nostalgia in the face of political crisis

Amid the barrage of bad news about US politics, I frequently find myself nostalgic.

Sometimes, it’s for the recent past–for last summer, when we were on a family vacation and Kamala Harris seemed to be surging; or the eve of last fall’s election, when I spoke dispassionately about polarization at American and Colgate universities; or even last month, when we thought that Trump might prove more feckless than reckless.

Other times, my nostalgia reaches further back, to the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11, when this white, male, college-educated, fairly moderate American felt that the republic was secure and the public’s values were evolving for the better with each new generation. That underlying optimism was one reason I spent most of the next 20 years focused on promoting youth civic engagement.

If I wish to return to when I felt better about politics, that means that I want to go back to being naive; and we shouldn’t want that for ourselves. Nor is nostalgia reliable. In the past, not everything was dappled sunlight on a late-afternoon lawn–certainly not for people less fortunate than me.

Near the beginning of The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Kundera’s narrator says that everything is bathed in nostalgia in the face of dissolution, even the guillotine. He’s discussing Nietzsche’s trope of the Eternal Return. If we believed that the French Revolutionary Terror would recur cyclically, we would fear it. Because we know that it has passed, we bathe it in nostalgia. Our deepest fear is the passage of time, because events do not recur endlessly for us. They move permanently into the past as our time runs out.

Nostalgia can be a way of grasping at the self, trying to trap that ghost in a display case. As such, it is better avoided, regardless of its cause. As for political nostalgia, it is a common ground of reactionary politics.

A related word is “envy.” In his Theses on the Philosophy of History (#2), Walter Benjamin notes that we never envy the future. He says that happiness that makes us envious is connected to our past. We seek redemption by wishing to recover (sometimes from other people) what we already experienced. A worthy redemption, however, requires a change for the better. Political progress brings a better future into the present and thereby imparts a new meaning to what happened in the past. “For every second of time [is] the strait gate through which Messiah might enter.”

This is a pretentious and roundabout way of saying that what matters is not what used to be but what we do now to improve the world that we are in.

See also: phenomenology of nostalgia; nostalgia for now; Martin Luther King’s philosophy of time

the theory of the Biden environmental policy may be proven right

The Washington Post mentions “Skylar Holden, a cattle farmer in eastern Missouri,” who is not receiving $240,000 in federal funding that he was awarded under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program because Trump froze it. The headline is: “Farmers [are] on the hook for millions after Trump freezes USDA funds,” In The New York Times, Michael W. Webber describes the broader pattern: “Mr. Trump’s G.O.P. rank and file might not let him choke off the money flowing to Republican districts; a majority of federal clean energy investments for wind, solar, batteries and clean tech factories are going to those regions.”

This was the design; the policy was built to survive political opposition. I believe the authors of the the $739 billion Inflation Reduction Act and related bills (provisions in the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan and the $280+ billion CHIPS Act) held the mental model shown on the right side of the image that accompanies this post.

You could read the image by focusing first on the teal loop. By burning carbon, people cause both good and bad outcomes. The net result is bad; probably around $185 of damage per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions (Rennert et al 2022), which I think comes to about $6.8 trillion per year for the world.

Governmental policies could reduce that social cost. A big carbon tax is an example. However, virtually no governments do enough. The reason is that carbon produces a set of interest groups–some environmental ones, but many stronger groups that are committed to cheap carbon. Not all of these groups are elite. They include working people in carbon-intensive jobs and their elected representatives. The carbon economy also generates public opinion, including concerns about climate change as well as deep support for carbon-intensive jobs and products. The interest groups and public opinion influence governments to adopt the policies that they enact. For the most part, it is a vicious circle.

To create an alternative loop (shown in light green on the left side of the diagram), Biden and the Democratic Congress basically poured a lot of money into green industry. Their goal was to create new interest groups that would demand continued funding for green technologies as well as other supportive policies. Just as conventional car owners demand cheap gas, electric car owners will demand charging stations. Public opinion would also evolve so that more people would support environmental policies and recognize their economic benefits. Ultimately, once the green loop was bigger than the teal one, there would be political support for pushing carbon emissions down.

The Biden policy probably lowered carbon emissions substantially. But it had no positive effects on public opinion. As I have discussed before, vast expenditures received startlingly little attention. Proponents were either unwilling or unable to defend the policy. The president of the environmentalist Sierra Club, Ben Jealous, emphasized abortion when he advocated for Harris. Even the names of the Biden bills hid their purpose. For instance, the Inflation Reduction Act had nothing to do with reducing inflation and may even have raised it somewhat. In short, the pathway to policy through public opinion failed, either because the messengers barely tried or because no one could have persuaded voters about such matters.

