should people trust the government?

Since the 1950s, pollsters have been asking Americans whether they “trust the government in Washington to do the right thing most of the time?” The proportion who say yes has plummeted. Here I show that trend along with data on horizontal trust (i.e., citizens trusting and working with one another).

I worry about the trust-in-government decline for three reasons. First, the government can be a valuable tool for public purposes, and when it’s deeply distrusted, voters won’t allow it to be used. In other words, distrust will prevent ambitious government. But–second–distrust will not necessarily curb or limit government. When the state is widely distrusted, interests still use it for private gain and don’t have to worry about a mass public that has higher expectations. So a distrusted government can be intrusive and expensive without doing much good. And, third, the trend line of distrust may–in part–reflect declining trustworthiness. Alexander Hamilton proposed as a “general rule” that people’s “confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.”

But I bring all of this up because I recently read Matthew G. Specter’s Habermas: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge, 2010) and kept track of Habermas’ thoughts on the importance of mistrust in government. For instance, in 1985, he wrote, “The legitimacy of rechtsstaatlichen [rule-of-law] institutions rests in the end on the non-institutionalizable mistrust of the citizens.” Separately, he argued that the legitimate state depends on a “non-institutionalized mistrust of itself,” which roughly translates into checks and balances. Habermas is an influence on theorists like Jean Cohen, who has written:

It makes little sense to use the category of generalized trust to describe one’s attitude toward law or government. One can only trust people, because only people can fulfill obligations. But institutions (legal and other) can provide functional equivalents for interpersonal trust in impersonal settings involving interactions with strangers, because they, as it were, institutionalize action-orienting norms and the expectation that these will be honored.*

If you asked Habermas whether he had confidence in the German state, he would probably say yes (at least “some confidence”–depending on the policies of the ruling coalition), but if you asked him whether he trusted it, he would say no. For him, trust in the state is a great evil that underlay German statism, from Frederick the Great to Hitler. Habermas is primarily concerned with preventing totalitarianism, something that he can personally remember.

Yet the aggregate survey results would be very similar if one replaced the word “trust” with “confidence,” because most people don’t make that subtle distinction. So, from a Habermasian perspective, what level of trust/confidence should we consider optimal? Too high means we have turned into state-worshipers, and totalitarianism is a threat. But too low means we no longer believe that we can use the state as our tool, and the national deliberation will suffer as a result. We could slide into some kind of dictatorship here, but since the American left is generally concerned with civil liberties and the right has a powerful strain of libertarianism, I think our more serious threat is the abandonment of government rather than too much of it.

In any case, this whole debate often focuses on the proportion of people who do not trust the government. But the desirable answer to this question is probably a subtle one, lying somewhere between trust and mistrust. We don’t want the proportion of people who trust the government implicitly to rise; we want everyone to give it partial trust (and to hold themselves responsible for improving government when it fails). I am not actually sure that the median American is so far from the optimal position if you take their ambivalence into account.

*Jean L. Cohen, “American Civil Society Talk,” in Robert K. Fullinwider, ed., Civil Society, Democracy, and Civic Renewal, p. 66. See also where do you turn if you mistrust the government and the people? and If You Want Citizens to Trust Government, Empower Them to Govern

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the youth vote in the news

Below is some recent news coverage of CIRCLE’s research on the youth vote in 2016. Most of this reporting uses data and visualization tools that we have collected in one place, our “Election Center.”

I don’t think the signs are good for national youth turnout in November, but one of the reasons we never see reasonable turnout in midterm years is that most places don’t have competitive elections. For instance, 16 states don’t have a Senate race at all this year, and virtually all House contests are foreordained. We have identified some key states where the youth vote will matter–and youth turnout may also be reasonable in those places:

*added later in the evening.

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on retreat

(en route to Baltimore, MD) I am heading to a three-day retreat focused on combating polarization and dysfunction in national politics. We’ve been asked to put aside our phones and other electronic devices in order to focus on the conversation. I think that’s a good policy. As a result, I’m going to sign off the blog until Thursday.

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science, democracy, and civic life

(Arlington, VA) After a day discussing Civic Science at the NSF, I am inclining to this conceptual model:

Screen Shot 2014-10-02 at 2.37.46 PM

Note that none of these circles is conterminous with any other. I believe, for example, that one can be a good citizen in a context (such as a church) that is not and should not be democratic. I believe that some valuable science is not done in public or with the public, although it must be justified to the public if they are asked to pay for it. And I believe that there are worthy aspects of civic life that are not scientific. Nevertheless, the three circles overlap, and given our particularly dire problems–matters like the climate crisis–a democratic civic science must be expanded.

