a generational call to rebuild

In January 2024, I wrote a post entitled “calling youth to government service.” I noted that many talented young people would vote to expand government, but few were interested in working in government. I posited both demand- and supply-side explanations. Young people do not know enough about public-sector employment, nor do they sufficiently value it. At the same time, the federal government has been very bad at recruitment and retention.

Now, as someone who advises many talented and idealistic undergraduates, I cannot encourage them to apply for federal jobs.

We don’t know how long “now” will last. Bad-case scenarios envision an extended period of crisis and the kind of kleptocratic authoritarianism that will keep federal (and some state) agencies from functioning appropriately for years.

Nevertheless, it is important to begin envisioning a rebuilding phase, even while we also strive to defend current institutions. The opportunity to rebuild could begin as soon as two years from now. At least, that is when presidential campaigns will launch, and one of their core messages could be rebuilding the government. Meanwhile, today’s college students and recent graduates can be obtaining further education or experience in local government or the private sector with an eye to joining the federal civil service in 2028.

Besides, having a positive vision can change the political situation in the present. Optimism is important for morale. We should be struggling to make change, not just to block threats.

Donald Trump and Elon Musk are already educating Americans about the value of the federal government. In the latest CNN poll, substantial majorities of Americans oppose “laying off large numbers of federal government workers,” “shutting down the agency that provides humanitarian aid in low-income countries,” and (by the widest margin) “blocking health agencies from communicating without approval from a Trump appointee.” Since foreign aid generally lacks public support, and the Trump/Musk layoffs have yet to affect many voters directly, I suspect that subsequent cuts will be even more unpopular.

Many of my recent predictions have been wrong. I thought that some of the Biden-era spending would be popular, and I thought that Musk’s layoffs at Twitter would break that platform. Nevertheless, I predict that mass federal layoffs will raise awareness of the value of the federal workforce. Meanwhile, the civil service already needs hundreds of thousands of new workers to replace retiring Baby Boomers, and Trump’s layoffs will create many additional vacancies.

Under these circumstances, how should the federal civil service be rebuilt? I would posit these principles:

1. We need an eloquent generational call. Today’s young people can reconstruct their government to address social and environmental challenges. This is their historical calling. Government service is an essential means to the ends that many of them care about, including saving the earth from climate change.

    2. The paradigm of service should be a full-time, professional career in the government. I am not against social entrepreneurship or temporary community service, but the civil service is much larger and more important. We do not need alternatives to government careers nearly as much as we need more and better positions within the civil service (federal, state, and local).

    3. The goal is not to return to 2024. The federal workforce had well-documented problems before Trump was inaugurated. Although we must tolerate some degree of sclerosis and waste in any large system–and although current federal workers deserve credit for much valuable work under difficult circumstances–there was already a need for change. Young people should be recruited to rejuvenate and reform federal systems, not just work in them.

    4. But any changes should be scrupulously legal. Rule of law is a fundamental value, and nowhere is it more important than in the executive branch, which monopolizes the legitimate use of violence in our society. The federal government can kill, imprison, monitor, or financially ruin people. Its every action must be governed by statutory law. This means that rejuvenating the federal civil service must proceed within the clear statutory authority of the president, unless new legislation passes. (And I am not expert enough on this topic to recommend legislation.)

    5. Federal agencies already do some work that I would label “civic”: collaborating with groups in civil society, convening citizens for important conversations, and educating (not propagandizing) the public. But they also (inevitably) play many roles that are bureaucratic, technocratic, and managerial. A rebuilding effort should emphasize the civic aspects of government, because these are valuable, they can appeal to younger people who are skeptical of bureaucracy, and they can reinforce the public legitimacy of the executive branch. If you want people to trust experts, give them opportunities to work with experts on common problems.

    The overall message should acknowledge the value of the institutions that we have built so far–and the service of our current and past public sector workers–while envisioning new and better ways of governing.

