Lesson Plan: Why are the founding principles essential for a free society?

Good morning, friends in civics and the social studies. Recently, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill Five. This bill does a great many things in relation to civics and government, but today’s post is specifically about this aspect, which adds a specific requirement to high school American Government:

one-half credit in United States Government, which must include a comparative discussion of political ideologies, such as communism and totalitarianism, that conflict with the principles of freedom
and democracy essential to the founding principles of the United States

Our work here at the Lou Frey Institute/Florida Joint Center for Citizenship is focused on ensuring that teachers have the resources they need to teach what they are supposed to teach. And this new requirement can be a tricky one to do effectively.

This past summer, we joined other civic education organizations (The Jack Miller Center, Ashbrook, and the Bill of Rights Institute) with the support of the Florida Education Foundation and the Florida Department of Education to support teachers in multiple locations across the state. Our session ‘workshopped’ a lesson/activity that could be used to support implementation of HB5. And we are pleased to make this available now on Florida Citizen.

This lesson will take about a class period, and uses a jigsaw approach to compare our Founding Principles to totalitarianism, using Mussolini’s 1932 work ‘What is Fascism?’ as a starting point. It includes a link to a slide deck that you are free to download and modify as needed.

The lesson comes in multiple formats that you may find useful for modification as well. There are also links to primary sources related to both Communism and Nazism to support additional comparisons.

Questions about the lesson? Email us!

Join the Online Facilitation Unconference October 22-24!

The Online Facilitation Unconference (OFU) is an annual learning exchange around all things virtual facilitation. It will be happening October 22–24, once again alongside and as part of IAF’s Facilitation Week. The event brings together practitioners from around the world, from a rich diversity of places and backgrounds and with various skill levels in terms of online/virtual/remote facilitation to explore the latest tools, share experiences, float new ideas etc.

In a nutshell, OFU is:

  • An unconference, meaning that the agenda will be created by the participants in real time
  • BYOT (bring your own technology) event, meaning the session hosts are free to run their sessions on whatever tool or platform (or combination thereof) they like
  • not-for-profit endeavor
  • Open to anyone regardless of income (about 10-20% of attendees each year take advantage of our “low or no income” option)

As a bonus, NCDD’s network can take advantage of a special 30% discount with code “ofu21-ncdd.”

For more information and to register: https://www.tickettailor.com/events/caceinstitute/582516

 

Reinventing Commons Governance in Modern Times

I gave the following remarks about commons governance on September 27 as part of the U!REKA Lab Lecture Series. U!REKA -- which stands for Urban Research and Education Knowledge Alliance -- is a consortium of eight European universities that studies urban commons. The subtitle of my talk was "Find Answers by Living the Questions." 

Thank you, Sandra Bos and the U!REKA Lab, for inviting me to share my ideas about commons governance with you today. It is a great privilege and pleasure.

As I began to gather my thoughts on this topic, I realized that the framing needed to expand. Yes, we must better understand commons governance and the commons more generally. But we must situate this discussion within the larger market/state system that dominates our societies.

This is necessary because commons and the market/state system are so deeply intertwined – even if their co-entanglement is not usually acknowledged. The two systems each represent very different ways of knowing, acting, and being. The struggles between the sovereign and commoners have a long history! They have been intimately conjoined, at least since the 13th Century, when King John signed the Magna Carta and Charter of the Forest.

The sovereign today is not a monarch, but the market/state – a system of governance that is an alliance between market and state institutions. Each has its own realm of authority -- production and governance, respectively – but they both share a deep utopian commitment to endless market growth and “progress.” Today, however, in the face of climate collapse and cascading ecological crises, respectable opinion is slowly come to realize that this vision may itself be a problem. Indeed, this may account for notional mainstream interest in the commons as a source of new ideas.

One stinging lesson that we are learning from the pandemic and climate collapse is that states and markets are not really on top of the situation. They can’t restrain capitalist appetites or provide existential security. I concede that this may be seen as an ideological conclusion, but it is equally a factual observation about the structural limitations of centralized, formalistic, bureaucratic systems. Totalistic regimes of control have trouble managing distributed complexity and change that arises from below.

Allow me to also make a blunt philosophical judgment: The market/state’s foundational commitments to private property, individualism, capital accumulation, and technology represent a kind of political and cultural lock-down. Certain departures from these ideas are simply taboo. Add to this the unexamined modern belief that humanity stands apart from natural systems, and that individualism trumps collective action, and it becomes clear that our current system offers very little space to imagine creative paths forward.

Which may help explain why young people are so despairing about the future. It also explains why so many ordinary people are turning to commons in these difficult times. Commoning is a means of survival. Informal cooperation, and mutual aid can meet needs that the market and state can’t or aren’t providing during the pandemic.

Yet strangely, commoning is often not seen as a “real system.” It is patronized as nice and well-meaning, but waved aside as too informal, improvised, and disorganized to be taken seriously as an institutional form. After all, governance and provisioning in commons do not rely on the formal rules or hierarchical structures. Power is decentralized and leadership diffused.

The polite dismissal of commons is a serious misjudgment, I believe, because the market/state system – if it is to navigate the civilizational turbulence ahead -- will need to forge some explicit, practical understandings with commoners. Their goodwill, creativity, and power to generate social legitimacy for state action will be indispensable. The market/state system itself already relies on social cooperation, trust, and commoning more than it realizes. Why not leverage this reality in more explicit ways?

In any case, this much is true: If commoning is to develop, mature, and succeed as a flourishing form of governance, it will have to work out a new modus vivendi with the market/state system.  So we stand at the threshold of a fascinating new conversation between commoners and the market/state system.

As my contribution to this dialogue, I’d like to explore three primary points:

First -- that commons are not resources, as conventional economics and politics seem to think. They are self-organized social systems. Commons are highly generative precisely because they are living social organisms entangled within the larger web of life.

My second point is that the dynamics of commoning remain poorly understood because there are so many erroneous ideas ascribed to it. So today I’d like to try to clarify some realities about commoning as a durable, proven social system.

And finally, my third point: The fate of the commons as a vehicle for social emancipation will depend upon negotiating and creating new configurations of state power.  We will need innovations in law, bureaucracy, and politics to safeguard and support commoning – and state power will need to align more closely with commoners if it hopes to neutralize the fierce, nihilistic pathologies of contemporary capitalism and the reactionary nationalism associated with nation-states. We absolutely need to understand commons governance on its own terms – but we must situate this discussion in a larger, more complicated context.

#1. Commons as a Social System, Not a Resource

Let’s first deal with Point #1, the persistent habit of treating the commons as unowned resources open to all. Economists and politicians habitually do this when they refer to land, the oceans, outer space, and the Internet as commons. But these resources are not commons. They are potentially shareable resources that currently lack a functional governance regime. There is no community stewardship on behalf of everyone. Right now, such resources are mostly free for the taking.

In his famous tragedy of the commons essay, Garrett Hardin called this scenario the “tragedy of the commons” because finite resources are vulnerable to overuse and ruination. But in reality, Hardin was not describing a commons. In his parable of an imaginary pasture, there is no community of shared purpose, no body of rules, and no penalties for free-riders. It’s more accurate to call this scenario a tragedy of the market because the free market invites individuals to plunder the common wealth for their private gain with impunity. 