See also is all truth scientific truth? and is science republican (with a little r)?.

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Civic Science

(Arlington, VA) I am at the National Science Foundation for a meeting on Civic Science. According to the background materials,

Civic science is a method of inquiry into important contemporary issues that enriches democracy by bringing citizens from all backgrounds and disciplines – not just scientists – together in shared projects that analyze current conditions, envision a better future, and devise a pathway to that future. Civic science is both an approach to generating knowledge and a democratic practice. In civic science, scientists express democratic citizenship through their scientific work: they engage in democratic world-building efforts as scientists. … The fundamental scientific question of “how does the world work” is situated in the context of democratic inquiry into a critical question—“What should we do in the face of complex problems?” Civic science, thus, integrates its work closely with the “purposive” disciplines of arts, humanities, and design, which ask fundamental questions about what is good and just, encouraging us to envision and debate ways of relating and living as civic agents.

Civic science is like “transdisciplinary” science (e.g., NRC 2014), but expands and enriches such frameworks by closely linking the practice of science to democracy and to other ways of knowing and learning from arts, humanities and design traditions and fields. Similarly, Civic Science is like community based participatory research (CBPR) and social movement-based “citizen science” in that it focuses on complex, pressing, real-world problems, and values diverse ways of knowing. However, in ways that usefully challenge theory and practice in CBPR, civic science intentionally and explicitly aims to promote democracy by framing scientific inquiry as an opportunity for participants to develop their capacity to work across differences, create common resources, and negotiate a shared democratic way of life. …

Civic science draws from research and theory in three areas: science and technology studies (STS), civic studies, and complex systems theory. Together, they provide the rationale for civic science and point to the benefits of pursuing civic science as an approach for furthering knowledge and democracy.

 

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the new history wars

(Boston’s Logan Airport) The new framework for AP US History is under fire for being too liberal, while students and teachers are walking out to protest a local Colorado history curriculum seen as too conservative. American “exceptionalism” is central to all these debates.

I think some schools, published curricula, and teachers want their students to develop a basically critical stance toward American history in order to yield certain political conclusions, such as a desire to remedy past wrongs or to constrain American power. I do not agree that these objectives are appropriate in a history class (for reasons I will get to below). Frederick Hess and Chester Finn write on the American Enterprise Institute’s blog that “Much of the criticism [of the AP framework] is hysterical and inaccurate . . . but not all of it. The critics make a legitimate case that the framework is ideologically slanted and infused with 21st-century progressivist bias.” It overlooks “America’s motivating ideals. … There’s little about economics that doesn’t feel caricatured or framed in terms of government efforts to combat injustice. Students are introduced to decade after decade of American racism and depravity, with little positive context for the nation’s foreign engagements or its success creating shared prosperity for tens of millions.”

I am not certain that actual AP instruction will play out this way, but if it does, I would share these authors’ concern.

But other critics reveal that their objective is as ideological as the progressives’, just from the opposite direction. In the National Review, Stanley Kurtz makes much of Thomas Bender’s influence on the AP Framework. Bender, he writes, “is a thoroughgoing critic of American exceptionalism, the notion that America is freer and more democratic than any other nation, and for that reason, a model, vindicator, and at times the chief defender of ordered liberty and self-government in the world.”

What kind of claim is this— that “American is freer and more democratic than any other nation”? It could be a hypothesis subject to investigation. We would need to define “democratic” and “free” and then look at comparative data. Many conservatives hold that the US is not a democracy but rather a republic (with strict limits on popular sovereignty), so it doesn’t seem likely that we will turn out to be the most democratic nation in the world–or even that we want to be. I suppose conservatives would point to a relative lack of economic regulation to support the claim that we are the “freest” nation. But I am not sure that regulation is more restrictive in other capitalist nations (especially if one uses Friedrich von Hayek’s criterion that regulation violates liberty when it is unpredictable and capricious), nor is economic freedom the only thing that matters. No other country comes close to ours in the proportion of people it imprisons–hardly a sign of freedom. Freedom House ranks the US in the top tier in overall freedom, but we have a lot of company there.

Or perhaps it is a moral premise that “America is freer and more democratic than any other nation.” This could be the basis for acting as the “chief defender of ordered liberty and self-government in the world.” I object both to making the study of history instrumental to any particular moral outcome and to the moral position implied in that sentence.

