youth activism now

I am grateful to have frequent opportunities to talk with grassroots democracy groups about tactics and methods. My current standard talk is here (but I like to offer it as a discussion rather than a lecture).

The groups that have invited me this year tend to be quite grey–well populated by retirees. I actually believe that it is important for large, nonviolent democracy movements to draw heavy participation from people who are relatively safe from state violence, including older and wealthier white people. But I encounter some anxiety about how to engage younger people.

I suspect that part of the issue is simply age-segregation: younger activists have separate groups. But there also may be some discouragement and confusion among American youth at this moment.

CIRCLE surveyed a representative national sample of youth shortly after the 2024 election and found relatively high levels of engagement. For example, 18% of young adults said they had recently participated in a protest, up from 15% in 2022. Another 29% said they would protest if they had the opportunity. (This was before Trump had been sworn in.) An outright majority had signed a petition.

For the population as a whole, the rate of participation in protests has risen rapidly during 2025, surpassing the increase in 2017. I am not sure whether youth are keeping pace with that growth.


See also: the state of nonviolent grassroots resistance; tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy etc.

Freud on mourning the past

In 1915, Sigmund Freud wrote a short essay entitled “Transience.” Just over a century later, during the Coronavirus pandemic, the philosopher Jonathan Lear wrote “Transience and Hope” about returning to Freud’s essay in a time of COVID-19, the climate emergency, and the resurgence of authoritarianism. Now, Lear has passed, adding one more layer of pathos to their dialogue.

Freud’s piece turns out to be political, but it begins with a personal memory. “Not long ago,” he says, he went on a “summer walk through a smiling countryside” with a “taciturn friend” and a “young but already famous poet.” Many commentators have identified this poet as Rilke, but Lear thinks the whole story is fiction.

In any case, Freud and the poet argue. The poet is unable to enjoy the beauty of nature because it will fade with the coming fall, “like all human beauty and all the beauty and splendour that men have created or may create.” Freud has the opposite feeling, that transience only “raises the value of the enjoyment.” He adds, “A flower that blooms only for a single night does not seem to us on that account any less lovely.” But neither the poet not the silent friend is convinced by Freud.

Freud says that his friends could not accept the transience of beauty because there was “a revolt in their minds against mourning.” He explains that we have a natural inclination to love–first ourselves, then other objects. When an object of love is lost, we cling to it anyway, which is the painful stage that we call mourning. However, mourning “comes to a spontaneous end,” allowing our love to move to new objects. In a later essay, Freud will explicitly distinguish the healthy, temporary process of mourning (which ultimately frees us to love something new) from “melancholia,” which is stuck in place.

The final paragraph of “On Transience” explains what the story is really about:

My conversation with the poet took place in the summer before the war. A year later the war broke out and robbed the world of its beauties. It destroyed not only the beauty of the countrysides through which it passed and the works of art which it met with on its path but it also shattered our pride in the achievements of our civilization, our admiration for many philosophers and artists and our hopes of a final triumph over the differences between nations and races. It tarnished the lofty impartiality of our science, it revealed our instincts in all their nakedness and let loose the evil spirits within us which we thought had been tamed forever by centuries of continuous education by the noblest minds. It made our country small again and made the rest of the world far remote. It robbed us of very much that we had loved, and showed us how ephemeral were many things that we had regarded as changeless.

In 1914, Europeans like Freud had lost an object of their love–life before the war–and they were mourning it. To make matters harder, they had strongly identified with prewar culture and taken pride and hope in it. They were like a widower who not only misses his deceased partner but also mourns his own lost role or place in the world as a spouse. (This is my analogy, not Freud’s or Lear’s.)

Dr. Freud has a prescription. Mourning passes, and the same will happen to Europeans as the war moves into the past. “When once the mourning is over, it will be found that our high opinion of the riches of civilization has lost nothing from our discovery of their fragility. We shall build up again all that war has destroyed, and perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before.”