Let me add, this is the near-inevitable outcome when you talk about commons as resources. The framing of “commons as resources” indirectly accepts the premises of standard economics, which holds that the market and state are the only serious, responsible regimes of governance. Western property law is invoked, the state defers to capitalist markets, and we know how this story ends. Shared wealth can only be protected successful through private property rights or state regulation, according to Hardin and his legion of followers, and state regulation is usually seen as ineffectual and intrusive.

But in fact, institutions of social cooperation offer another path, as we can see throughout world history; in Elinor Ostrom’s scholarship; and in countless examples in contemporary life.

Evolutionary scientists confirm that cooperation is a key way that organisms improve their evolutionary fitness. Natural selection doesn’t work just at individual levels. Group selection or “multi-level selection” are powerful forces in evolution, as E.O. Wilson, David Sloan Wilson, Martin Nowak, and others argue persuasively. 

This analysis helps us see that relationality is a deep, animating force of commons and of life itself. We are not just atomistic individuals bouncing around in a vacuum called “society,” whose very existence Margaret Thatcher denied in her famous remark that “there is no such thing as society.” Symbiotic cooperation among organisms occurs even at the cellular level, often in subtle, nonobvious ways.

Complexity sciences, too, show that life arises through entangled relationships of interdependence. Biologist Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock of ‘Gaia hypothesis’ fame, showed that life arises through a process or ‘autopoiesis’ or ‘dependent origination.’ Read Merlin Sheldrake’s recent book Entangled Life for some amazing scientific accounts of how mushrooms and lichen and insects and trees and other plant life are all intimately interconnected as creative agents!

The point that I wish to stress is nicely stated by cultural historian Thomas Berry: “The universe is the communion of subjects, not a collection of objects.” This applies to the commons as well.

Scientific rationalism and economic thinking have trouble understanding this fact, however. They are too intent on objectifying life and seeing it in machine-like terms. In the words of ecophilosopher Andreas Weber, science and economics are “unwilling to acknowledge creative aliveness as an ontological foundation of reality.” Weber, a biologist, shows how life itself functions as a vast, complex commons. However, modern, Western categories of thought – which separate humanity from nature, and our minds from our bodies – can’t make sense of this reality.

I make this brief detour into evolutionary science and ontology because it’s important to understand why commons are so highly generative. It’s because they are alive. It’s because all living things are relational, symbiotic, and therefore generative. Life consists of networks of entangled interdependencies that produce what we need. 

Ah, but can modern human societies actually honor this fact – or is the market/state machine fated to control, extract, and monetize the gifts of life?

It is true that commons usually do not have the infrastructure or financing that markets and states enjoy. But commons do meet people’s needs in highly flexible, place-based, and humanly satisfying ways in cooperation with nature, and without the pathologies of extractive growth.

Now that the Internet is empowering small, disaggregated players in dramatic new ways, we can see the structural deficiencies of centralized systems. Large-scale industrial systems tend to have enormous fixed overhead costs, rigid designs for efficient mass production, and a commitment to efficiency over resilience. They are not respectful of place, pluralism, or human agency. 

Commons, by contrast, unconstrained by business models and market powers, are free to be flexible, creative, and open to new approaches from the street. In this regard, Dutch artist Thomas Lommée has offered a bit of prophecy that resonates with me: “The next big thing will be a lot of small things.”

Unfortunately, change that occurs in smaller, self-organized, and distributed contexts tend to be dismissed as too trivial, local, and inconsequential to matter. In climate debates, even progressives tend to say, But we don’t have time to develop these small-scale alternatives! Which always prompts me to wonder, So what have the top-down market/state institutions been doing to deal with climate change these past thirty years? Could it be that there are problems with the fundamental structures and belief-systems of the market/state?

While state power often expresses a nominal interest in the idea of commons, it often amounts to lip service, or a way to freshen up and re-brand the battered reputation of liberal democracy. (I might add that this tendency afflicts some progressive advocacy groups as well.)

Because the commoners that I know want real shifts of economic power. They want formal legal rights to steward their shared wealth, and affirmative rights to common. They want the kinds of state support – in legal regimes, finance, infrastructure, and official celebration – that investors and corporations have long take for granted.

Alas, when push comes to shove, when commoners make demands, it becomes clear that the state’s deeper allegiance is to growth and capitalism. The state may be sincere about protecting the commonweal, but its deep commitment to the market economy overrides action to support commoning and the ecological, social, intergenerational, and ethical value that flows from it.

#2. What Does Commoning Look Like?

This leads me to my second point, about commoning as a social system. It’s important to see the commons as a social system – as a set of relational dynamics that is generative – because this lets us move beyond market price as the default theory of value in modern life.

My coauthor Silke Helfrich and I -- when writing our book Free, Fair and Alive -- eventually realized that the very language and thought-categories of economics and politics are themselves a big problem. We came to see that the language of “resource management” and individual “rational choice” cannot express the types of value that we saw firsthand in countless real-life commons. Econo-speak does not convey the emotional richness, subtlety, or situational character of commons governance.

So we set out to describe the commons as a social system and how it creates (non-monetary) value. We took our cue less from economists than from anthropologists, sociologists, and cultural theorists. Instead of accepting the normative lens of modern, Western culture and the ontological commitments of economics – the half-truths about individualism, the fictions about “rationality” – we wanted to show that the commoning is about the deep relationality of everything.

We took pains to escape the language of methodological individualism and its ideas about direct cause-and-effect and objects having fixed, essential attributes. So Newtonian, so mechanical, so divorced from the ontology of life! 

Instead, we have tried to show how commoning is about fluid, always-evolving webs of social relations, like life itself. We want to show how commoning is the enactment of an open-ended process of emergence. We want to show how the subjectivity and the inner lives of people are part of what animates successful commons.

I delve into these metaphysical aspects of commoning because truly understanding commons governance requires this shift in worldview. Or more precisely, as Silke and I put it, understanding commons requires an OntoShift – a shift of ontological perspective. We need to understand the inner dynamics and relational logic of commons – which is to say, commons as a verb – commoning – rather than as a noun.  Commons as a social process, not a resource.

To theorize the commons in this new way, Silke and I identified the many recurrent patterns of commoning and divided them up into three spheres – Social Life, Provisioning, and Peer Governance. While we treat them separately, they are all tightly interconnected. We call the whole framework the Triad of Commoning.

We were inspired by the work of philosopher/architect Christopher Alexander, who devised a methodology for developing “pattern languages” based on actual social behaviors that occur historically and cross-culturally. Using an inductive method based on studying actual examples, Silke and I identified more than two dozen patterns of commoning. Not idealizations or abstractions, but careful generalizations based on successful commons we had witnessed

In liberal political theory, it is customary to separate production (or “the economy”) from governance (the state) – and to treat social life, otherwise known as “civil society,” as a cameo player off to the side. This is where commons governance really strikes off in new directions because commons blend production, governance, and social life into one integrated system.