    See also: calling youth to government service and putting the civic back in civil service.

    nostalgia in the face of political crisis

    Amid the barrage of bad news about US politics, I frequently find myself nostalgic.

    Sometimes, it’s for the recent past–for last summer, when we were on a family vacation and Kamala Harris seemed to be surging; or the eve of last fall’s election, when I spoke dispassionately about polarization at American and Colgate universities; or even last month, when we thought that Trump might prove more feckless than reckless.

    Other times, my nostalgia reaches further back, to the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11, when this white, male, college-educated, fairly moderate American felt that the republic was secure and the public’s values were evolving for the better with each new generation. That underlying optimism was one reason I spent most of the next 20 years focused on promoting youth civic engagement.

    If I wish to return to when I felt better about politics, that means that I want to go back to being naive; and we shouldn’t want that for ourselves. Nor is nostalgia reliable. In the past, not everything was dappled sunlight on a late-afternoon lawn–certainly not for people less fortunate than me.

    Near the beginning of The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Kundera’s narrator says that everything is bathed in nostalgia in the face of dissolution, even the guillotine. He’s discussing Nietzsche’s trope of the Eternal Return. If we believed that the French Revolutionary Terror would recur cyclically, we would fear it. Because we know that it has passed, we bathe it in nostalgia. Our deepest fear is the passage of time, because events do not recur endlessly for us. They move permanently into the past as our time runs out.

    Nostalgia can be a way of grasping at the self, trying to trap that ghost in a display case. As such, it is better avoided, regardless of its cause. As for political nostalgia, it is a common ground of reactionary politics.

    A related word is “envy.” In his Theses on the Philosophy of History (#2), Walter Benjamin notes that we never envy the future. He says that happiness that makes us envious is connected to our past. We seek redemption by wishing to recover (sometimes from other people) what we already experienced. A worthy redemption, however, requires a change for the better. Political progress brings a better future into the present and thereby imparts a new meaning to what happened in the past. “For every second of time [is] the strait gate through which Messiah might enter.”

    This is a pretentious and roundabout way of saying that what matters is not what used to be but what we do now to improve the world that we are in.

    See also: phenomenology of nostalgia; nostalgia for now; Martin Luther King’s philosophy of time

    young people’s support for Trump

    The success of Trump’s revolution depends on its popularity. As long as he remains reasonably popular, he will retain the support of Republicans and business interests and assertive resistance will fizzle. If his support sinks badly, other politicians will want to abandon him and more people will join the opposition.

    According to the latest CBS News/YouGov poll, somewhat more Americans approve than disapprove of Trump (53% versus 47%). That ratio is poor for a newly inaugurated president but far higher than it should be, and too high–for now–to enable a successful grassroots opposition.

    Young people are especially supportive.* Fifty-five percent of respondents under 30 approve of “the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president.” That is the second-highest level among the age groups, just below ages 45-64 (56%). Young people are also least likely to strongly disapprove of Trump, at 32%–compared to 44% of those 65 and older.

    Young people are the most likely to agree that Trump is “effective” (63%), “focused” (62%), “competent” (58%), “tough” (71%), and “energetic” (65%), although they are also the least likely to agree that he is “compassionate” (35%).

    On policies: young people seem to approve of Trump’s cutting government. They are the most likely to think that Trump is appropriately focused on cutting taxes (45% think he is doing enough on that score and another 37% think he is not yet doing enough) and cutting spending (just 27% think he is cutting too much, the lowest of any age group).

    According to the survey, Americans feel that Trump is not doing enough to combat inflation. But young people are slightly more likely than others to think that Trump is already doing enough on that score (although a majority of youth think he is not).

    Deportations are quite popular in the sample as a whole, but not especially so among young people. And despite their relatively positive answers on most of the specific survey questions, a smaller majority of young people (56%) than other people say that they mostly like what Trump is doing.

    As always, it’s important not to assume that people are seeing the same news that you see and reaching the opposite conclusions. Many Americans see very little political or policy news at all, and what they do see is a small sample of all the possible stories.