Donald Kagan is also a solid conservative, and his critique of debunking versions of American history is roughly similar to Kurtz. Yet he is an excellent historian (I was privileged to take a seminar with him a quarter century ago), and he takes pains to acknowledge that the valid goal of instilling love of country “does not require us to denigrate or attack any other country, nor does it require us to admire our own uncritically. . … In telling the story of the American political experience, we must insist on the honest search for truth; we must permit no comfortable self-deception or evasion, no seeking of scapegoats. The story of this country’s vision of a free, democratic republic and of its struggle to achieve it need not fear the most thorough examination and can proudly stand comparison with that of any other land.”

Ultimately, here is where I stand:

First, the study of history is not, and should not be, value-neutral. It is an investigation into human agency in its benign and evil forms, and it should support appropriate value-judgments. However, the question of whether the US is the best country in the world is not worthy of us. It reflects unnecessary insecurity. It implies that in order for us to love America, we first have to rate it above all other countries, which would be like assuming that in order to love our children, we must know that they score best in the world on some measure of excellence. Likewise, the question of whether America is fundamentally bad and dangerous is unhelpful. Valid moral questions are about particular institutions, events, movements, ideas, and people. If you add up all the results, you will surely get a mixed score for the nation as whole.

Second, history is an intellectual discipline that should not be harnessed to any ideological agenda. It is impossible to think about history value-neutrally, yet we can design inquiries in such a way that the value conclusions are not foreordained; facts that are unknown when we pose our research questions will influence our conclusions. We can introduce our students to that kind of inquiry and its fundamental norms (intellectual openness and responsibility to facts). History as an intellectual discipline is inconsistent with an a priori message that the US is either uniquely excellent or deeply flawed. For instance, the Colorado curriculum that says “Materials should promote citizenship, patriotism, essentials and benefits of the free enterprise system, respect for authority and respect for individual rights” is inconsistent with disciplined inquiry into our complex past.

We must also teach students to interact constructively and respectfully with fellow citizens who hold different views of American history. Such disagreements are inevitable because our overall opinions of the country are related to our religious and political commitments, which vary. Students should understand the variation. We ought to “teach the controversy.” Gerald Graff, the distinguished literary critic and former president of the Modern Language Association, wrote back in 1993:

One does not have to be a tenured radical to see that what has taken over the educational world today is not barbarism and unreason but, simply, conflict.  The first step in dealing productively with today’s conflicts is to recognize their legitimacy. [We should] rethink the premise that the eruption of fundamental conflict in education has to mean educational and cultural paralysis. My argument is that conflict has to mean paralysis only as long as we fail to take advantage of it.

Finally, a “thorough examination” of American history (as recommended by Kagan) will yield compelling stories of grandeur, inspiration, tragedy, and pathos. Again, I would not use either a positive or a negative assessment of America as the premise of a history curriculum to which I would subject students. But my own reading leaves me thinking that our past is a remarkable combination of both. We have deep original sins of slavery and genocide and a record of extraordinary altruism and idealism. Our story is not as humane as, say, Canada’s, but it is an epic. If students get a whiff of the grandeur of American history and a strong sense that the moral verdict is not yet in, they may be motivated to help make our country the best it can be. If I had to sum up my own reaction to the drama of American history, it would be both loving and troubled, and it could even take the form of a palindrome*

America, you Jerusalem reborn!
No profligate, old-world, ruined people, you.
Behold: peace. You’re principle without pain and dishonor.
Dishonor and pain without principle: your peace.
Behold, you people: ruined world!
Old, profligate. No reborn Jerusalem you, America.

*Distantly inspired by Yehuda Alharizi’s “Palindrome for a Patron” [12th or 13th century] as translated by Peter Cole and cited by Harold Bloom in the June 28 New York Review of Books.

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engaging citizens in cities

(Los Angeles) At CityLab 2014, I’m on a panel called “Beyond the Buzz: What Citizen Engagement Strategies are Really Working.”

I think mayors and the people who work for them tend to think of engaged citizens as potential suppliers of:

  1. votes
  2. taxes
  3. input/opinion
  4. voluntary work

The first two won’t be strictly relevant to our panel, because taxes are required by law and voting is a “political” concern, officially separate from public administration (except insofar as the voting process itself should be convenient and reliable).