I don’t have time to go through the many patterns that we identified, but let me give you a quick idea. Here are some of the patterns of commoning for the sphere of Peer Governance.

We had trouble with the connotations of “governance” as something that a group of people vested with power does to and for another group of people, perhaps with their participantion and consent, perhaps not.  But Peer Governance not governance that is done for people or to people. It is governance through people themselves.

Commoners see each other as peers with equal rights and duties to participate in the collective process of making decisions. They set boundaries for the commons and make and enforce rules. They have an aversion to centralized systems of power. They try to contribute in nonhierarchical ways.

One pattern of peer governance is Honor transparency in a sphere of trust.  Transparency cannot just be mandated; it can flourish only if people trust each other. Thus to honor real transparency in a commons, people must come to trust each other deeply, so that difficult, uncomfortable information can be shared.

Another pattern is Create semi-permeable membranes for commons. This allows commoners to interact with the larger world in careful, selective ways. They can absorb the energy and life and creative ideas of the larger world – but still protect their shared wealth and peer governance from appropriation and co-optation by outsiders, especially markets.

I don’t have time to go through all of the patterns here in detail, so I’ll just mention a few other patterns of Peer Governance. They include: Share knowledge generouslyAssure consent in decision making.  Rely on heterarchy. Relationalize property.

The patterns in Peer Governance and the two other spheres – Social Life and Provisioning -- reveal that commoning is a cross-sectoral social phenomena. It may be shaped by specific resources, but it is not defined and driven by them.

What unites commons across resource-categories their similar social dynamics. Commons governance helps to advance:

….a richer collective wisdom and a sense of consensual fairness

….distributed power, so that teams can work independently in modular ways.

….dense social relationships of trust that create stability and yet flexibility.

….rapid feedback loops that create better, fresher knowledge.

….overlapping systems and resilience, so that disruptions are not catastrophic and adaptation can occur more easily.

….and stewardship of value that is not priced and traded, thereby avoiding the habit of market economics to treat nature, care work, gift economies, and social cooperation as limitless and free.

Unlike economic theory, which sees human beings as rational materialists who want to maximize their material wealth, commons governance allows for a more spacious field of human development. In a commons, people have greater opportunities to develop a richer amplitude of human talents, ethical commitments, and relationships than economic theory allows. Seemingly improbable organizational forms such as open source communities, Wikipedia, local land stewardship, committed care work, and other cooperative possibilities are revealed entirely practical.

The “social theory of commoning” that I’ve sketched here has one wild card, however:  What role will state power play? So let me turn now to the third issue of commons governance.

#3. State Power and Commoning

As commons grow in size and influence, they often begin to become vehicles of political power and moral authority in their own right. This often makes politicians and state power nervous. Because commons might begin to erode consumer demand and siphon away “market share,” just as Linux undercut Microsoft twenty years ago, leading to complaints that open source software is communistic.

Successful commons also begin to attract more loyalty and trust than the state, and indirectly become a political force. So the state often frowns upon the work of commons. At the behest of certain industrial sectors, the state may even criminalize commoning, as we have seen for digital sharing and seed-sharing. (Recall that women in the Middle Ages who insisted upon using their former common lands after they were enclosed, were often branded witches and burned!)

Suffice it to say, from the perspective of state officials, there is so much more upside in working closely with well-heeled capitalists and the familiar interfaces that the state and capitalists have negotiated over generations.  

The problem here is not just about money and power. Modern bureaucracy has formal, rigid, legalistic way of doing things. Its mindsets and methods do not easily accommodate the vernacular practices and norms of commoning. States want to regularize and control things in top-down, centralized ways. As political scientist James C. Scott has written, “The utopian, immanent, and continually frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality behind it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observation.”

The state as a bureaucratic apparatus has historically not really wanted to support commons, and even if it did, it does not have readily available ways to do so. Certainly it has not gone out of its way to provide legal, financial, or technical support.

A key question for our times, then, is Why should state power support commons? And How can it do this in constructive ways?

I believe the state must eventually come to terms with the surging interest and social reality of commoning. The Commonsverse today is a burgeoning space. Think open source software communities, platform cooperatives, open access publishing, citizen-science, and myriad forms of digital collaboration. Think agroecology, community land trusts, community-supported agriculture, and relocalization movements.

Think of the many innovative urban commons from regional mesh networks like Guifi.net in Catalonia, to co-cities projects in many European cities, to timebanks, to the expanding number of cities that are pursuing Doughnut Economics. Think local currencies, crowdfunding, crowdequity, and other forms of relationalized finance. 

These countless commons are doing significant work outside of the market/state system – a point illustrated by the famous iceberg image used by feminist economists and the community economies research network. The formal economy is just the very small tip of a very large iceberg of nonmarket provisioning. For states that are hard-pressed to meet their citizens’ needs – governments that don’t have the budgets, the political support to expand services, the bureaucratic capabilities – the Commonsverse is a potentially significant ally.

Partnerships with commoners can not only meet a lot of urgent human needs, they can help reconstruct social connections and community.  State support for commoning can help nourish a sense of belonging and responsibility linked to real entitlements. It can strengthen a sense of social agency and identity at a time of great social anxiety and disempowerment. And let’s not forget, commons can help us step away from the extractivist practices, competition, and consumerism of the capitalist economy. 

Of course, entering into commons/public partnerships at the national level -- where ideological considerations tend to drive politics – may be too ambitious for now. But at municipal levels, there is greater room for open experimentation driven by practical needs and working personal relationships among people. I find it immensely gratifying to see all sorts of commons-oriented innovation in cities like Barcelona, Amsterdam, Ghent, Lille, Naples and Milan and other Italian cities; and Seoul, Korea; among others. There is an explosion of experimentation going on in such cities….urban land ytrusts…citizen crowdsourcing…municipal data commons….

Projects like U!REKA do a great deal to help cross-fertilize our knowledge and deepen our understanding about the possibilities for state/commons partnerships. There are arguably some durable new patterns of urban commoning being born right now.

But I do not think that there are any magic templates to be found. What is really needed are open minds and social commitments to explore fresh approaches. Which is why the subtitle of this talk is “Find Answers by Living the Questions.” This is a frontier. The answers have to be imagined and developed. They will be built on relationships of trust and a spirit of experimentation.

The good news is that there is a rich constellation of commons to work with. The sobering news is that developing stable and resilient forms of commons governance will take time, hard work, imagination, negotiation, conflict, and persistence. Despite that, I believe commoning remains one of the more promising avenues that we have for addressing the profound structural challenges of contemporary politics, economics, and culture.  Thank you.

Reinventing Commons Governance in Modern Times

I gave the following remarks about commons governance on September 27 as part of the U!REKA Lab Lecture Series. U!REKA -- which stands for Urban Research and Education Knowledge Alliance -- is a consortium of eight European universities that studies urban commons. The subtitle of my talk was "Find Answers by Living the Questions." 

Thank you, Sandra Bos and the U!REKA Lab, for inviting me to share my ideas about commons governance with you today. It is a great privilege and pleasure.

As I began to gather my thoughts on this topic, I realized that the framing needed to expand. Yes, we must better understand commons governance and the commons more generally. But we must situate this discussion within the larger market/state system that dominates our societies.