Mourning involves, among other emotions, a recognition of the value of what was lost. Thus, for someone like Freud to mourn his optimistic youthful days before August 1914 was to recognize their worth. His sadness reveals that it had been good to pursue medical science in Vienna.

In this case, however, the prewar culture had yielded an unspeakably terrible war. Therefore, the culture was not only over but also discredited. If Freud could travel back in time, perhaps he should not enjoy prewar Vienna (or Paris) but regard it with dismay as the predecessor of a global slaughter. Perhaps Freud and his contemporaries were not like people mourning loved-ones who had died innocently, but like people whose lovers had been unmasked as villains. Worse, the mourners had been part of the lost and discredited world.

When Freud went for his country walk, he and his friends knew that the flowers would fade. But that was not the flowers’ fault. Watching them wither would not negate their value while they bloomed, and the friends could fully appreciate new buds when they returned (as normal) the following spring. In contrast, the First World War revealed that prewar European society, which had seemed so progressive to Freud’s generation, had been deeply corrupt all along.

I am disagreeing here with Freud. He thinks that the negative feelings of his contemporaries are symptoms of mourning, which is healthy but should not be allowed to last forever. Their mourning reflects an authentic and appropriate appreciation for life before the war. They now realize that the past was “fragile,” but this recognition should not detract from its value. Their job is to create good things anew.

It is much harder if we think that something that we have lost is not only transient and absent but was never as valuable as we had previously believed.

I am often nostalgic for the polity and society that I knew as a young adult and up through the Obama Administration. I realize that many people who were less fortunate than I felt less positive about things then, as did people who were more radical than I. I am simply reporting my subjective state. I now experience mourning for that time. The questions is whether my mourning is appropriate because the past was good, or whether it is naive and self-justifying.

Lear’s main objective is to help us to see that mourning reflects a degree of appropriate appreciation for the past, and we can continue to make good things. We should recognize the fragility of what we had built but not reject it all. This is difficult if we blame the past that we miss for what has gone wrong.


Source: Sigmund Freud, “On Transience,” 1915 (just “Vergänglichkeit” in the original, without a preposition), translated by James Strachey in the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, pp. 305-7, discussed in Jonathan Lear, Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life (Harvard, 2022). See also: the politics of nostalgia just isn’t what it used to be; nostalgia in the face of political crisis; there are tears of things; and Rilke, The Grownup

the rule of law and the Trump Administration versus higher education

On Wednesday, according to The New York Times, the Trump Administration sent letters to nine universities offering them financial benefits and relief from investigations if they agree (among other things) to “freeze tuition for five years,” provide “free tuition to students studying math, biology, or other ‘hard sciences’ if endowments exceed $2 million per undergraduate,” “cap the enrollment of international students,” “commit to strict definitions of gender,” and “change their governance structures to prohibit anything that would ‘punish, belittle and even spark violence against conservative ideas.'”

I have not seen the letter itself, but it refers to a “compact” document that the universities are asked to sign, and that is here. It includes, among other things, a provision that “all university employees, in their capacity as university representatives, will abstain from actions or speech relating to societal and political events except in cases in which external events have a direct impact upon the university.” (Does that mean I may not publish an article about Ukraine and identify myself as a Tufts professor?) Erwin Chemerinsky says, “It would be hard to come up with a more explicit attempt to restrict freedom of speech.”

Failure to sign evidently means risking federal support, or at least facing investigations and litigation. “This Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education represents the priorities of the U.S. government in its engagements with universities …. Institutions of higher education are free to develop models and values other than those below, if the institution elects to forego federal benefits.”

Trump won the election, and elections have consequences. The Administration may write regulations governing higher education. So why doesn’t the Department of Education publish this “compact” as a regulation applying to all universities? One rule would then apply to all, and it would be transparent and predictable.

A rule would also be subject to judicial review, and colleges and higher ed. associations would have incentives to sue, arguing that the regulations exceed the statutory authorization of the Department of Education, violate the First Amendment, or both. Some or all of the regulations might survive judicial review. In any case, everyone would know the results and would have to comply with the courts’ rulings. Because the rules would apply to the entire sector of higher education in all 50 states, there might be considerable backlash from voters.