However, the other path shown in green may still work. The Biden bills created hundred of thousands of post-carbon jobs and subsidized many farmers and business owners. Disproportionately–and by design–these people live in Republican states and districts. They are now a powerful interest group.

Clearly, the president and his team will try to wreck what they call the “Green New Deal.” But if the green loop holds, they will fail.

Source: Rennert, K., Errickson, F., Prest, B.C. et al. Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2Nature 610, 687–692 (2022). See also a trillion here, a trillion there, and pretty soon, you’re talking real money; tracking the Biden climate investments; a different way in which the 2024 election is a failure for democracy etc.

did the first resistance work?

Many people are skeptical that the grassroots resistance to Donald Trump in 2017-18 was successful. I have argued that it could have been considerably more potent if the grassroots groups had taken stronger and more durable forms.

That said, it is not true that resistance failed. As Theda Skocpol argues, grassroots efforts saved the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and began the Blue Wave that returned the House to Democratic control in 2018, thus freezing Trump’s agenda and preventing him from changing federal legislation very much at all.

I would distinguish between two forms of resistance, although some individuals worked on both.

One was a set of social movements that aimed to transform the US fairly radically. Black Lives Matter (BLM) was the largest, but there were also significant LGBTQ+, environmentalist, and pro-immigration movements. Of course, these had started before Trump’s election.

I aligned with most of these efforts, and I discuss BLM as a positive case in my most recent book. None of their struggles are over. However, these movements faced popular backlash and were defeated (for the time being) on most policy fronts. For example, my former student and two colleagues show that BLM protests were associated with increases in police budgets. If these movements contributed to Trump’s reelection, that is a disturbing fact about how the American people received them, but it may still help to explain our situation.

The other kind of resistance was what Skocpol refers to when she mentions “2,000 to 3,000 grassroots Resistance groups” that defended the ACA and then often helped Democratic candidates in the 2018 election. Their goal was not to change American society but to preserve its current institutions. And they largely succeeded during the first Trump Administration. Theirs could be described as a conservative movement in the sense that they intended to conserve what was most valuable in the status quo.

I have no interest in sidelining the radical movements. At least some of their goals are urgent, and their participants have the right to participate fully. Successful resistance will depend–in part–on them. But I do want to highlight Trump’s other kind of opponents because success will also depend on these Americans. I have lately been talking about “Alarmed Complete Newbies” (ACNs)–people who are activated by Trump’s outrages and want to hold them off. My current priority is to provide as much guidance and support as I can for the ACNs.

See also: What our nation needs is a broad-based, pro-democracy civic movement; the current state of resistance, and what to do about it; BLM protests and backlash; strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy etc.

young people’s support for Trump

The success of Trump’s revolution depends on its popularity. As long as he remains reasonably popular, he will retain the support of Republicans and business interests and assertive resistance will fizzle. If his support sinks badly, other politicians will want to abandon him and more people will join the opposition.

According to the latest CBS News/YouGov poll, somewhat more Americans approve than disapprove of Trump (53% versus 47%). That ratio is poor for a newly inaugurated president but far higher than it should be, and too high–for now–to enable a successful grassroots opposition.

Young people are especially supportive.* Fifty-five percent of respondents under 30 approve of “the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president.” That is the second-highest level among the age groups, just below ages 45-64 (56%). Young people are also least likely to strongly disapprove of Trump, at 32%–compared to 44% of those 65 and older.

Young people are the most likely to agree that Trump is “effective” (63%), “focused” (62%), “competent” (58%), “tough” (71%), and “energetic” (65%), although they are also the least likely to agree that he is “compassionate” (35%).

On policies: young people seem to approve of Trump’s cutting government. They are the most likely to think that Trump is appropriately focused on cutting taxes (45% think he is doing enough on that score and another 37% think he is not yet doing enough) and cutting spending (just 27% think he is cutting too much, the lowest of any age group).

According to the survey, Americans feel that Trump is not doing enough to combat inflation. But young people are slightly more likely than others to think that Trump is already doing enough on that score (although a majority of youth think he is not).

Deportations are quite popular in the sample as a whole, but not especially so among young people. And despite their relatively positive answers on most of the specific survey questions, a smaller majority of young people (56%) than other people say that they mostly like what Trump is doing.

As always, it’s important not to assume that people are seeing the same news that you see and reaching the opposite conclusions. Many Americans see very little political or policy news at all, and what they do see is a small sample of all the possible stories.