This is necessary because commons and the market/state system are so deeply intertwined – even if their co-entanglement is not usually acknowledged. The two systems each represent very different ways of knowing, acting, and being. The struggles between the sovereign and commoners have a long history! They have been intimately conjoined, at least since the 13th Century, when King John signed the Magna Carta and Charter of the Forest.

The sovereign today is not a monarch, but the market/state – a system of governance that is an alliance between market and state institutions. Each has its own realm of authority -- production and governance, respectively – but they both share a deep utopian commitment to endless market growth and “progress.” Today, however, in the face of climate collapse and cascading ecological crises, respectable opinion is slowly come to realize that this vision may itself be a problem. Indeed, this may account for notional mainstream interest in the commons as a source of new ideas.

One stinging lesson that we are learning from the pandemic and climate collapse is that states and markets are not really on top of the situation. They can’t restrain capitalist appetites or provide existential security. I concede that this may be seen as an ideological conclusion, but it is equally a factual observation about the structural limitations of centralized, formalistic, bureaucratic systems. Totalistic regimes of control have trouble managing distributed complexity and change that arises from below.

Allow me to also make a blunt philosophical judgment: The market/state’s foundational commitments to private property, individualism, capital accumulation, and technology represent a kind of political and cultural lock-down. Certain departures from these ideas are simply taboo. Add to this the unexamined modern belief that humanity stands apart from natural systems, and that individualism trumps collective action, and it becomes clear that our current system offers very little space to imagine creative paths forward.

Which may help explain why young people are so despairing about the future. It also explains why so many ordinary people are turning to commons in these difficult times. Commoning is a means of survival. Informal cooperation, and mutual aid can meet needs that the market and state can’t or aren’t providing during the pandemic.

Yet strangely, commoning is often not seen as a “real system.” It is patronized as nice and well-meaning, but waved aside as too informal, improvised, and disorganized to be taken seriously as an institutional form. After all, governance and provisioning in commons do not rely on the formal rules or hierarchical structures. Power is decentralized and leadership diffused.

The polite dismissal of commons is a serious misjudgment, I believe, because the market/state system – if it is to navigate the civilizational turbulence ahead -- will need to forge some explicit, practical understandings with commoners. Their goodwill, creativity, and power to generate social legitimacy for state action will be indispensable. The market/state system itself already relies on social cooperation, trust, and commoning more than it realizes. Why not leverage this reality in more explicit ways?

In any case, this much is true: If commoning is to develop, mature, and succeed as a flourishing form of governance, it will have to work out a new modus vivendi with the market/state system.  So we stand at the threshold of a fascinating new conversation between commoners and the market/state system.

As my contribution to this dialogue, I’d like to explore three primary points:

First -- that commons are not resources, as conventional economics and politics seem to think. They are self-organized social systems. Commons are highly generative precisely because they are living social organisms entangled within the larger web of life.

My second point is that the dynamics of commoning remain poorly understood because there are so many erroneous ideas ascribed to it. So today I’d like to try to clarify some realities about commoning as a durable, proven social system.

And finally, my third point: The fate of the commons as a vehicle for social emancipation will depend upon negotiating and creating new configurations of state power.  We will need innovations in law, bureaucracy, and politics to safeguard and support commoning – and state power will need to align more closely with commoners if it hopes to neutralize the fierce, nihilistic pathologies of contemporary capitalism and the reactionary nationalism associated with nation-states. We absolutely need to understand commons governance on its own terms – but we must situate this discussion in a larger, more complicated context.

#1. Commons as a Social System, Not a Resource

Let’s first deal with Point #1, the persistent habit of treating the commons as unowned resources open to all. Economists and politicians habitually do this when they refer to land, the oceans, outer space, and the Internet as commons. But these resources are not commons. They are potentially shareable resources that currently lack a functional governance regime. There is no community stewardship on behalf of everyone. Right now, such resources are mostly free for the taking.

In his famous tragedy of the commons essay, Garrett Hardin called this scenario the “tragedy of the commons” because finite resources are vulnerable to overuse and ruination. But in reality, Hardin was not describing a commons. In his parable of an imaginary pasture, there is no community of shared purpose, no body of rules, and no penalties for free-riders. It’s more accurate to call this scenario a tragedy of the market because the free market invites individuals to plunder the common wealth for their private gain with impunity. 

Let me add, this is the near-inevitable outcome when you talk about commons as resources. The framing of “commons as resources” indirectly accepts the premises of standard economics, which holds that the market and state are the only serious, responsible regimes of governance. Western property law is invoked, the state defers to capitalist markets, and we know how this story ends. Shared wealth can only be protected successful through private property rights or state regulation, according to Hardin and his legion of followers, and state regulation is usually seen as ineffectual and intrusive.

But in fact, institutions of social cooperation offer another path, as we can see throughout world history; in Elinor Ostrom’s scholarship; and in countless examples in contemporary life.

Evolutionary scientists confirm that cooperation is a key way that organisms improve their evolutionary fitness. Natural selection doesn’t work just at individual levels. Group selection or “multi-level selection” are powerful forces in evolution, as E.O. Wilson, David Sloan Wilson, Martin Nowak, and others argue persuasively. 

This analysis helps us see that relationality is a deep, animating force of commons and of life itself. We are not just atomistic individuals bouncing around in a vacuum called “society,” whose very existence Margaret Thatcher denied in her famous remark that “there is no such thing as society.” Symbiotic cooperation among organisms occurs even at the cellular level, often in subtle, nonobvious ways.

Complexity sciences, too, show that life arises through entangled relationships of interdependence. Biologist Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock of ‘Gaia hypothesis’ fame, showed that life arises through a process or ‘autopoiesis’ or ‘dependent origination.’ Read Merlin Sheldrake’s recent book Entangled Life for some amazing scientific accounts of how mushrooms and lichen and insects and trees and other plant life are all intimately interconnected as creative agents!

The point that I wish to stress is nicely stated by cultural historian Thomas Berry: “The universe is the communion of subjects, not a collection of objects.” This applies to the commons as well.

Scientific rationalism and economic thinking have trouble understanding this fact, however. They are too intent on objectifying life and seeing it in machine-like terms. In the words of ecophilosopher Andreas Weber, science and economics are “unwilling to acknowledge creative aliveness as an ontological foundation of reality.” Weber, a biologist, shows how life itself functions as a vast, complex commons. However, modern, Western categories of thought – which separate humanity from nature, and our minds from our bodies – can’t make sense of this reality.

I make this brief detour into evolutionary science and ontology because it’s important to understand why commons are so highly generative. It’s because they are alive. It’s because all living things are relational, symbiotic, and therefore generative. Life consists of networks of entangled interdependencies that produce what we need. 

Ah, but can modern human societies actually honor this fact – or is the market/state machine fated to control, extract, and monetize the gifts of life?

It is true that commons usually do not have the infrastructure or financing that markets and states enjoy. But commons do meet people’s needs in highly flexible, place-based, and humanly satisfying ways in cooperation with nature, and without the pathologies of extractive growth.