All of this–publicity, consistency, predictability, judicial review, and review by voters–constitutes the rule of law. These letters violate it.

Some institutions may willingly take the deal, and others may decide to settle even if they believe that it undermines their rights because it is cheaper to negotiate than to fight back. Already, the chair of the University of Texas Board of Regents has said that UT is “honored” to have been “named as one of only nine institutions in the U.S. selected by the Trump administration for potential funding advantages.”

The result will be a de facto policy, applied one institution at a time, with no judicial review. Colleges may accept deals that trade away their Constitutional rights. Possibly, students and faculty will have standing to sue their own institutions (as Jimmy Kimmel could have sued ABC), but it will be hard for third parties to challenge these “voluntary” agreements. And institutions that the Administration decides not to target will be left alone, thus reducing any backlash.

It is very important that students, faculty, and alumni of these communities advocate for their institutions not to sign the compact: University of Arizona, Brown, Dartmouth, MIT, the University of Pennsylvania, USC, the University of Texas, Vanderbilt University, and UVa.

See also: primer on free speech and academic freedom; AAUP v Rubio; Holding two ideas at once: the attack on universities is authoritarian, and viewpoint diversity is important

AAUP v Rubio

On March 25, Tufts student Rümeysa Öztürk was abducted by masked ICE agents because she had co-authored a clearly legal op-ed in our campus newspaper, not directly about Israel but about how the university had responded to our student government. According to Andre Watson, the Assistant Director of the National Security Division of ICE, this op-ed could “undermine U.S. foreign policy by creating a hostile environment for Jewish students and indicating support for a designated terrorist organization.”

After an unconscionably long period of detainment in inhumane circumstances, Rümeysa was ordered released. Subsequently, the American Association of University Professors and the Middle Eastern Studies Association sued Donald Trump and members of his administration, seeking an injunction against the policy that had ensnared Rümeysa and other defendants.

Yesterday, federal District Court judge William G. Young, an appointee of Ronald Reagan, issued a 161-page decision in favor of the plaintiffs that is a blistering denunciation of the Administration. It makes quite a read.

It starts with the image that I reproduce above. (I have never seen a judicial decision with a front-page illustration.)

The judge’s main finding comes early:

Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, together with the subordinate officials and agents of each of them, deliberately and with purposeful aforethought, did so concert their actions and those of their two departments intentionally to chill the rights to freedom of speech and peacefully to assemble of the non-citizen plaintiff members of the plaintiff associations (pp. 4-5).

Judge Young does not mince words in the many pages that follow. For example, “the facts prove that the President himself approves truly scandalous and unconstitutional suppression of free speech on the part of two of his senior cabinet secretaries” (p. 96).

After considering the arguments in favor of masking ICE agents, the court “rejects this testimony as disingenuous, squalid and dishonorable” (p. 98).

The judge explains:

It was never the Secretaries’ immediate intention to deport all pro- Palestinian non-citizens[.] for that obvious First Amendment violation … could have raised a major outcry. Rather, the intent of the Secretaries was more invidious — to target a few for speaking out and then use the full rigor of the Immigration and Nationality Act (in ways it had never been used before) to have them publicly deported with the goal of tamping down pro-Palestinian student protests and terrorizing similarly situated non-citizen (and other) pro-Palestinians into silence because their views were unwelcome.

The Secretaries have succeeded, apparently well beyond their immediate intentions” (p. 95).

I have been saying that we in academia should enhance ideological pluralism because it’s the right thing to do. It makes our thinking and teaching more rigorous. However, the Trump’s Administration’s attacks on higher education have nothing to do with that goal, except that intellectual diversity is occasionally and inconsistently used as a pretext. The Administration is trying to crush pluralism by applying a set of tools popular among modern authoritarians of the left, center, and right. The Administration’s policies make it considerably more difficult to promote reasonable dialogue across ideological differences on campuses. But more importantly, the government is “terrorizing” vulnerable people into silence.