Young people are the least attentive to politics: according to the poll, just 34% are currently paying a lot of attention, in comparison to 64% of those 65 and older. The only “trending” video on TikTok right now that involves Trump shows him and Melania taking a “happy walk” together (and looking a lot younger than they do today). The level of attention to news rises steadily with age in this survey. Therefore, if young people see more news, that will probably lower Trump’s support.

It is not appropriate for schools and colleges to advocate opinions about Trump. (And this survey undermines the claim that schools have been turning young people “woke.” If any schools were trying to do so, their attempt backfired.) However, it is proper and important for leaders in politics and civil society to persuade youth to care more about democracy and the rule of law, and young advocates can be particularly persuasive. Their success may prove critical to preserving the rule of law.

[Important update, Feb. 13: YouGov’s latest polling shows a substantial (11-point) decrease in Trump’s support among young people. They are now opposed (57% hold a negative view), and this change is the main cause of a decline in Trump’s overall support. So maybe the critical news is beginning to break through.]

*Some of these comparisons fall within the margin of error (+/- 2.5% for the whole sample, and larger for subgroups). However, some of the differences exceed the margin, and even the smaller gaps reflect the best available information. We should act accordingly.

See also the current state of resistance, and what to do about it; where have lower-educated voters moved right? (a look at 102 countries over 35 years); to restore trust in schools and media, engage people in civic life etc.

examples of resistance by the civil service

Historical examples of resistance by the civil service suggest that resistance is much more successful when the public is convinced that the stakes are constitutional rather than budgetary.

Jeremy Pressman is tracking various forms of opposition to the illegal and illiberal actions of the Trump administration in this document. Some are actions by civil servants. For instance, on Feb. 1, “Two officials at the the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) refused to provide non-government, pro-Trump individuals (Musk et al) illegal access to USAID security systems, personnel files, and classified information.”

In this context, it is useful to browse historical examples of resistance by civil servants that are collected in the Global Nonviolent Action Database.

In 2010, the UK Public and Commercial Services Union struck in opposition to proposed job cuts and other changes mandated by the Labour Government. I don’t have grounds to assess the unions’ complaints. Job cuts are not necessarily illegal, undemocratic, or even unwise. My interest is the unions’ tactics. In addition to a 24-hour strike supported by less than half of the workforce, the unions also organized protests and a bus tour to gain public support. On the positive side, union membership grew, but the union lost in both the High Court and Parliament, and the job cuts went through.

In 1995, French public employees organized a much larger and longer strike against similar cuts. “While the strikes were having a devastating impact on the economy and on the lives of all ordinary French citizens, [the strikers] still enjoyed public approval.” The Chirac Government came to the negotiating table and offered concessions that particularly spared railroad workers, whose opposition abated. The government’s proposal “remained relatively untouched save for adjustments to placate the railroad workers,” and it passed.

In March 1920, German right-wingers began a coup against the republic, now known as the Kapp Putsch. Heavily armed insurgents arrived in Berlin, set up machine-gun posts and checkpoints, dropped leaflets from military aircraft, and seized the newsrooms of two newspapers.

The coup’s support among local garrisons was mixed. Waiters and other ordinary workers began stalling on the job. Trade unions and elected officials called for resistance. After some civilian protesters were killed in a clash with Putschists, Berliners stopped reporting for work–probably out of fear as well as an active desire to strike. The capacity of the German state withered, and Wolfgang Kapp “resigned” from his self-appointed position. The republic survived for 13 years.

Three examples cannot support general conclusions, but we know from other research that the scale of resistance matters. If a lot of people (not just civil servants but also contractors, grantees, and regular workers) stop contributing to the normal functions of the US government, it will be hard for Trump to proceed. Most Berliners stopped working because the coup was violent and it aimed to overthrow the regime, not just to cut government jobs. Paramilitary violence dramatized the threat and undercut the coup.

If most people see Trump’s civil-service layoffs as means to cut costs, then any resistance–even from those who disagree with him–will be routine and likely to be defeated. I could be wrong, but I see his cuts as unprecedented and unconstitutional attacks on the rule of law. If the public comes to see them that way, then resistance may be broad and effective.

See also: the current state of resistance, and what to do about it (Jan 22), strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy (November), tools people need to preserve and strengthen democracy; Why Civil Resistance Works (etc.). The image is from Wikipedia, where it is labeled “Demonstration in Berlin against the putsch.” The caption reads: “A quarter million participants”

was Weber wrong about bureaucracy?

With the US civil service under attack, it’s worth revisiting classical ideas about bureaucracy. Max Weber begins his hugely influential discussion (Weber 1922/1968) with this paragraph:

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks (223).