Now that the Internet is empowering small, disaggregated players in dramatic new ways, we can see the structural deficiencies of centralized systems. Large-scale industrial systems tend to have enormous fixed overhead costs, rigid designs for efficient mass production, and a commitment to efficiency over resilience. They are not respectful of place, pluralism, or human agency. 

Commons, by contrast, unconstrained by business models and market powers, are free to be flexible, creative, and open to new approaches from the street. In this regard, Dutch artist Thomas Lommée has offered a bit of prophecy that resonates with me: “The next big thing will be a lot of small things.”

Unfortunately, change that occurs in smaller, self-organized, and distributed contexts tend to be dismissed as too trivial, local, and inconsequential to matter. In climate debates, even progressives tend to say, But we don’t have time to develop these small-scale alternatives! Which always prompts me to wonder, So what have the top-down market/state institutions been doing to deal with climate change these past thirty years? Could it be that there are problems with the fundamental structures and belief-systems of the market/state?

While state power often expresses a nominal interest in the idea of commons, it often amounts to lip service, or a way to freshen up and re-brand the battered reputation of liberal democracy. (I might add that this tendency afflicts some progressive advocacy groups as well.)

Because the commoners that I know want real shifts of economic power. They want formal legal rights to steward their shared wealth, and affirmative rights to common. They want the kinds of state support – in legal regimes, finance, infrastructure, and official celebration – that investors and corporations have long take for granted.

Alas, when push comes to shove, when commoners make demands, it becomes clear that the state’s deeper allegiance is to growth and capitalism. The state may be sincere about protecting the commonweal, but its deep commitment to the market economy overrides action to support commoning and the ecological, social, intergenerational, and ethical value that flows from it.

#2. What Does Commoning Look Like?

This leads me to my second point, about commoning as a social system. It’s important to see the commons as a social system – as a set of relational dynamics that is generative – because this lets us move beyond market price as the default theory of value in modern life.

My coauthor Silke Helfrich and I -- when writing our book Free, Fair and Alive -- eventually realized that the very language and thought-categories of economics and politics are themselves a big problem. We came to see that the language of “resource management” and individual “rational choice” cannot express the types of value that we saw firsthand in countless real-life commons. Econo-speak does not convey the emotional richness, subtlety, or situational character of commons governance.

So we set out to describe the commons as a social system and how it creates (non-monetary) value. We took our cue less from economists than from anthropologists, sociologists, and cultural theorists. Instead of accepting the normative lens of modern, Western culture and the ontological commitments of economics – the half-truths about individualism, the fictions about “rationality” – we wanted to show that the commoning is about the deep relationality of everything.

We took pains to escape the language of methodological individualism and its ideas about direct cause-and-effect and objects having fixed, essential attributes. So Newtonian, so mechanical, so divorced from the ontology of life! 

Instead, we have tried to show how commoning is about fluid, always-evolving webs of social relations, like life itself. We want to show how commoning is the enactment of an open-ended process of emergence. We want to show how the subjectivity and the inner lives of people are part of what animates successful commons.

I delve into these metaphysical aspects of commoning because truly understanding commons governance requires this shift in worldview. Or more precisely, as Silke and I put it, understanding commons requires an OntoShift – a shift of ontological perspective. We need to understand the inner dynamics and relational logic of commons – which is to say, commons as a verb – commoning – rather than as a noun.  Commons as a social process, not a resource.

To theorize the commons in this new way, Silke and I identified the many recurrent patterns of commoning and divided them up into three spheres – Social Life, Provisioning, and Peer Governance. While we treat them separately, they are all tightly interconnected. We call the whole framework the Triad of Commoning.

We were inspired by the work of philosopher/architect Christopher Alexander, who devised a methodology for developing “pattern languages” based on actual social behaviors that occur historically and cross-culturally. Using an inductive method based on studying actual examples, Silke and I identified more than two dozen patterns of commoning. Not idealizations or abstractions, but careful generalizations based on successful commons we had witnessed

In liberal political theory, it is customary to separate production (or “the economy”) from governance (the state) – and to treat social life, otherwise known as “civil society,” as a cameo player off to the side. This is where commons governance really strikes off in new directions because commons blend production, governance, and social life into one integrated system.

I don’t have time to go through the many patterns that we identified, but let me give you a quick idea. Here are some of the patterns of commoning for the sphere of Peer Governance.

We had trouble with the connotations of “governance” as something that a group of people vested with power does to and for another group of people, perhaps with their participantion and consent, perhaps not.  But Peer Governance not governance that is done for people or to people. It is governance through people themselves.

Commoners see each other as peers with equal rights and duties to participate in the collective process of making decisions. They set boundaries for the commons and make and enforce rules. They have an aversion to centralized systems of power. They try to contribute in nonhierarchical ways.

One pattern of peer governance is Honor transparency in a sphere of trust.  Transparency cannot just be mandated; it can flourish only if people trust each other. Thus to honor real transparency in a commons, people must come to trust each other deeply, so that difficult, uncomfortable information can be shared.

Another pattern is Create semi-permeable membranes for commons. This allows commoners to interact with the larger world in careful, selective ways. They can absorb the energy and life and creative ideas of the larger world – but still protect their shared wealth and peer governance from appropriation and co-optation by outsiders, especially markets.

I don’t have time to go through all of the patterns here in detail, so I’ll just mention a few other patterns of Peer Governance. They include: Share knowledge generouslyAssure consent in decision making.  Rely on heterarchy. Relationalize property.

The patterns in Peer Governance and the two other spheres – Social Life and Provisioning -- reveal that commoning is a cross-sectoral social phenomena. It may be shaped by specific resources, but it is not defined and driven by them.

What unites commons across resource-categories their similar social dynamics. Commons governance helps to advance:

….a richer collective wisdom and a sense of consensual fairness

….distributed power, so that teams can work independently in modular ways.

….dense social relationships of trust that create stability and yet flexibility.

….rapid feedback loops that create better, fresher knowledge.

….overlapping systems and resilience, so that disruptions are not catastrophic and adaptation can occur more easily.

….and stewardship of value that is not priced and traded, thereby avoiding the habit of market economics to treat nature, care work, gift economies, and social cooperation as limitless and free.

Unlike economic theory, which sees human beings as rational materialists who want to maximize their material wealth, commons governance allows for a more spacious field of human development. In a commons, people have greater opportunities to develop a richer amplitude of human talents, ethical commitments, and relationships than economic theory allows. Seemingly improbable organizational forms such as open source communities, Wikipedia, local land stewardship, committed care work, and other cooperative possibilities are revealed entirely practical.

The “social theory of commoning” that I’ve sketched here has one wild card, however:  What role will state power play? So let me turn now to the third issue of commons governance.

#3. State Power and Commoning

As commons grow in size and influence, they often begin to become vehicles of political power and moral authority in their own right. This often makes politicians and state power nervous. Because commons might begin to erode consumer demand and siphon away “market share,” just as Linux undercut Microsoft twenty years ago, leading to complaints that open source software is communistic.