Near the end of the decision, Judge Young quotes the president who appointed him, Ronald Reagan: “Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation, for it comes only once to a people.” The judge concludes:

As I’ve read and re-read the record in this case, listened widely, and reflected extensively, I’ve come to believe that President Trump truly understands and appreciates the full import of President Reagan’s inspiring message –- yet I fear he has drawn from it a darker, more cynical message. I fear President Trump believes the American people are so divided that today they will not stand up, fight for, and defend our most precious constitutional values so long as they are lulled into thinking their own personal interests are not affected.

Is he correct?

See also: primer on free speech and academic freedomacademic freedom for individuals and for groupsHolding two ideas at once: the attack on universities is authoritarian, and viewpoint diversity is important

consider the octopus

Ancient Greek members of the Skeptical School taught methods or habits that helped people to live better. One method involved pondering how different the world might seem to different animals, considering that other species have diverse types of eyes, ears, and tongues; preferences and aversions; and perhaps whole senses unknown to us.

Skeptics said that we are animals and not fundamentally different from the “so-called irrational animals.” Meditating on examples of animal psychology would prevent people from believing that their own experience was true or that the pursuit of truth was possible. In turn, suspending judgment was a path to inner peace and good treatment of others.

In this spirit, consider the octopus, as described in detail by the philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith. People who study this animal almost universally conclude that it is curious, intelligent, and interactive and that each octopus has a personality that persists over time. Yet the species is so remote from us on the evolutionary tree that it is like an alien visitor to our planet. Or we could be the aliens on theirs.

For one thing, an octopus has quite different senses from ours, such as suckers that each have 10,000 sensors and eyes of a fundamentally different design. Since an octopus lives underwater and has a soft and flexible body, its whole relationship with its environment must be profoundly different from ours.

I gradually became who I am over many years–the first period now barely a memory for me–and I was deeply connected to other people from the start. I have persisted for almost six decades, building up (and losing) memories. An octopus emerges from an egg and for lives for two years, if it’s lucky, before it dies of old age. Its combination of substantial intelligence and a brief lifespan is unusual on earth and would presumably give it a different sense of time from mine.

An octopus doesn’t have a brain, because its complex nervous system is distributed through its body, and its arms have considerable autonomy. “Octopuses [may] not even track where their own arms might be” (p. 67). Nevertheless, each octopus functions as a coherent organism with an individual personality.

I think of myself as one thing, my body parts as something a bit different (because I control them imperfectly), and the external world as something distinct from both my self and my body. This experience deeply influences my assumptions about fundamentals like self and other, thought and matter, cause-and-effect, intention, and the objective world. It is hard to believe that an octopus feels the same way, yet my experience is no more valid or true.

If you doubt that an octopus has enough mental capacity to have a model of its own world, fine—just imagine an extraterrestrial creature with a similar design as an octopus and 10 times as many neurons. It doesn’t matter whether an alien like that exists on other planets, only that it is plausible. The thought-experiment is enough to tell us that we experience just one of many possible worlds.


Sources: Sextus, Outlines of Pyrhhonism (see 1.13:61 on humans as animals); Peter Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017). See also: thinking both sides of the limits of human cognition; ‘every thing that lives is holy’: Blake’s radical relativism;

Tufts equity dataset

The Tufts Survey of Equity in Health, Wealth, and Civic Engagement was a longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adults across the United States from 2020 to 2022. The data includes responses to our original questions plus more than 100 purchased archived variables previously collected by Ipsos. As many as possible of the same individuals were contacted across the waves. Items involve measures of health, wealth, and civic engagement, broadly defined.

The dataset is now available to anyone for free, courtesy of ICPSR. We have also built an interactive website where you can explore variables and produce infographics with very little knowledge of statistics. This is an example of a result produced by that website:

The interactive website is a few years old, but the ICPSR version of the dataset is new.