    Young people are the least attentive to politics: according to the poll, just 34% are currently paying a lot of attention, in comparison to 64% of those 65 and older. The only “trending” video on TikTok right now that involves Trump shows him and Melania taking a “happy walk” together (and looking a lot younger than they do today). The level of attention to news rises steadily with age in this survey. Therefore, if young people see more news, that will probably lower Trump’s support.

    It is not appropriate for schools and colleges to advocate opinions about Trump. (And this survey undermines the claim that schools have been turning young people “woke.” If any schools were trying to do so, their attempt backfired.) However, it is proper and important for leaders in politics and civil society to persuade youth to care more about democracy and the rule of law, and young advocates can be particularly persuasive. Their success may prove critical to preserving the rule of law.

    [Important update, Feb. 13: YouGov’s latest polling shows a substantial (11-point) decrease in Trump’s support among young people. They are now opposed (57% hold a negative view), and this change is the main cause of a decline in Trump’s overall support. So maybe the critical news is beginning to break through.]

    *Some of these comparisons fall within the margin of error (+/- 2.5% for the whole sample, and larger for subgroups). However, some of the differences exceed the margin, and even the smaller gaps reflect the best available information. We should act accordingly.

    See also the current state of resistance, and what to do about it; where have lower-educated voters moved right? (a look at 102 countries over 35 years); to restore trust in schools and media, engage people in civic life etc.

    examples of resistance by the civil service

    Historical examples of resistance by the civil service suggest that resistance is much more successful when the public is convinced that the stakes are constitutional rather than budgetary.

    Jeremy Pressman is tracking various forms of opposition to the illegal and illiberal actions of the Trump administration in this document. Some are actions by civil servants. For instance, on Feb. 1, “Two officials at the the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) refused to provide non-government, pro-Trump individuals (Musk et al) illegal access to USAID security systems, personnel files, and classified information.”

    In this context, it is useful to browse historical examples of resistance by civil servants that are collected in the Global Nonviolent Action Database.

    In 2010, the UK Public and Commercial Services Union struck in opposition to proposed job cuts and other changes mandated by the Labour Government. I don’t have grounds to assess the unions’ complaints. Job cuts are not necessarily illegal, undemocratic, or even unwise. My interest is the unions’ tactics. In addition to a 24-hour strike supported by less than half of the workforce, the unions also organized protests and a bus tour to gain public support. On the positive side, union membership grew, but the union lost in both the High Court and Parliament, and the job cuts went through.

    In 1995, French public employees organized a much larger and longer strike against similar cuts. “While the strikes were having a devastating impact on the economy and on the lives of all ordinary French citizens, [the strikers] still enjoyed public approval.” The Chirac Government came to the negotiating table and offered concessions that particularly spared railroad workers, whose opposition abated. The government’s proposal “remained relatively untouched save for adjustments to placate the railroad workers,” and it passed.

    In March 1920, German right-wingers began a coup against the republic, now known as the Kapp Putsch. Heavily armed insurgents arrived in Berlin, set up machine-gun posts and checkpoints, dropped leaflets from military aircraft, and seized the newsrooms of two newspapers.

    The coup’s support among local garrisons was mixed. Waiters and other ordinary workers began stalling on the job. Trade unions and elected officials called for resistance. After some civilian protesters were killed in a clash with Putschists, Berliners stopped reporting for work–probably out of fear as well as an active desire to strike. The capacity of the German state withered, and Wolfgang Kapp “resigned” from his self-appointed position. The republic survived for 13 years.

    Three examples cannot support general conclusions, but we know from other research that the scale of resistance matters. If a lot of people (not just civil servants but also contractors, grantees, and regular workers) stop contributing to the normal functions of the US government, it will be hard for Trump to proceed. Most Berliners stopped working because the coup was violent and it aimed to overthrow the regime, not just to cut government jobs. Paramilitary violence dramatized the threat and undercut the coup.