Successful commons also begin to attract more loyalty and trust than the state, and indirectly become a political force. So the state often frowns upon the work of commons. At the behest of certain industrial sectors, the state may even criminalize commoning, as we have seen for digital sharing and seed-sharing. (Recall that women in the Middle Ages who insisted upon using their former common lands after they were enclosed, were often branded witches and burned!)

Suffice it to say, from the perspective of state officials, there is so much more upside in working closely with well-heeled capitalists and the familiar interfaces that the state and capitalists have negotiated over generations.  

The problem here is not just about money and power. Modern bureaucracy has formal, rigid, legalistic way of doing things. Its mindsets and methods do not easily accommodate the vernacular practices and norms of commoning. States want to regularize and control things in top-down, centralized ways. As political scientist James C. Scott has written, “The utopian, immanent, and continually frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality behind it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observation.”

The state as a bureaucratic apparatus has historically not really wanted to support commons, and even if it did, it does not have readily available ways to do so. Certainly it has not gone out of its way to provide legal, financial, or technical support.

A key question for our times, then, is Why should state power support commons? And How can it do this in constructive ways?

I believe the state must eventually come to terms with the surging interest and social reality of commoning. The Commonsverse today is a burgeoning space. Think open source software communities, platform cooperatives, open access publishing, citizen-science, and myriad forms of digital collaboration. Think agroecology, community land trusts, community-supported agriculture, and relocalization movements.

Think of the many innovative urban commons from regional mesh networks like Guifi.net in Catalonia, to co-cities projects in many European cities, to timebanks, to the expanding number of cities that are pursuing Doughnut Economics. Think local currencies, crowdfunding, crowdequity, and other forms of relationalized finance. 

These countless commons are doing significant work outside of the market/state system – a point illustrated by the famous iceberg image used by feminist economists and the community economies research network. The formal economy is just the very small tip of a very large iceberg of nonmarket provisioning. For states that are hard-pressed to meet their citizens’ needs – governments that don’t have the budgets, the political support to expand services, the bureaucratic capabilities – the Commonsverse is a potentially significant ally.

Partnerships with commoners can not only meet a lot of urgent human needs, they can help reconstruct social connections and community.  State support for commoning can help nourish a sense of belonging and responsibility linked to real entitlements. It can strengthen a sense of social agency and identity at a time of great social anxiety and disempowerment. And let’s not forget, commons can help us step away from the extractivist practices, competition, and consumerism of the capitalist economy. 

Of course, entering into commons/public partnerships at the national level -- where ideological considerations tend to drive politics – may be too ambitious for now. But at municipal levels, there is greater room for open experimentation driven by practical needs and working personal relationships among people. I find it immensely gratifying to see all sorts of commons-oriented innovation in cities like Barcelona, Amsterdam, Ghent, Lille, Naples and Milan and other Italian cities; and Seoul, Korea; among others. There is an explosion of experimentation going on in such cities….urban land ytrusts…citizen crowdsourcing…municipal data commons….

Projects like U!REKA do a great deal to help cross-fertilize our knowledge and deepen our understanding about the possibilities for state/commons partnerships. There are arguably some durable new patterns of urban commoning being born right now.

But I do not think that there are any magic templates to be found. What is really needed are open minds and social commitments to explore fresh approaches. Which is why the subtitle of this talk is “Find Answers by Living the Questions.” This is a frontier. The answers have to be imagined and developed. They will be built on relationships of trust and a spirit of experimentation.

The good news is that there is a rich constellation of commons to work with. The sobering news is that developing stable and resilient forms of commons governance will take time, hard work, imagination, negotiation, conflict, and persistence. Despite that, I believe commoning remains one of the more promising avenues that we have for addressing the profound structural challenges of contemporary politics, economics, and culture.  Thank you.

the social class inversion as a threat to democracy

It is important for left and center-left political parties to rely on lower-income voters, who–nowadays–are also people with less educational attainment. Then the left’s political leadership will be accountable to disadvantaged people. Since they identify with the left, they will try to serve their core voters by promising more funds and more regulation. I generally favor such policies, but even if you do not, you should acknowledge that taxing, spending, and regulating are compatible with a constitutional democracy. If you want to oppose the left, you can vote for the right.

It is equally important for center-right parties to depend on people with higher incomes (which generally means more education), because then they will have incentives to advocate lower taxes and less regulation. I tend to oppose such policies, but I would acknowledge–and urge others on the left to accept–that trying to shrink the size of government is compatible with constitutional democracy. People who have reasons to shrink government need a political outlet. Again, the way to oppose their position is to vote for the other side. This debate is a good one.

As long as the parties split the electorate this way, they will have incentives to act reasonably on matters outside their core interests. A pro-business party rooted in the upper stratum of society can easily support civil liberties and a safety net. A left party dependent on working class voters will want to protect economic growth. Both should defend the basic constitutional order.

Unfortunately, this neat arrangement has been scrambled in many developed, democratic countries. Considerable numbers of highly educated people vote left, even forming the base of the center-left parties, while many working-class people have shifted to the right. Democrats now represent the 17 richest congressional districts and most of the richest 50. In the aggregate, Democratic districts are wealthier than Republican ones. (Race is certainly relevant in the USA, and I will say more about that later.)

Mark Muro and Jacob Whiton, Brookings

This situation is dangerous because of the incentives it creates. A center-left party that relies on highly educated people will want to preserve the society’s most advantaged institutions: its most dynamic industries, thriving communities, and elite universities. Since it’s on the left, it won’t explicitly defend inequality, but it won’t really undermine it, either. It will prefer symbolic gestures of inclusion and equity that don’t shake the social foundations. Basically, advantaged individuals will assume that they can retain their own nice neighborhoods, good schools, and satisfying jobs while allowing some newcomers to join them. If such voters represent the main force on the left, social transformation becomes impossible.

Nevertheless, the center-left party will offer the least-bad option for people of color, since diversity and inclusion are better than outright exclusion. Thus Biden drew 70% of voters of color along with a majority of college-educated white voters.

National Exit Polls 2020 (CNN)

For their part, right parties that are based in working-class, low-income communities will have incentives to turn ethno-nationalist, xenophobic, and authoritarian. Being on the right, they cannot embrace social democracy. They could offer libertarian alternatives: getting the state off people’s backs. Unlike authoritarianism, libertarianism is compatible with constitutional democracy. However, surveys never show much support for truly libertarian policies–and less so today, after the neoliberal revolution has played out. Ethno-nationalism has much wider support.

When the parties invert in this way, the left tends to become moderate–excessively so, in my view–but it also generates a critical flank. Right now, the Democrats’ critical flank is led by younger politicians of color who represent urban communities with many lower-income voters of color. They have incentives, as well as genuine commitments, that anchor them on the left. But they are outnumbered within their own party by politicians who represent and reflect high-income communities. If we had a multi-party system, these factions would split and then negotiate about whether to form a coalition in Congress. In our duopoly, the strife occurs within the party and is constrained by difficult calculations.

Meanwhile, the Republicans have strong and palpable incentives to move in a racist and authoritarian direction, jettisoning their libertarian impulses. Debate is less evident on their side of the aisle, since Trump supporters truly dominate the GOP’s elected ranks. Only a significant electoral defeat can re-empower the traditional conservatives, and that seems unlikely.