Citation: Levine, Peter, Stopka, Thomas, Allen, Jennifer, and Mistry, Jayanthi. Tufts Survey of Equity in Health, Wealth, and Civic Engagement, United States, 2020-2022. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2025-08-19. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR39204.v1

national narcissism

At the United Nations yesterday, our president told the assembled leaders, “Your countries are going to hell.” The Trump Administration extolls the unique excellence of the United States. An early executive order (14190, Jan 29, 2025) called on schools “to instill a patriotic admiration for our incredible Nation.” But the same movement also paints a picture of decline in the face of overseas rivals and traitors within.

Aleksandra Cislak and Aleksandra Cichocka (2023) provide a review of research on “national narcissism.” This phrase does not mean a secure affection for one’s nation or a commitment to enhancing it. Rather, it is a belief that the nation with which one identifies is “exceptional and deserving of privileged treatment but underappreciated by others.” It “reflects a demand for recognition, privileges and special treatment … and predicts aggression and hostility when these are not provided to the nation.”

At the individual level, indicators of national narcissism are correlated with higher support for “populist” politicians (using that adjective in a pejorative sense) and lower support for democracy (Cislak & Cichocka 2023).

In the 2016 election, national narcissism predicted voting for and approving of Donald Trump even when many other variables were controlled (Federico & Golec de Zavala 2018).

I submit that Donald Trump himself would score high on the group narcissism scale, answering questions like these positively:

  • “I wish other countries would more quickly recognize the authority of my country”
  • “My country deserves special treatment”
  • “I will never be satisfied until my country gets all it deserves”
  • “Other countries are envious of my country”

And 19 more (Golec de Zavala et al. 2025)

I do not know how many other Americans share these views. Some people certainly voted for Trump without being national narcissists. I also do not know whether national narcissism has risen in the United States. It is not a new phenomenon. However, I would guess that it has risen lately in response to anxieties about the US role in the world.

After all, the United States spent most of this century so far fighting two wars and essentially lost both. Typically, foreign policy issues do not register in national surveys as reasons for voters’ preferences. My suggestion is subtler and more difficult to document. Two long and costly military disasters discredited elites, worsened polarization as communities bore disparate burdens, and provoked deep self-doubt and resentment in a country that had seen itself as enormously powerful. At any rate, it is difficult to imagine that twin defeats at this scale would not affect the mood of an electorate; and one outcome could be national narcissism.


Sources: Cislak, A., & Cichocka, A. (2023). National narcissism in politics and public understanding of science. Nature Reviews Psychology2(12), 740-750; Christopher M Federico, Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, Collective Narcissism and the 2016 US Presidential Vote, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 82, Issue 1, Spring 2018, Pages 110–121; de Zavala, Agnieszka Golec, et al. “Collective Narcissism and its Social Consequences.” Journal of personality and social psychology 97.6 (2009): 1074-96. ProQuest. Web. 24 Sept. 2025.

See also: anxieties about American exceptionalism; American exceptionalism, revisited

tips for democracy activists in 2025

This is a 22-minute video of me offering suggestions and diagnostic questions for activists in nonviolent, pro-democracy movements in the USA right now, and for those want to get involved.

I have been offering these ideas in interactive webinars and in-person meetings. In those settings, I don’t lecture; we discuss. For this publicly accessible video, I have extracted some of my own thoughts and questions.

truth, justice, and the purposes of a university

On the website of the Heterodox Academy, Jonathan Haidt writes, “it is clear that no university can have Truth and Social Justice as dual teloses [goals]. Each university must pick one.”

He undermines his own case in the previous paragraph by distinguishing between “finding and eradicating disparate treatment” and “finding and eradicating disparate outcomes.” The former is “always a good thing to do, and … never conflicts with truth,” whereas the latter “causes all of the problems, all of the conflicts with truth.”

This is a view of social justice. It is perfectly respectable. It sounds like classical liberalism. It also echoes Karl Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program. (Marx demands equal treatment–in the form of shared ownership of industry–as opposed to equal outcomes.) However, this view conflicts with Catholic social justice doctrines, the classical republican idea that citizenship requires rough equality, and many people’s sense that some levels of suffering are simply unacceptable. In short, it is a substantive and contested political view that Haidt is sure is always right.