    If most people see Trump’s civil-service layoffs as means to cut costs, then any resistance–even from those who disagree with him–will be routine and likely to be defeated. I could be wrong, but I see his cuts as unprecedented and unconstitutional attacks on the rule of law. If the public comes to see them that way, then resistance may be broad and effective.

    See also: the current state of resistance, and what to do about it (Jan 22), strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy (November), tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy; Why Civil Resistance Works (etc.). The image is from Wikipedia, where it is labeled “Demonstration in Berlin against the putsch.” The caption reads: “A quarter million participants”

    the current state of resistance, and what to do about it

    Soon after the November election, I predicted that grassroots resistance would rise in response to Donald Trump.

    Some activity is underway. There was, for example, a march in Boston over the weekend. Dana Fisher offers valuable statistics about the march in Washington. Still, I perceive less activity than I had honestly expected by this point.

    I think some reasons are psychological. Many people who oppose Trump are tired and discouraged. Eight years ago, many retained a faith in the basic democratic process because Trump had lost the popular vote and had lost all the age groups under 45. It was easy to envision that future elections would go better. The courts, big media platforms, and the press were are at least making noises about defending democratic institutions.

    In 2025, Trump’s popular-vote majority, his gains among some younger groups and some people of color, and his reelection after the events of 2016-21 are demoralizing and may suggest that the American people are to blame for the situation. Even if this blame is fair, it discourages democratic solutions. Meanwhile, media moguls are bending the knee, and the Supreme Court has a pro-Trump majority. And perhaps some people who would otherwise resist a 78-year-old president in his second term are counting on time to do their work.

    Such psychological challenges can be addressed. If morale is low, maybe it’s time for planning and recruitment. If a march or a public meeting would draw small numbers, maybe it’s time for one-to-one meetings. We can develop messages for various types of people that renew their energy in the face of discouragement and alienation.

    But there is a deeper problem. Not enough people have roles and resources that allow them to address psychological barriers to participation.

    Imagine an organization that draws enough money from its own members that it can afford to hire at least one part-time organizer, and it elects a leadership team of volunteers. Its organizer and its leaders can–right now–combat resignation and spur action in their specific context. I’m sure that some of this is happening.

    On the other hand, let’s say there are many people in a given community who have expressed abhorrence for Trump and are willing to give time or money–but they have no relevant organization. Then, even if some of them discuss ways to energize people, it’s not likely that anyone will get working on it. This is the situation in most places.

    That is why, for me, it’s so important to build power for resisting authoritarianism and provide the tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy.

    There is a debate about the ideology and political objectives of the first Trump resistance, with some arguing that it provoked a backlash because it was too radical. (See Adam Gurri’s rebuttal to these views.) Without going into that debate, I would note that the ideology of a movement is only one variable–and it tends to change over time. Three other variables are its methods, structures, and composition. We need a large and diverse movement that is self-sustaining and autonomous (not dependent on grants or celebrities) and that allows its participants to discuss, debate, and develop while taking the actions that are appropriate for the moment.

    We do have many elements of this movement, but we must expand and strengthen it greatly.

    See also: What our nation needs is a broad-based, pro-democracy civic movement

    tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy

    In this post, I’m proposing that it would be useful to develop a suite of practical tools for civic organizations. I believe this is an urgent task at the onset of the second Trump Administration as well as a more permanent need. I’ll start with a general argument and conclude with a preliminary list of needed tools.

    First, the basis of a strong and resilient democracy is hands-on, local political engagement.

    That is an old theory, but current evidence reinforces it. Just for example, I showed recently that Americans who participate in community groups are much less likely to dismiss the media and schools as sources of information, probably because participation gives them a feeling of agency, teaches them that compromise is necessary (it’s not a sign that leaders are corrupt), and encourages them to share and critically assess information. Direct involvement is much more important than ideology or demographics as a predictor of trust in media and schools. People who are more engaged also hold Trump in lower esteem, regardless of their ideology.

