of Proclus, a philosopher’s works cannot be interpreted without taking into consideration the concrete situation which gave birth to them. They are the products of a philosophical school, in the most concrete sense of the term, in which a master forms his disciples, trying to guide them to self-transformation and -realization. Thus, the written work is a reflection of pedagogical, pyschagogic, and methodological preoccupations.

Although every written work is a monologue, the philosophical work is always implicitly a dialogue. The dimension of the possible interlocutor is always present within it. This explains the incoherencies and contradictions which modern historians discover with astonishment in the works of ancient philosophers.

Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, translated by Michael Chase (Blackwell 1995), pp. 104-5

Foucault’s concrete situation was rather unusual. As a holder of a chair in the College de France, he was required only to conduct his own research and report the results annually in a series of lectures–free, public, and uncredited. Because he was an academic superstar, he gave these lectures to a packed lecture hall and overflow areas, with ranks of tape-recorders piled on the desk before him. The audience could not literally discuss with him, but he could address them in a dialogic way.

Here is Foucault’s description of Epictetus:

unlike Seneca, [Epictetus] is a teacher by profession [and] he really does have a school. He opens a school which is called “school” and in which he has students. And, of course, among his students there are a number, no doubt a considerable number, of young people who come to be trained. … It should not be thought that the care of the self, as principal axis of the art of life, was reserved for adults. But alongside this, intertwined with this training of young people, we can say that in Epictetus’s school there is also what could be called, employing an unjust metaphor no doubt, an open shop: an open shop for adults. And in fact adults come to his school to hear his teaching for one day, for a few days or for some time. Here also, in the social world evoked in the Discourses, you see, for example, a town inspector passing through, a sort of tax procurer if you like. He is an Epicurean who comes to consult Epictetus and ask him questions. There is a man sent to Rome by his town who, passing through Asia Minor to Rome, stops to ask Epictetus questions and get advice on how he can best accomplish his mission. Moreover, Epictetus by no means disregards this clientele, or these adult interlocutors, since he advises his own students, young people therefore, to find prominent people in their town and to shake them up a bit by saying: Tell me then, how do you live? Do you really take proper care of yourselves? (p. 90)

I think Foucault’s own role is similar. And that makes him–not a scientist of history–but a practitioner and provider of spiritual exercises.

See also Philosophy as a Way of Life (on Pierre Hadot); does focusing philosophy on how to live broaden or narrow it?;  Hannah Arendt and philosophy as a way of life; Kieran Setiya on midlife: reviving philosophy as a way of life; science, UFOs, and the diminishment of humankind; notes on the social role of science: 1. the example of fetal ultrasounds.