We could delete this passage and try to envision a university devoted to truth, not to any form of (social) justice–Haidt’s or otherwise. I would ask whether such an institution can employ thousands of workers, confer valuable degrees and professional licenses, own extensive real estate, conduct research with military and medical applications, field quasi-professional sports teams, and invest in the stock market.

One answer, to be taken seriously, is: no. Socrates believed that he had to be completely independent–financially and otherwise–to be a gadfly. Unlike his Sophist rivals, he wouldn’t charge a drachma for teaching. There is a long tradition of creating spiritual or intellectual communities (monasteries, sanghas, communes, wikis) that have minimal social obligations so that they can focus on truth. But those are not like modern American universities.

Another answer is yes: the university can operate as a billion-dollar enterprise without views of social justice. I don’t see how that is possible. If you employ people, they must be employees or contractors, unionized or not, with or without various benefits and mandates. If you build a new building, it must either raise or lower rents in the neighborhood and consume fossil fuels or renewables. You can start a business school or an education school (or both, or neither). There are no neutral answers. You should welcome alternative opinions and arguments by students and faculty, but your actions reflect positions.

The University of Chicago’s famous Kalven Report mischaracterized that university. It said, “The mission of the university is the discovery, improvement, and dissemination of knowledge … It is … a community of scholars…. It is not a club, it is not a trade association, it is not a lobby.”

But the University of Chicago was a very powerful lobby, especially in its own city. In 1955, a report produced by UC employees lamented “the accelerated immigration of lower-income families, including lower-income Negro families settling in concentrated groups.” The university advocated “demolishing and rebuilding entire blocks of Hyde Park,” which then happened.

Like other universities, UC was definitely a club, and membership conferred substantial benefits. During the Vietnam War, Dow Chemical, the manufacturer of Napalm, recruited on the UC campus because students with Chicago degrees would be well-qualified executives. Dow’s recruitment became a specific target of student protest.

The first human-made self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction in history had taken place under the Hyde Park campus as part of the development of the atom bomb. In that sense, this “community of scholars” had helped to destroy two Japanese cities.

UC also ran and still runs a hospital, which has made controversial decisions, such as shutting down its trauma center in 1988 and starting a new one in 2015. UC even has its own police department, which can arrest and charge anyone in its jurisdiction.

Universities do not have one telos. They are “multiversities,” in Clark Kerr’s 1963 phrase. The Kalven Report makes me think of a seminar room in a liberal arts department. That is where the pursuit of truth is most prominent, and we must be vigilant against challenges to freedom there. But the people mowing the lawn outside are employees or contractors, the building had a wealthy donor whose gift was invested in stocks, the lab across the street may be creating AI tools that could wipe out jobs, and the students in the seminar may use their degrees to enter monopoly professions like law and medicine.

It is better to do all those things justly rather than unjustly. Everyone in the community must be free and welcome to contest what justice demands, but the corporate body will act one way or another. A good university strives for both truth (a topic of debate) and justice (a criterion for assessing action).


See also: primer on free speech and academic freedom; academic freedom for individuals and for groups; Holding two ideas at once: the attack on universities is authoritarian, and viewpoint diversity is important

the politics of nostalgia just isn’t what it used to be

I believe Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. coined the phrase “politics of nostalgia” in a 1955 article in which he observed, “Today, we are told, the bright young men are conservatives; the thoughtful professors are conservatives; even a few liberals, in their own cycle of despair, are beginning to avow themselves conservatives.”

This article is light but disdainful. Schlesinger dismisses the intellectual conservatives of his day as “irrelevant” and a “hothouse growth.” They feel nostalgic, and they officially endorse a principled form of conservatism that respects ancestors and inherited ways. But the USA “is a dynamic and expanding economy” whose elites are not landed aristocrats but plutocrats. So the real power on the right is not conservatism but business, which seeks lower taxes and less regulation and welcomes rapid change.