    However, not very many people address community problems in groups. In 2023, 21% of Americans told the Census that they “get together with other people from [their] neighborhood to do something positive for [their] neighborhood or the community.” That is a valuable base–millions of people–but it’s too few for democracy’s urgent current needs. And 21% may be an overestimate, since you could say that you’d “gotten together” with neighbors even if you just attended one event that didn’t amount to much.

    I have argued that at least one million Americans not only participate themselves but also enable others to do so. These community organizers, nonprofit board members and staff, teachers, and other civic leaders help to organize opportunities to engage in local problem-solving.

    The first Trump Administration was a stress test for democratic engagement–not because Donald Trump poses the only threat to our republic, nor because all local civic action should define itself as resistance to Trump, and certainly not because civically engaged people must be Democrats. Rather, it was a test because robust local organizations would at least push back against some aspects of the Trump agenda.

    We learned from the 2017-2020 stress test that the one million local leaders and 21% of other engaged citizens can generate a lot of activity and resources, but they face limitations. They tend to direct money and attention to national organizations. They don’t hire people to work locally. When they grow, they don’t federate into state and local bodies, and they rarely form truly robust coalitions. Their own members come and go; many groups fade away.

    One reason for these limitations was a lack of knowledge about how to organize sustainable groups that encompass diversity.

    To be successful, people need big ideals and principles, allies and mentors, and inspiring stories. But I think that tools would also make a difference for our one million (or more) local leaders. I am thinking about tools like these:

    • Model documents and instructions for forming a new nonprofit in defense of democracy;
    • Model budgets (of several sizes) for such organizations;
    • Job descriptions (and pay ranges) for organizers, ranging from a part-time, paid student worker to an experienced leader of a team;
    • Bylaws for a local organization, for federated organizations, and for a coalition’s steering committee, including the roles of elected leaders and the responsibilities of members;
    • A model agenda for a first meeting in a community, plus agendas for several other kinds of meeting that might follow;
    • A discussion guide that a new group could use to analyze its local situation and begin to develop a strategy;
    • A member survey that an organization can field to collect anonymous guidance on its strategy;
    • A blank diagram (often called a “logic model”) that can turn into a strategic plan once the group fills in the empty boxes, which have labels like “assets,” “actions,” “outcomes,” etc.
    • Worksheets that can help a civic group troubleshoot its own limitations.
    • A simplified set of rules that can replace Roberts’ Rules of Order for groups that don’t want to deal with that book;
    • Scripts that organizers can use when they talk to residents for the first time in relational, one-to-one interviews;
    • Draft outreach emails requesting friendly initial meetings with local elected officials, editors, school superintendents, clergy, college presidents, and the like.

    What else would be useful?


    See also: “What our nation needs is a broad-based, pro-democracy civic movement” (in the Fulcrum); the tide will turnbuilding power for resisting authoritarianism; and strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy; nonviolence, state repression, and saving democracy; to restore trust in schools and media, engage people in civic life; learning from Robert’s Rules?; : a flowchart for collective decision-making in democratic small groupscivic education and the science of association; etc.

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    to restore trust in schools and media, engage people in civic life

    People are more likely to trust institutions if they are involved in diverse, participatory groups, because such participation gives them a feeling of agency, teaches them that compromise is necessary (it’s not a sign that leaders are corrupt), and encourages them to share and critically assess information.

    The 2020 American National Election Study (the most recent available wave) asked several items about civic participation, including this one: “During the past 12 months, have you worked with other people to deal with some issue facing your community?” It also asked several items about confidence in institutions, such as whether respondents agreed that “Much of what people hear in schools and the media are lies designed to keep people from learning the real truth about those in power.”

    When controlling for education, gender, race, and self-placement on a liberal-conservative scale, working with others is strongly related to not holding a hostile view of media and schools (see below). Conservatives are more likely to be hostile, but when ideology is included in this model along with civic participation, it is not significant. Apparently, people who work with others to address local issues are more likely to trust schools and media, irrespective of ideology.