A similar inversion has been evident in several other countries, including Germany, where the Social Democrats (SPD) now attract highly educated knowledge-workers, while many blue-collar workers have moved right. (I graphed some historical trends here.) One election does not make a trend, but the results from the recent German election are somewhat encouraging. The SPD performed best among people with lower education: the working class. That is how a social-democratic party should perform. The Greens drew almost entirely from the top educational stratum. A red/green coalition would combine working class voters with the liberal intelligentsia, but with the working class in control because of their larger numbers. That coalition would resemble the Democrats if the Progressive Caucus were three times as big.

From DW.com

On the other hand, the hard right (AfD) is disproportionately working class, as is the center right (CDU). Although I do not expect the CDU and AfD to form a coalition in the near future, the temptation is real.

It will not be easy to get out of this situation. The Democrats could offer more tangible benefits to working class people of all races and ethnicities. One problem: policies that I would regard as beneficial are not always seen as such, for a variety of reasons. Besides, there is always a loose connection between policy and public opinion, given the genuine difficulty of discerning the effects of policies plus the low level of attention that most people give to public affairs.

To make matters even harder, Democrats are a loose group of entrepreneurial politicians who have their own constituencies–disproportionately wealthy ones. This means that Democratic leaders are not the best group to reach out to working-class voters, nor are their core supporters likely to support really bold policies. That is why I have been interested in tactics like investing in the Appalachian cities, whose mayors are Democrats.

See also: what does the European Green surge mean?; and why the white working class must organize

Peter Barnes: Protect Commons Assets through ‘Universal Property’

Can property law be used to reclaim our common wealth and transform capitalism in the process? Peter Barnes, a socially minded entrepreneur and commoner, believes it can. He has just published a brilliant new book, Ours: The Case for Universal Property that explains how a new class of property rights and trusts can help protect common assets and generate revenues for everyone in the process.  You can hear Barnes explain his ideas in my latest podcast episode (#19) of Frontiers of Commoning.Frontiers of Commoning. 

The book Ours amounts to a capstone of twenty years of Peter’s thinking – and I should know: Peter and I were close colleagues twenty years ago in the start up of the Tomales Bay Institute, later renamed On the Commons. Together with journalist and policy expert Jonathan Rowe, we set out to develop a new, activist-minded discourse about the commons. From different perspectives, each of us shared a deep concern about reckless enclosures of shared wealth and sought to develop novel ways to protect the commons.

Peter’s inquiries into this topic had begun years earlier with research into protecting land. In 2001, he took a new direction with his book Who Owns the Sky?, which offered one of the most serious and coherent early proposals for dealing with climate change. He proposed the Sky Trust, a new nongovernmental institution to set limits on carbon emissions and charge polluters for the right to emit carbon into the atmosphere.

The Sky Trust would manage the funds collected, which in turn would generate dividends to be paid to every citizen equally. The premise is that we collectively own the atmosphere as a commons, and so should have some reliable means to protect it and benefit from it. Under Barnes’ elegant proposal, market forces would deter carbon emissions (by making  polluters pay) while directing those revenues to all citizens. This would both help reduce inequality and incentivize lower carbon usage. 

In later books -- Capitalism 3.0 (2006) and With Liberty and Dividends for All (2014) – Barnes further developed this idea of stakeholder trusts for a wide variety of common assets. Again, the model was to use charge rent to limit the use of scarce common assets, and then use that pool of money to pay dividends to everyone.

Barnes’ ideas later gained some traction in Congress as “cap-and-dividend” legislation, in part because they had the virtue of being specific, practical, and fostering greater equality. (The Sky Trust would provide a predistribution of benefits from common assets owned by everyone, rather than rely on redistribution by the welfare state, which is routinely criticized by free-market defenders.) Hillary Clinton actually nearly embraced the stakeholder trust idea during her 2016 presidential campaign, before eventually rejecting it.

Now, in Barnes’ latest book, Ours, he takes his analysis to a richer, more developed level. He argues for inventing a broad new class of property rights known as “universal property.” Its premise is that most of today’s wealth is co-inherited from nature and past human efforts, not individually earned.

Why should politically connected corporations and lucky individuals reap the lion's share of benefits from public lands, watersheds and the atmosphere? Why should all of us pay for civic infrastructures like our financial and communications systems even though most of the benefits are privately captured?

If some of this wealth were placed in a trust for all citizens and future generations, it would introduce a new set of institutions that could tame two serious structural flaws in contemporary capitalism – its destruction of nature and concentration of wealth among the few. The lever for this shift would be a new class of universal property rights for common assets such as the atmosphere and ecosystems, for example, which are not protected by property rights. As a result (along with government inaction), industries are able to over-exploit them as “free” resources, with little or no economic penalty. 

Universal property aims to correct this problem by making businesses respect nature’s limits and pay for its resources, while generating new flows of non-labor income for all citizens. You can listen to my podcast interview with Peter Barnes here.

Peter Barnes: Protect Commons Assets through ‘Universal Property’

Can property law be used to reclaim our common wealth and transform capitalism in the process? Peter Barnes, a socially minded entrepreneur and commoner, believes it can. He has just published a brilliant new book, Ours: The Case for Universal Property that explains how a new class of property rights and trusts can help protect common assets and generate revenues for everyone in the process.  You can hear Barnes explain his ideas in my latest podcast episode (#19) of Frontiers of Commoning.Frontiers of Commoning. 

The book Ours amounts to a capstone of twenty years of Peter’s thinking – and I should know: Peter and I were close colleagues twenty years ago in the start up of the Tomales Bay Institute, later renamed On the Commons. Together with journalist and policy expert Jonathan Rowe, we set out to develop a new, activist-minded discourse about the commons. From different perspectives, each of us shared a deep concern about reckless enclosures of shared wealth and sought to develop novel ways to protect the commons.

Peter’s inquiries into this topic had begun years earlier with research into protecting land. In 2001, he took a new direction with his book Who Owns the Sky?, which offered one of the most serious and coherent early proposals for dealing with climate change. He proposed the Sky Trust, a new nongovernmental institution to set limits on carbon emissions and charge polluters for the right to emit carbon into the atmosphere.

The Sky Trust would manage the funds collected, which in turn would generate dividends to be paid to every citizen equally. The premise is that we collectively own the atmosphere as a commons, and so should have some reliable means to protect it and benefit from it. Under Barnes’ elegant proposal, market forces would deter carbon emissions (by making  polluters pay) while directing those revenues to all citizens. This would both help reduce inequality and incentivize lower carbon usage. 

In later books -- Capitalism 3.0 (2006) and With Liberty and Dividends for All (2014) – Barnes further developed this idea of stakeholder trusts for a wide variety of common assets. Again, the model was to use charge rent to limit the use of scarce common assets, and then use that pool of money to pay dividends to everyone.

Barnes’ ideas later gained some traction in Congress as “cap-and-dividend” legislation, in part because they had the virtue of being specific, practical, and fostering greater equality. (The Sky Trust would provide a predistribution of benefits from common assets owned by everyone, rather than rely on redistribution by the welfare state, which is routinely criticized by free-market defenders.) Hillary Clinton actually nearly embraced the stakeholder trust idea during her 2016 presidential campaign, before eventually rejecting it.