Input and volunteering are valuable, but we need to push them to the next level. Both  tend to be individual and disconnected from other aspects of life. For example, a private citizen may contact the city to complain about an immediate problem, like a broken light, or to express an opinion about a community problem, like police bias. She may separately sign up to clean a park or tutor a child.

Individuals give their best input when they discuss their ideas with other people, checking their biases and values, holding themselves and others accountable, and learning from collective experience. They do their best volunteer work when they have decided with others what is needed and how to address those needs, and when they can reflect on the results of their efforts. That means that both input and volunteer labor are best when they are connected to citizens’ discussions.

What’s more, both talk and volunteer work are best when they are connected to paid work (presuming that the individual is employed). We learn a great deal on the job, and we have the potential to improve a city through our paid employment. If our civic engagement is limited to free contributions–input and/or volunteer service–it is not nearly as serious, informed, or potentially effective as it is if it also influences our paid work.

So instead of imagining an individual complaining about her children’s school or volunteering to chaperone students, picture her engaging in a discussion with diverse people about how to improve the school for all kids. That conversation should involve parents, other residents, students themselves, and also professional teachers and administrators. Some of the adults will have jobs that affect the welfare of children, from ministering to a religious congregation to operating a local grocery store. They should bring their experience from work into the discussions and hold themselves accountable to their fellow citizens as they go about their jobs. They may also volunteer and express individual opinions, but those acts will be informed by their discussion and their work.

(See also “the rise of urban citizenship” “youth Participatory Budgeting in Boston” and “civic responses to Newtown“)

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assessing the sharing economy

(Los Angeles) I’m here for CityLab 2014 (which is being live-streamed):

Hosted by The Atlantic in partnership with The Aspen Institute and Bloomberg Philanthropies, CityLabis one of our most innovative programs of the year, bringing together 300+ of the world’s top mayors, urban experts, city planners, writers, technologists, economists, and designers.

The current panel is entitled “What’s Mine is Yours? The New Dynamics of the Sharing City.” I am struck by an ideological disagreement that may not be as evident to the Moderator (James Bennet, Editor-in-Chief of The Atlantic).

Two participants–Brian Chesky, the CEO and founder of Airbnb, and NYU professor Arun Sundararajan–are enthusiastic about new market mechanisms for pairing individual sellers with buyers, firms like Uber and Airbnb. They see these innovations as not only economically efficient and good for both parties (Sundararajan has found positive impacts on wages) but also as signs of a “profound” shift to a greater degree of interpersonal trust and community. Chesky argues that firms like Airbnb are restoring some of the social bonds that existed before mass manufacturing estranged individuals from one another.

In contrast, David Sheard, the Council Leader in Kirklees (UK) is a Labour politician. He opened his remarks by telling a story of a Council decision to close a public facility. Citizens objected that  the facility was “theirs,” not the city’s. Now the Kirklees Council engages the public in deliberative processes. It may be that Kirlklees also supports new  sharing markets; panelist April Rinne suggested that was the case. Nevertheless, I hear two very different ideas of “community”–one in which people form voluntary relationships in order to exchange services and develop trust, and the other in which people talk together about public goods and make binding decisions for the community as a whole. Sheard said, “It is not about sharing assets, it is about sharing ideas.”

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two reviews of We are the Ones

(Salt Lake City) Ego-surfing in the airport, I came across two reviews of We are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For in Goodreads. Both reviewers (who happen to be friends of mine) end on the same note. Russell Fox says, “Levine doesn’t provide any easy solutions for putting together winning coalitions, but he makes about as good a case for trying as I’ve ever read.” And Micah Sifry says, “What remains to be seen is whether the nascent civic renewal movement, which Peter argues has more than a million participants, can take a more self-conscious and self-sustaining role on the national stage–a lot of this work is currently either too local or too dependent on foundation support to be that assertive. But we need it.”

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at BYU

(Provo, UT) I am at Brigham Young University to speak in three classes and to meet with faculty, all under the aegis of the university’s Office of Civic Engagement and its minor in Civic Engagement Leadership. I’m certainly an outsider to this particular place, which is also a central node in a global faith community. I did read Richard Bushman’s A Very Short Introduction to Mormonism (Oxford UP, 2008) before I came, as a quick orientation to the historical and theological fundamentals, but I know that I know very little. I will be speaking about my usual themes of civic renewal, and it will be interesting to see how they go over.

Last time I was in Utah was 11 years ago. I went from there to pre-Katrina New Orleans and blogged about how Salt Lake City and NOLA were like two elementary aspects of the American character, usually mixed together but here distilled into their pure forms.

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