    If I replace working with others with volunteering, the same pattern is evident: those who volunteer are less hostile. And if I replace hostility to schools and the media with positive impressions of Donald Trump as the dependent variable, the same general pattern recurs, with a fascinating twist. Self-placement on a left-right spectrum is unrelated to liking Donald Trump (standardized Beta = 0), but working with other citizens is related to disliking him (standardized Beta = .292, sig. <001).

    These are correlations, not proofs of causality. In truth, the causal arrow may point both ways. Trusting schools and media may encourage civic participation, as well as the reverse. I suppose that disliking Trump could encourage local volunteering. However, I see a strong theoretical basis (dating back to Alexis de Tocqueville) for the thesis that local engagement generates trust in democratic institutions.

    The question then becomes: how can we engage more people in local civic work? I address that topic in “What our nation needs is a broad-based, pro-democracy civic movement” (The Fulcrum, Nov. 25). (See also: the tide will turn; time to build; strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy etc.)

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    nonviolence, state repression, and saving democracy

    I showed the image that accompanies this post in class recently, when we discussed these articles:

    • Enos, Kaufman and Sands (2019): The 1992 Los Angeles riots caused local voters to support more funding for public schools, presumably because voters became more concerned about racial justice.
    • Wasow (2020): The nonviolent Civil Rights Movement dramatically shifted public opinion in favor of civil rights and helped cause major favorable legislation, but rioting later in the 1960s caused a backlash and helped elect Richard M. Nixon.
    • Ebbinghaus, Baile & Rubel (2024): Black Lives Matter protests–which, research shows, were overwhelmingly nonviolent and which called for reductions in police budgets–were associated with increases in police spending.

    My image is meant to be a framework that can accommodate these divergent examples and findings. You can read it like this:

    A social injustice (or at least a perceived one) may cause a reaction in the form of violence and/or nonviolence. This reaction may be largely spontaneous or may reflect leadership and structure. The vast majority of citizens and decision-makers will not directly witness the reaction. However, it may be conveyed in media, which may present the reaction positively or negatively and may describe, ignore, or downplay the underlying injustice. As a result, public opinion may shift, favorably or unfavorably. A substantial shift in public opinion may cause policymakers to ameliorate or to exacerbate the original injustice. This whole system may be affected by intentional state violence directed at the protesters, the media, or the public.

    I used conditional verbs throughout the previous paragraph because none of this is inevitable. Sometimes people just bear injustice, or the media ignores a protest, or the public retains its opinions, or policymakers shrug off a shift in opinion. But change is possible, for better or worse.

    Given the very different outcomes discussed in our readings, one might conclude that the outcomes are random. A nonviolent movement may be depicted as violent and cause a backlash. A riot may draw sympathy. A huge march may barely cause a ripple. A tiny protest can start something big.

    In my view, history always involves an element of randomness, but it still pays to plan, train, and organize. The dramatic shift in public opinion about civil rights that Wasow describes was due to the Civil Rights Movement.

    Looking ahead to the next 2-4 years, I think we can anticipate a significant amount of planned, structured, nonviolent resistance that will be met with state violence. The state violence is likely to pay off if the protesters (or insurrectionists) can be depicted as violent and lawless, whether that is true or not. But state violence may badly backfire on the government if it looks cruel.

    It is not fair that organizers must navigate these issues, but then again, organizing would be unnecessary if the society were just. I believe this kind of analysis is necessary if you are willing to strategize to combat injustice.


    Sources: Ryan Enos, Aaron Kaufmann & Melissa Sands, “Can Violent Protest Change Local Policy Support? Evidence from the Aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots (American Political Science Review, 2019); Omar Wasow,. “Agenda Seeding: How 1960s Black Protests Moved Elites, Public Opinion and Voting” (American Political Science Review, 2020); Mathis Ebbinghaus, Nathan Bailey, Jacob Rubel,The Effect of the 2020 Black Lives Matter Protests on Police Budgets: How ‘Defund the Police’ Sparked Political Backlash, “Social Problems, 2024. See also: the tide will turn; building power for resisting authoritarianism; and strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy.