Now, in Barnes’ latest book, Ours, he takes his analysis to a richer, more developed level. He argues for inventing a broad new class of property rights known as “universal property.” Its premise is that most of today’s wealth is co-inherited from nature and past human efforts, not individually earned.

Why should politically connected corporations and lucky individuals reap the lion's share of benefits from public lands, watersheds and the atmosphere? Why should all of us pay for civic infrastructures like our financial and communications systems even though most of the benefits are privately captured?

If some of this wealth were placed in a trust for all citizens and future generations, it would introduce a new set of institutions that could tame two serious structural flaws in contemporary capitalism – its destruction of nature and concentration of wealth among the few. The lever for this shift would be a new class of universal property rights for common assets such as the atmosphere and ecosystems, for example, which are not protected by property rights. As a result (along with government inaction), industries are able to over-exploit them as “free” resources, with little or no economic penalty. 

Universal property aims to correct this problem by making businesses respect nature’s limits and pay for its resources, while generating new flows of non-labor income for all citizens. You can listen to my podcast interview with Peter Barnes here.

The Lou Frey Institute/FJCC Advisory Council of Educators is looking to launch!

As an organization, the Lou Frey Institute and FJCC want to ensure that we are supporting our teachers and the broader civic education community to the best of our ability. In pursuit of this, we are launching a new advisory council of Florida middle school civics educators! This group would provide us with guidance and feedback on our work, and also provide experts that we can turn to to support projects and activities we are working on.

We are seeking about 30 Florida middle school civics teachers, with a variety of experience, that will provide us with demographic and regional diversity and ensure that we putting out the best resources for civic education that we can. Are you interested? Please complete the application. We would love for you to be a part! Questions? Email Steve at any time!

Help the Lou Frey Institute/FJCC support you! Complete our survey!

Good afternoon, friends. Many of you are familiar with our resources at Civics360 and Florida Citizen. And it is those latter resources we would like to ask you to help us with today. As we start our revision work to align our materials to the upcoming 2023-2024 K-12 civics benchmarks, we would be grateful for your feedback on our lesson plans and related materials.

It should only take a few minutes, and even if you aren’t a Florida teacher, we want your feedback if you use our lesson plans. You can complete the survey/feedback form here. Thanks so much for taking the time to help us improve!

the progress of science

My colleagues and I in Tisch College’s small but mighty Civic Science program recently read and discussed these three works together:

  • Arendt, Hannah. “Man’s Conquest of Space.” The American Scholar (1963): 527-540.
  • Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
  • Polanyi, Michael. 1962. “The Republic of Science.” Minerva 1 (1): 54-73.

Polanyi is interested in how scientists coordinate. A “multitude of scientists, each of whom is competent to assess only a tiny fragment of current scientific work,” must collectively decide what to study next, which methods to use, what findings to publish and cite, and what the results mean. You become a scientist by joining a “network of mutual appreciation extending far beyond [your] own horizon.” This network is governed by the community of science through such means as blind peer-review and citation. These tools play the same role as prices in a market: they communicate information about what is valued without resort to a central authority, which would lack sufficient knowledge and would be untrustworthy.

Science is “an association of independent initiatives, combined towards an indeterminate achievement. It is disciplined and motivated by serving a traditional authority, but this authority is dynamic: its continued existence depends on its constant self-renewal through the originality of its followers.” Science is not exactly goal-directed, because no one knows what it will discover. But it is value-driven, because the “explorers strive toward a hidden reality, for the sake of intellectual satisfaction.”

Polanyi developed the idea of “spontaneous order,” which Hayek used to advocate for minimally regulated markets. But Polanyi distinguished himself from classical liberalism. “It appears, at first sight, that I have assimilated the pursuit of science to the market. But the emphasis should be in the opposite direction. The self-coordination of independent scientists embodies principle which is reduced to the mechanism of the market when applied to the production and distribution of material goods.” In other words, science is better than a market because the motives of all the independent but coordinated decision makers are superior to those of buyers and sellers.

Polanyi paints a comfortable picture of constant progress–the steady accumulation of knowledge. In contrast, Kuhn focuses on scientific “revolutions.” He observes that all the scientists working at a given time tend to share one overall “paradigm,” composed not only of foundational beliefs but also of methods and instruments. These paradigms “shift” occasionally when the current one ceases to explain the data. Kuhn introduces a modest kind of relativism by suggesting that scientists at any given time see the world through, or with, a paradigm that will later become obsolete. Yet nature or reality plays a substantial role in changing our paradigms. It is because the earth really moves around the sun that the Ptolemaic system falls to the Copernican system once scientists have obtained enough data to shake the former view.

Both of these theories are progressive and take an essentially benign view of science. They seek to explain the apparent fact that science is successful. Arendt’s stance is very different. She notes that “physicists split the atom without any hesitations the very moment they knew how to do it, although they realized full well the enormous destructive potentialities of their operation.” This is an example of the fundamental amorality of science. “The scientist qua scientist does not even care about the survival of the human race on earth or, for that matter, about the survival of the planet itself.”

Not only does science yield catastrophic practical results–including the possible extinction of the human race–but it also alienates us from nature and ourselves. As scientists discover aspects of reality that are deeply counter-intuitive (for instance, invisible living organisms in our noses; distant ancestors that were apes and even bacteria; light as both wave and a particle), knowledge becomes unmoored from experience. Science culminates with the figure of “the astronaut, shot into outer space and imprisoned in his instrument-ridden capsule where each actual physical encounter with his surroundings would spell immediate death.”

For Arendt, the problem is built into the logic of science and the mentality and motivation of scientists. (It is not nature’s fault that we study it as we do.) Polanyi admires scientists’ motives and defends their refusal to look at ultimate consequences. Results should be “emergent” rather than planned. The contrast between these two authors raises interesting questions about the motivations and underlying commitments of actual scientists.

But the governance of science is a different issue from the mentality of scientists. I think Polanyi errs in assuming a well-functioning system. What about bias, status hierarchies within labs, replication crises, selling out to industry? Kuhn might offer some insights about why revolutions are sometimes necessary. Meanwhile, Arendt misses the problem of collective action. An individual physicist could opt not to study atoms ca. 1935 because that research might lead to atom bombs. But this physicist would reasonably believe that other scientists–possibly Nazi scientists–would go ahead with the research anyway. To stop scientific investigation of a particular topic is a problem of governance.

Polanyi is too cheerful about the actual governance of what he calls the “republic of science,” but Arendt (despite being a great republican political theorist) strangely neglects it. I suspect this is because she views republics as autonomous political entities that have plenipotentiary power within their geographical borders. She would subsume scientists to their respective republican states. She misses the possibility that science is a republic of its own, overlapping political borders. But then the question is how that republic should be governed.

See also: science, UFOs, and the diminishment of humankind; The truth in Hayek; adding democracy to Robert Merton’s CUDOS norms for science; vaccination, masking, political polarization, and the authority of science; mixed thoughts about the status of science.