Weber seems to have a kind of Darwinian model in mind. Given a soup of different kinds of organizational forms, the bureaucratic ones will prevail thanks to their superior efficiency. Socialism requires bureaucracy, and Weber even lists soviets (communist workers’ councils) as one of the bureaucracies of his time. He also interprets modern capitalism not as a system of market exchanges but as a space in which corporate bureaucracies grow. “Capitalism in its modern stages of development requires the bureaucracy” (p. 224). In fact, state agencies and corporations use convergent methods. Today, the same Microsoft Office tools can generate similar-looking Key Performance Indicators or org charts for a company, a nonprofit, or a state agency, because these organizations work very similarly.

If you asked people to associate words with “bureaucracy,” I doubt that many would suggest “efficiency.” Quite the contrary: words like “bloat” and “waste” would come to mind. Few would worry that we are trapped in a world in which bureaucracies metastasize because they are so efficient. Their spread would be treated as a sign of declining efficiency and would be blamed on the self-interest of the bureaucrats.

Was Weber right about the bureaucracy of Wilhelmine Germany but wrong to generalize, because bureaucracies tend to become inefficient? In that case, was he wrong to see their growth as inevitable? Or was he right about bureaucracies, and critics mistake bureaucratic systems as inefficient when they actually maximize outputs? Are many people undervaluing bureaucratic work as a calling, in Weber’s sense? Do people dislike the means that bureaucracies use, or resent their inevitable costs, or disagree about their ends? Are bureaucracies efficient for their own goals but not for the public good?

Source: Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 1922. The translation of this section is by Talcott Parsons (Bedminster Press, 1968). See also in defense of institutions as “garbage cans”; radical change needs institutional innovation; what to do about the guy behind the desk

predicting Trump’s moves

What explains Trump’s specific choices? For instance, why impose tariffs on Canada and Mexico instead of, say, Japan? Why is USAID such a prominent target?

Tyler Cowen offers a theory. To paraphrase …

  1. Trump is interested in the discourse, the chatter. All his choices are about how he’ll look on Fox News and social media and how he’ll affect those conversations. Choosing Canada as a target for tariffs “is a symbol of strength and Trump’s apparent ability to ignore and contradict mainstream opinion.” Besides, Cowen says, Americans know and have opinions about Canada–negative opinions on the hard right. If Trump had chosen a less familiar country, people “would not know how to debate” his decision to pick a fight with it.

The chatter is highly heterogeneous and segmented. Right now, CBS News’ homepage leads with Trump’s threat to annex Gaza, but a “massive asteroid” gets about as much attention, and CBS offers a prominent story about an orphaned wolf pup who bonded with a shelter dog. Fox News blares a headline about the “panicked” Iranian regime facing off with Trump. Fox buries the Gaza story. The US edition of The Guardian leads with: “Trump’s declaration US will ‘take over’ Gaza Strip sparks global condemnation.” ‘

In short, Trump is driving several distinct conversations in different ways. MAGA is delighted, progressives are furious and flummoxed, and many Americans are oblivious. All of that is probably fine with Trump.

I would add five more explanations of Trump’s choices:

  1. He is pretty canny about his own interests. Big tariffs would damage the economy. Massive deportations would raise prices. So Trump threatens tariffs and then withdraws them and deports people at the same rate as Obama but with much more fanfare. He doesn’t always manage the fallout; for instance, his new Chinese tariffs could raise prices. But it is notable that they are set at 10% (so that any effects will be difficult to assess), not at 60% or higher, as he had threatened. If something would hurt Trump, he is unlikely to do it.
  2. He picks on the most vulnerable: government employees and contractors, people without US citizenship, trans people, and recipients of US aid. These choices are on-brand for him. They are also safer than tangling with anyone who has more clout.
  3. He doesn’t care about outcomes. A threat to impose tariffs grabs headlines. It doesn’t matter if there is no actual tariff. If a federal judge rules against the administration, the policy might be halted, but Trump still gets the fight that he wanted in the first place.
  4. Breaking norms and even laws is useful, because it forces Republicans to support Trump against their own expressed principles–thus increasing their dependence on him–and provokes people like me to defend the norms, which were never very popular to start with. It’s also possible that Trump will win some cases–or get away with ignoring court decisions–and then he’ll have even more power.
  5. Trump provides cover for hundreds of committed right-wing ideologues who are busy making decisions about funding, personnel, and policy that don’t rise to the level of his attention or influence the chatter much. Those efforts will continue.