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    Where have lower-educated voters moved right? (a look at 102 countries over 35 years)

    I believe that left parties should draw their votes from lower on the socio-economic hierarchy, so that they can compete by offering more governmental support. Right parties should draw their votes from the upper end, so that they can compete by promising economic growth. This debate and competition is healthy.

    In contrast, when left parties draw from the top of the social order, they tend to offer performative or symbolic policies, while the right promises low-SES voters some version of ethnonationalism. This debate is unhealthy because it blocks more effective and fair social policies, and it sets the right on a path whose terminus can be fascism.

    Education is a marker of social class. We saw a social class inversion in the US 2024 election, with Harris getting 56% of college graduates and Trump getting 56% of non-college-educated adults.

    Nowadays, we are used to assuming that Republicans have an advantage in the Electoral College because they are dominant in the states with the lowest percentages of college gradates, while Democrats win easily in the most educated states. But the opposite should be true.

    I am fully aware that race is involved in the USA. Recently, less-educated white voters have formed the Republican base, whereas voters of color have preferred Democrats, regardless of their social class. However, in 2024, we saw a significant shift of low-education voters of color toward Trump.

    Besides, race plays different roles in various countries, but many countries display a trend of lower-educated people preferring the right and moving in that direction .

    The World Values Survey has periodically surveyed populations in 102 countries since 1989, for a total sample of almost half a million individuals in the dataset that I used for this post. The WVS asks most respondents to place themselves on a left-right spectrum, and the global mean is somewhat to the right of the middle. It also asks people their education level. For the entire sample, the correlation between these two variables is slightly negative and statistically significant (-.047**). In about two-thirds of sampled countries, the correlation is negative. This pattern is upside-down, suggesting the people with more education tilt mildly to the left around the world.

    However, considering the heterogeneity of the countries and years in this sample (from Switzerland in 1989 to India in 2023), it is important to break things down.

    The graph with this post shows the correlations for wealthy countries with democratic elections: the EU countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. A positive score indicates that people lower on the educational spectrum are more likely to vote left. The trend is slightly downward, meaning that the highest-educated have moved a bit left (and the lowest have moved right).

    Among the countries that have recently demonstrated a class reversal (with the lower classes voting right) are Australia, Canada, Greece, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, the UK and the USA. Czechia and Slovakia are the main exceptions. In Japan and South Korea, less educated people have consistently favored the right to a small degree.

    By contrast, for a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the trend has generally been toward what I consider the desirable pattern, with lower-educated people increasingly voting left. The mean for all voters in this region is distinctly left of center.

    In a cluster of countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact and are not now members of the EU, the trend is flat. Interestingly, in these countries, the mean voter is on the right.

    Finally, the WVS surveys in some countries from the Global South–from Bangladesh to Zimbabwe-but these countries do not seem representative of the whole hemisphere. For what it’s worth, the trend for this sample is just slightly upward, and the results vary a great deal among countries.

    I am still in the “deliverism” camp, believing that left parties have not delivered sufficient tangible benefits to less advantaged voters since the 1990s. (One explanation could be their dependence on affluent voters, who do not really want them to do much.) Achieving more tangible change could turn things right-side-up again.

    However, it should give us pause that the Biden Administration actually spent trillions of dollars in ways that will benefit working-class Americans, yet Trump won and drew an increasing proportion of lower-educated voters of color. The “deliverist” thesis now depends on the premise that Biden-Harris had too little time and suffered from post-COVID inflation.

    Meanwhile, if your premise is that US working-class voters moved right due to (increasing?) racism and sexism, you need an explanation of similar trends in many countries, including some without substantial ethnic minorities.