Schlesinger wrote a long time ago, and nostalgia seems much more widespread today, when relatively few people celebrate a dynamic economy or its attendant technological and social advances. Even our plutocrats (Silicon Valley barons) often sound scared of the future or bitter about present obstacles to their genius.

Not only is MAGA nostalgic, but so are never-Trump conservatives and, I think, many across the broad spectrum of the left. To be sure, progressives insist that progress occurred in living memory, especially on social issues. Nevertheless, they (or perhaps I should include myself and say “we”) tend to be deeply nostalgic for a remembered time when society seemed to be moving in the right direction and when crises–from climate change to polarization–had not reached their current levels.

Analytically, it might be worth distinguishing these political attitudes:

  • Despair: the attitude that things cannot or will not improve.
  • Fear, in the sense of Judith Shklar’s “Liberalism of Fear” (1989). Shklar’s starting point: “somewhere someone is being tortured right now.” Her philosophy is “a response to these undeniable actualities, and it therefore concentrate[d] on damage control.” She is “entirely nonutopian,” motivated by memories of disaster, not by hope for a better state. Her main recommendation is to limit state power.
  • Caution based on pessimism. Montaigne (1588) writes, “Our morals are extremely corrupt and have an amazing tilt toward getting worse; among our laws and customs, several are barbaric and monstrous: however, because of the difficulty of putting ourselves in a better state and the danger of further decline, if I could plant a peg in our wheel and stop it at this point, I would do so willingly.”
  • Nostalgia: A bittersweet appreciation for a past state, combined with regret for its passing. Nostalgia is compatible with hope, and it need not imply pessimism. However, the following common features of nostalgia can be obstacles to progress or can simply prevent clear thinking:
  1. Nostalgia often assumes that a harmonious and integrated condition continued over a whole span of the past. “This is how things were back in the day … This is how my life was back then …” In contrast, we often perceive our present selves and our current society as inconsistent or even contradictory and as constantly changing (Hart 1973, Brewer 2023). This contrast biases us against the present.
  2. Envy easily attaches to nostalgia. We wish that we could be like the people back in the time for which we feel nostalgic. We may envy individuals or groups who benefited from causing those good times to end for us. However, as Walter Benjamin notes, we never seem to envy the people of the future. Someone living in 1925 might have anticipated the amount of technological and economic progress that has occurred since then, yet they didn’t envy us. Likewise, we don’t envy our successors, even if we are optimistic. Envy is problematic because it is zero-sum and promotes conflict.
  3. Nostalgia can erase the salutary kind of fear that Shklar recommends. Near the beginning of The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Kundera’s narrator says that everything is bathed in nostalgia in the face of dissolution, even the guillotine. People feel nostalgic for moments of crisis and action, such as the French Revolution: “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive” (Wordsworth). They forget the violence, confusion, failure, and vices of the moment. Of course, good things also happened, but nostalgia distorts our estimation and causes us to discount present dangers.
  4. Nostalgia suggests that the best choices were obvious and makes us angry at those who chose badly, or self-critical if we think that we were unwise. We think: Why didn’t they (or we) prevent harmful change? But we always act under conditions of deep uncertainty and confusion, and the best choices are rarely obvious until it is too late.
  5. Nostalgia tends to discourage action. It is not a sharp analysis of trends that can recommend concrete reforms to restore broken institutions or to reverse declines. Nostalgia is a hazy, elegiac, twilight feeling; an attitude for spectators rather than actors.

To summarize: Nostalgia can cause symptoms of bias, envy, complacency, anger and/or disdain, and passivity. As one who exhibits all of its symptoms, I recommend trying to avoid it.


See also: nostalgia in the face of political crisis; phenomenology of nostalgia; nostalgia for now.

Sources: Judith N. Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed. Liberalism and the moral life. Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 27, 26; Montaigne 2.17 (“Of Presumption”), my trans.; Marshawn Brewer, “Sketch for a Phenomenology of Nostalgia,” Human Studies 46.3 (2023): 547-563; J.G. Hart “Toward a phenomenology of nostalgia,” Man and World 6 (1973), 406-7; Walter Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte (1940), II.