Applying these guidelines, I doubt very much that Trump would order an invasion of Gaza and begin a long, costly (as well as deeply immoral) imperialistic counter-insurgency war. Since his supporters don’t hold him accountable, he can drop his threats whenever he wants to. His performance yesterday dominated a news cycle, which was the primary goal. Refraining from invading Gaza might also help to legitimize Israeli land annexations.

I could see Trump sending US troops to Greenland to provoke legal and diplomatic challenges, monopolize attention, and demonstrate that he is unfettered by treaties and congressional oversight. The endgame would not be a permanent takeover of Greenland but more domestic power (or at least perceived power) for Trump.

See also: strategizing for civil resistance in defense of democracy (Nov. 6), in which I ventured some predictions. I’m recalibrating my theories, as I think we should.

Frontiers of Democracy 2025: Listening and Leading

Please hold the dates (June 19-21, 2025) and consider proposing one or more sessions for this conference by April 18. Be sure to register and take advantage of the “early bird” discounted rate, available until March 29.

Tisch College is launching an initiative on Generous Listening and Dialogue (GLADi), led by Jonathan Tirrell. As part of this effort, the special theme of Frontiers in 2025 is “Listening and Leading,” focused on how to characterize, navigate, and overcome challenges associated with division and polarization in our world. Join us for robust conversations (and constructive disagreements) about the role of and approaches to listening and dialogue (perhaps especially across difference) for a thriving democracy.?

This theme is not exclusive; we welcome sessions on other topics related to Tisch College’s “North Star:” building robust, inclusive democracy for an increasingly multiracial society. As always, we are eager to continue past conversations, such as about violence and nonviolence, and religious pluralism and democracy. We welcome proposals in these areas, regardless of whether they relate to listening and dialogue.

Although we will consider proposals for presentations or panels of presentations, we generally prefer proposals for other formats, such as moderated discussions, meetings devoted to strategy or design, trainings and workshops, case study discussions, debates, and other creative formats.

Learn more and register here.

housekeeping note

(Atlanta) This site was hacked this week, and someone loaded malware that caused Google to list the site as dangerous. Thanks to help from Wordfence (recommended), I believe that everything is OK now. Since the site was down, I didn’t post anything new after Tuesday. I expect to resume usual activity next week.

radical change needs institutional innovation

In The Civil War in France (1871), Karl Marx interprets the Paris Commune as “essentially a working class government.” The bourgeoisie and capitalism had been overthrown; the workers ruled. For Marx, the deep structure of a society was its class structure, and therefore everything about the Commune must be fundamentally new. It would be a mistake to interpret any of its offices, bodies, or laws that might seem familiar as if they replicated those of the previous regime. “It is generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterparts of older, and even defunct, forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness.”

A counterpoint–not to this passage, but to major interpretations of Marx–comes from the radical Brazilian theorist and activist Roberto Mangabeira Unger. To paraphrase loosely, Unger might say that once the workers own the government and major enterprises, it becomes possible for people to distribute both the fruits of their labor and the rewarding productive activities more fairly and to collaborative more than compete. However, a revolution does not automatically resolve problems of organization and management. It remains challenging to coordinate individuals’ behavior, to identify and reward diligence, to apply expertise without letting the experts dominate, and so on. Thus the revolution should be judged on whether it yields new forms of self-government, which is not inevitable but depends on the participants.

In False Necessity (2004), Unger writes:

The radical left has generally found in the assumptions of deep-structure social analysis an excuse for the poverty of its institutional ideas. With few exceptions (such as the Yugoslav innovations) it has produced only one innovative institutional conception, the idea of the soviet or conciliar type of organization: that is to say, direct territorial and enterprise democracy. But this conception has never been and probably never can be worked into detailed institutional arrangements capable of solving the practical problems of and administrative and economic management in large countries, torn by internal divisions, beleaguered by foreign enemies, and excited by rising expectations. Thus, the conciliar model of popular organization has quickly given way to forms of despotic governnment that seem the sole feasible alternatives to the overthrown bourgeois regimes (pp. 24-5).

Unger is making an empirical claim that may be overstated. It has been 150+ years since the Paris Commune, and there have been many experiments under state socialism (of various types) and in capitalist economies–from mini-communes to, for instance, Mondragon, which has 75,000 employees/owners today. But I do think his theoretical insight is valid: the fundamental task is to redesign specific institutions.

Source: Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False necessity: anti-necessitarian social theory in the service of radical democracy: from Politics, a work in constructive social theory. London: Verso, 2004. See also: the visionary fire of Roberto Mangabeira Unger and needed: pragmatists for utopian experiments