    See also: class inversion in France; social class inversion in the 2022 US elections; class inversion as an alternative to the polarization thesis; the social class inversion as a threat to democracy; social class and the youth vote in 2024; social class and political values in the 2024 election; why “liberal” can sound like “upper-class”; UK election results by social class; social class in the French election (2022); and encouraging working class candidates

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    countering selective harassment in the Trump Administration

    In How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt summarize the current playbook for authoritarian rule in countries whose constitutions are officially democratic.

    Note that canceling elections, banning opposition parties, and summarily arresting opponents are not in this playbook, because they are unnecessary and too risky for the perpetrators. Authoritarians have moved beyond such tactics, which tended to fail from 1985-2010. They have improved their success rate by becoming more sophisticated. The graph with this post, by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, shows a disconcerting decline in the success rates of popular movements since 2010, which also illustrates that state repression has become more effective.

    Key Trump loyalists like Russell Vought and Steven Miller have explicitly learned the current authoritarian playbook from its main practitioners. Their tactics are consistent with Trump’s personality and how he navigates life, so he doesn’t really have to learn them from the likes of Viktor Orban.

    Here is the core:

    [T]he government [can] selectively enforce the law, punishing opponents while protecting allies. Tax authorities may be used to target rival politicians, businesses, and media outlets. The police can crack down on opposition protest while tolerating acts of violence by progovernment thugs. Intelligence agencies can be used to spy on critics and dig up material for blackmail. Most often, the capture of the referees is done by quietly firing civil servants and other nonpartisan officials and replacing them with loyalists.

    … Once the referees are in tow, elected autocrats can turn to their opponents. Most contemporary autocracies do not wipe out all traces of dissent, as Mussolini did in fascist Italy or Fidel Castro did in communist Cuba. But many make an effort to ensure that key players—anyone capable of really hurting the government—are sidelined, hobbled, or bribed into throwing the game. Key players might include opposition politicians, business leaders who finance the opposition, major media outlets, and in some cases, religious or other cultural figures who enjoy a certain public moral standing …

    Players who cannot be bought must be weakened by other means. Whereas old-school dictators often jailed, exiled, or even killed their rivals, contemporary autocrats tend to hide their repression behind a veneer of legality. This is why capturing the referees is so important. …

    Governments may also use their control of referees to “legally” sideline the opposition media, often through libel or defamation suits. … As key media outlets are assaulted, others grow wary and begin to practice self-censorship. …

    Finally, elected autocrats often try to silence cultural figures—artists, intellectuals, pop stars, athletes—whose popularity or moral standing makes them potential threats. …

    The quiet silencing of influential voices—by co-optation or, if necessary, bullying—can have potent consequences for regime opposition. When powerful businesspeople are jailed or ruined economically, as in the case of Khodorkovsky in Russia, other businesspeople conclude that it is wisest to withdraw from politics entirely. And when opposition politicians are arrested or exiled, as in Venezuela, other politicians decide to give up and retire. Many dissenters decide to stay home rather than enter politics, and those who remain active grow demoralized. This is what the government aims for. Once key opposition, media, and business players are bought off or sidelined, the opposition deflates. The government “wins” without necessarily breaking the rules.

    Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018, pp. 78-85)

    One appropriate response is to raise the price of subservience, as many tried to do when they dropped their Washington Post subscriptions after Jeff Bezos blocked a presidential endorsement. I am not against this strategy, but I do worry that it can inflict collateral damage (in that case, to journalists) and further encourage other organizations to stay out of view.

    Thus I believe it’s at least as important to do the opposite: to assist individuals and groups that suffer selective harassment, so that they experience benefits as well as costs. For instance, we should subscribe to targeted publications, donate to nonprofits that are threatened with investigations or the loss of tax-exempt status, and make heroes out of people who are harassed.

    Source: Levitsky, S., Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown. See also why autocrats are winning (right now); building power for resisting authoritarianism; strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy

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